[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Res. 414 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>






114th CONGRESS
  2d Session
S. RES. 414

   Expressing the sense of the Senate on the actions, including the 
  reapplication of waived nuclear-related sanctions, that the United 
  States should undertake in the event of an Iranian violation of the 
                  Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             April 6, 2016

Mr. Lankford submitted the following resolution; which was referred to 
                   the Committee on Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION


 
   Expressing the sense of the Senate on the actions, including the 
  reapplication of waived nuclear-related sanctions, that the United 
  States should undertake in the event of an Iranian violation of the 
                  Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

Whereas national security is a fundamental and primary responsibility of both 
        Congress and the President;
Whereas, on July 14, 2015, President Barack Obama reached an agreement with Iran 
        known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, a political agreement 
        among the United States, France, the Russian Federation, the People's 
        Republic of China, the United Kingdom, and Germany (commonly referred to 
        as the ``P5+1 countries'') and Iran that does not carry the force or 
        effect of United States law;
Whereas President Obama lifted nuclear-related sanctions imposed by the United 
        States with respect to Iran on January 16, 2016;
Whereas, on July 14, 2015, President Obama stated, ``If Iran violates the deal, 
        all of these sanctions will snap back into place.'';
Whereas Congress intends to work with the President to ensure that the 
        President's commitment to snapping back sanctions in response to any 
        violation by Iran of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is fully 
        enforced;
Whereas Iran has been the beneficiary of financial assets and international 
        engagement while its commitment to fulfilling its obligations under the 
        Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action has yet to be proven; and
Whereas, given the historic and dramatic shift in longstanding United States 
        foreign policy represented by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, 
        the obligations and commitments Iran agreed to as part of the Joint 
        Comprehensive Plan of Action must be clarified by the Senate: Now, 
        therefore, be it
    Resolved,

SECTION 1. SENSE OF THE SENATE ON IRANIAN VIOLATIONS OF THE JOINT 
              COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION.

    (a) In General.--It is the sense of the Senate--
            (1) that the United States should take the actions 
        specified in subsection (b) if--
                    (A) Iran ever seeks, develops, manufactures, or 
                acquires nuclear weapons;
                    (B) Iran ever engages in plutonium reprocessing or 
                plutonium-related research and development;
                    (C) Iran violates--
                            (i) the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
                        Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, 
                        and Moscow July 1, 1968 (21 UST 483) (commonly 
                        referred to as the ``Nuclear Nonproliferation 
                        Treaty'' or the ``NPT'');
                            (ii) the Agreement between Iran and the 
                        International Atomic Energy Agency for the 
                        Application of Safeguards in Connection with 
                        the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
                        Weapons, done at Vienna June 19, 1973 (commonly 
                        referred to as the ``Comprehensive Safeguards 
                        Agreement'');
                            (iii) its commitment to ratify by October 
                        18, 2023, the Additional Protocol to the 
                        Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement; or
                            (iv) the Iranian-ratified Additional 
                        Protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguards 
                        Agreement and modified Code 3.1 of the 
                        Subsidiary Arrangements to the Comprehensive 
                        Safeguards Agreement;
                    (D) Iran installs a new natural uranium core or the 
                original core in the Arak reactor;
                    (E) the power of Iran's redesigned heavy water 
                reactor exceeds 20 MWth;
                    (F) Iran produces any amount of weapons grade 
                uranium or plutonium;
                    (G) Iran pursues construction at the existing 
                unfinished Arak heavy water reactor based on its 
                original design;
                    (H) Iran produces or tests natural uranium pellets, 
                fuel pins, or fuel assemblies that are specifically 
                designed for the support of the originally designed 
                Arak heavy water reactor, designated by the 
                International Atomic Energy Agency as IR-40;
                    (I) Iran does not store all existing natural 
                uranium pellets and IR-40 fuel assemblies under the 
                continuous monitoring of the International Atomic 
                Energy Agency until the modernized Arak reactor becomes 
                operable;
                    (J) once the Arak reactor becomes operable, Iran 
                does not take the IR-40 fuel assemblies and natural 
                uranium pellets and convert them to uranyl nitrate or 
                exchange them with an equivalent quantity of natural 
                uranium;
                    (K) Iran does not make the necessary technical 
                modifications to the natural uranium fuel production 
                process line that was intended to supply fuel for the 
                IR-40 reactor design, such that it can be used for the 
                fabrication of the fuel reloads for the modernized Arak 
                reactor;
                    (L) all spent fuel from the redesigned Arak 
                reactor, regardless of its origin, for the lifetime of 
                the reactor, is not shipped out of Iran;
                    (M) Iran operates the Fuel Manufacturing Plant to 
                produce anything other than fuel assemblies for light 
                water reactors or reloads for the modernized Arak 
                reactor;
                    (N) Iran does not inform the International Atomic 
                Energy Agency about the inventory and production of the 
                Heavy Water Production Plant or does not allow the 
                International Atomic Energy Agency to monitor the 
                quantities of the heavy water stocks and the amount of 
                heavy water produced, including through visits by the 
                International Atomic Energy Agency, as requested, to 
                the Heavy Water Production Plant;
                    (O) Iran does not ship out all spent fuel for all 
                future and present nuclear power and research reactors;
                    (P) Iran does not remove and keep stored at Natanz 
                in Hall B of the fuel enrichment plant under continuous 
                monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency--
                            (i) all excess centrifuge machines, 
                        including IR-2m centrifuges (during the 10-year 
                        prohibition period under the Joint 
                        Comprehensive Plan of Action); and
                            (ii) UF6 pipework including sub headers, 
                        valves and pressure transducers at cascade 
                        level, and frequency inverters, and UF6 
                        withdrawal equipment from one of the withdrawal 
                        stations, which is currently not in service, 
                        including its vacuum pumps and chemical traps 
                        (during the 10-year prohibition period under 
                        the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action);
                    (Q) the 164-machine IR-2m cascade does not remain 
                stored at Natanz in Hall B of the fuel enrichment plan 
                under the continuous monitoring of the International 
                Atomic Energy Agency;
                    (R) the 164-machine IR-4 cascade does not remain 
                stored at Natanz in Hall B of the fuel enrichment plan 
                under the continuous monitoring of the International 
                Atomic Energy Agency;
                    (S) Iran enriches, obtains, or otherwise stockpiles 
                any uranium, including in oxide form, enriched to 
                greater than 3.67 percent;
                    (T) all future uranium oxide, scrap oxide, or other 
                material not in fuel plates enriched to between 5 and 
                20 percent is not transferred out of Iran or diluted to 
                a level of 3.67 percent or less within 6 months of 
                production;
                    (U) Iran does not abide by its voluntary 
                commitments as expressed in its own long-term 
                enrichment and enrichment research and development plan 
                submitted as part of the initial declaration described 
                in Article 2 of the Additional Protocol to the 
                Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement;
                    (V) Iran engages in production of centrifuges, 
                including centrifuge rotors suitable for isotope 
                separation or any other centrifuge components, which 
                exceeds the enrichment and enrichment research and 
                development requirements outlined in Annex I of the 
                Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action;
                    (W) Iran does not permit the International Atomic 
                Energy Agency the use of online enrichment measurement 
                and electronic seals, as well as other International 
                Atomic Energy Agency-approved and certified modern 
                technologies in line with internationally accepted 
                practices of the International Atomic Energy Agency;
                    (X) Iran does not facilitate automated collection 
                of International Atomic Energy Agency measurement 
                recordings registered by installed measurement devices 
                and sent to the International Atomic Energy Agency 
                working space at individual nuclear sites;
                    (Y) Iran does not make the necessary arrangements 
                to allow for a long-term presence of the International 
                Atomic Energy Agency, including issuing long-term 
                visas, as well as providing proper working space at 
                nuclear sites and, to the best of its effort, at 
                locations near nuclear sites in Iran for the designated 
                International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors for 
                working and keeping necessary equipment;
                    (Z) Iran does not increase the number of designated 
                International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors to at 
                least 130 by October 16, 2016, which is the date that 
                is 9 months after implementation day, or does not allow 
                the designation of inspectors from countries that have 
                diplomatic relations with Iran;
                    (AA) Iran does not apply nuclear export policies 
                and practices in line with the internationally 
                established standards for the export of nuclear 
                material, equipment, and technology;
                    (BB) Iran does not permit the International Atomic 
                Energy Agency access to verify that uranium isotope 
                separation production and research and development 
                activities are consistent with Annex I of the Joint 
                Comprehensive Plan of Action;
                    (CC) Iran engages in--
                            (i) designing, developing, acquiring, or 
                        using computer models to simulate nuclear 
                        explosive devices;
                            (ii) designing, developing, fabricating, 
                        acquiring, or using multi-point explosive 
                        detonation systems suitable for a nuclear 
                        explosive device, unless approved by the Joint 
                        Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject 
                        to monitoring;
                            (iii) designing, developing, fabricating, 
                        acquiring, or using explosive diagnostic 
                        systems (streak cameras, framing cameras and 
                        flash x-ray cameras) suitable for the 
                        development of a nuclear explosive device, 
                        unless approved by the Joint Commission for 
                        non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring; 
                        or
                            (iv) designing, developing, fabricating, 
                        acquiring, or using explosively driven neutron 
                        sources or specialized materials for 
                        explosively driven neutron sources;
                    (DD) during the 10-year period beginning on 
                implementation day and ending on January 16, 2026--
                            (i) Iran operates, for the purpose of 
                        enriching uranium, more than 5,060 IR-1 
                        centrifuges;
                            (ii) Iran's enrichment capacity exceeds 
                        5,060 IR-1 centrifuge machines in 30 cascades 
                        in their current configurations in currently 
                        operating units at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment 
                        Plant;
                            (iii) consistent with Iran's enrichment 
                        research and development plan, Iran's 
                        enrichment research and development with 
                        uranium includes any centrifuges other than IR-
                        4, IR-5, IR-6, and IR-8 centrifuges;
                            (iv) Iran conducts testing of more than a 
                        single IR-4 centrifuge machine and IR-4 
                        centrifuge cascade of up to 10 centrifuge 
                        machines;
                            (v) Iran tests more than a single IR-5 
                        centrifuge machine;
                            (vi) Iran does not recombine the enriched 
                        and depleted streams from the IR-6 and IR-8 
                        cascades through the use of welded pipework on 
                        withdrawal main headers in a manner that 
                        precludes the withdrawal of enriched and 
                        depleted uranium materials and verified by the 
                        International Atomic Energy Agency;
                            (vii) research and development with uranium 
                        is not strictly limited to IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, 
                        and IR-8 centrifuges;
                            (viii) Iran's uranium isotope separation-
                        related research and development or production 
                        activities are not exclusively based on gaseous 
                        centrifuge technology;
                            (ix) Iran engages in nuclear direct-use or 
                        nuclear dual-use procurements of commodities 
                        without using the procurement channel mandated 
                        by the United Nations under United Nations 
                        Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015);
                            (x) research and development is carried out 
                        in the IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, or IR-8 centrifuges in 
                        a manner that accumulates enriched uranium, or 
                        Iran installs or tests those centrifuges beyond 
                        the enrichment and enrichment research and 
                        development requirements outlined in Annex I of 
                        the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action;
                            (xi) except as otherwise provided in 
                        subparagraph (LL), mechanical testing on up to 
                        2 single centrifuges for each type is carried 
                        out on any centrifuge other than the IR-2m, IR-
                        4, IR-5, IR-6, IR-6s, IR-7, or IR-8; or
                            (xii) Iran builds or tests any new 
                        centrifuge without approval of the Joint 
                        Commission;
                    (EE) during the 15-year period beginning on 
                implementation day and ending on January 16, 2031--
                            (i) Iran conducts uranium enrichment-
                        related activities at Fordow;
                            (ii) Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium 
                        hexafluoride, or the equivalent in other 
                        chemical forms, exceeds 300 kg enriched to 3.67 
                        percent;
                            (iii) Iran reprocesses spent fuel except 
                        for irradiated enriched uranium targets for 
                        production of radioisotopes for medical and 
                        peaceful industrial purposes;
                            (iv) Iran develops, acquires, or builds 
                        facilities capable of separation of plutonium, 
                        uranium, or neptunium from spent fuel or from 
                        fertile targets, other than for production of 
                        radioisotopes for medical and peaceful 
                        industrial purposes;
                            (v) Iran develops, acquires, builds, or 
                        operates hot cells (containing a cell or 
                        interconnected cells), shielded cells, or 
                        shielded glove boxes with dimensions not less 
                        than 6 cubic meters in volume compatible with 
                        the specifications set out in Annex I of the 
                        Additional Protocol to the Comprehensive 
                        Safeguards Agreement, unless approved by the 
                        Joint Commission established by the Joint 
                        Comprehensive Plan of Action;
                            (vi) Iran undertakes destructive post 
                        irradiation examination of fuel pins, fuel 
                        assembly prototypes, and structural materials, 
                        unless the P5+1 countries make available their 
                        facilities to conduct destructive testing with 
                        Iranian specialists, as agreed pursuant to the 
                        Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action;
                            (vii) Iran engages in producing or 
                        acquiring plutonium or uranium metals or their 
                        alloys, or conducts research and development on 
                        plutonium or uranium (or their alloys) 
                        metallurgy, or casting, forming, or machining 
                        plutonium or uranium metal;
                            (viii) Iran produces, seeks, or acquires 
                        separated plutonium, highly enriched uranium, 
                        uranium-233, or neptunium-237 (except for use 
                        for laboratory standards or in instruments 
                        using neptunium-237);
                            (ix) Iran installs gas centrifuge machines, 
                        or enrichment-related infrastructure, whether 
                        suitable for uranium enrichment, research and 
                        development, or stable isotope enrichment, at 
                        any location other than a location exclusively 
                        specified under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
                        Action;
                            (x) Iran conducts all testing of 
                        centrifuges with uranium anywhere other than at 
                        the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant or Iran 
                        conducts mechanical testing of centrifuges 
                        anywhere other than at the Pilot Fuel 
                        Enrichment Plant and the Tehran Research 
                        Centre;
                            (xi) Iran maintains more than 1044 IR-1 
                        centrifuge machines at one wing of the Fordow 
                        Fuel Enrichment Plant;
                            (xii) Iran does not limit its stable 
                        isotope production activities with gas 
                        centrifuges to the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant 
                        or uses more than 348 IR-1 centrifuges for such 
                        activities;
                            (xiii) Iran exceeds the limitations on its 
                        activities at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant 
                        as described in Annex I of the Joint 
                        Comprehensive Plan of Action;
                            (xiv) Iran does not permit the 
                        International Atomic Energy Agency regular 
                        access, including daily as requested by the 
                        International Atomic Energy Agency, access to 
                        the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant;
                            (xv) Iran builds or has a heavy water 
                        reactor;
                            (xvi) Iran does not permit the 
                        International Atomic Energy Agency to implement 
                        continuous monitoring, including through 
                        containment and surveillance measures, as 
                        necessary, to verify that stored centrifuges 
                        and infrastructure remain in storage;
                            (xvii) Iran does not permit the 
                        International Atomic Energy Agency regular 
                        access, including daily access as requested by 
                        the International Atomic Energy Agency, to 
                        relevant buildings at Natanz, including parts 
                        of the fuel enrichment plan and the Pilot Fuel 
                        Enrichment Plant;
                            (xviii) any uranium enrichment activity in 
                        Iran, including safeguarded research and 
                        development, occurs anywhere but the Natanz 
                        enrichment site;
                            (xix) Iran engages, including through 
                        export of any enrichment or enrichment related 
                        equipment and technology, with any other 
                        country, or with any foreign entity in 
                        enrichment or enrichment related activities, 
                        including related research and development 
                        activities, without approval by the Joint 
                        Commission;
                            (xx) the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant does 
                        not remain strictly a research facility, Iran 
                        conducts enrichment or research and 
                        development-related activities, or Iran holds 
                        nuclear material at that Plant;
                            (xxi) excess heavy water that is beyond 
                        Iran's needs for the modernized Arak research 
                        reactor or the zero power heavy water reactor, 
                        quantities needed for medical research and 
                        production of the deuterated solutions, and 
                        chemical compounds including, where 
                        appropriate, contingency stocks, is not made 
                        available for export to the international 
                        market based on international prices and 
                        delivered to an international buyer;
                            (xxii) all enriched uranium hexafluoride in 
                        excess of 300 kg of up to 3.57 percent enriched 
                        UF6 (or the equivalent in different chemical 
                        forms) is not immediately down-blended to 
                        natural uranium level or sold on the 
                        international market and delivered to an 
                        international buyer;
                            (xxiii) Iran does not rely on only light 
                        water for its future nuclear power and research 
                        reactors;
                            (xxiv) Iran conducts enrichment research 
                        and development in a manner that accumulates 
                        enriched uranium; or
                            (xxv) Iran enriches uranium to a level 
                        exceeding 3.67 percent;
                    (FF) during the 25-year period beginning on 
                implementation day and ending on January 16, 2041--
                            (i) Iran does not permit the International 
                        Atomic Energy Agency to monitor that all 
                        uranium ore concentrate produced in Iran or 
                        obtained from any other source is transferred 
                        to the uranium conversion facility in Esfahan 
                        or to any other future uranium conversion 
                        facility that Iran might decide to build in 
                        Iran within this period; or
                            (ii) Iran does not provide the 
                        International Atomic Energy Agency with all 
                        necessary information so that the International 
                        Atomic Energy Agency will be able to verify the 
                        production of the uranium ore concentrate and 
                        the inventory of uranium ore concentrate 
                        produced in Iran or obtained from any other 
                        source;
                    (GG) on or after January 16, 2024, which is the 
                date that is 8 years after implementation day, Iran 
                commences manufacturing IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges with 
                rotors, or commences manufacturing IR-6 and IR-8 
                centrifuges without rotors at a rate of more than 200 
                centrifuges per year for each type;
                    (HH) on or after January 16, 2026, which is the 
                date that is 10 years after implementation day, Iran 
                commences manufacturing on more than 200 complete 
                centrifuges per year for each type;
                    (II) Iran does not present its plan to, and seek 
                approval by, the Joint Commission if Iran seeks to 
                initiate research and development on a uranium metal-
                based fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor in small 
                agreed quantities after January 16, 2026, and before 
                January 15, 2031, which are 10 and 15 years after 
                implementation day, respectively; or
                    (JJ) during the 8\1/2\ year period beginning on 
                implementation day and ending on July 16, 2024--
                            (i) Iran conducts testing on more than a 
                        single IR-6 centrifuge machine and intermediate 
                        cascades for such machines and commences 
                        testing on more than 30 centrifuge machines; or
                            (ii) Iran conducts testing on more than a 
                        single IR-8 centrifuge machine and intermediate 
                        cascades for such machines or commences testing 
                        on more than 30 centrifuge machines; and
            (2) that--
                    (A) Iran's uranium enrichment and research and 
                development plans should be made public;
                    (B) the reports of the Joint Commission and 
                procurement requests made to the United Nations 
                Security Council and to the Joint Commission, and 
                whether or not such requests were approved, should be 
                made available to the public; and
                    (C) countries should verify the end-use of items, 
                materials, equipment, goods, and technologies that 
                require import authorization by the Joint Commission 
                but are not verified by the International Atomic Energy 
                Agency.
    (b) Actions Specified.--The actions specified in this subsection 
are the following:
            (1) Seeking immediate reinstitution and application of 
        United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 
        (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1929 (2010), and 
        2224 (2015).
            (2) Seeking the immediate adoption of a United Nations 
        Security Council resolution that directs all United Nations 
        member states to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale, 
        or transfer to Iran of all items listed in subsection (a)(i) of 
        United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 (2006) in order 
        to prevent Iran from arming itself while its commitment to 
        international law is still in question.
            (3) Working with international partners of the United 
        States to seek the immediate reapplication of the regulations 
        of the Council of the European Union concerning restrictive 
        measures against Iran, as in effect on October 17, 2015.
            (4) The immediate reapplication of the nuclear-related 
        sanctions waived by the United States.
            (5) Seeking the imposition of additional punitive sanctions 
        with respect to Iran.
    (c) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Highly enriched uranium.--The term ``highly enriched 
        uranium'' means uranium with a 20 percent or higher 
        concentration of the isotope uranium-235.
            (2) Implementation day.--The term ``implementation day'' 
        means January 16, 2016.
            (3) Joint comprehensive plan of action.--The term ``Joint 
        Comprehensive Plan of Action'' means the Joint Comprehensive 
        Plan of Action, agreed to at Vienna on July 14, 2015, by Iran 
        and by the People's Republic of China, France, Germany, the 
        Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States, 
        with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign 
        Affairs and Security Policy, and all implementing materials and 
        agreements related to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
            (4) P5+1 countries.--The term ``P5+1 countries'' means the 
        United States, France, the Russian Federation, the People's 
        Republic of China, the United Kingdom, and Germany.
            (5) Spent fuel.--The term ``spent fuel'' includes all types 
        of irradiated fuel.
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