[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 410 Introduced in House (IH)]

114th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. RES. 410

  Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the Iran 
   Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 does not apply to the Joint 
 Comprehensive Plan of Action regarding Iran and submitted to Congress 
 on July 19, 2015, because the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is a 
treaty and, pursuant to Article II of the U.S. Constitution, the Senate 
     must give its advice and consent to ratification if the Joint 
 Comprehensive Plan of Action is to be effective and binding upon the 
                             United States.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           September 8, 2015

Mr. Gohmert (for himself, Mr. Duncan of South Carolina, Mr. McClintock, 
  Mr. King of Iowa, Mr. Babin, Mr. Yoho, and Mr. Brat) submitted the 
 following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign 
                                Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION


 
  Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the Iran 
   Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 does not apply to the Joint 
 Comprehensive Plan of Action regarding Iran and submitted to Congress 
 on July 19, 2015, because the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is a 
treaty and, pursuant to Article II of the U.S. Constitution, the Senate 
     must give its advice and consent to ratification if the Joint 
 Comprehensive Plan of Action is to be effective and binding upon the 
                             United States.

Whereas, on March 11, 2015, Secretary of State John Kerry, in describing the 
        Administration's nuclear negotiations with Iran, clearly stated that it 
        was ``not negotiating a legally binding plan'' with Iran and therefore 
        it does not have to be submitted to Congress;
Whereas, on August 6, 2015, White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest, at a White 
        House Press Briefing, stated that ``we don't need Congress to approve 
        this [Iran nuclear deal]'';
Whereas, on July 28, 2015, Secretary Kerry, at a hearing before the House 
        Committee on Foreign Affairs, stated that ``the reason why'' the Iran 
        nuclear agreement is not considered a treaty is because ``it's become 
        physically impossible . . . [to] pass a treaty [through the United 
        States Senate] anymore. . . . [I]t's become impossible to . . . 
        schedule. It's become impossible to pass.'';
Whereas two days after Secretary Kerry testified that it has become ``physically 
        impossible'' for the Senate to ratify treaties, the United States 
        formally ratified the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical 
        Protection of Nuclear Material when Henry S. Ensher, the Department of 
        State's ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 
        delivered the United States instrument of ratification to the IAEA;
Whereas, on June 4, 2015, less than two months before Secretary Kerry testified 
        that it has become ``physically impossible'' for the Senate to ratify 
        treaties, he stated that the Department of State is ``preparing the 
        instruments of ratification of [several] important treaties'' and that 
        he ``want[s] to personally thank the U.S. Congress . . . for their 
        efforts on'' the implementing legislation for the nuclear security 
        treaties;
Whereas, on May 7, 2015, the Senate held a vote on the Iran Nuclear Agreement 
        Review Act of 2015, commonly referred to as the ``Corker-Cardin bill'', 
        in which every Senator voted on that bill with the understanding that 
        the Iran nuclear agreement was an executive agreement, and not a treaty, 
        and that United States sanctions on Iran's ballistic missile program 
        remain in place;
Whereas the Corker-Cardin bill states that ``[i]t is the sense of Congress that 
        . . . United States sanctions on Iran for . . . ballistic missiles will 
        remain in place under an agreement related to the nuclear program of 
        Iran that includes the United States'';
Whereas the Corker-Cardin bill was intended as a review of the application of 
        statutory sanctions against only Iran's nuclear program;
Whereas the Corker-Cardin bill prescribes a process for congressional review 
        only of ``Agreements with Iran Related to the Nuclear Program of Iran'';
Whereas under subsections (b) and (c) of section 135 of the Atomic Energy Act of 
        1954, as added by the Corker-Cardin bill, lawmakers may resolve to 
        approve, disapprove, or take no action on ``Nuclear Agreements with 
        Iran'';
Whereas section 135(d) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as added by the Corker-
        Cardin bill, calls for ``Congressional Oversight of Iranian Compliance 
        with Nuclear Agreements'';
Whereas, on July 14, 2015, the Administration finalized the Iran nuclear 
        agreement and referred to it as the ``Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
        Action'' (JCPOA);
Whereas, on July 19, 2015, the Administration submitted the JCPOA to Congress;
Whereas the JCPOA is not limited to sanctions enacted by Congress related to 
        only Iran's nuclear program;
Whereas the JCPOA extends to Iran's ballistic missiles programs and other 
        weapons activities--including the lifting of international arms 
        embargoes covering both ``any material or technology that might be 
        useful to a ballistic-missile program,'' and ``battle tanks, armored 
        combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, 
        attack helicopters, warships, missiles, or missile systems'';
Whereas Congress was informed only after the JCPOA was submitted to Congress 
        that it removed international restrictions on Iran's ballistic missiles 
        program and conventional arms;
Whereas because the terms of the Iran nuclear negotiations changed after 
        Congress voted on the Corker-Cardin bill, the bill does not permit 
        Congress to review or approve agreements on ballistic missiles and other 
        weapons;
Whereas until July 22, 2015, more than a week after the Iran nuclear agreement 
        was finalized, Secretary Kerry failed to inform Congress of the 
        existence of ``side deals'' to nuclear agreement between the IAEA and 
        Iran;
Whereas recent news reports indicate the IAEA has a secret agreement which would 
        allow Iran to use its own experts to inspect a site allegedly used to 
        develop nuclear arms, directly contradicting the intended effect of the 
        Corker-Cardin bill by bypassing congressional oversight;
Whereas the Administration failed to follow the Corker-Cardin bill which 
        required it to provide Congress with all nuclear agreement documents, 
        including all ``annexes, appendices, codicils, side agreements, 
        implementing materials, documents, and guidance, technical or other 
        understandings and any related agreements, whether entered into or 
        implemented prior to the agreement or to be entered into or implemented 
        in the future'';
Whereas the Administration failed to comply with the Corker-Cardin bill by not 
        transmitting the nuclear agreement, ``including all materials,'' to 
        Congress by ``September 7, 2015'';
Whereas the JCPOA grants Iran's Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani, Defense 
        Minister Mostafa Mohammad Najjar, who trained and commanded Hezbollah 
        fighters in Lebanon at the time of the Beirut barracks bombing, and 
        Hossein Salami, the current second-in-command of the Iranian Islamic 
        Revolutionary Guard Corps, individual relief from international 
        sanctions;
Whereas the JCPOA amends Article I of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
        Nuclear Weapons (commonly referred to as the ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
        Treaty'' or ``NPT'') to which the United States is a signatory, and 
        under which the United States is obligated ``not in any way to assist, 
        encourage, or induce . . . [Iran] to acquire nuclear weapons or other 
        nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive 
        devices'';
Whereas the JCPOA amends Article II of the NPT under which Iran is responsible 
        not to acquire, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons or capabilities 
        of controlling nuclear weapons;
Whereas the JCPOA and the various secret side agreements to the JCPOA amend 
        Article III of the NPT regarding international inspectors in Iran ``who 
        shall have access at all times to all places and data and to any person 
        who by reason of his occupation deals with materials, equipment, or 
        facilities which are required by this Statute to be safeguarded'';
Whereas the JCPOA amends the NPT outside of the prescribed method of amendment 
        in Article VIII of the NPT;
Whereas, on July 31, 2015, the non-partisan Congressional Research Service 
        released a study establishing that Iran's defense budget ranges anywhere 
        from $14 to $30 billion a year, with much of that money going to fund 
        terrorist proxy groups and rebel fighters across the Middle East, 
        including in Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, and the Gaza Strip;
Whereas it is evident that the JCPOA is fundamentally different from the 
        ``international agreement'' described by the Administration when 
        Congress passed the Corker-Cardin bill;
Whereas it is evident that the Corker-Cardin bill does not reach many of the 
        parts of the finalized nuclear agreement with Iran, and that the JCPOA 
        thoroughly marginalized the Corker-Cardin bill;
Whereas the Corker-Cardin bill is designed to address an international agreement 
        that is fundamentally different from the JCPOA and not a treaty; and
Whereas it is now evident the JCPOA is of sufficient magnitude that it rises to 
        the level of a treaty: Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved, That--
            (1) the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, commonly 
        referred to as the ``Corker-Cardin bill'', does not apply to 
        the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding Iran 
        because the JCPOA is fundamentally different from the agreement 
        as represented to Congress by the Administration and that the 
        Corker-Cardin bill is only applicable to an agreement that is 
        not a treaty;
            (2) Article II of the U.S. Constitution declares that the 
        President ``shall have Power, by and with the Advice and 
        Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties,'' but only if ``two 
        thirds of the Senators present concur'';
            (3) the JCPOA is a treaty and, pursuant to Article II of 
        the U.S. Constitution, the Senate must give its advice and 
        consent to ratification if the JCPOA is to be effective and 
        binding upon the United States; and
            (4) not later than 30 days after the date of the adoption 
        of this resolution, the Senate should schedule and consider a 
        resolution of ratification with respect to the JCPOA.
                                 <all>