[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1021 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

113th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1021

To provide for a Next Generation Cooperative Threat Reduction Strategy, 
                        and for other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                              May 22, 2013

 Mrs. Shaheen introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
             referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
To provide for a Next Generation Cooperative Threat Reduction Strategy, 
                        and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Next Generation Cooperative Threat 
Reduction Act of 2013''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The United States nonproliferation and threat reduction 
        assistance program known as the Cooperative Threat Reduction 
        (CTR) Program is one of the most successful congressionally led 
        United States foreign policy initiatives in the post-Cold War 
        era.
            (2) The CTR Program was initiated by the United States 
        Congress in legislation introduced by Senators Sam Nunn (D-GA) 
        and Dick Lugar (R-IN) in 1991.
            (3) The initial purpose of the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program was 
        to dismantle and prevent proliferation of nuclear, chemical, 
        and biological weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their 
        associated infrastructure in the independent states of the 
        former Soviet Union and to prevent the transfer of weapons of 
        mass destruction knowledge to other countries.
            (4) As of February 28, 2013, the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program 
        has--
                    (A) deactivated 13,300 nuclear warheads;
                    (B) destroyed 1,473 intercontinental ballistic 
                missiles (ICBMs);
                    (C) eliminated 831 ICBM silos;
                    (D) destroyed 442 ICBM mobile launchers;
                    (E) eliminated 233 bombers;
                    (F) eliminated 906 nuclear capable air-to-surface 
                missiles;
                    (G) destroyed 728 submarine launched ballistic 
                missile (SLBM) launchers;
                    (H) eliminated 936 SLBMs;
                    (I) destroyed 48 ballistic missile submarines;
                    (J) sealed 194 nuclear test tunnels and holes; and
                    (K) destroyed 39,986 metric tons of chemical weapon 
                agent.
            (5) Due to the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, 
        and Belarus are nuclear weapons free and Albania is chemical 
        weapons free.
            (6) The Nunn-Lugar CTR Program is based on the premise that 
        governments have a responsibility and a mutual interest in 
        working together to reduce the threat posed by nuclear, 
        chemical, and biological weapons and their associated 
        infrastructure and know-how.
            (7) Though the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program was initially focused 
        on the independent states of the former Soviet Union, the 
        threat represented by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, 
        and biological WMD-related materials, infrastructure, and know-
        how extends well beyond the borders of these states.
            (8) The threat posed by WMD-related proliferation is 
        increasingly prevalent in the Middle East and North Africa 
        (MENA), where political instability and deeply rooted violent 
        extremism contribute to an already dangerous threat to the 
        United States and some of its strongest allies.
            (9) Terrorist organizations, including core al Qaeda, al 
        Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al Qaeda in Iraq, al Qaeda in the 
        Arabian Peninsula, Hezbollah, Hamas, and their extremist 
        supporters continue to operate in the MENA region and have 
        sought or may seek to attempt to secure WMD materials or know-
        how.
            (10) The Government of Iran's continued illicit development 
        of its nuclear program and its movement towards an advanced 
        nuclear weapons capability could lead to a nuclear arms race in 
        the region.
            (11) The Iranian regime's continued support for and 
        association with terrorist organizations in the region, 
        including Hamas and Hezbollah, pose a significant and growing 
        proliferation challenge for the entire global community.
            (12) Continued upheaval and violence in Syria and the 
        threat of the Assad regime's substantial chemical weapons 
        stockpile being used or falling into the wrong hands also pose 
        a significant and immediate WMD-related proliferation challenge 
        to the entire global community.
            (13) United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 
        1540 (2004) binds all United Nations members to adopt and 
        enforce effective controls to prevent the proliferation of WMD, 
        their means of delivery, and the illicit spread of related 
        materials; yet countries in the Middle East and North Africa 
        have a relatively weak record of implementation of UNSCR 1540.
            (14) The MENA region continues to experience significant 
        political instability and sits atop a complex web of ethnic 
        differences, a history of violence and extremism, robust 
        military capabilities, a growing collection of unsecured 
        weapons, and a variety of unstable governments.
            (15) The Arab Spring and the continued revolutions across 
        the MENA region represent significant opportunities but also 
        difficult challenges as the United States attempts to create 
        new relationships with popularly elected governments that can 
        be inexperienced in nonproliferation, counter-proliferation, or 
        related security efforts.
            (16) A number of governments in this unstable region are 
        considering the development of civilian nuclear power programs, 
        including the Governments of the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, 
        Saudi Arabia, and other countries.
            (17) As a result of these difficult challenges, the United 
        States has a clear interest in preventing or minimizing the 
        potential proliferation of WMD-related weapons, technologies, 
        materials, and know-how in the MENA region.
            (18) Despite the threat of proliferation in the Middle East 
        and North Africa, only a small percentage of United States CTR 
        and nonproliferation-related assistance programs have been 
        focused on the countries of this region.
            (19) Until 2003, Congress limited the use of Department of 
        Defense (DOD) CTR funding to programs in the former Soviet 
        Union.
            (20) Section 1308 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
        for Fiscal Year 2004 (22 U.S.C. 5963) authorized the 
        utilization of limited Department of Defense CTR funding 
        outside the independent states of the former Soviet Union for 
        short-term projects and emergency funding.
            (21) In section 1306 of the National Defense Authorization 
        Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181; 122 Stat. 413), 
        Congress, for the first time, specifically authorized funding 
        for longer-term CTR initiatives to address emerging security 
        challenges and urgent threats in regions of the world beyond 
        the independent states of the former Soviet Union, stipulating 
        that CTR should be ``strengthened and expanded'' for ``broader 
        international cooperation and partnerships,'' including 
        ``programs and projects in . . . the Middle East''.
            (22) Section 1306 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
        for Fiscal Year 2008 also mandated that the National Academy of 
        Sciences conduct a study ``to analyze options for strengthening 
        and expanding the CTR program''.
            (23) The congressionally mandated report from the National 
        Academy of Sciences, ``Global Security Engagement: A New Model 
        for Cooperative Threat Reduction,'' published in 2009, 
        recommended expanding CTR activities into the Middle East, to 
        include--
                    (A) encouraging and assisting with security and 
                destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles;
                    (B) providing chemical weapons detection and 
                interdiction equipment and training;
                    (C) providing training for parliamentarians and 
                national technical advisors;
                    (D) promoting chemical safety and security in the 
                region;
                    (E) promoting biological safety, security, and 
                disease surveillance programs;
                    (F) promoting implementation of UNSCR 1540;
                    (G) promoting counter-trafficking obligations under 
                UNSCR 1540;
                    (H) strengthening export controls and border 
                security, including maritime security; and
                    (I) other cooperative programs aimed at stemming 
                the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological 
                weapons of mass destruction technologies, materials, 
                and know-how.
            (24) The Department of State, the Department of Energy, and 
        the Department of Homeland Security support nonproliferation 
        projects aimed at cooperatively preventing the proliferation of 
        weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East and North 
        Africa, including through--
                    (A) the Department of State Nonproliferation and 
                Disarmament Fund;
                    (B) the Department of State Export Control and 
                Related Border Security Program;
                    (C) the Department of State Global Threat Reduction 
                program;
                    (D) the Department of Energy Second Line of Defense 
                program;
                    (E) the Department of Energy Global Initiatives to 
                Prevent Proliferation program;
                    (F) the Department of Energy Global Threat 
                Reduction Initiative;
                    (G) the Department of Homeland Security Container 
                Security Initiative; and
                    (H) the Department of Homeland Security Secure 
                Freight Initiative.
            (25) These programs provide critical but small-scale 
        support in combating proliferation challenges in the region, 
        and they do not by themselves represent a robust, 
        comprehensive, or whole-of-government approach to 
        nonproliferation in the MENA region.
            (26) After extensive delays, near the end of 2012, the 
        Executive Branch finally completed internal bureaucratic 
        processes necessary to expand the Department of Defense CTR 
        Program more extensively into the Middle East and the 
        Department of Defense recently publicly announced its intention 
        to apply fiscal year 2013 funds to help Syria's neighbors 
        counter the immediate threat posed by Syria's chemical weapons.
            (27) The Department of Defense has also initiated a program 
        with fiscal year 2013 funds to work with the Government of 
        Libya to help the country meet its commitment to the 
        Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons by 
        destroying its chemical weapons stockpile.
            (28) In addition to preventing proliferation of WMD across 
        borders shared with Syria and destroying chemical weapons 
        stockpiles in Libya, the Department of Defense has requested 
        new funding to initiate bio-engagement programs in the Middle 
        East in its fiscal year 2014 budget request.
            (29) There is an urgent need today to more sharply focus 
        United States Government efforts and resources on WMD 
        proliferation in the MENA region.
            (30) The United States Government needs a comprehensive 
        regional strategy for nonproliferation activities in the Middle 
        East and North Africa, which includes additional, targeted 
        resources for cooperative threat reduction work in the region, 
        and one that utilizes all of our diplomatic, intelligence, 
        military, and public affairs tools in a coordinated and 
        creative whole-of-government approach and leverages support 
        from a wide variety of partners and donors, including foreign 
        countries, nongovernmental organizations, international 
        institutions, United States and foreign businesses, academic 
        institutions, and other sectors.

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) countries around the world have a continued interest in 
        working together to reduce the threat posed by nuclear, 
        chemical, and biological weapons, related technologies, 
        materials, associated infrastructure, and know-how;
            (2) the United States Government, as a leader in the 
        international community in curbing the threat posed by the 
        proliferation of WMD-related weapons, technologies, materials, 
        infrastructure, and know-how, has a national security interest 
        in working with the countries of the Middle East and North 
        Africa on establishing and developing robust nonproliferation 
        capabilities in the region to effectively detect, interdict, 
        deter, and defend against proliferation of WMD in the region;
            (3) the United States Government should continue to expand 
        the Department of Defense CTR Program beyond the independent 
        states of the former Soviet Union, to include the countries of 
        the MENA region, provided that these programs complement 
        already existing United States nonproliferation programs in 
        this region and provided that Congress is properly informed of 
        the long-term cooperative threat reduction and nonproliferation 
        assistance strategy to be implemented;
            (4) Congress supports the initiation of CTR programs aimed 
        at addressing the immediate threat of Syrian WMD-related 
        proliferation in the region and the destruction of the chemical 
        weapons stockpile in Libya and urges the United States 
        Government to ensure sufficient funding for the continuation 
        and expansion, if necessary, of these critical programs;
            (5) the United States Government should continue to 
        strongly press all members of the United Nations, including the 
        countries of the MENA region, to fully implement UNSCR1540, 
        which imposes binding obligations on all United Nations member 
        states to adopt and enforce effective controls to prevent the 
        proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their means of 
        delivery, and the illicit spread of related materials, and the 
        United States Government should provide for and develop 
        cooperative assistance programs aimed at more expeditiously 
        implementing those responsibilities and controls;
            (6) at a time of strained resources, the United States 
        needs a comprehensive and effective, whole-of-government 
        approach to global cooperative threat reduction and 
        nonproliferation assistance programs that maintains the ability 
        to provide assistance through both military and civilian 
        channels, seeks to cancel unnecessary or ineffective programs, 
        reduce and eliminate duplication or overlap, and that maximizes 
        the efficiency and effectiveness of United States assistance;
            (7) the United States Government should seek increased and 
        sustained financial and other support from Russia, the European 
        Union and its member states, China, Japan, and other countries 
        for stronger, standardized, and worldwide physical security for 
        WMD-related weapons and materials as well as for other 
        international nonproliferation efforts, particularly in the 
        MENA region;
            (8) the United States Government should make clear that any 
        states that provide WMD to terrorist groups or individuals will 
        face severe and grave retaliation involving all elements of 
        United States power; and
            (9) the United States Government should reassert and 
        reinforce United States security commitments around the MENA 
        region in order to assure allies that the pursuit of nuclear, 
        chemical, or biological weapons or capabilities is not 
        necessary or conducive to stability in this dangerous region.

SEC. 4. STRATEGY TO PREVENT THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS 
              DESTRUCTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA.

    (a) In General.--The President shall establish a multi-year 
comprehensive regional assistance strategy to coordinate and advance 
CTR and related nonproliferation efforts in the Middle East and North 
Africa (in this section referred to as the ``MENA CTR and 
Nonproliferation Strategy'').
    (b) Consultation.--In establishing the MENA CTR and 
Nonproliferation Strategy, the President shall consult with the 
appropriate congressional committees; relevant Federal departments and 
agencies, including the Departments of State, Defense, Energy, and 
Homeland Security; multilateral organizations; international 
institutions; representatives of civil society, including leading 
nongovernmental and other experts; and other entities that could assist 
in curbing the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological 
weapons, weapons components, weapons-related materials, their 
associated delivery vehicles, and know-how.
    (c) Elements.--The strategy required by subsection (a) shall 
include the following elements:
            (1) A commitment to utilizing and building upon the 
        cooperative model of success demonstrated by the last two 
        decades of the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program in the independent states 
        of the former Soviet Union.
            (2) A commitment to approach Middle East and North Africa 
        nonproliferation issues on a regional basis as well as on a 
        country-by-country basis.
            (3) The expansion of current CTR and other nonproliferation 
        assistance programs in the MENA region and the initiation of 
        new programs with new partner countries in the region as 
        appropriate.
            (4) Planning to ensure that countries receiving such 
        assistance in the Middle East and North Africa countries have 
        an appropriate stake in the development of each country-
        specific strategy and are also contributing financially to the 
        effort with an appropriate level of burden-sharing.
            (5) A plan to more fully engage, leverage, and increase 
        assistance, financing, and other support from partners in the 
        international community for CTR and nonproliferation assistance 
        programs in the Middle East and North Africa, which may 
        include--
                    (A) governments of other countries, including 
                Russia, Japan, China, Turkey, and others with an 
                interest in a safe, secure, and stable MENA region;
                    (B) the European Union, including the European 
                Council, the European Commission, the European 
                Parliament, and the associated member states of the 
                European Union;
                    (C) the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its 
                member states;
                    (D) international institutions, including the 
                United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency, 
                and others;
                    (E) international donors, including 
                philanthropists, foundations, and businesses interested 
                in international nonproliferation efforts;
                    (F) multilateral partnerships, like the Group of 
                Eight or the Group of Twenty;
                    (G) Middle East and North African regional 
                institutions, including the Gulf Cooperation Council 
                and the Arab Atomic Energy Agency; or
                    (H) well-respected and prominent international 
                nonprofit and nongovernmental organizations such as the 
                Nuclear Threat Initiative.
    (d) Activities Supported.--Assistance authorized under subsection 
(g) in support of the MENA CTR and Nonproliferation Strategy may be 
made available for programs and activities to address the challenges 
posed by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, 
weapons components, weapons-related materials, and their delivery 
vehicles, in the MENA region, including innovative new assistance 
programs with new partner countries in the region.
    (e) Coordination.--
            (1) In general.--Assistance authorized under subsection (g) 
        in support of the MENA CTR and Nonproliferation Strategy shall 
        be integrated with pre-existing CTR and nonproliferation 
        programs, and such assistance shall be coordinated between the 
        relevant United States Government agencies involved with CTR or 
        nonproliferation programming in the Middle East and North 
        Africa.
            (2) Scope.--Integration and coordination of the Middle East 
        and North Africa CTR and Nonproliferation Strategy required 
        under subsection (a) should be the responsibility of the 
        President and shall include--
                    (A) an assessment to address where potential gaps 
                in assistance may exist while also ensuring the 
                elimination or reduction of any potential overlap or 
                duplication in efforts;
                    (B) the establishment of appropriate metrics for 
                determining success in the MENA region, as well as 
                metrics for prioritizing potential partner countries 
                under consideration for Middle East and North Africa 
                CTR and nonproliferation programs;
                    (C) an effort to ensure that the MENA CTR and 
                Nonproliferation Strategy fits in the broader United 
                States Government-wide global WMD threat reduction 
                strategy and that assistance is properly aligned with 
                United States policy goals in the MENA region;
                    (D) a formal plan to ensure the sustainability of 
                coordination in the long term, irrespective of the 
                President and other officials in office or 
                personalities in place, including clear designations of 
                agency and departmental responsibilities, 
                accountability, and lines of communication and 
                authorities;
                    (E) a description of ways to reduce the potential 
                for stove-piping of information, intelligence, and 
                activities between counterterrorism and 
                counterproliferation programming; and
                    (F) a plan to ensure the proper tracking and 
                reporting of United States Government-wide assistance 
                in the MENA region.
    (f) Reports.--
            (1) Initial report.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
        of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to 
        Congress the strategy outlined in subsection (a).
            (2) Annual report.--Annually thereafter, the President 
        shall submit to Congress a report, in classified and 
        unclassified form, that describes the progress made by the 
        President in implementing the MENA CTR and Nonproliferation 
        Strategy, which should include a list of the activities and 
        countries supported by the MENA CTR and Nonproliferation 
        Strategy, the agencies and assistance levels utilized to 
        implement the strategy, and the extent to which specific 
        program goals, progress, and milestones have been achieved over 
        the course of the prior year.
    (g) Assistance Authorized.--There is authorized to be appropriated 
not less than $30,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2014 through 2019 to 
be utilized by the relevant executive agencies, including the 
Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the Department of 
Energy, to implement the strategy outlined in subsection (a).

SEC. 5. REPORT ON CTR AND NONPROLIFERATION EFFORTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
              AND NORTH AFRICA.

    Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this 
Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a report detailing all current CTR and related non-
proliferation activities in the MENA region over the previous five 
years and all United States Government funding contributed across each 
of the Federal agencies in support of CTR and related nonproliferation 
activities in the MENA region during that time period, including the 
amount contributed, the identity of the entity receiving such 
contribution and undertaking each funded activity, the agency providing 
the contribution, a brief summary of each specific project undertaken, 
the specific nonproliferation objectives sought to be achieved by each 
project, and the extent to which the objectives have been achieved.

SEC. 6. REPORTS ON 2014 NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT IN THE NETHERLANDS.

    (a) Report on Comprehensive Objectives, Strategies, and Policies in 
the Lead-Up to the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in the Netherlands.--
The President shall submit to Congress a report, in classified and 
unclassified forms, that details the comprehensive objectives, 
strategy, and policies of the United States with respect to the 
upcoming 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in the Netherlands, not later 
than 30 days prior to the Summit.
    (b) Follow-Up Report on Outcomes From the 2014 Nuclear Security 
Summit in the Netherlands.--Not later than 90 days after the conclusion 
of the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in the Netherlands, the President 
shall submit to Congress a report, in classified and unclassified 
forms, detailing the outcomes of the Summit and the extent to which the 
United States Government was able to accomplish the objectives, 
strategies and policies detailed pursuant to subsection (a).

SEC. 7. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Middle east and north africa.--The term ``Middle East 
        and North Africa'' includes the countries or areas of Algeria, 
        Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
        Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestinian Territories, Qatar, Saudi 
        Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.
            (2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' includes--
                    (A) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee 
                on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
                the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
                Affairs, and the Committee on Energy and Natural 
                Resources of the Senate; and
                    (B) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee 
                on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
                the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee 
                on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives.
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