

113TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. R. 4433

To provide military assistance to Ukraine, to enhance the presence and capabilities of the United States military in Europe, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

APRIL 9, 2014

Mr. TURNER (for himself, Mr. ROGERS of Alabama, and Mr. MCKEON) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Armed Services and Select Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To provide military assistance to Ukraine, to enhance the presence and capabilities of the United States military in Europe, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*
3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS; DEFINI-**
4 **TIONS.**

5 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the
6 “Forging Peace Through Strength in Ukraine and the
7 Transatlantic Alliance Act”.

1 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for
2 this Act is as follows:

- Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents; definitions.
- Sec. 2. Sense of Congress.
- Sec. 3. Strategic framework for United States security force assistance and cooperation in the European and Eurasian regions.
- Sec. 4. Requirement for plan to increase intelligence and cyber cooperation with Ukraine.
- Sec. 5. Enhancing presence and capabilities of United States military in Europe.
- Sec. 6. Enhancing readiness posture of United States military in Europe.
- Sec. 7. Posturing United States strategic capabilities.
- Sec. 8. Limitation on military contact and cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation.
- Sec. 9. Limitation on non-proliferation activities between the United States and the Russian Federation.
- Sec. 10. Annual report on military and security developments involving the Russian Federation.

3 (c) DEFINITIONS.—In this Act:

4 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
5 TEES.—Except as otherwise provided, the term “ap-
6 propriate congressional committees” means—

7 (A) the Committee on Armed Services and
8 the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Sen-
9 ate; and

10 (B) the Committee on Armed Services and
11 the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
12 of Representatives.

13 (2) CONGRESSIONAL DEFENSE COMMITTEES.—
14 The term “congressional defense committees” has
15 the meaning given that term in section 101(a)(16)
16 of title 10, United States Code.

17 (3) NATO.—The term “NATO” means the
18 North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

1 (4) TREATIES DEFINED.—

2 (A) CFE TREATY.—The term “CFE Trea-
3 ty” means the Treaty on Conventional Armed
4 Forces in Europe, signed at Paris November
5 19, 1990, and entered into force July 17, 1992.

6 (B) INF TREATY.—The term “INF Trea-
7 ty” means the Treaty Between the United
8 States of America and the Union of Soviet So-
9 cialist Republics on the Elimination of Their
10 Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Mis-
11 siles, commonly referred to as the Intermediate-
12 Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, signed at
13 Washington December 8, 1987, and entered
14 into force June 1, 1988.

15 (C) NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY.—The term
16 “North Atlantic Treaty” means the North At-
17 lantic Treaty signed at Washington, April 4,
18 1949, and entered into force August 24, 1949.

19 **SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

20 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

21 (1) On March 1, 2014, Russian Federation
22 President Vladimir Putin sought and received from
23 the upper house of the Russian parliament the
24 standing authorization of the use of military force to
25 send Russian forces into Ukrainian territory.

1 (2) On March 2, 2014, Russian troops invaded
2 the Ukrainian territory of Crimea, seizing control of
3 the peninsula, border crossings, government and ad-
4 ministrative buildings, key infrastructure, and sur-
5 rounding Ukrainian military bases.

6 (3) From February 26 to March 3, 2014,
7 President Putin directed exercises of 150,000 troops,
8 including air and naval forces, and live fire dem-
9 onstrations in western Russia, near the border with
10 Ukraine.

11 (4) On March 3, 2014, the Department of De-
12 fense announced it was suspending United States
13 military engagement with Russia.

14 (5) On March 12, 2014, in response to Russian
15 aggression and provocations, the United States de-
16 ployed additional F-15 aircraft to NATO's Baltic
17 Air Policing Mission and F-16 aircraft to an avia-
18 tion detachment in Poland.

19 (6) On March 16, 2014, Crimea held a ref-
20 erendum on seceding from Ukraine and accede to
21 the Russian Federation, which violated the Ukrain-
22 ian constitution, occurred under duress of Russian
23 military intervention, and was not recognized by the
24 international community.

1 (7) On March 20, 2014, the Russian par-
2 liament voted to annex Crimea and Russian Presi-
3 dent Putin signed the treaty of accession annexing
4 Crimea to the Russian Federation.

5 (8) On March 23, 2014, NATO Supreme Allied
6 Command and Commander of U.S. European Com-
7 mand, General Philip Breedlove stated that the Rus-
8 sian “force that is at the Ukrainian border now to
9 the east is very, very sizeable and very, very ready”.

10 (9) The Government of the Federation of Rus-
11 sian continues to provoke demonstrations and vio-
12 lence in Ukraine in order to create a false narrative
13 of separatism and illegal justification for Russian
14 intervention.

15 (10) On April 3, 2014, NATO Supreme Allied
16 Commander and Commander of U.S. European
17 Command, General Philip Breedlove, stated that
18 Russia has 40,000 troops capable of moving within
19 12 hours with elements of a Combined Arms Army,
20 supported by fixed-wing aircraft, rotary aircraft, and
21 the logistics required in order to successfully make
22 an incursion.

23 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of the
24 Congress that—

1 (1) the continuing and long-standing pattern
2 and practice by the Government of the Russian Fed-
3 eration of physical, diplomatic, and economic aggres-
4 sion toward neighboring countries is clearly intended
5 to undermine regional security and stability;

6 (2) the Russian military build-up and aggres-
7 sive posture on the eastern border of Ukraine rep-
8 resents a deliberate intent to intimidate Ukraine and
9 its citizens to submit to Russian control;

10 (3) the Russian Federation should immediately
11 cease all improper and illegal activities in Ukraine,
12 including the seizures of airfields and other loca-
13 tions, and President Putin should direct an imme-
14 diate return of Russian forces to their barracks;

15 (4) the United States reaffirms its strong com-
16 mitment to the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Se-
17 curity Assurances which was executed jointly with
18 the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom to
19 explicitly secure the independence, sovereignty, and
20 territorial integrity and borders of Ukraine;

21 (5) the United States supports the continued
22 professionalization of the Ukrainian military and
23 should enhance United States direct security co-
24 operation with the Ukrainian military;

1 (6) the United States reaffirms its defense com-
2 mitments to its treaty allies under Article 5 of the
3 North Atlantic Treaty;

4 (7) the United States supports the expansion of
5 security cooperation with states in Central and East-
6 ern Europe, including NATO member states, NATO
7 aspirants, and appropriate Eastern Partnership
8 countries;

9 (8) the United States should seek immediate
10 membership in NATO for Montenegro, a NATO
11 Membership Action Plan for Georgia, a diplomatic
12 solution to disputes between Macedonia and Greece,
13 and seek resolution to the constitutional issues of
14 Bosnia and Herzegovina;

15 (9) the United States reaffirms its support for
16 the Supreme Allied Commander of Supreme Head-
17 quarters, Allied Powers Europe to support NATO
18 efforts to resolve the conflict peacefully and dip-
19 lomatically;

20 (10) the United States encourages the North
21 Atlantic Council to act in a timely manner to direct
22 the Supreme Allied Commander of Supreme Head-
23 quarters, Allied Powers Europe to begin the NATO
24 Defense Planning Process to NATO contingency
25 plans in response to a Russian invasion of Ukraine,

1 including in Crimea, and establish political guidance
2 and determine military capability requirements to ef-
3 fectively posture NATO military forces; and

4 (11) the United States should take immediate
5 steps to enhance its military presence and readiness
6 posture in Europe to deter aggression and assure al-
7 lies and partners through forward presence and en-
8 gagement.

9 **SEC. 3. STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR UNITED STATES SE-**
10 **CURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE AND COOPERA-**
11 **TION IN THE EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN RE-**
12 **GIONS.**

13 (a) STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK.—

14 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense, in
15 coordination with the Secretary of State, shall de-
16 velop a strategic framework for United States secu-
17 rity force assistance and cooperation in the Euro-
18 pean and Eurasian regions.

19 (2) ELEMENTS.—The strategic framework re-
20 quired by paragraph (1) shall include the following:

21 (A) An evaluation of the extent to which
22 the threat to security and stability in the Euro-
23 pean and Eurasian regions is a threat to the
24 national security of the United States and the
25 security interests of the NATO alliance.

1 (B) An identification of the primary objec-
2 tives, priorities, and desired end-states of
3 United States security force assistance and co-
4 operation programs in such regions and of the
5 resources required to achieve such objectives,
6 priorities, and end states.

7 (C) A methodology for assessing the effec-
8 tiveness of United States security force assist-
9 ance and cooperation programs in such regions
10 in making progress towards such objectives, pri-
11 orities, and end-states, including an identifica-
12 tion of key benchmarks for such progress.

13 (D) Criteria for bilateral and multilateral
14 partnerships in such regions.

15 (b) REPORT.—

16 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
17 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
18 retary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary
19 of State, shall submit to the appropriate congress-
20 sional committees a report on the strategic frame-
21 work required by subsection (a).

22 (2) FORM.—The report required by paragraph
23 (1) shall be submitted in an unclassified form, but
24 may include a classified annex.

1 **SEC. 4. REQUIREMENT FOR PLAN TO INCREASE INTEL-**
2 **LIGENCE AND CYBER COOPERATION WITH**
3 **UKRAINE.**

4 (a) **PLAN REQUIRED.**—Not later than 90 days after
5 the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall
6 submit to the appropriate congressional committees a plan
7 to—

8 (1) increase United States intelligence, surveil-
9 lance, and reconnaissance capabilities devoted to
10 monitoring the situation in Ukraine;

11 (2) increase United States intelligence informa-
12 tion sharing and situational awareness to the max-
13 imum extent practicable with Ukraine utilizing ap-
14 propriate bilateral channels and the NATO–Ukraine
15 Commission;

16 (3) provide military advice and technical assist-
17 ance to the Ukrainian military to enhance their de-
18 fensive preparations and posture;

19 (4) convene NATO member states and Ukraine
20 to review options and implement prudent steps to in-
21 crease the defense of United States, NATO and
22 Ukraine cyber networks;

23 (5) work with NATO member states and the
24 Ukrainian military to counter Russian propaganda;
25 and

1 (6) provide any other types of intelligence and
2 cyber cooperation with Ukraine and NATO members
3 that the Secretary of Defense deems appropriate.

4 (b) FORM.—The plan required in subsection (a) shall
5 be submitted in an unclassified form, but may include a
6 classified annex.

7 (c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—
8 In this section, the term “appropriate congressional com-
9 mittees” means—

10 (1) the Committee on Armed Services, the
11 Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent
12 Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
13 Representatives; and

14 (2) the Committee on Armed Services, the
15 Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select
16 Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

17 **SEC. 5. ENHANCING PRESENCE AND CAPABILITIES OF**
18 **UNITED STATES MILITARY IN EUROPE.**

19 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
20 gress that the President should immediately augment the
21 Armed Forces of the United States in the area of responsi-
22 bility of the United States European Command to ensure
23 that the Commander of the United States European Com-
24 mand has the capabilities and capacity needed to meet

1 operational plan requirements for response under Article
2 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty in support of a NATO ally.

3 (b) NOTIFICATION.—Not later than 60 days after the
4 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense
5 shall submit to the congressional defense committees—

6 (1) notification that the Secretary has com-
7 menced the augmentation described in subsection
8 (a), including—

9 (A) the means through which the United
10 States European Command has been provided
11 the capabilities and capacity described in such
12 subsection, including with respect to cyber, spe-
13 cial operations, and intelligence capabilities to
14 counter or mitigate conventional, unconven-
15 tional, and subversive activities of the Russian
16 Federation within the area of responsibility of
17 such command; and

18 (B) how such capabilities and capacity
19 meet operational plan requirements; or

20 (2) a detailed justification of the Secretary for
21 failing to—

22 (A) commence such augmentation; and

23 (B) ensure that the Commander of the
24 United States European Command has such ca-
25 pabilities and capacity.

1 **SEC. 6. ENHANCING READINESS POSTURE OF UNITED**
2 **STATES MILITARY IN EUROPE.**

3 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
4 gress that the President should—

5 (1) immediately correct deficiencies in the read-
6 iness of the Armed Forces of the United States in
7 the area of responsibility of the United States Euro-
8 pean Command to meet the operational plan require-
9 ments for a response under Article 5 of the North
10 Atlantic Treaty in support of a NATO ally; and

11 (2) provide appropriate additional resources to
12 NATO as needed to enhance the readiness of the
13 forces of NATO member states if a response under
14 Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is required.

15 (b) NOTIFICATION.—Not later than 60 days after the
16 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense
17 shall submit to the congressional defense committees—

18 (1) notification that—

19 (A) the Secretary has commenced the ac-
20 tions described in paragraphs (1) and (2) of
21 subsection (a); and

22 (B) the current, as of the date of the noti-
23 fication, and the six-month projected readiness
24 of the Armed Forces of the United States meet
25 the augmentation described in section (4)(a); or

1 (2) a detailed justification of the Secretary for
2 failing to commence the actions described in para-
3 graphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a).

4 **SEC. 7. POSTURING UNITED STATES STRATEGIC CAPABILI-**
5 **TIES.**

6 (a) AEGIS ASHORE SYSTEM.—

7 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than December 31,
8 2016, and pursuant to an agreement between the
9 United States and the Government of Poland, the
10 Secretary of Defense shall ensure the operational
11 availability of the Aegis Ashore system site in Po-
12 land.

13 (2) RELOCATION OF ASSETS.—The Secretary
14 may relocate the necessary assets of the Aegis weap-
15 on system between and within the DDG–51 Class
16 Destroyer program and the Aegis Ashore program to
17 meet mission requirements.

18 (3) BRIEFINGS.—The Secretary shall provide to
19 the congressional defense committees quarterly brief-
20 ings to update the status of the progress in carrying
21 out paragraph (1).

22 (b) THEATER AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE.—

23 (1) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

24 (A) A Patriot battery of the United States
25 providing a short-range air and missile defense

1 capability has previously been rotationally de-
2 ployed to Poland, pursuant to an agreement be-
3 tween the United States and the Government of
4 Poland, during a period occurring between
5 2010 to 2012.

6 (B) The deployment of the Patriot battery
7 did not include operational missiles and was not
8 replaced with another short-range air and mis-
9 sile defense system upon completion of the de-
10 ployment rotation in 2012.

11 (2) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United
12 States that available short-range air and missile de-
13 fense systems and terminal missile defense systems
14 of the United States with operational missiles be
15 rotationally deployed to central and eastern Euro-
16 pean allies, pursuant to agreements between the
17 United States and such allies, to strength the air
18 and missile defense capabilities of such allies.

19 (3) MISSILE DEFENSE CAPABILITY OF PO-
20 LAND.—

21 (A) Not later than December 31, 2014,
22 and pursuant to an agreement between the
23 United States and the Government of Poland,
24 the Secretary of Defense shall deploy to Poland
25 a system providing a short-range air and mis-

1 sile defense capability or terminal missile de-
2 fense capability, or both, and the personnel re-
3 quired to operate and maintain such system.

4 (B) No action may be taken to effect or
5 implement the removal of the system or the
6 personnel described in subparagraph (A) un-
7 less—

8 (i) at least 30 days before the re-
9 moval, the Secretary of Defense notifies
10 the congressional defense committees that
11 such removal is temporary and in the na-
12 tional security interests of the United
13 States; or

14 (ii) the removal is requested by the
15 Government of Poland in the manner pro-
16 vided in the agreement between the United
17 States and the Government of Poland re-
18 garding the system and personnel.

19 (4) NOTIFICATION.—The Secretary of Defense
20 shall notify the appropriate congressional committees
21 by not later than 60 days after the date on which
22 a NATO member state makes a request that com-
23 municates to the Secretary the interest of the mem-
24 ber state in hosting missile defense capabilities de-

1 scribed in paragraph (2) and the plan of the Sec-
2 retary for addressing such request.

3 (c) FORWARD DEPLOYED NUCLEAR WEAPONS.—The
4 Secretary of Defense shall immediately—

5 (1) stop plans for the relocation and consolida-
6 tion of dual-capable aircraft (as defined in section
7 497a of title 10, United States Code) of the United
8 States that are based in Europe;

9 (2) develop plans to temporarily base dual-capable
10 aircraft of the United States in NATO member
11 states that make requests to host such aircraft;

12 (3) conduct siting studies for the construction
13 of weapon storage and security systems and protec-
14 tive aircraft shelters in NATO members states that
15 notify the Secretary of an interest in hosting such
16 systems and shelters and to provide for reasonable
17 burden sharing of associated non-recurring and re-
18 curring costs; and

19 (4) coordinate with NATO member states on
20 the policy considerations of a decision by the United
21 States and its allies to alter the posture of forward
22 deployed nuclear weapons and related capabilities of
23 the United States.

1 **SEC. 8. LIMITATION ON MILITARY CONTACT AND COOPERA-**
2 **TION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND**
3 **THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.**

4 (a) **LIMITATION.**—None of the funds authorized to
5 be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year
6 2015 for the Department of Defense may be used for any
7 bilateral military-to-military contact or cooperation be-
8 tween the Governments of the United States and the Rus-
9 sian Federation until the Secretary of Defense, in con-
10 sultation with the Secretary of State, certifies to the ap-
11 propriate congressional committees that—

12 (1) the armed forces of the Russian Federation
13 are no longer illegally occupying Ukrainian territory;

14 (2) the Russian Federation is respecting the
15 sovereignty of all Ukrainian territory;

16 (3) the Russian Federation is no longer vio-
17 lating the INF Treaty; and

18 (4) the Russian Federation is in compliance
19 with the CFE Treaty and has lifted its suspension
20 of Russian observance of its treaty obligations.

21 (b) **WAIVER.**—The Secretary of Defense may waive
22 the limitation in subsection (a) if—

23 (1) the Secretary of Defense, in coordination
24 with the Secretary of State, submits to the appro-
25 priate congressional committees—

1 (A) a notification that such a waiver is in
2 the national security interest of the United
3 States and a description of the national security
4 interest covered by the waiver; and

5 (B) a report, in unclassified form, explain-
6 ing why the Secretary of Defense cannot make
7 the certification under subsection (a); and

8 (2) a period of 30 days has elapsed following
9 the date on which the Secretary of Defense submits
10 the information in the report under subparagraph
11 (B).

12 (c) EXCEPTION FOR CERTAIN MILITARY BASES.—
13 The certification requirement specified in paragraph (1)
14 of subsection (a) shall not apply to military bases of the
15 Russian Federation in Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula oper-
16 ating in accordance with its 1997 agreement on the Status
17 and Conditions of the Black Sea Fleet Stationing on the
18 Territory of Ukraine.

19 (d) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term “bilateral
20 military-to-military contact or cooperation”—

21 (1) means—

22 (A) reciprocal visits and meetings by high-
23 ranking delegations;

1 (B) information sharing, policy consulta-
2 tions, security dialogues or other forms of con-
3 sultative discussions;

4 (C) exchanges of military instructors,
5 training personnel, and students;

6 (D) exchanges of information;

7 (E) defense planning; and

8 (F) military training or exercises; but

9 (2) does not include any contact or cooperation
10 that is in support of United States stability oper-
11 ations.

12 (e) EFFECTIVE DATE.—This section takes effect on
13 the date of the enactment of this Act and applies with
14 respect to funds described in subsection (a) that are unob-
15 ligated as of such date of enactment.

16 **SEC. 9. LIMITATION ON NON-PROLIFERATION ACTIVITIES**
17 **BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE**
18 **RUSSIAN FEDERATION.**

19 (a) LIMITATION.—None of the funds authorized to
20 be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year
21 2015 for the National Nuclear Security Administration of
22 the Department of Energy may be used for any contact,
23 cooperation, or transfer of technology between the United
24 States and the Russian Federation until the Secretary of
25 Energy, in consultation with the Secretary of State and

1 Secretary of Defense, certifies to the appropriate congress-
2 sional committees that—

3 (1) the armed forces of the Russian Federation
4 are no longer illegally occupying Ukrainian territory;

5 (2) the Russian Federation is respecting the
6 sovereignty of all Ukrainian territory;

7 (3) the Russian Federation is no longer vio-
8 lating the INF Treaty; and

9 (4) the Russian Federation is in compliance
10 with the CFE Treaty and has lifted its suspension
11 of Russian observance of its treaty obligations.

12 (b) WAIVER.—The Secretary of Energy may waive
13 the limitation in subsection (a) if—

14 (1) the Secretary of Energy, in coordination
15 with the Secretary of State and Secretary of De-
16 fense, submits to the appropriate congressional com-
17 mittees—

18 (A) a notification that such a waiver is in
19 the national security interest of the United
20 States and a description of the national security
21 interest covered by the waiver; and

22 (B) a report, in an unclassified form, ex-
23 plaining why the Secretary of Energy cannot
24 make a certification for such under subsection
25 (a); and

1 ment of the Russian military, the tenets and probable de-
2 velopment of Russian security strategy and military strat-
3 egy, and military organizations and operational concepts,
4 for the 20-year period following submission of such report.

5 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—A report required
6 under subsection (a) shall include the following:

7 (1) An assessment of the security situation in
8 regions neighboring Russia.

9 (2) The goals and factors shaping Russian se-
10 curity strategy and military strategy.

11 (3) Trends in Russian security and military be-
12 havior that would be designed to achieve, or that are
13 consistent with, the goals described in paragraph
14 (2).

15 (4) An assessment of Russia’s global and re-
16 gional security objectives, including objectives that
17 would affect NATO, the Middle East, and the Peo-
18 ple’s Republic of China.

19 (5) A detailed assessment of the sizes, loca-
20 tions, and capabilities of Russian nuclear, special op-
21 erations, land, sea, and air forces.

22 (6) Developments in Russian military doctrine
23 and training.

24 (7) An assessment of the proliferation activities
25 of Russia and Russian entities, as a supplier of ma-

1 materials, technologies, or expertise relating to nuclear
2 weapons or other weapons of mass destruction or
3 missile systems.

4 (8) Developments in Russia's asymmetric capa-
5 bilities, including its strategy and efforts to develop
6 and deploy cyberwarfare and electronic warfare ca-
7 pabilities, details on the number of malicious cyber
8 incidents originating from Russia against Depart-
9 ment of Defense infrastructure, and associated ac-
10 tivities originating or suspected of originating from
11 Russia.

12 (9) The strategy and capabilities of Russian
13 space and counterspace programs, including trends,
14 global and regional activities, the involvement of
15 military and civilian organizations, including state-
16 owned enterprises, academic institutions, and com-
17 mercial entities, and efforts to develop, acquire, or
18 gain access to advanced technologies that would en-
19 hance Russian military capabilities.

20 (10) Developments in Russia's nuclear pro-
21 gram, including the size and state of Russia's stock-
22 pile, its nuclear strategy and associated doctrines, its
23 civil and military production capacities, and projec-
24 tions of its future arsenals.

1 (11) A description of Russia’s anti-access and
2 area denial capabilities.

3 (12) A description of Russia’s command, con-
4 trol, communications, computers, intelligence, sur-
5 veillance, and reconnaissance modernization program
6 and its applications for Russia’s precision guided
7 weapons.

8 (13) In consultation with the Secretary of En-
9 ergy and the Secretary of State, developments re-
10 garding United States-Russian engagement and co-
11 operation on security matters.

12 (14) The current state of United States mili-
13 tary-to-military contacts with the Russian Federa-
14 tion Armed Forces, which shall include the following:

15 (A) A comprehensive and coordinated
16 strategy for such military-to-military contacts
17 and updates to the strategy.

18 (B) A summary of all such military-to-mili-
19 tary contacts during the one-year period pre-
20 ceeding the report, including a summary of top-
21 ics discussed and questions asked by the Rus-
22 sian participants in those contacts.

23 (C) A description of such military-to-mili-
24 tary contacts scheduled for the 12-month period

1 following such report and the plan for future
2 contacts.

3 (D) The Secretary's assessment of the ben-
4 efits the Russians expect to gain from such
5 military-to-military contacts.

6 (E) The Secretary's assessment of the ben-
7 efits the Department of Defense expects to gain
8 from such military-to-military contacts, and any
9 concerns regarding such contacts.

10 (F) The Secretary's assessment of how
11 such military-to-military contacts fit into the
12 larger security relationship between the United
13 States and the Russian Federation.

14 (15) A description of Russian military-to-mili-
15 tary relationships with other countries, including the
16 size and activity of military attaché offices around
17 the world and military education programs con-
18 ducted in Russia for other countries or in other
19 countries for the Russians.

20 (16) Other military and security developments
21 involving Russia that the Secretary of Defense con-
22 siders relevant to United States national security.

○