[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5103 Introduced in House (IH)]

113th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 5103

 To impose sanctions on Chinese state-owned enterprises and any person 
 who is a member of the board of directors, an executive officer, or a 
  senior official of a Chinese state-owned enterprise for benefitting 
      from cyber and economic espionage against the United States.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             July 14, 2014

   Mr. Rohrabacher (for himself and Mr. Ryan of Ohio) introduced the 
following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
   and in addition to the Committees on the Judiciary and Financial 
Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in 
   each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the 
                jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
 To impose sanctions on Chinese state-owned enterprises and any person 
 who is a member of the board of directors, an executive officer, or a 
  senior official of a Chinese state-owned enterprise for benefitting 
      from cyber and economic espionage against the United States.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Chinese Communist Economic Espionage 
Sanctions Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds the following:
            (1) The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has made it its 
        policy to engage in economic warfare against the United States.
            (2) The CCP uses the resources of the People's Liberation 
        Army (PLA) and the Chinese State to drain the United States of 
        economic might, including by means of economic espionage and 
        cyber espionage, unfair trade practices, unfair labor 
        practices, and currency manipulation.
            (3) Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOE) and the PLA are 
        the main beneficiary of the CCP's campaign of theft against the 
        United States.
            (4) Although many SOEs are listed on stock exchanges or 
        officially privatized, the Chinese government retains at least 
        one-half of equity in those companies.
            (5) SOEs come under the control of the ministerial-level 
        State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission.
            (6) Members of the boards of directors and senior 
        management of SOEs are appointed by the State-owned Assets 
        Supervision and Administration Commission in consultation with 
        the Communist Party's Department of Organization.
            (7) More than two-thirds of board members and three-
        quarters of senior executives of SOEs are either Communist 
        Party members or officials.
            (8) Corruption within the CCP is widespread and endemic.
            (9) CCP officials use their positions of control and 
        influence within and over SOE's to enrich themselves and their 
        families.
            (10) The vast majority of the Chinese people do not benefit 
        from the corruption of the CCP.
            (11) On May 19, 2014, the United States Department of 
        Justice announced charges against five members of the PLA, 
        accusing them of stealing trade secrets from United States 
        companies and marking the first time the United States has 
        charged foreign government employees with economic espionage.
            (12) The indictment charged that members of the PLA worked 
        to ``steal information'' from United States companies ``that 
        would be useful to their competitors in China, including state-
        owned enterprises''.
            (13) Chinese SOEs are reported to have benefitted directly 
        from their actions, including the State Nuclear Power 
        Technology Corporation, the Baosteel Group, and the Aluminum 
        Corporation of China (Chinalco).
            (14) The chairman of the board and the majority of the 
        boards for the State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation, the 
        Baosteel Group, and the Aluminum Corporation of China 
        (Chinalco) are members of the CCP.
            (15) On May 21, 2014, Assistant Attorney General John 
        Carlin said that criminal charges can justify economic 
        sanctions.
            (16) The indictment named members of Unit 61398 which is 
        publicly identified as a Shanghai-based cyber unit of the PLA 
        also known as APT1.
            (17) Unit 61398 is part of the 2nd Bureau of the PLA, 3rd 
        Department of the General Staff.
            (18) Unit 61398 was first publically identified in 2013 as 
        APT1 by Mandiant, a United States cyber security firm and 
        leader in cyber incident response industry.
            (19) Mandiant exposed a timeline of Unit 61398's economic 
        espionage conducted since 2006 against 141 victims across 
        multiple industries.
            (20) Mandiant's conclusions have been supported by 
        CrowdStrike, another cyber security company, which publicly 
        revealed the existence of Unit 61486, a related PLA unit 
        dedicated to cyber espionage.
            (21) George Kurts, the co-founder of CrowdStrike, stated 
        that ``If you look at all the groups that we track in China, 
        the indictments are just the very tip of the iceberg.''.
            (22) Units 61398 and 61486 are only two of at least 20 
        cyber threat groups in Communist China and are considered by 
        multiple experts to have stolen vast amounts of valuable 
        information from the United States.
            (23) The 2011 annual report to Congress from the Office of 
        the Secretary of Defense, titled ``Military and Security 
        Developments Involving the People's Republic of China'', 
        states, ``The PRC also utilizes a large, well-organized network 
        of enterprises, defense factories, affiliated research 
        institutes, and computer network operations to facilitate the 
        collection of sensitive information and export-controlled 
        technology, as well as basic research and science that supports 
        U.S. defense system modernization.''.
            (24) A 2011 report by the Office of the National 
        Counterintelligence Executive found that ``Chinese actors are 
        the world's most active and persistent perpetrators of economic 
        espionage.''.
            (25) The 2012 annual report to Congress from the Office of 
        the Secretary of Defense, titled ``Military and Security 
        Developments Involving the People's Republic of China'', found 
        that ``Chinese attempts to collect U.S. technological and 
        economic information will continue at a high level and will 
        represent a growing and persistent threat to U.S. economic 
        security.''.
            (26) James Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence, 
        stated, ``Among significant foreign threats . . . China 
        remain[s] the most capable and persistent intelligence threats 
        and are aggressive practitioners of economic espionage against 
        the United States.''.
            (27) Retired General Michael Hayden, former Director of the 
        Central Intelligence Agency and Director of the National 
        Security Agency, stated, ``The intensity of Chinese espionage 
        is certainly greater than that what we saw between the U.S. and 
        the Soviets during the Cold War. The problem is China's view is 
        that industrial espionage by the state against relatively 
        vulnerable private enterprise is a commonly accepted state 
        practice,''.
            (28) The annual report by the congressional United States-
        China Economic and Security Review Commission stated in 2013, 
        ``strong evidence emerged that the Chinese government is 
        directing and executing a large-scale cyber espionage campaign 
        against the United States''.
            (29) Retired Lieutenant General Ronald Burgess, Jr., former 
        Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, stated, ``China 
        has used its intelligence services to gather information via a 
        significant network of agents and contacts using a variety of 
        methods . . . In recent years, multiple cases of economic 
        espionage and theft of dual-use and military technology have 
        uncovered pervasive Chinese collection efforts,''.
            (30) Congressman Mike Rogers, Chairman of the Permanent 
        Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
        Representatives, stated, ``China's economic espionage has 
        reached an intolerable level and I believe that the United 
        States and our allies in Europe and Asia have an obligation to 
        confront Beijing and demand that they put a stop to this 
        piracy. Beijing is waging a massive trade war on us all, and we 
        should band together to pressure them to stop. Combined, the 
        United States and our allies in Europe and Asia have 
        significant diplomatic and economic leverage over China, and we 
        should use this to our advantage to put an end to this 
        scourge,''.
            (31) The threat of Chinese espionage is so large that 
        Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, D-Rhode Island, who chaired the 
        Cyber Task Force of the Select Committee on Intelligence, 
        proclaimed it to be part of ``the biggest transfer of wealth 
        through theft and piracy in the history of mankind''.
            (32) Massive cyber and economic espionage organized, 
        directed, and carried out by the CCP and the PLA has 
        contributed to creating a $318,000,000,000 United States trade 
        deficit with Communist China in 2013, which equals 1.89 percent 
        of total United States gross domestic product (GDP).

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that the Chinese Communist Party and 
the Government of the People's Republic of China should be condemned 
for sponsoring, planning, ordering, conducting, and benefitting from 
cyber and economic espionage against the United States.

SEC. 4. FINANCIAL MEASURES.

    (a) Freezing of Assets.--The President shall exercise all powers 
granted by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 
1701 et seq.) (except that the requirements of section 202 of such Act 
(50 U.S.C. 1701) shall not apply) to the extent necessary to block and 
prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of 
a covered Chinese state-owned enterprise or a person who is a member of 
the board of directors, an executive officer, or a senior official of a 
covered Chinese state-owned enterprise if such property and interests 
in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or 
are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.
    (b) Enforcement.--
            (1) Penalties.--A covered Chinese state-owned enterprise or 
        a person who is a member of the board of directors, an 
        executive officer, or a senior official of a covered Chinese 
        state-owned enterprise shall be subject to the penalties set 
        forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the 
        International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to 
        the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act 
        described in subsection (a) of such section.
            (2) Requirements for financial institutions.--Not later 
        than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
        Secretary of the Treasury shall prescribe or amend regulations 
        as needed to require each financial institution that is a 
        United States person and has within its possession or control 
        assets that are property or interests in property of a covered 
        Chinese state-owned enterprise or a person who is a member of 
        the board of directors, an executive officer, or a senior 
        official of a covered Chinese state-owned enterprise if such 
        property and interests in property are in the United States to 
        certify to the Secretary that, to the best of the knowledge of 
        the financial institution, the financial institution has frozen 
        all assets within the possession or control of the financial 
        institution that are required to be frozen pursuant to 
        subsection (a).
    (c) Regulatory Authority.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall 
issue such regulations, licenses, and orders as are necessary to carry 
out this section.
    (d) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Covered chinese state-owned enterprise.--The term 
        ``covered Chinese state-owned enterprise'' means an enterprise 
        that--
                    (A) is organized under the laws of the People's 
                Republic of China, including a foreign branch of such 
                enterprise; and
                    (B) is owned or controlled by the Government of the 
                People's Republic of China or the Chinese Communist 
                Party.
            (2) United states person.--The term ``United States 
        person'' means--
                    (A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully 
                admitted for permanent residence to the United States; 
                or
                    (B) an entity organized under the laws of the 
                United States or any jurisdiction within the United 
                States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.

SEC. 5. INADMISSIBILITY OF CERTAIN ALIENS.

    (a) Ineligibility for Visas.--An alien is ineligible to receive a 
visa to enter the United States and ineligible to be admitted to the 
United States if the alien is a person who is a member of the board of 
directors, an executive officer, or a senior official of a covered 
Chinese state-owned enterprise.
    (b) Current Visas Revoked.--The Secretary of State shall revoke, in 
accordance with section 221(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(8 U.S.C. 1201(i)), the visa or other documentation of any alien who 
would be ineligible to receive such a visa or documentation under 
subsection (a) of this section.
    (c) Regulatory Authority.--The Secretary of State shall prescribe 
such regulations as are necessary to carry out this section.

SEC. 6. REPORT TO CONGRESS.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State 
and the Secretary of the Treasury shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report on--
            (1) the actions taken to carry out this Act, including the 
        number of covered Chinese state-owned enterprises and persons 
        who are members of the board of directors, executive officers, 
        or senior officials of covered Chinese state-owned enterprises 
        sanctioned during the year preceding the report; and
            (2) efforts by the executive branch to encourage the 
        governments of other countries to impose sanctions that are 
        similar to the sanctions imposed under this Act.
    (b) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted 
in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.
    (c) Definition.--In this section, the term ``appropriate 
congressional committees'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Permanent Select 
        Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Ways and Means 
        of the House of Representatives; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Select 
        Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Finance, and the 
        Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.
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