[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3010 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>






114th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 3010

  To provide for restrictions related to nuclear cooperation with the 
          People's Republic of China, and for other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                              May 26, 2016

 Mr. Markey (for himself and Mr. Rubio) introduced the following bill; 
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
  To provide for restrictions related to nuclear cooperation with the 
          People's Republic of China, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation and 
Nonproliferation Act of 2016''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) A 2001 report from the Department of Defense found that 
        ``China supplied Pakistan with nuclear material and expertise 
        and has provided critical assistance in the production of 
        Pakistan's nuclear facilities.'' China is also alleged to have 
        provided Pakistan with 50 kilograms of highly enriched uranium, 
        and designs for a nuclear weapon.
            (2) An unclassified 2011 report to Congress from the 
        Director of National Intelligence found that Chinese entities 
        ``continue to supply a variety of missile-related items to 
        multiple customers, including Iran and Pakistan.'' Previous 
        reports from the Director of National Intelligence have 
        confirmed that Chinese entities have provided support for the 
        missile program of North Korea.
            (3) China has failed to bring to justice Li Fangwei, also 
        known as Karl Lee, who has been indicted in the United States 
        on charges of providing sensitive missile technology to Iran. 
        According to a report from the Congressional Research Service, 
        ``concerns persist about Chinese willingness as well as ability 
        to detect and prevent illicit transfers'' of dual-use and 
        sensitive nuclear and missile items.
            (4) At a May 12, 2015, hearing, members of the Committee on 
        Foreign Relations of the Senate raised concerns that China may 
        have diverted reactor cooling pumps produced by Curtiss-Wright 
        Corporation to its nuclear submarine program, bolstering the 
        stealth of its submarines, and violating the Previous Nuclear 
        Cooperation Agreement (as that term is defined in section 
        3(3)).
            (5) China has announced plans to provide Pakistan with 
        additional nuclear reactors, beyond those it had already agreed 
        to construct prior to 2004, in violation of its 2004 
        commitments to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
            (6) Five members of the Chinese People's Liberation Army 
        have been indicted in the United States on charges of hacking 
        into the computer networks of Westinghouse and stealing United 
        States intellectual property, including the design of nuclear 
        power plants.
            (7) China has announced plans to export nuclear power 
        plants based on technology acquired from Westinghouse, one of 
        China's primary commercial partners under its current and 
        previous nuclear cooperation agreements with the United States. 
        While China has committed not to export United States-origin 
        technology without a marketing license from Westinghouse, there 
        is no definition of ``United States-origin technology'' in the 
        Federal Register, complicating United States enforcement of 
        this provision.
            (8) China General Nuclear Power Company, a state-owned 
        nuclear power provider, has been indicted in the United States 
        on charges of unlawfully producing special nuclear material 
        outside the United States without the authorization of the 
        Department of Energy.
            (9) China's plans to reprocess United States-origin spent 
        fuel raise the risk that China could divert plutonium to 
        military purposes, enabling it to produce additional nuclear 
        weapons that threaten the United States and its allies.
            (10) Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz, in Beijing on March 
        17, 2016, told the Wall Street Journal that the United States 
        does not ``support large-scale reprocessing'' and China's plan 
        to proceed with a commercial-scale reprocessing facility 
        ``certainly isn't a positive in terms of nonproliferation''.
            (11) China's pursuit of commercial plutonium reprocessing 
        will increase the likelihood that Japan expands its commercial 
        reprocessing program and that South Korea will increase efforts 
        to initiate a similar program of its own. Growing stockpiles of 
        plutonium in East Asia increase the chances of military 
        diversion and theft, raising the risk of nuclear proliferation, 
        nuclear terrorism, and interstate nuclear conflict. It is in 
        the interest of the United States to prevent the stockpiling of 
        plutonium in East Asia.

SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
                Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 
                Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House 
                of Representatives.
            (2) China.--The term ``China'' means the People's Republic 
        of China.
            (3) Chinese person.--The term ``Chinese person'' means--
                    (A) an individual who is a citizen or national of 
                the People's Republic of China; or
                    (B) an entity organized under the laws of the 
                People's Republic of China or otherwise subject to the 
                jurisdiction of the Government of the People's Republic 
                of China.
            (4) Previous nuclear cooperation agreement.--The term 
        ``Previous Nuclear Cooperation Agreement'' means the Agreement 
        for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of 
        America and the Government of the People's Republic of China 
        Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, concluded July 23, 
        1985.
            (5) United states.--The term ``United States'' means the 
        several States, the District of Columbia, and any territory or 
        possession of the United States.
            (6) United states person.--The term ``United States 
        person'' means any United States citizen, any alien admitted to 
        the United States for permanent residence, any entity organized 
        under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within 
        the United States, including a foreign branch of such an 
        entity.
            (7) United states-china nuclear cooperation agreement.--The 
        term ``United States-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement'' 
        means the Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States 
        and the Government of the People's Republic of China that was 
        submitted to the appropriate congressional committees under 
        section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) 
        on April 21, 2015, and which entered into force on October 29, 
        2015.

SEC. 4. NOTICE REGARDING TRANSFERS OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY TO CHINA.

    The Secretary of Energy shall, not later than 5 days after 
receiving an application for the proposed transfer of nuclear 
technology to China under section 57b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 
(42 U.S.C. 2077(b)), including an application for specific 
authorization to be provided for in a subsequent arrangement under 
section 131 of that Act (42 U.S.C. 2160), notify the appropriate 
congressional committees of the receipt of such application. The notice 
shall describe with particularity the items contained in the proposed 
transfer of nuclear technology.

SEC. 5. ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENT FOR APPROVAL OF RETRANSFERS OF UNITED 
              STATES-ORIGIN TECHNOLOGY.

    (a) In General.--Any request for authorization to transfer United 
States-origin technology (as defined pursuant to subsection (b)) from 
China, or with the significant participation of Chinese persons not 
located in the United States, to a country other than the United States 
or China, shall be subject to the authorization requirements in section 
57b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2077(b)). Furthermore, 
such requests for authorization shall be denied unless the applicant 
can demonstrate--
            (1) significant ongoing participation by United States 
        persons in the transfer;
            (2) in the case of nuclear reactors and reactor components, 
        significant United States content involved in, or attendant to, 
        the proposed transfer; and
            (3) in the case of the transfer of technology developed 
        with the participation of the United States Government, timely 
        and adequate reimbursement of the United States Government for 
        any grants or loans provided by the United States Government to 
        entities involved in the development of the technology.
    (b) Definition of United States-Origin Technology.--Not later than 
90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
Energy shall issue a definition of items covered by the term ``United 
States-origin technology'' in subsection (a), including items derived 
from such technology. The term shall include items developed by United 
States persons or persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States, and items developed with the participation of the United States 
Government, including large, passive light water reactors.

SEC. 6. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON CHINA-PAKISTAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION.

    It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to oppose the provision by China of assistance in the 
        construction of any nuclear reactor in Pakistan other than the 
        first 2 reactors constructed at Chasma, which were consistent 
        with the conditions concerning China's participation in the 
        Nuclear Suppliers Group; and
            (2) to assist Pakistan with the acquisition and development 
        of sufficient electrical power to meet its domestic 
        requirements for electrical power through means other than 
        nuclear power.

SEC. 7. ADDITIONAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.

    (a) Determination Required.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the President, 
in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Energy, 
the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of National Intelligence, 
shall determine whether the Government of China, persons acting on 
behalf of the Government of China, or Chinese persons have, since the 
entry into force of the United States-China Nuclear Cooperation 
Agreement--
            (1) retransferred any United States nuclear items to a 
        third country without the permission of the United States 
        Government;
            (2) diverted or attempted to divert United States nuclear 
        items to military use;
            (3) stolen or attempted to steal United States nuclear 
        items;
            (4) failed to undertake measures necessary to prevent 
        transfers of goods, services, and technology described in 
        section 2(a) of the Iran, North Korea, and Syria 
        Nonproliferation Act (Public Law 106-178; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note), 
        or to make substantial progress in preventing such transfers;
            (5) failed to undertake measures to enforce the sanctions 
        provided for in United Nations Security Council Resolution 
        2270, adopted on March 2, 2016, and previous relevant 
        resolutions recalled in Resolution 2270;
            (6) refused to adhere to the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
        guidelines regarding the export of any new civilian nuclear 
        reactors, regardless of any prior or future contract 
        obligations; or
            (7) otherwise violated the terms and conditions of the 
        United States-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, or any 
        authorization issued by the United States Government concerning 
        transfers of United States nuclear items.
    (b) Suspension of Cooperation.--If the President makes a 
determination described in subsection (a), the President shall 
immediately suspend all cooperation under the United States-China 
Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, including any transfers of nuclear 
technology or materials, until the President submits to the appropriate 
congressional committees--
            (1) a plan of corrective action to--
                    (A) address the activity described in subsection 
                (a);
                    (B) mitigate any damage to the national security of 
                the United States because of such activity; and
                    (C) prevent further such activity; and
            (2) a certification to the appropriate congressional 
        committees that the plan described in paragraph (1) is being 
        implemented.
    (c) Definition.--In this section, the term ``United States nuclear 
items'' means any items that are transferred to China under--
            (1) the United States-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement;
            (2) section 57b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 
        U.S.C. 2077(b)); or
            (3) part 110 of title 10, Code of Federal Regulations.

SEC. 8. IMPLEMENTATION OF AGREED MINUTE.

    The President may not bring into effect the procedures described in 
the section of the Agreed Minute to the United States-China Nuclear 
Cooperation Agreement that appear under the heading ``Technology and 
Information Exchanges'' unless the President, at least 60 days of 
continuous session of Congress before those procedures become 
effective--
            (1) provides to the appropriate congressional committees 
        the details concerning the implementation of those provisions; 
        and
            (2) certifies to the appropriate congressional committees 
        that those procedures protect the national security of the 
        United States to an extent that is equal to or greater than 
        those procedures provided for under part 810 of title 10, Code 
        of Federal Regulations.

SEC. 9. REPROCESSING UNDER THE UNITED STATES-CHINA NUCLEAR COOPERATION 
              AGREEMENT.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United 
States should encourage countries in East Asia to forgo the 
commencement of new spent fuel reprocessing activities, as part of a 
mutual effort to prevent the increased or expanded stockpiling of 
separated plutonium in the region.
    (b) Implementation of Reprocessing Consent Rights Under 
Agreement.--The President shall not agree to the reprocessing, 
recycling, or other alteration in form or content of nuclear material, 
as described in Article 6.2 of the United States-China Nuclear 
Cooperation Agreement, at any individual facility to which the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards are not applied, 
unless, for each proposed facility at which such activity will take 
place, the President certifies to the appropriate congressional 
committees that--
            (1) the President has made a formal request to the IAEA to 
        apply safeguards to the facility;
            (2) the IAEA has refused the request described in paragraph 
        (1); and
            (3) the arrangements and procedures under which such 
        reprocessing, recycling, or other alteration in form or content 
        will occur--
                    (A) include a requirement that nuclear material 
                transferred pursuant to the United States-China Nuclear 
                Cooperation Agreement and nuclear material used in or 
                produced through the use of such material--
                            (i) not be commingled with any other 
                        nuclear material;
                            (ii) be clearly marked as United States-
                        obligated nuclear material;
                            (iii) be stored in separate facilities from 
                        any other nuclear material; and
                            (iv) be available for inspection 
                        immediately and without prior notice upon 
                        request by the IAEA or either party to the 
                        agreement; and
                    (B) are sufficient to detect in a timely manner--
                            (i) the diversion for military purposes of 
                        nuclear material transferred pursuant to the 
                        United States-China Nuclear Cooperation 
                        Agreement and nuclear material used in or 
                        produced through the use of such material; and
                            (ii) the transfer to facilities or 
                        locations not agreed to by the United States of 
                        nuclear material transferred pursuant to the 
                        United States-China Nuclear Cooperation 
                        Agreement and nuclear material used in or 
                        produced through the use of such material.
    (c) Notification Required.--If the President issues a certification 
described in subsection (b), the President shall include with that 
certification a detailed description of--
            (1) the facility at which the reprocessing, recycling, or 
        other alteration in form and content will take place;
            (2) the safeguards applied to the facility;
            (3) the measures that will be undertaken to secure and 
        prevent the theft or diversion to military purposes of any 
        separated plutonium that will result from the activities at the 
        facility;
            (4) the amounts of materials to be processed at the 
        facility;
            (5) the amount of processed fissile material that might be 
        stockpiled as a result of the activities at the facility, and 
        the estimated time that it may be stockpiled prior to its 
        civilian use in a nuclear reactor; and
            (6) the risks to United States national security posed by 
        the potential diversion of nuclear material at the facility.

SEC. 10. REPORTS.

    (a) Initial Report.--
            (1) In general.--No later than 90 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, with the 
        concurrence of the Director of National Intelligence, shall 
        submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on 
        China's history of compliance with the peaceful use and non-
        proliferation provisions of the Previous Nuclear Cooperation 
        Agreement.
            (2) Elements.--The report required under paragraph (1) 
        shall include--
                    (A) a detailed examination of every suspected or 
                alleged violation of such previous agreement;
                    (B) the response by China to any inquiries by the 
                United States regarding any such suspected or alleged 
                violations of the previous agreement;
                    (C) an assessment of the likelihood of future 
                violations under the terms of the United States-China 
                Nuclear Cooperation Agreement; and
                    (D) an assessment of the potential advantages that 
                a large civil nuclear infrastructure or program may 
                provide the People's Republic of China as it seeks to 
                meet its future nuclear weapons requirements.
    (b) Annual Intelligence Report.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than April 15, 2017, and 
        annually thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence 
        shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
        report on the status of the United States-China Nuclear 
        Cooperation Agreement and compliance by China with the 
        agreement.
            (2) Elements.--The report required under paragraph (1) 
        shall include, at a minimum--
                    (A) a detailed examination of every suspected or 
                alleged violation of the Agreement by the People's 
                Republic of China that may have occurred during the 
                prior calendar year;
                    (B) the response by China to any inquiries by the 
                United States regarding any such suspected or alleged 
                violations;
                    (C) an accounting of the specific roles played in 
                the civil and military nuclear programs of the People's 
                Republic of China by all Chinese persons visiting 
                United States nuclear labs and facilities;
                    (D) an assessment of whether the People's Republic 
                of China or any entity acting on its behalf has 
                targeted and United States nuclear-related private-
                sector or governmental entities, enterprises, or assets 
                for any form of cyber trespass, theft, or attack, or 
                has taken specific actions pursuant to such targeting 
                by any entity;
                    (E) an assessment of the risks of diversion of 
                special nuclear material transferred pursuant to this 
                Agreement, the likely consequences of such diversion, 
                and steps taken to avert any potential diversion;
                    (F) an assessment of the potential military utility 
                of diverted civil nuclear technology;
                    (G) an assessment of any civil and criminal law 
                enforcement actions taken by the People's Republic of 
                China's against any entities or individuals within its 
                government or its jurisdiction that have--
                            (i) violated non-proliferation or peaceful 
                        use requirements of this or any other bilateral 
                        or multilateral nuclear agreement to which 
                        People's Republic of China is a party;
                            (ii) committed cyber trespass, theft, or 
                        attack on any United States nuclear-related 
                        private sector or governmental entities, 
                        enterprises, or assets; or
                            (iii) conducted cyber trespass or cyber 
                        exploitation against any private sector nuclear 
                        entities, enterprises, or assets for commercial 
                        gain; and
                    (H) a description of the extent to which the 
                Government of the People's Republic of China has 
                honored United States requests for enforcement of 
                United States legal action against any entities or 
                individuals described in subparagraph (G), including 
                requests for extradition by the United States.
    (c) Form.--The reports required under subsections (a) and (b) may 
be submitted in classified form, but shall also contain an unclassified 
executive summary and may contain an unclassified annex.
    (d) Annual Exports Report.--Not later than April 15, 2017, and 
annually thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report that--
            (1) identifies all export licenses issued in the previous 
        calendar year pursuant to the United States-China Nuclear 
        Cooperation Agreement, including at a minimum, the license 
        applicant, proposed end user, items licensed, value, and term 
        of the license; and
            (2) assesses China's progress in strengthening, 
        implementing, and enforcing laws to ensure restricted dual-use 
        technology is not transferred to countries of proliferation 
        concern.
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