[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4534 Introduced in House (IH)]
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114th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 4534
To recognize the importance of the land forces of the United States
Armed Forces and to revise the fiscal year 2016 end-strength levels for
these Land Forces and specify new permanent active duty end strength
minimum levels, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
February 11, 2016
Mr. Gibson (for himself, Mr. Turner, Mr. Walz, Mr. Nugent, Mr. Austin
Scott of Georgia, Mr. Russell, Mr. Wittman, Mr. Wilson of South
Carolina, Mr. O'Rourke, Ms. Stefanik, Mr. Fleming, Mr. Ashford, Mr.
Wenstrup, Mr. Crawford, Mr. Zeldin, Ms. Gabbard, Mr. Young of Alaska,
Mr. Zinke, and Mr. Moulton) introduced the following bill; which was
referred to the Committee on Armed Services
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To recognize the importance of the land forces of the United States
Armed Forces and to revise the fiscal year 2016 end-strength levels for
these Land Forces and specify new permanent active duty end strength
minimum levels, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Protecting Our Security Through
Utilizing Right-Sized End-Strength Act of 2016'' or the ``POSTURE
Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) The first function of Government is to secure its
people and their rights. The United States is blessed that
countless men and women have done so by serving in the Armed
Forces, which consists of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air
Force, and Coast Guard.
(2) History has shown that sufficient Land Forces are
critical to the security of the American people and their
rights and to assure United States allies, deter aggression,
shape security environments, and win wars. Furthermore, Land
Forces have been proven to be essential to consolidate gains
and achieve sustainable outcomes.
(3) The Land Forces of the United States are comprised of
the Army (Active Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard)
and the Marine Corps (Active Marine Corps and Marine Corps
Reserve).
(4) On the day before September 11, 2001, the Land Forces
of the United States included 1,036,601 Soldiers and 212,744
Marines. Broken down by component, that included 480,801
Soldiers in the Active Army, 205,300 Soldiers in the Army
Reserve, 350,500 Soldiers in the Army National Guard, 172,934
Marines in the Active Marine Corps, and 39,810 Marines in the
Marine Corps Reserve.
(5) At the height of the Global War on Terrorism, the Land
Forces of the United States included 1,138,907 Soldiers and
242,558 Marines. Broken down by component, that included
570,000 Soldiers in the Active Army, 206,892 Soldiers in the
Army Reserve, 362,015 Soldiers in the Army National Guard,
202,786 Marines in the Active Marine Corps, and 39,772 Marines
in the Marine Corps Reserve.
(6) For fiscal year 2016, authorizations for the Land
Forces of the United States include 1,015,000 Soldiers and
222,900 Marines. Broken down by component, that includes
475,000 Soldiers in the Active Army, 198,000 Soldiers in the
Army Reserve, 342,000 Soldiers in the Army National Guard,
184,000 Marines in the Active Marine Corps, and 38,900 Marines
in the Marine Corps Reserve.
(7) The drawdown of the Land Forces of the United States is
planned to continue through fiscal year 2018, when end strength
will be approximately 970,000 Soldiers and 220,500 Marines.
Broken down by component, that will be 450,000 Soldiers in the
Active Army, approximately 195,000 Soldiers in the Army
Reserve, approximately 335,000 Soldiers in the Army National
Guard, 182,000 Marines in Active Marine Corps, and 38,500
Marines in the Marine Corps Reserve.
(8) In Europe, forward-stationed Army forces have been
reduced from over 215,000 at the time of the fall of the Berlin
Wall to the current level of under 30,000, jeopardizing the
United States strategic capability to deter adversaries by
conventional force and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's
capability to rapidly respond to Russian aggression against its
front-line member states.
(9) The Administration has enacted this policy of reducing
the end strength of United States Land Forces based on security
analysis and expectations of future force capabilities
contained in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, the 2013
Strategic Choices and Management Review (SCMR), and the 2014
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which included the following:
(A) Ending the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan by
``transitioning out of Iraq and drawing down in
Afghanistan''.
(B) ``Building a closer relationship'' with Russia
and assuming that ``most European countries are now
producers of security rather than consumers of it''.
(C) No longer sizing United States Armed Forces
``to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability
operations''.
(D) ``Increasing reliance on our allies and
partners'' to compensate for ``reductions in our
capacity''.
(E) Emphasizing an ability to regenerate
capabilities and the use of innovation and technology
to compensate for a smaller force.
(10) Given developments over the past several years, the
assumptions about the security environment are outdated and,
unfortunately, proven flawed.
(11) The United States, its allies, and their partners face
new threats, including the following:
(A) A civil war in Syria, triggering a humanitarian
crisis and destabilizing the entire region.
(B) The rise of the Islamic State which has taken
control of large swaths of territory in Syria and Iraq
and has more ambitious global goals, including stated
intentions of additional direct attacks against the
United States and United States allies, both at home
and abroad.
(C) Iran, which has continued its bellicose
rhetoric and support for terrorist activities
throughout the Middle East.
(D) A resurgent Russia that annexed Crimea, invaded
Ukraine, and is now conducting military operations in
Syria, with its posture and actions causing concern to
NATO allies.
(E) The continued military build-up by China and
its actions in the South China Sea, which have raised
concerns among nations in the Pacific and across the
world.
(F) A provocative and unpredictable North Korea
that has escalated tensions throughout the Pacific and
beyond and expanded its nuclear capability.
(12) In response to these developments, short notice
deployments of United States Land Forces have increased across
the globe, including the following:
(A) To address a resurgent Russia, the Army
deployed forces in various locations in Eastern Europe
to assure NATO allies and to help train, assist, and
assure their armed forces as well as sent forces to
Ukraine to train and equip their armed forces.
(B) To address the rise of the Islamic State, the
Army deployed forces to Iraq to train and assist their
armed forces.
(C) To address a resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan,
scheduled redeployments of United States Land Forces
were altered and these forces are now expected to
remain in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future.
(D) To help stabilize troubled areas across the
globe, including Southeast Asia and Africa, the Marine
Corps and Army have deployed to conflict-scarred
countries such as Cambodia.
(E) To address unique threats and to build partner
capacity across the globe, United States Joint Special
Operations Forces continue to constantly deploy
worldwide.
(F) To address widespread and destabilizing natural
disasters, including the Indian Ocean earthquake and
tsunami in 2004, the earthquake in Haiti in 2010, the
tsunami in Japan in 2011, the Ebola outbreak in West
Africa in 2014, and the earthquake in Nepal in 2015,
the Army and Marine Corps continue to deploy on short
notice across the globe.
(13) Furthermore, the assumptions about the future purpose,
use, and capability of the Land Forces have also been disputed:
(A) The 2014 National Defense Panel concluded that
the 2014 QDR's ``reduction in Army end strength goes
too far.''.
(B) The National Commission on the Future of the
Army found the following:
(i) ``Because PB16 (FY2016 President's
Budget) does not address the escalation of
threats to global stability and national
security, it is, at best, on the low end of
needed resources'' (Page 43).
(ii) ``. . . this force size provides only
limited ability to react to unforeseen
circumstances'' (Page 51).
(iii) ``Using directed planning assumptions
and with its planned fiscal year 2017 force,
the Army is, in fact, neither sized nor shaped
for conducting any kind of large-scale, long-
duration mission at acceptable risk'' (Page
52).
(14) A comprehensive and holistic view of the Land Forces
of the United States is necessary. In particular, previous
assumptions about the deployment and use of reserve components
no longer apply. For example, more than 600,000 members of the
reserve components have been deployed since September 11, 2001.
Beyond these missions conducted pursuant to the authority of
title 10 of the United States Code, these forces are also
responsible for all homeland defense and critical defense
support to civil authority missions under title 32 of the
United States Code during times of crisis response and natural
disaster relief. For these reasons, the reserve components of
the Land Forces are a critical piece to the overall mission of
the total force.
(15) Finally, senior leaders in the United States military
have expressed concern regarding the current and future
reductions in the end strength of the Land Forces of the United
States, including the following:
(A) Then-Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff,
General Martin Dempsey, wrote in his risk assessment
accompanying the 2014 QDR that the current defense
strategy ``takes risk in the capacity of . . . land
forces''.
(B) The current Chief of Staff of the Army, General
Mark Milley disputed many of the assumptions described
in finding eight in an address before the Association
of the United States Army, including that ``wars of the
future will be short'', ``wars can be won through the
use of advanced technologies'', ``allies and partners
can provide capable land forces in sufficient scale'',
and ``armies are easy to regenerate''.
(C) The current commander of United States European
Command, General Philip Breedlove, testified before the
House Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on
Defense that ``virtual presence means actual absence. .
. . Further reductions of both infrastructure and
forces will reduce our access to key strategic
locations during times of crisis''.
(D) The former Commandant of the Marine Corps,
General James Amos, testified at a hearing before the
Senate Armed Services Committee that ``we are headed
towards a force in not too many years that will be
hollow back home and not ready to deploy . . . there
would be no rotational relief like we had in Iraq and
Afghanistan''.
(E) The former commander of United States European
Command, Admiral James Stavridis, recently stated that
``we're still at war . . . actively involved on
multiple continents in real combat operations. We
should not be drastically reducing our troop levels.''.
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
Given the volatile, uncertain, and ambiguous world and the need for
trained and ready Land Forces of the United States, in conjunction with
joint and multinational forces, to deter threats, shape the
international security environment, respond to emergent situations and
crises, and, if necessary, to fight and win the Nation's wars, it is
the sense of Congress that the planned drawdown of Land Forces should
be immediately stopped.
SEC. 4. FISCAL YEAR 2016 END-STRENGTH LEVELS FOR LAND FORCES OF THE
UNITED STATES.
(a) Active Forces.--
(1) Army.--The authorized end strength for Army active duty
personnel as of September 30, 2016, is 480,000.
(2) Marine corps.--The authorized end strength for Marine
Corps active duty personnel as of September 30, 2016, is
184,000.
(b) Selected Reserve.--
(1) Army reserve components.--The authorized end strength
for Selected Reserve personnel of the Army reserve components
as of September 30, 2016, are as follows:
(A) The Army National Guard of the United States,
350,000.
(B) The Army Reserve, 205,000.
(2) Marine corps reserve.--The authorized end strength for
Selected Reserve personnel of the Marine Corps Reserve as of
September 30, 2016, is 38,900.
SEC. 5. REVISION IN PERMANENT ACTIVE DUTY END STRENGTH MINIMUM LEVELS.
Section 691(b) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by
striking paragraphs (1) through (4) and inserting the following:
``(1) For the Army, 480,000.
``(2) For the Navy, 329,200.
``(3) For the Marine Corps, 184,000.
``(4) For the Air Force, 317,000.''.
SEC. 6. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
It is policy of the United States to pursue and maintain peace
through strength. Therefore, any proposal to lower the end strength
levels established by this Act and the amendments made by this Act must
first be approved by Congress through the enactment of a law to that
effect.
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