[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 780 Engrossed in House (EH)]

<DOC>
H. Res. 780

                In the House of Representatives, U. S.,

                                                     November 15, 2016.
Whereas given its size, location, and diverse economy, the United States has 
        deep interests in the democratic stability of the Democratic Republic of 
        the Congo (DRC);
Whereas from 1996 to 2006, more than 3,000,000 people died in the DRC as a 
        result of internal and regional wars, and significant violence persists 
        in the Eastern Congo;
Whereas a root cause of these conflicts was the decay of the undemocratic and 
        corrupt regime of President Mobutu Sese Seko;
Whereas in 2002 the United States, working with African and European partners, 
        helped facilitate a Congo peace accord that included a democratic 
        transition and free elections under a new constitution limiting the 
        President to two terms by an unamendable provision and providing for the 
        President of the Senate to assume power temporarily until elections can 
        be held once a Presidential vacancy is declared;
Whereas in 2006 Joseph Kabila was elected President in what was widely viewed as 
        a free and fair election, but many respected international observers 
        concluded that his 2011 election ``victory'' was ``not credible'';
Whereas President Kabila's second term will end on December 19, 2016, after 
        which his government can no longer be considered the constitutionally 
        legitimate representative of the Congolese people;
Whereas President Kabila has yet to declare unequivocally and publicly that he 
        will step down at the end of his term, as required by the constitution, 
        causing growing political tension, unrest, and violence across the 
        country;
Whereas during the summer of 2014, President Kabila tried unsuccessfully to 
        persuade parliament to change the constitution to open the way for his 
        continuation in power after his term expires on December 19, 2016, and 
        subsequently attempted to pass a law requiring a multiyear census in 
        advance of the Presidential election--an effort that was dropped in 
        January 2015 after mass demonstrations in which Kabila's security forces 
        killed at least 42 people and arbitrarily jailed hundreds;
Whereas since January 2015, in further steps to undermine democratic processes 
        and institutions, Congolese security and intelligence officials have 
        clamped down on peaceful activists, political leaders, and others who 
        oppose President Kabila's effort to stay in power past his 
        constitutionally mandated two-term limit;
Whereas since January 2015 President Kabila has continually used administrative 
        and technical means to try to delay the Presidential election (including 
        an overloaded, unfeasible multielection calendar, failure to pass timely 
        election laws and release authorized election budgets, abruptly 
        implementing the division of the country's provinces, and having his 
        ``Independent National Election Commission'' recently declare that it 
        will take 16 months to update the voter roll);
Whereas the broad national dialogue convened by President Kabila served as 
        another means of justifying a delay of the scheduled November 2016 
        elections despite the widespread withdrawal of participation by 
        opposition parties and church leaders;
Whereas President Obama spoke with President Kabila on March 15, 2015, and 
        ``emphasized the importance of timely, credible, and peaceful elections 
        that respect the DRC's constitution and protect the rights of all DRC 
        citizens'';
Whereas President Kabila is calling for a broad national dialogue that could be 
        used to confuse the election issue and serve as yet another means of 
        delaying the scheduled November 2016 elections;
Whereas international and domestic human rights groups continually report on the 
        worsening of the situation with regard to human rights in the DRC, 
        including the use of excessive force against peaceful demonstrators and 
        an increase in politically motivated trials and the United Nations 
        Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the 
        Congo (MONUSCO) has registered more than 260 human rights violations, 
        mainly against political opponents, civil society, and journalists 
        during the past year;
Whereas the DRC retains a relatively vibrant civil society that is exerting 
        pressure on the government, and is at risk of being stamped out due to 
        government repression consistent with President Kabila's attempt to 
        remain in power;
Whereas leaders of Congo's main opposition parties, nongovernmental 
        organizations, and prodemocracy youth movements called on Congolese 
        citizens to stay home from work and school on February 16, 2016, for 
        ``Ville Morte (Dead City Day)'' largely to protest against delays in 
        organizing Presidential elections;
Whereas the strike was largely successful in major Congolese cities despite 
        government detentions and threats;
Whereas, on March 10, 2016, the European Union Parliament adopted a resolution 
        that urged the European Union to ``use all its diplomatic and economic 
        tools'' in favor of ``compliance with the constitution of the DRC'' and 
        invited African Union member states to also become engaged in the effort 
        to advance this goal;
Whereas the European Union Parliament resolution also called upon the European 
        Union ``to consider imposing targeted sanctions, including travel bans 
        and asset freezes, so as to help prevent further violence'';
Whereas, on March 30, 2016, the United Nations Security Council unanimously 
        adopted Resolution 2277, expressing ``deep concern'' about ``delays in 
        the Presidential election'' and ``increased restriction of the political 
        space in the DRC'' and calling for ``ensuring the successful and timely 
        holding'' of Presidential and legislative elections ``in accordance with 
        the Constitution'';
Whereas, on June 23, 2016, the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of 
        Foreign Assets Control sanctioned General Celestin Kanyama of the 
        Congolese National Police for his role in targeting of civilian 
        protestors;
Whereas, on September 28, 2016, the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of 
        Foreign Assets Control sanctioned Major General Gabriel Amisi Kumba and 
        General John Numbi for leading an armed group that has threatened the 
        stability of the DRC and violently suppressing political opposition, 
        respectively;
Whereas the DRC's Independent National Electoral Commission and the 
        Constitutional Court have validated the indefinite postponement of the 
        scheduled November 2016 elections; and
Whereas the Kabila government has stated that the elections may now take place 
        as late as 2018, potentially extending his mandate by as much as two 
        years: Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved, That--
            (1) under Executive Order No. 13413, as amended by Executive Order 
        No. 13671, in coordination to the maximum extent possible with its 
        African and European partners, the United States should impose sanctions 
        on government officials of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) 
        who impede progress toward a peaceful democratic transition through 
        credible elections that respect the will of the people of the DRC;
            (2) sanctions should target core figures in the government of 
        President Kabila for visa denials and for asset freezes because of 
        actions that ``undermine democratic processes or institutions'';
            (3) economic and security assistance provided to the DRC government 
        should be reviewed for possible termination, while preserving other, 
        particularly humanitarian, assistance through nongovernmental and 
        international organizations, and review future international financial 
        institution assistance to the DRC until the election crisis is resolved;
            (4) the President should lift sanctions only when the President 
        determines that--
                    (A) President Kabila has unequivocally and publicly declared 
                that, in accordance with the constitution, he will not remain in 
                power once his term ends on December 19, 2016, has made 
                verifiable progress on the ground towards holding timely free 
                and fair national elections in accordance with the constitution, 
                and has demonstrably opened the necessary political space for 
                the opposition and civil society; or
                    (B) the DRC has held a free and fair Presidential election 
                as provided by the constitution and a new President has been 
                sworn in;
            (5) if President Kabila's government meets the condition specified 
        in paragraph (4)(A), the United States should join other donors in 
        helping to support election preparedness, including voter registration 
        and supporting a level playing field for campaign activities by diverse 
        political parties;
            (6) the United States Government should support independent DRC 
        civil society organizations and media to more effectively monitor 
        efforts to undermine democracy and governance;
            (7) the United States Government should use authorities under 
        subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 31, United States Code, chapter X 
        of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations, and the section 1956 of title 
        18, United States Code, to investigate and target money laundering 
        activities, specifically related to the diversion of proceeds of 
        corruption, by key figures close to President Kabila;
            (8) these authorities should be employed to target the financial 
        institutions facilitating money laundering by these figures as well as 
        to pressure the jurisdictions in which they are located to monitor this 
        activity and take enforcement action as appropriate; and
            (9) the United States should coordinate these efforts with key 
        Western and African partners, including through other financial 
        intelligence units.
            Attest:

                                                                          Clerk.