1.Short title; table of
contents
(a)This Act may be cited
as the United Nations Transparency,
Accountability, and Reform Act of 2011
.
(b)The table of contents is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
TITLE I—Funding of the United Nations
Sec. 101. Findings.
Sec. 102. Apportionment of the United Nations regular budget on
a voluntary basis.
Sec. 103. Budget justification for United States contributions
to the regular budget of the United Nations.
Sec. 104. Report on United Nations reform.
TITLE II—Transparency and accountability for United States
contributions to the United Nations
Sec. 201. Findings.
Sec. 202. Definitions.
Sec. 203. Independent and objective conduct of audits and
investigations relating to United States contributions to the United Nations
system.
Sec. 204. Transparency for United States
contributions.
Sec. 205. Integrity for United States
contributions.
Sec. 206. Refund of monies owed by the United Nations to the
United States.
Sec. 207. Annual reports on United States contributions to the
United Nations.
TITLE III—United States policy at the United Nations
Sec. 301. Annual publication.
Sec. 302. Annual financial disclosure.
Sec. 303. Policy with respect to expansion of the United
Nations Security Council.
Sec. 304. Access to reports and audits.
Sec. 305. Waiver of immunity.
Sec. 306. Terrorism and the United Nations.
Sec. 307. Report on United Nations personnel.
Sec. 308. United Nations treaty bodies.
Sec. 309. Anti-Semitism and the United Nations.
Sec. 310. Regional group inclusion of Israel.
Sec. 311. United States policy on tier 3 human rights
violators.
TITLE IV—Status of Palestinian entities at the United
Nations
Sec. 401. Findings.
Sec. 402. Statement of policy.
Sec. 403. Implementation.
TITLE V—United Nations Human Rights Council
Sec. 501. Findings.
Sec. 502. United Nations Human Rights Council membership and
funding.
TITLE VI—Goldstone report
Sec. 601. Findings.
Sec. 602. Statement of policy.
Sec. 603. Withholding of funds; refund of United States
taxpayer dollars.
TITLE VII—Durban process
Sec. 701. Findings.
Sec. 702. Sense of Congress; statement of policy.
Sec. 703. Non-participation in the Durban process.
Sec. 704. Withholding of funds; refund of United States
taxpayer dollars.
TITLE VIII—United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Middle East
Sec. 801. Findings.
Sec. 802. United States contributions to UNRWA.
Sec. 803. Sense of Congress.
TITLE IX—International Atomic Energy Agency
Sec. 901. Technical Cooperation Program.
Sec. 902. United States policy at the IAEA.
Sec. 903. Sense of Congress regarding the Nuclear Security
Action Plan of the IAEA.
TITLE X—Peacekeeping
Sec. 1001. Reform of United Nations peacekeeping
operations.
Sec. 1002. Policy relating to reform of United Nations
peacekeeping operations.
Sec. 1003. Certification.
2.In this Act:
(1)Appropriate
congressional committeesThe term appropriate congressional
committees means—
(A)the Committees on
Foreign Relations, Appropriations, and Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs of the Senate; and
(B)the Committees on
Foreign Affairs, Appropriations, and Oversight and Government Reform of the
House of Representatives.
(2)The
term employee means an individual who is employed in the general
services, professional staff, or senior management of the United Nations,
including consultants, contractors, and subcontractors.
(3)The term General Assembly means the General
Assembly of the United Nations.
(4)The term Member State means a Member State of
the United Nations. Such term is synonymous with the term
country.
(5)The
term Secretary means the Secretary of State.
(6)The term Secretary-General
means the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
(7)The term
Security Council means the Security Council of the United
Nations.
(8)The term UN means the United
Nations.
(9)The term United Nations entity means any
United Nations agency, commission, conference, council, court, department,
forum, fund, institute, office, organization, partnership, program, subsidiary
body, tribunal, trust, university or academic body, related organization or
subsidiary body, wherever located, that flies the United Nations flag or is
authorized to use the United Nations logo, including but not limited to those
United Nations affiliated agencies and bodies identified as recipients of
United States contributions under section 1225(b)(3)(E) of the John Warner
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109–364;
120 Stat. 2424).
(10)The term United Nations system means the
aggregation of all United Nations entities, as defined in paragraph (9).
(11)United States
contributionThe term United States contribution
means an assessed or voluntary contribution, whether financial, in-kind, or
otherwise, from the United States Federal Government to a United Nations
entity, including contributions passed through other entities for ultimate use
by a United Nations entity. United States contributions include those
contributions identified pursuant to section 1225(b)(3)(E) of the John Warner
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109–364;
120 Stat. 2424).
<enum>I</enum><header>Funding of the
United Nations</header>
<section id="HB045E299E2AD49398507301A4E84D7DA"><enum>101.</enum><header>Findings</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">Congress makes the following
findings:</text>
<paragraph id="H4EFE5BFB7A004045850BE610755E75CE"><enum>(1)</enum><text>The United States
pays billions of dollars into the United Nations system every year (almost
$7,700,000,000 in 2010, according to the Office of Management and Budget),
significantly more than any other nation.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H566615CC298647EC897DF1A5BB02F009"><enum>(2)</enum><text>Under current
rules and contribution levels, it is possible to assemble the two-thirds
majority needed for important United Nations budget votes with a group of
countries that, taken together, pay less than 1 percent of the total United
Nations regular budget.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H137DF752F625442EB5266A1E6F531A5A"><enum>(3)</enum><text>The disconnect
between contribution levels and management control creates significant perverse
incentives in terms of United Nations spending, transparency, and
accountability.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H2ECBD33721F94731AB4B616EAE3D88C2"><enum>(4)</enum><text>The United Nations
system suffers from unacceptably high levels of waste, fraud, and abuse, which
seriously impair the ability of the United Nations to fulfill the ideals of its
founding.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H1F71C38B46E543A78E78F1831BBE4FB0"><enum>(5)</enum><text>Significant
improvements in United Nations transparency and accountability are necessary
for improving public perceptions of and United States support for United
Nations operations.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HA7BC9C47A74E4F44BC1BA8E2CB60BBE9"><enum>(6)</enum><text>Because of their
need to justify future contributions from donors, voluntarily funded
organizations have more incentive to be responsive and efficient in their
operations than organizations funded by compulsory contributions that are not
tied to performance.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HEB76502CAD614204A14A653CB939C9CA"><enum>(7)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">Catherine Bertini, the former UN
Under-Secretary-General for Management and director of the World Food Programme
(WFP), has stated, <quote>Voluntary funding creates an entirely different
atmosphere at WFP than at the UN. At WFP, every staff member knows that we have
to be as efficient, accountable, transparent, and results-oriented as possible.
If we are not, donor governments can take their funding elsewhere in a very
competitive world among UN agencies, NGOs, and bilateral
governments.</quote>.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H4727B6485EDB4475AA405AD16C3A4621"><enum>(8)</enum><text>Article XVII of
the Charter of the United Nations, which states that <quote>[t]he expenses of
the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General
Assembly</quote>, leaves to the discretion of the General Assembly the basis of
apportionment, which could be done on the basis of voluntary pledges by Member
States.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HF6F3D13C2A3A4D56AD9D79E672A13D56"><enum>(9)</enum><text>Unlike United
States assessed contributions to the United Nations regular budget, which are
statutorily capped at 22 percent of the total, there is no cap on voluntary
contributions.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H45FCFD5A29A1416A85A71028173E7E4B"><enum>(10)</enum><text>The United
States, which contributes generously to international organizations whose
activities it recognizes as credible, worthwhile, and efficient, contributes
more than 22 percent of the budget of certain voluntarily funded United Nations
Specialized Agencies.</text>
</paragraph></section><section id="H7F36CB868D1C4CDB85FCAD7B7FDBD01E"><enum>102.</enum><header>Apportionment
of the United Nations regular budget on a voluntary basis</header>
<subsection id="HEA3DFABE4D184526B41C465E4E5ABD9E"><enum>(a)</enum><header>United States
policy</header>
<paragraph id="HF680D044FCEE4DE5A0F16B14F7F925F9"><enum>(1)</enum><header>Voluntary
funding</header><text>It is the policy of the United States to seek to shift
the funding mechanism for the regular budget of the United Nations from an
assessed to a voluntary basis.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H0FDD3EF3FA6943E498F3B293F3C7E5DE"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Requirement to
seek change</header><text>The President shall direct the United States
Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and
influence of the United States at the United Nations to shift the funding
mechanism for the regular budget of the United Nations to a voluntary basis,
and to make it a priority to build support for such a transformational change
among Member States, particularly key United Nations donors.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="HA8DEF14782D74EA0868A2E2AF497D12F"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Certification of
predominantly voluntary UN regular budget finding</header><text>A certification
described in this section is a certification by the Secretary to the
appropriate congressional committees that at least 80 percent of the total
regular budget (not including extra-budgetary contributions) of the United
Nations is apportioned on a voluntary basis. Each such certification shall be
effective for a period of no more than 1 year, and shall be promptly revoked by
the Secretary, with notice to the appropriate congressional committees, if the
underlying circumstances change so as not to warrant such certification.</text>
</subsection><subsection id="H35C55677125041DAB42E31522FF38ED5"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Withholding of
nonvoluntary contributions</header>
<paragraph id="H7A948DE3A3A74D689473431C3804462D"><enum>(1)</enum><header>In
general</header><text>Beginning 2 years after the date of the enactment of this
Act and notwithstanding any other provision of law, no funds may be obligated
or expended for a United States assessed contribution to the regular budget of
the United Nations in an amount greater than 50 percent of the United States
share of assessed contributions for the regular budget of the United Nations
unless there is in effect a certification by the Secretary, as described in
subsection (b).</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H4B29BFE62AAC48388A90DA8F367796FE"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Disposition of
withheld funds</header><text>For a period of 1 year after appropriation, funds
appropriated for use as a United States contribution to the regular budget of
the United Nations but withheld from obligation and expenditure pursuant to
paragraph (1) may be obligated and expended for that purpose upon the
certification described in subsection (b). After 1 year, in the absence of such
certification, those funds shall revert to the United States Treasury.</text>
</paragraph></subsection></section><section id="HF3BE9E46C69B48BC8C7DFBE96C0C3935"><enum>103.</enum><header>Budget
justification for United States contributions to the regular budget of the
United Nations</header>
<subsection id="H3A35C457A2EA4A2EA5D285D103B4BFC6"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Detailed
itemization</header><text>The President shall include in the annual
congressional budget justification a detailed itemized request in support of
the contribution of the United States to the regular budget of the United
Nations.</text>
</subsection><subsection id="H9CFE4894831C458F93B9F7A4BA94ACF8"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Contents of
detailed itemization</header><text>The detailed itemization required under
subsection (a) shall—</text>
<paragraph id="H234886867F38443A970C5AC89F549843"><enum>(1)</enum><text>contain
information relating to the amounts requested in support of each of the various
sections and titles of the regular budget of the United Nations; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HC666BC31F7F346E590E1E1BE6C2BA48B"><enum>(2)</enum><text>compare the
amounts requested for the current year with the actual or estimated amounts
contributed by the United States in previous fiscal years for the same sections
and titles.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="H05958ED8140844DDA50763EE8BB7330B"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Adjustments and
notification</header><text>If the United Nations proposes an adjustment to its
regular assessed budget, the Secretary shall, at the time such adjustment is
presented to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
(ACABQ), notify and consult with the appropriate congressional
committees.</text>
</subsection></section><section id="HA57D08DF2345415899C26666A3DDAFF0"><enum>104.</enum><header>Report on
United Nations reform</header>
<subsection id="H785E91D8E27442F79EF19718077293CE"><enum>(a)</enum><header>In
general</header><text>Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report on United Nations reform.</text>
</subsection><subsection id="HF03E2C90D5184119A9A0820D8CD7B093"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Contents</header><text>The
report required under subsection (a) shall describe—</text>
<paragraph id="H77CD2DC4AE8D4B11938D277A237D82DC"><enum>(1)</enum><text>progress toward
the goal of shifting the funding for the regular budget of the United Nations
to a voluntary basis as identified in section 102, and a detailed description
of efforts and activities by United States diplomats and officials toward that
end;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HE1C67CA7C9EE4146A41AF8F04A4FC4CA"><enum>(2)</enum><text>progress toward
each of the policy goals identified in this title, and a detailed,
goal-specific description of efforts and activities by United States diplomats
and officials toward those ends;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HFAE0848F13854E6FB2AEEDEA0022DA09"><enum>(3)</enum><text>the status of the
implementation of management reforms within the United Nations and its
specialized agencies;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H0744281F606341208F3F928E51130B7A"><enum>(4)</enum><text>the number of
outputs, reports, or other mandates generated by General Assembly resolutions
that have been eliminated;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H3DA23E2B38A04D918BB184906C465909"><enum>(5)</enum><text>the progress of
the General Assembly to modernize and streamline the committee structure and
its specific recommendations on oversight and committee outputs, consistent
with the March 2005 report of the Secretary-General entitled <quote>In Larger
Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All</quote>;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HED0ADEE2ACF24C6D9525E4E6A87EF358"><enum>(6)</enum><text>the status of the
review by the General Assembly of all mandates older than 5 years and how
resources have been redirected to new challenges, consistent with such March
2005 report of the Secretary-General;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HE162979B499A422E89DD4B0BF6A280EE"><enum>(7)</enum><text>the continued
utility and relevance of the Economic and Financial Committee and the Social,
Humanitarian, and Cultural Committee, in light of the duplicative agendas of
those committees and the Economic and Social Council; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H11DA3922E4BE49448F00C4577185A42D"><enum>(8)</enum><text>whether the United
Nations or any of its specialized agencies has contracted with any party
included on the List of Parties Excluded from Federal Procurement and
Nonprocurement Programs.</text>
</paragraph></subsection></section><enum>II</enum><header>Transparency and
accountability for United States contributions to the United Nations</header>
<section id="HA37E92E0CB164981A9E11EF04103172A"><enum>201.</enum><header>Findings</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">Congress makes the following
findings:</text>
<paragraph id="H54515DFC14774C729B31DAFC957C507A"><enum>(1)</enum><text>As underscored by
continuing revelations of waste, fraud, and abuse, oversight and accountability
mechanisms within the United Nations system remain significantly deficient,
despite decades of reform attempts, including those initiated by
Secretaries-General of the United Nations.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H07D255503E3342E686892B7D75F0B877"><enum>(2)</enum><text>Notwithstanding
the personal intentions of any Secretary-General of the United Nations to
promote institutional transparency and accountability within the United Nations
system, the Secretary-General lacks the power to impose far reaching management
reforms without the concurrence of the General Assembly.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H944190B240304B3097C68FA1D0A377AA"><enum>(3)</enum><text>Groupings of
Member States whose voting power in the General Assembly significantly outpaces
their proportional contributions to the United Nations system have repeatedly
and successfully defeated, delayed, and diluted various reform proposals that
would have enabled more detailed oversight and scrutiny of United Nations
system operations and expenditures.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H878F2E07951B453AA868F94C6C05D7C2"><enum>(4)</enum><text>To an unacceptable
degree, major donor states, including the United States, lack access to
reasonably detailed, reliable information that would allow them to determine
how their contributions have been spent by various United Nations system
entities, further contributing to the lack of accountability within the United
Nations system.</text>
</paragraph></section><section id="H4F30EDC897B84B11A4271662133AD48B"><enum>202.</enum><header>Definitions</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">In this title:</text>
<paragraph id="HA834ADB85FEC4F0DB1B911C9CA54AA34"><enum>(1)</enum><header>Transparency
certification</header><text>The term <term>transparency certification</term>
means an annual, written affirmation by the head or authorized designee of a
United Nations entity to the Comptroller General of the United States that the
entity will cooperate with the Comptroller General and the appropriate
congressional committees, including by providing the Comptroller General, and
the appropriate congressional committees, upon request, with full, complete,
and unfettered access to oversight information.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H56A31BBDB60847D596A5A22DA1DC6199"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Oversight
information</header><text>The term <term>oversight information</term>
includes—</text>
<subparagraph id="H4F6FB7BD620A454B9C91386FBCE618A8"><enum>(A)</enum><text>internally and
externally commissioned audits, investigatory reports, program reviews,
performance reports, and evaluations;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H49E4EAE97E9A47BDA3A83C1BA93DEB00"><enum>(B)</enum><text>financial
statements, records, and billing systems;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="HB16E16DCB7CF4E91B180641BD7C8CD4F"><enum>(C)</enum><text>program budgets
and program budget implications, including revised estimates and reports
produced by or provided to the Secretary-General and the Secretary-General’s
agents on budget related matters;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="HC22A7BBFDC264E36B77A144422FE0A87"><enum>(D)</enum><text>operational plans,
budgets, and budgetary analyses for peacekeeping operations;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="HFAB3F4CD4B844555B62AD278DE55D4D0"><enum>(E)</enum><text>analyses and
reports regarding the scale of assessments;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H3B8ADC5D8C8A4F8A8B806DDFF73AE6E5"><enum>(F)</enum><text>databases and
other data systems containing financial or programmatic information;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H47C1CBD2F3514D6AA51F2E69C50E10C2"><enum>(G)</enum><text>documents or other
records alleging or involving improper use of resources, misconduct,
mismanagement, or other violations of rules and regulations applicable to a
United Nations entity; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H0E1A07B7447B4D418E158BE41BD2F8EB"><enum>(H)</enum><text>other
documentation relevant to the audit and investigative work of the Comptroller
General of the United States with respect to United States contributions to the
United Nations system.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="H5B855D2C4692431B9BFA20475A9E91A6"><enum>(3)</enum><header>Accountability
certification</header><text>The term <term>accountability certification</term>
means an annual, written affirmation by the head or authorized designee of a
United Nations entity to the Comptroller General of the United States that the
entity—</text>
<subparagraph id="H3D799D87844B44CBBC0854DCD94ED819"><enum>(A)</enum><text>provides the
public with full, complete, and unfettered access to all relevant documentation
relating to operations and activities, including budget and procurement
activities;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="HE3FB1C48E5684D7596CFFCEF90A2D85A"><enum>(B)</enum><text>implements and
upholds policies and procedures to protect whistleblowers;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="HE9B5C320A76F4B328535A61D5B44B5E3"><enum>(C)</enum><text>implements and
upholds policies and procedures to require the filing of individual annual
financial disclosure forms by each of its employees at the P–5 level and above
and to require that such forms be made available to the Office of Internal
Oversight Services, to Member States, and to the public;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H7097E1E497044CA7A827FFCC9DACA0E2"><enum>(D)</enum><text>has established an
effective ethics office;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H3EDE5594E3B9425AA39C54AF1D2832D5"><enum>(E)</enum><text>has established a
fully independent, autonomous, and effective internal oversight body;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="HA73466D80B46480089421BCA50A66BAC"><enum>(F)</enum><text>has adopted and
implemented, and is in full compliance with, International Public Sector
Accounting Standards; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H631E54FD8F5342DE883C246AF22E5377"><enum>(G)</enum><text>has established a
cap on its administrative overhead costs.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph></section><section id="H3322DD5860CC4BA28654CE6BCDE0877E"><enum>203.</enum><header>Independent and
objective conduct of audits and investigations relating to United States
contributions to the United Nations system</header>
<subsection id="HF7AE7007C58F433FB8BA965C3E5597EE"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Purpose</header><text>The
purpose of this section is to make possible the independent and objective
conduct of audits and investigations relating to United States contributions to
the United Nations system and the use of those contributions by United Nations
entities, in an effort to eliminate and deter waste, fraud, and abuse in the
use of those contributions, and thereby to contribute to the development of
greater transparency, accountability, and internal controls throughout the
United Nations system.</text>
</subsection><subsection id="H1C1E7D0C24184CCE89D8B6F89B600E83"><enum>(b)</enum><header>The comptroller
general</header>
<paragraph id="H370DEA04E56C4C16A359B73727C384A3"><enum>(1)</enum><header>Duties</header>
<subparagraph id="idDDEC91960EF54FCFAAF00CC861A504E1"><enum>(A)</enum><header>Audits and
investigations</header><text>The Comptroller General of the United States shall
conduct, supervise, and coordinate audits and investigations of—</text>
<clause id="HF38CDE8F758340619CC11F5B44C93C9D"><enum>(i)</enum><text>the
treatment, handling, expenditure, and use of United States contributions by and
to United Nations entities; and</text>
</clause><clause id="H4B168B58B24340708B2107E9F71AB8CD"><enum>(ii)</enum><text>the
adequacy of accounting, oversight, and internal control mechanisms at United
Nations entities that receive United States contributions.</text>
</clause></subparagraph><subparagraph id="H9FF9830979624B5A8F87BE5C572DC035"><enum>(B)</enum><header>Recordkeeping</header><text>The
Comptroller General shall collect and maintain current records regarding
transparency certifications and accountability certifications by all United
Nations entities that receive United States contributions.</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="HF92F636D50AE44E1A7EEDE58A7831459"><enum>(C)</enum><header>Briefings</header><text>The
Comptroller General shall keep the appropriate congressional committees fully
and promptly informed of how United Nations entities are spending United States
contributions by means of reports, testimony, and briefings.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="H2C8A0D7FC46142D2913C5AA0C20BAECE"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Referrals</header>
<subparagraph id="H9537D79F484B48428198E8DD8947F799"><enum>(A)</enum><header>Criminal law
violations</header><text>The Comptroller General shall promptly report to the
United States Attorney General and to the appropriate congressional committees
when the Comptroller General has reasonable grounds to believe a United States
Federal criminal law has been violated by a United Nations entity or one of its
employees, contractors, or representatives.</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H9E8A719A60B34D48A73A67E7FEED356C"><enum>(B)</enum><header>Mismanagement</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The Comptroller General shall promptly
report, when appropriate, to the appropriate congressional committees, and to
the Secretary-General or to the head of the appropriate United Nations entity,
cases where the Comptroller General reasonably believes that mismanagement,
misfeasance, or malfeasance is likely to have taken place within a United
Nations entity and disciplinary proceedings are likely justified.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="HDA0556A1C52B4EB4B05AF765A656D080"><enum>(3)</enum><header>Cooperation by
United States Government entities</header>
<subparagraph id="HAF4E7679FAC84CFEB6917B3A03459FE5"><enum>(A)</enum><header>In
general</header><text>In carrying out the duties, responsibilities, and
authorities of the Comptroller General under this section, the Comptroller
shall receive the cooperation of other Federal agencies.</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H61950E1A6DBF40E9A1DCC0B1D8FC35F8"><enum>(B)</enum><header>Responses to
requests</header><text>Upon request of the Comptroller General for information
or assistance from any department, agency, or other entity of the Federal
Government, the head of such entity shall, insofar as is practicable and not in
contravention of any existing law, furnish such information or assistance to
the Comptroller General, or an authorized designee.</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H83D4EC8C8F844C4BBA0270F9A4385B1A"><enum>(C)</enum><header>Reporting of
lack of cooperation</header><text>Whenever information or assistance requested
by the Comptroller General is, in the judgment of the Comptroller General,
unreasonably refused or not provided, the Comptroller General shall report the
circumstances to the appropriate congressional committees without delay.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="H54710A28617C4E339C68A49DC8299C99"><enum>(4)</enum><header>Confirmation of
transparency by United Nations entities</header>
<subparagraph id="H9F83D55D72874F5F881D518D117455FA"><enum>(A)</enum><header>Prompt notice by
comptroller general</header><text>Whenever information or assistance requested
from a United Nations entity by the Comptroller General pursuant to a
transparency certification is, in the opinion of the Comptroller General,
unreasonably refused or not provided in a timely manner, the Comptroller
General shall notify the appropriate congressional committees, the head of that
particular United Nations entity, and the Secretary-General of the
circumstances in writing, without delay.</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="HC5A9DDDE70C04BC2ADD8644A3C0EA424"><enum>(B)</enum><header>Notice of
compliance</header><text>If and when the information or assistance being sought
by the Comptroller General in connection with a notification pursuant to
subparagraph (A) is provided to the satisfaction of the Comptroller General,
the Comptroller General shall so notify in writing to the appropriate
congressional committees and the head of that particular United Nations
entity.</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="HB2A50A513C014B3881EFE9D54C56C7E0"><enum>(C)</enum><header>Noncompliance</header><text>If
the information or assistance being sought by the Comptroller General in
connection with a notification pursuant to subparagraph (A) is not provided to
the satisfaction of the Comptroller General within 90 days of that
notification, then the United Nations entity that is the subject of the
notification shall be deemed to be noncompliant with its transparency
certification.</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="HF845774C5AD841D99A0D4C8CF015E1D9"><enum>(D)</enum><header>Restoration of
compliance</header><text>After the situation has been resolved to the
satisfaction of the Comptroller General, the Comptroller General shall promptly
provide prompt, written notification of that fact and of the restoration of
compliance, along with a description of the basis for the Comptroller General’s
decision, to the appropriate congressional committees, the head of that United
Nations entity, the Secretary-General, and any office or agency of the Federal
Government that has provided that United Nations entity with any United States
contribution during the prior 2 years.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="H6297FB76F0DF4DC9941FDDBCCB42E9B8"><enum>(5)</enum><header>Confirmation of
accountability by United Nations entities</header>
<subparagraph id="H7CB1FD43FB94464F92581C2C7DC17D1F"><enum>(A)</enum><header>Prompt notice by
comptroller general</header><text>Whenever a United Nations entity that has
provided an accountability certification is, in the opinion of the Comptroller
General, not in full compliance with any or all of the provisions of that
certification, the Comptroller General shall notify the appropriate
congressional committees, the head of that particular United Nations entity,
and the Secretary-General of the circumstances in writing, without
delay.</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H3BC6CA630D90436283632BC5A519129D"><enum>(B)</enum><header>Notice of
compliance</header><text>If and when the United Nations entity resumes full
compliance with its accountability certification following the provision of the
notification pursuant to subparagraph (A), the Comptroller General shall so
notify in writing the appropriate congressional committees and the head of that
United Nations entity.</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="HBB09139712E143B7ACEAC12A6571C386"><enum>(C)</enum><header>Noncompliance</header><text>If
the United Nations entity named in the notification in subparagraph (A) does
not resume full compliance with its accountability certification to the
satisfaction of the Comptroller General within 90 days of that notification,
then the United Nations entity that is the subject of the notification shall be
deemed to be noncompliant with its accountability certification, and the
Comptroller General shall provide prompt, written notification of that fact to
the appropriate congressional committees, the head of that United Nations
entity, the Secretary-General, and any office or agency of the Federal
Government that has provided that United Nations entity with any United States
contribution during the prior 2 years.</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H3F07456E480C45B691AF5537A5BF15ED"><enum>(D)</enum><header>Restoration of
compliance</header><text>After the situation has been resolved to the
satisfaction of the Comptroller General, the Comptroller General shall promptly
provide prompt, written notification of that fact and of the restoration of
compliance, along with a description of the basis for the Comptroller General’s
decision, to the appropriate congressional committees, the head of that United
Nations entity, the Secretary-General, and any office or agency of the Federal
Government that has provided that United Nations entity with any United States
contribution during the prior 2 years.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="H72B11D2CA35F456D82FFE520D3C55351"><enum>(6)</enum><header>Reports</header>
<subparagraph id="HEE0C8D1F7FC1477BB9A533AA9E4D51E7"><enum>(A)</enum><header>Audit and
investigation reports</header><text>Promptly upon completion, the Comptroller
General shall provide copies of each audit and investigation report completed
pursuant to paragraph (1) to the appropriate congressional committees, and, to
the extent permissible under United States law, the head of each United Nations
entity that is the subject of that particular report.</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H6B105729722D4BB9B72EA56B79D77A03"><enum>(B)</enum><header>Semiannual
reports</header><text>Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, and semiannually thereafter, the Comptroller General shall submit to
the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes a list of and
detailed description of the circumstances surrounding any notification of
noncompliance issued pursuant to paragraph (4)(C) or paragraph (5)(C) during
the covered timeframe, and whether and when the Comptroller General has
reversed such finding of noncompliance.</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H6440A345895D43D1A39743A1C0A4A4B3"><enum>(C)</enum><header>Prohibited
disclosures</header><text>Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to
authorize the public disclosure of information that is—</text>
<clause id="H04894C8ED4E84EA7B305387D28999539"><enum>(i)</enum><text>specifically
prohibited from disclosure by any other provision of law;</text>
</clause><clause id="HB82046F3AF594AF2AE0CE2E43CE09CCA"><enum>(ii)</enum><text>specifically
required by executive order to be protected from disclosure in the interest of
national defense or national security or in the conduct of foreign affairs;
or</text>
</clause><clause id="H24734A8C4464420DB91E8B590BBFBC4C"><enum>(iii)</enum><text>a
part of an ongoing criminal investigation.</text>
</clause></subparagraph><subparagraph id="HE7645702E14F4B49B9D9816F901373E6"><enum>(D)</enum><header>Privacy
protections</header><text>The Comptroller General shall exempt from public
disclosure information received from a United Nations entity or developed
during an audit or investigation that the Comptroller General believes—</text>
<clause id="HB335BFE0AEBE4E798C23B8C563D1035F"><enum>(i)</enum><text>constitutes a
trade secret or privileged and confidential personal financial
information;</text>
</clause><clause id="H3C4F994DE4ED4C2E8F78138BD446A0FE"><enum>(ii)</enum><text>accuses a
particular person of a crime;</text>
</clause><clause id="HAF226F05E0034FE78F8FD4BA62B985A9"><enum>(iii)</enum><text>would, if
publicly disclosed, constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy; and</text>
</clause><clause id="HF7EECAB164CB47F39E8584FD4C938A56"><enum>(iv)</enum><text>would compromise
an ongoing law enforcement investigation or judicial trial in the United
States.</text>
</clause></subparagraph><subparagraph id="H5286211824CD4119B9E9526606C64C0C"><enum>(E)</enum><header>Publication</header><text>Subject
to the exceptions detailed in subparagraphs (C) and (D), the Comptroller
General shall promptly publish each report under this subsection on the Web
site of the Government Accountability Office.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph></subsection></section><section id="HBCC85852C2CB483888C6D6E2EED09609"><enum>204.</enum><header>Transparency
for United States contributions</header>
<subsection id="HE716C357298A4C5388AC13395714513F"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Funding
prerequisites</header><text>Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no
funds made available for use as a United States contribution to any United
Nations entity may be obligated or expended if—</text>
<paragraph id="H6464373103F941E789B187FD8BCAE872"><enum>(1)</enum><text>the intended
United Nations entity recipient has not provided to the Comptroller General
within the preceding year a transparency certification;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HAACF51310D664A3DBD1924155441083C"><enum>(2)</enum><text>the intended
United Nations entity recipient is noncompliant with its transparency
certification;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HC1E43F8E9D7B407E814EA8781150C354"><enum>(3)</enum><text>the intended
United Nations entity recipient has not provided to the Comptroller General
within the preceding year an accountability certification; or</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HD402E6ED63BA4F56A655E94967827302"><enum>(4)</enum><text>the intended
United Nations entity is noncompliant with its accountability certification as
described in section 203(b)(5)(C).</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="H329678989C3F4E72B125E92FEE0492C2"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Treatment of
funds withheld for noncompliance</header><text>At the conclusion of each fiscal
year, any funds that had been appropriated for use as a United States
contribution to a United Nations entity during that fiscal year, but could not
be obligated or expended because of the restrictions of subsection (a), shall
be returned to the United States Treasury, and are not subject to reprogramming
for any other use. Any such funds returned to the Treasury shall not be
considered arrears to be repaid to any United Nations entity.</text>
</subsection><subsection id="H39D1A60EEBA74940A9766B810E54CA02"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Presidential
waiver</header><text>The President may waive the limitations of this section
with respect to a particular United States contribution to a particular United
Nations entity within a single fiscal year if the President determines that
failure to do so would pose an extraordinary threat to the national security of
the United States and provides notification and explanation of that
determination to the appropriate congressional committees.</text>
</subsection></section><section id="H1C54FD0F03644AF38AE301F4CB12B5AE"><enum>205.</enum><header>Integrity for
United States contributions</header>
<subsection id="H9E190ABB4C774E108E400F8C5ED787D9"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Limitations</header>
<paragraph id="H3B32C9AEE109466E918134BFDFFA64BB"><enum>(1)</enum><header>contributions to
international organizations</header><text>No funds made available for use under
the heading <quote>Contributions to International Organizations</quote> may be
used for any purpose other than an assessed United States contribution to a
United Nations entity or other international organization.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HB2C0A2978B94410D9D7BC6FC17ADEF80"><enum>(2)</enum><header>International
organizations and programs</header><text>No funds made available for use under
the heading <quote>International Organizations and Programs</quote> may be used
for any purpose other than a voluntary United States contribution to a United
Nations entity or other international organization.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H822CBAF82D3148048E8CC9220966E8E2"><enum>(3)</enum><header>Contributions to
international peacekeeping activities</header><text>No funds made available for
use under the heading <quote>Contributions to International Peacekeeping
Activities</quote> may be used for any purpose other than a United States
contribution to United Nations peacekeeping activities, to the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, or to the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="H117F12B5CFAE453B9F206DB1982CD2E8"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Treatment of
funds withheld for noncompliance</header><text>At the conclusion of each fiscal
year, any funds that had been appropriated for use as a United States
contribution to a United Nations entity during that fiscal year, but could not
be obligated or expended because of the restrictions of subsection (a), shall
be returned to the United States Treasury, and are not subject to reprogramming
for any other use. Any such funds returned to the Treasury shall not be
considered arrears to be repaid to any United Nations entity.</text>
</subsection></section><section id="H9173CE6929D24128B9F6A4A39AAA3CA6"><enum>206.</enum><header>Refund of
monies owed by the United Nations to the United States</header>
<subsection id="H0EF9E38FE37D4131ABE516DFA33C7EE2"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Findings</header><text>Congress
makes the following findings:</text>
<paragraph id="H3B3BCCE0408E46D0A062870F1E565FA9"><enum>(1)</enum><text>United States
taxpayer funds overpaid to United Nations entities and payable back to the
United States sometimes remain in the hands of the United Nations because the
United States has not requested the return of those funds.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H959C65CA335D40B789194A534A3A6693"><enum>(2)</enum><text>Such funds have
been paid into, among other United Nations entities, the United Nations Tax
Equalization Fund (TEF), which was established under the provisions of United
Nations General Assembly Resolution 973 (1955), and which is used to reimburse
United Nations staff members subject to United States income taxes for the cost
of those taxes.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H76F3A94AEFF84DB9A2A2EDCDADAA366C"><enum>(3)</enum><text>In recent years,
the TEF has taken in considerably more money than it has paid out, with the
United States apparently overpaying into the TEF by $52,200,000 in the
2008–2009 timeframe alone.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H9F12B94424744CB3A693393952B2C26C"><enum>(4)</enum><text>According to the
United Nations Financial Report and Audited Financial Statements released on
July 29, 2010, <quote>As of 31 December 2009, an amount of $179.0 million was
payable to the United States of America pending instructions as to its
disposition.</quote>.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H0711CE382C8748F2B665EF9935F12943"><enum>(5)</enum><text>That balance was
allowed to accrue notwithstanding United Nations Financial Regulation 4.12,
which states that any such surpluses <quote>shall be credited against the
assessed contributions due from that Member State the following
year</quote>.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HFC9FA05632B241E48436E3E84924813F"><enum>(6)</enum><text>Allowing the
United Nations to regularly overcharge the United States and to retain those
overpayments, or to spend them on wholly unrelated activities, is a disservice
to United States taxpayers and a subversion of the congressional budget
process.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="HA501A383964D4F84945079E117A80854"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Statement of
policy</header><text>It is the policy of the United States—</text>
<paragraph id="H96E7CC86FE034A2C801B7AC30EDE612C"><enum>(1)</enum><text>to annually
instruct the United Nations to return to the United States any surplus assessed
contributions or other overpayments by the United States to any United Nations
entity; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HE2223787AF794D9AA97369C339FE735C"><enum>(2)</enum><text>to use the voice
and vote of the United States to press the United Nations to reform its TEF
assessment procedures to reduce the repeated discrepancies between TEF income
and expenditures.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="H399FED8009394AFAA831F50177AD7E7C"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Certification
and withholding</header><text>For each and every fiscal year beginning after
the effective date of this Act, until the Secretary submits to the appropriate
congressional committees a certification that the United Nations has returned
to the United States any surplus assessed contributions or other overpayments
by the United States to any United Nations entity, the Secretary shall withhold
from the regular budget of the United Nations an amount equal to the amount of
the funds that the United Nations has yet to return to the United
States.</text>
</subsection></section><section id="H4C05120ED7EC4D6D9B7A9FC5CCCB357A"><enum>207.</enum><header>Annual reports
on United States contributions to the United Nations</header>
<subsection id="HAACFD2F754654DCDA2C4AD332217A80C"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Annual
report</header><text>Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act and annually thereafter, the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget shall submit to Congress a report listing all assessed and voluntary
contributions of the United States Government for the preceding fiscal year to
the United Nations and United Nations affiliated agencies and related
bodies.</text>
</subsection><subsection id="H681AC81D0D6545C48B56B0719AB5F1A2"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Contents</header><text>Each
report required under subsection (a) shall set forth, for the fiscal year
covered by such report, the following:</text>
<paragraph id="HB680E4C2F9F448A580B922EAB27DC1B0"><enum>(1)</enum><text>The total amount
of all assessed and voluntary contributions of the United States Government to
the United Nations and United Nations affiliated agencies and related
bodies.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H22D4E54636034D39B91A0AFD20358DE4"><enum>(2)</enum><text>The approximate
percentage of United States Government contributions to each United Nations
affiliated agency or body in such fiscal year when compared with all
contributions to such agency or body from any source in such fiscal
year.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H3A9DF75167A047AAAD8BD79F7037DDC9"><enum>(3)</enum><text>For each such
contribution—</text>
<subparagraph id="H786C15663821463CBC1298C2DE95C5AE"><enum>(A)</enum><text>the amount of such
contribution;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H686BFE01FF614570BB53BC6E51BB3381"><enum>(B)</enum><text>a description of
such contribution (including whether assessed or voluntary);</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H57C1D355647B419986EA1A1EC5F089FB"><enum>(C)</enum><text>the department or
agency of the United States Government responsible for such
contribution;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="HC5EC0B97CBC5409DB3231E942453629F"><enum>(D)</enum><text>the purpose of
such contribution; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="HFA9DF86745B04BF0BB0948A0AD8D1C13"><enum>(E)</enum><text>the United Nations
or United Nations affiliated agency or related body receiving such
contribution.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph></subsection></section><enum>III</enum><header>United States
policy at the United Nations</header>
<section id="HA47078B37DAE48199C669B5E1B8A5710"><enum>301.</enum><header>Annual
publication</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">The President
shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations
to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the United
Nations to ensure the United Nations publishes annually, including on a
publicly searchable internet Web site, a list of all United Nations subsidiary
bodies and their functions, budgets, staff, and contributions, both voluntary
and assessed, sorted by donor.</text>
</section><section id="H1A8BB457AB0E4414B74366C3B51D92BC"><enum>302.</enum><header>Annual
financial disclosure</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">The
President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the United
Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the
United Nations to implement a system for the required filing of individual
annual financial disclosure forms by each employee of the United Nations and
its specialized agencies, programs, and funds at the P–5 level and above, which
shall be made available to the Office of Internal Oversight Services, to Member
States, and to the public.</text>
</section><section id="H9000805AFD09484CBB30AD3FC7507C11"><enum>303.</enum><header>Policy with
respect to expansion of the United Nations Security Council</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">It is the policy of the United States to use
the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the United Nations to
oppose any proposals on expansion of the Security Council if such expansion
would—</text>
<paragraph id="HD2234E42E4FB49EFAC6B5E079FEF2304"><enum>(1)</enum><text>diminish the
influence of the United States on the Security Council; or</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H448947DB58374081AB1B64B33AC57859"><enum>(2)</enum><text>include veto
rights for any new members of the Security Council.</text>
</paragraph></section><section id="H407247BB4FF8467BAB0ABD80C92F8991"><enum>304.</enum><header>Access to
reports and audits</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">The
President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the United
Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the
United Nations to ensure that Member States may, upon request, have access to
all reports and audits completed by the Board of External Auditors.</text>
</section><section id="H7A07BF84A191449A996272BB54EA4A74"><enum>305.</enum><header>Waiver of
immunity</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">The President shall
direct the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use
the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the United Nations to
ensure that the Secretary-General exercises the right and duty of the
Secretary-General under section 20 of the Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations to waive the immunity of any United Nations
official in any case in which such immunity would impede the course of justice.
In exercising such waiver, the Secretary-General is urged to interpret the
interests of the United Nations as favoring the investigation or prosecution of
a United Nations official who is credibly under investigation for having
committed a serious criminal offense or who is credibly charged with a serious
criminal offense.</text>
</section><section id="HF19C3D759DC24F3C81246CC774EE6C7F"><enum>306.</enum><header>Terrorism and
the United Nations</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">The
President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the United
Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the
United Nations to work toward adoption by the General Assembly of—</text>
<paragraph id="H03BF4FA5994F448BB52507B758D5396D"><enum>(1)</enum><text>a
definition of terrorism that—</text>
<subparagraph id="HCA5353E518A04C4F85FECCA9843DCA6E"><enum>(A)</enum><text>builds upon the
recommendations of the December 2004 report of the High-Level Panel on Threats,
Challenges, and Change;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H0ABD620F9E20430AB55E9ECC24FEB173"><enum>(B)</enum><text>includes as an
essential component of such definition any action that is intended to cause
death or serious bodily harm to civilians with the purpose of intimidating a
population or compelling a government or an international organization to do,
or abstain from doing, any act; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="HC36FD49770DA4A0FA7CB41E5202604DF"><enum>(C)</enum><text>does not propose a
legal or moral equivalence between an action described in subparagraph (B) and
measures taken by a government or international organization in self-defense
against an action described in subparagraph (B); and</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="H55C7C55E42654F0CB248AE3BA1D12E43"><enum>(2)</enum><text>a
comprehensive convention on terrorism that includes the definition described in
paragraph (1).</text>
</paragraph></section><section id="H79F4A21A22C94FD9B15E25670BA66070"><enum>307.</enum><header>Report on
United Nations personnel</header>
<subsection id="HE452E6E9524244ABB6A989013BC3089A"><enum>(a)</enum><header>In
general</header><text>Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report—</text>
<paragraph id="HF17AF95A014D4F4387E5009123DAF1B5"><enum>(1)</enum><text>concerning the
progress of the General Assembly to modernize human resource practices,
consistent with the March 2005 report of the Secretary-General entitled
<quote>In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for
All</quote>; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H2D68FB418E8A48488C69C4162FB00A5B"><enum>(2)</enum><text>containing the
information described in subsection (b).</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="H146112D3D27D451781E6DBC8915F4686"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Contents</header><text>The
report shall include—</text>
<paragraph id="H80603562134E4F54A6D8693A90568C05"><enum>(1)</enum><text>a
comprehensive evaluation of human resources reforms at the United Nations,
including an evaluation of—</text>
<subparagraph id="H151C1E3C12C14DF396FDFBFEAD3ABE4A"><enum>(A)</enum><text>tenure;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H4512AF011BCF49AF94D092F750DA926D"><enum>(B)</enum><text>performance
reviews;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H1800D9446CAD492B84A786EC206FC9BD"><enum>(C)</enum><text>the promotion
system;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H77B3D2290CD948F7911F9A891E59FB9C"><enum>(D)</enum><text>a merit-based
hiring system and enhanced regulations concerning termination of employment of
employees; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H38A7F0E645854CD889AD9654CE07D1EC"><enum>(E)</enum><text>the implementation
of a code of conduct and ethics training;</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="HFB243849FA2F4411B0A15A0E1612D062"><enum>(2)</enum><text>the implementation
of a system of procedures for filing complaints and protective measures for
workplace harassment, including sexual harassment;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HF95046AD82F64ADFB98CC0DF59069A81"><enum>(3)</enum><text>policy
recommendations relating to the establishment of a rotation requirement for
nonadministrative positions;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HD57A6A1694DA46C3899F2AEAA8C41D9D"><enum>(4)</enum><text>policy
recommendations relating to the establishment of a prohibition preventing
personnel and officials assigned to the mission of a member state to the United
Nations from transferring to a position within the United Nations Secretariat
that is compensated at the P–5 level and above;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HDA418CBA279C4818A6C643308247E920"><enum>(5)</enum><text>policy
recommendations relating to a reduction in travel allowances and attendant
oversight with respect to accommodations and airline flights; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H52DBF3ADD08043739E77E16529DDF1C0"><enum>(6)</enum><text>an evaluation of
the recommendations of the Secretary-General relating to greater flexibility
for the Secretary-General in staffing decisions to accommodate changing
priorities.</text>
</paragraph></subsection></section><section id="H19443FF475D647C88C5A51B63D6AC5FD"><enum>308.</enum><header>United Nations
treaty bodies</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">The United
States shall withhold from United States contributions to the regular assessed
budget of the United Nations for a biennial period amounts that are
proportional to the percentage of such budget that are expended with respect to
a United Nations human rights treaty monitoring body or committee that was
established by—</text>
<paragraph id="H42FA073152534402AD691C205C6BD39A"><enum>(1)</enum><text>a
convention (without any protocols) or an international covenant (without any
protocols) to which the United States is not party; or</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HEADFB3A5E8EC4A2EB81E27580C0980D7"><enum>(2)</enum><text>a
convention, with a subsequent protocol, if the United States is a party to
neither.</text>
</paragraph></section><section id="HF9D28EDE9FBB419F825AF172A7196226"><enum>309.</enum><header>Anti-Semitism
and the United Nations</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">The
President shall direct the United States permanent representative to the United
Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the
United Nations to make every effort to—</text>
<paragraph id="HDE701EAFE4754159B87B868A885302CF"><enum>(1)</enum><text>ensure the
issuance and implementation of a directive by the Secretary-General or the
Secretariat, as appropriate, that—</text>
<subparagraph id="HE860D0AEBFEE41C2BACED6DEFB8EC391"><enum>(A)</enum><text>requires all
employees of the United Nations and its specialized agencies to officially and
publicly condemn anti-Semitic statements made at any session of the United
Nations or its specialized agencies, or at any other session sponsored by the
United Nations;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H3CD950C5D00A4C25BBB6633F8D91B89C"><enum>(B)</enum><text>requires employees
of the United Nations and its specialized agencies, programs, and funds to be
subject to punitive action, including immediate dismissal, for making
anti-Semitic statements or references;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H2E24AC1B8643482AB7C94B39D62E70C0"><enum>(C)</enum><text>proposes specific
recommendations to the General Assembly for the establishment of mechanisms to
hold accountable employees and officials of the United Nations and its
specialized agencies, programs, and funds, or Member States, that make such
anti-Semitic statements or references in any forum of the United Nations or of
its specialized agencies;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="HE047A99CEC734DEA9A576163265ACE00"><enum>(D)</enum><text>continues to
develop and implements education awareness programs about the Holocaust and
anti-Semitism throughout the world, as part of an effort to combat intolerance
and hatred; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H8240A561453948769E6644DF050D71A9"><enum>(E)</enum><text>requires the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to
develop programming and other measures that address anti-Semitism;</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="H9C19DE38E30740558BB23FD2318218ED"><enum>(2)</enum><text>secure the
adoption of a resolution by the General Assembly that establishes the
mechanisms described in paragraph (1)(C); and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H8AB1170548324FB88FE69AA15BBFB536"><enum>(3)</enum><text>continue working
toward further reduction of anti-Semitic language and anti-Israel resolutions
in the United Nations and its specialized agencies, programs, and funds.</text>
</paragraph></section><section id="HAAF13F36E6374121AD01D38AACB7BB49"><enum>310.</enum><header>Regional group
inclusion of Israel</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">The
President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the United
Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the
United Nations to expand the Western European and Others Group (WEOG) in the
United Nations in Geneva to include Israel as a permanent member with full
rights and privileges.</text>
</section><section id="idBF040214C3764B7BAA6B6AC436D9A997"><enum>311.</enum><header>United States
policy on tier 3 human rights violators</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">The President shall direct the United States
Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and
influence of the United States at the United Nations to ensure that no
representative of a country designated by the Department of State pursuant to
section 110 of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7107)
as a Tier 3 country presides as Chair or President of any United Nations
Entity.</text>
</section><enum>IV</enum><header>Status of
Palestinian entities at the United Nations</header>
<section id="H229F33DF4F9540CD854D2525CC215BC1"><enum>401.</enum><header>Findings</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">Congress makes the following
findings:</text>
<paragraph id="HF12D1990E1214C68A1A97A0F8D4D2BF8"><enum>(1)</enum><text>In 1989, the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) launched an effort to evade direct
negotiations for peace with the State of Israel by instead pursuing Palestinian
membership in international organizations, which could imply de facto
recognition of a Palestinian state by the United Nations.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H35614D353117428F92404AC785125D74"><enum>(2)</enum><text>The Executive
branch, with significant support from Members of Congress, successfully stopped
the PLO’s effort by credibly threatening, as noted in a May 1, 1989, statement
by then-Secretary of State James A. Baker, <quote>that the United States
[would] make no further contributions, voluntary or assessed, to any
international organization which makes any change in the P.L.O.’s present
status as an observer organization</quote>.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HAAD904B6B6BE481FAC4EDD768AF96695"><enum>(3)</enum><text>The United States
success in this case demonstrates that withholding contributions and placing
conditions on their payment can result in real reforms, stop counterproductive
developments, and advance United States interests at the United Nations.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H18E5D7A9D7FE4F6081D21E87B68463EF"><enum>(4)</enum><text>The Palestinian
leadership has recently resumed its effort to evade direct negotiations for
peace with the State of Israel by seeking recognition of a Palestinian state
from foreign governments and in international forums.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H189E05E67A364C3F8BFE2086AF5FA608"><enum>(5)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">Efforts to bypass negotiations and to
unilaterally declare a Palestinian state, or to appeal to the United Nations or
other international forums or to foreign governments for recognition of a
Palestinian state or membership or other upgraded status for the Palestinian
observer mission at those forums, would violate the underlying principles of
the Oslo Accords, the Road Map, and other relevant Middle East peace process
efforts.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HCB61D6CCA0474560A74A95533A0E34B6"><enum>(6)</enum><text>On June 18, 2011,
the Senate passed Senate Resolution 185 (112th Congress), in which the
Senate—</text>
<subparagraph id="IDd55934c367ad4177a5c780097189d8f6"><enum>(A)</enum><text><quote>reaffirms
its strong support for a negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict resulting in two states, a democratic, Jewish state of Israel and a
viable, democratic Palestinian state, living side-by-side in peace, security,
and mutual recognition</quote>;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="IDb9115023e6754fd4a5b711e838f986df"><enum>(B)</enum><text><quote>reiterates
its strong opposition to any attempt to establish or seek recognition of a
Palestinian state outside of an agreement negotiated between leaders in Israel
and the Palestinians</quote>;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H8D28DEB11A02460A889528649163C349"><enum>(C)</enum><text><quote>supports
the Administration's opposition to a unilateral declaration of a Palestinian
state and to veto by the United States on February 18, 2011, of the most recent
United Nations Security Council resolution regarding a key issue of the
Israeli-Palestinian process</quote>; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="ID1d37b83f72d64a71913d505bf699a80d"><enum>(D)</enum><text><quote>calls upon
the President to announce that the United States will veto any resolution on
Palestinian statehood that comes before the United Nations Security Council
which is not a result of agreements reached between the Government of Israel
and the Palestinians</quote>.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="H78D714067BAC4522A1D9BB89F1E08054"><enum>(7)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">Ambassador Rosemary DiCarlo, United States
Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, stated on July 26, 2011,
<quote>Let there be no doubt: symbolic actions to isolate Israel at the United
Nations in September will not create an independent Palestinian state. … The
United States will not support unilateral campaigns at the United Nations in
September or any other time.</quote>.</text>
</paragraph></section><section id="H6DCBB1A6FB4E405D8DD17A85BDC7F973"><enum>402.</enum><header>Statement of
policy</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">It is the policy of the
United States to oppose the recognition of a Palestinian state by any United
Nations entity, or any upgrade, including full membership or non-member-state
observer status, in the status of the Palestinian observer mission at the
United Nations, the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Palestinian
Authority, or any other Palestinian administrative organization or governing
entity, at any United Nations entity, prior to the achievement of a final peace
agreement negotiated between and agreed to by Israel and the
Palestinians.</text>
</section><section id="H26AC179E59F54288A082BBCF1E04175E"><enum>403.</enum><header>Implementation</header>
<subsection id="H1BC66D3F690E42909F7DA4A629522939"><enum>(a)</enum><header>In
general</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The President shall
direct the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use
the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the United Nations to
advance the policy stated in section 402.</text>
</subsection><subsection id="H819234C44DDB405D89C10A2739981335"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Withholding of
funds</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The Secretary shall
withhold United States contributions from any United Nations entity that
recognizes a Palestinian state or upgrades in any way, including full
membership or non-member-state observer status, the status of the Palestinian
observer mission at the United Nations, the Palestine Liberation Organization,
the Palestinian Authority, or any other Palestinian administrative organization
or governing entity, at that United Nations entity, prior to the achievement of
complete and final peace agreement negotiated between and agreed to by Israel
and the Palestinians. Funds appropriated for use as a United States
contribution to the United Nations but withheld from obligation and expenditure
pursuant to this section shall immediately revert to the United States Treasury
and shall not be considered arrears to be repaid to any United Nations
entity.</text>
</subsection></section><enum>V</enum><header>United Nations
Human Rights Council</header>
<section id="H7BA5D60CDF724169B35B900299A776DE"><enum>501.</enum><header>Findings</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">Congress makes the following
findings:</text>
<paragraph id="HA65F827E316A4C99BE4D24FFEE3484A0"><enum>(1)</enum><text>Since its
establishment in 2006, the United Nations Human Rights Council has failed to
meaningfully promote the protection of internationally recognized human rights,
and has proven to be even more problematic than the United Nations Human Rights
Commission that it was created to replace.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H9B7F83F8591D44BF8DE732A16C369516"><enum>(2)</enum><text>The United Nations
Human Rights Council suffers from fundamental and severe structural flaws
present since its establishment by the United Nations General Assembly, such as
the fact that it draws its members from the General Assembly without any
substantive membership criteria, with the perverse result that a number of the
world’s worst human rights abusers are members of the council.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H58043FE985E34AB3A9C26F8B57DC35CD"><enum>(3)</enum><text>The structure and
composition of the United Nations Human Rights Council have made it subject to
gross political manipulation, with the result that, during its almost five
years of operation, the Council has passed over 40 resolutions censuring the
democratic, Jewish State of Israel, as compared to only a handful censuring the
dictatorships in Burma and North Korea, just one addressing the severe, ongoing
human rights abuses in Libya, Iran, Syria, and Belarus, and none addressing the
severe, ongoing human rights abuses in China, Cuba, Russia, Zimbabwe,
Venezuela, and elsewhere.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H6C17FA28A6DB44E7B83D7E5FB8D2245A"><enum>(4)</enum><text>The United Nations
Human Rights Council’s agenda contains a permanent item for criticism of the
democratic, Jewish State of Israel, but no permanent items criticizing any
other state.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HE6A25B5A1ABE45D7A91D9DE56A6820ED"><enum>(5)</enum><text>The United Nations
Human Rights Council has established, or preserved the existence of, a number
of <quote>Special Procedures</quote> mechanisms to address country-specific
situations or thematic issues. These mechanisms include a number of
<quote>special rapporteurs</quote> whose expenses and staff support are paid
for by contributions to the United Nations.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H4F5A34BFF7C440509A76618F4F33DB3D"><enum>(6)</enum><text>The United Nations
Human Rights Council has also established an <quote>Advisory Committee</quote>
whose expenses and staff support are paid for by contributions to the United
Nations.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HC03F335472194A2696381603D537CB4A"><enum>(7)</enum><text>The ongoing
five-year review of the United Nations Human Rights Council concluded on June
17, 2011, and failed make any significant reforms to its fundamental and severe
structural flaws, including its absence of substantive membership criteria, or
to remove the permanent agenda item on Israel.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H0ADFD24B73FF45DB8B77427D47B06213"><enum>(8)</enum><text>On June 17, 2011,
John F. Sammis, United States Deputy Representative to the Economic and Social
Council, stated, <quote>The Geneva process [of the five-year review] failed to
yield even minimally positive results, forcing us to dissociate from the
outcome. … the final resolution [for the five-year review] also fails to
address the core problems that still plague the Human Rights Council. … The
United States has therefore voted <quote>no</quote> on the resolution. … the
Council’s effectiveness and legitimacy will always be compromised so long as
one country in all the world is unfairly and uniquely singled out while others,
including chronic human rights abusers, escape scrutiny. … The resolution
before us today does nothing to address the Council’s failures nor move it any
closer to the founding values of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights.</quote>.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H9C4AF3608A05423AA1B8A334387273E8"><enum>(9)</enum><text>United States
membership in the Human Rights Council has not led to reform of its fundamental
flaw or diminished the Council’s virulently anti-Israel behavior. The Council
has passed 14 resolutions criticizing Israel since the United States joined in
2009.</text>
</paragraph></section><section id="HAC7A53D5AB9B4A9FB7E3D44E8FF2DA37"><enum>502.</enum><header>United Nations
Human Rights Council membership and funding</header>
<subsection id="H04BA25C397FD45E4A262A304746A4FBE"><enum>(a)</enum><header>In
general</header><text>For each fiscal year beginning after the effective date
of this Act, until the Secretary submits to Congress a certification that the
requirements described in subsection (b) have been satisfied—</text>
<paragraph id="HE9AF6721564F4C42990A941C28CA4C18"><enum>(1)</enum><text>the Secretary
shall withhold from a United States contribution each fiscal year to a regular
budget of the United Nations an amount that is equal to the percentage of such
contribution that the Secretary determines would be allocated by the United
Nations to support the United Nations Human Rights Council;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H96FAC34D080249FAB1A9DF56A385BCD0"><enum>(2)</enum><text>the Secretary
shall not make a voluntary contribution to the United Nations Human Rights
Council; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H13815A287C634517B898790BE2F7C3F5"><enum>(3)</enum><text>the United States
shall not run for a seat on the United Nations Human Rights Council.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="H4606E78E9BE841CAAFC5D70E545FFFCE"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Certification</header><text>The
annual certification referred to in subsection (a) is a certification made by
the Secretary to Congress that—</text>
<paragraph id="HB5A633C6B6394821A9C278D79ED6775F"><enum>(1)</enum><text>the United Nations
Human Rights Council’s mandate from the United Nations General Assembly
explicitly and effectively prohibits candidacy for Human Rights Council
membership of a United Nations Member State—</text>
<subparagraph id="HBCC9057E813B4E2AAEEB87E5BF62D647"><enum>(A)</enum><text>subject to
sanctions by the Security Council; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H0B35F08A5168455081CB04877E306AA3"><enum>(B)</enum><text>under a Security
Council-mandated investigation for human rights abuses;</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="HB1F55E3427854B2A88118E02F29EA5DB"><enum>(2)</enum><text>the United Nations
Human Rights Council does not include a United Nations Member State—</text>
<subparagraph id="HDFF2ADC8F8324460A6649D95A17CF3B4"><enum>(A)</enum><text>subject to
sanctions by the Security Council;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H022743394C4547389C3EBE313580D55F"><enum>(B)</enum><text>under a Security
Council-mandated investigation for human rights abuses;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H6BC6C602D6E64F4ABDBC183A077A1492"><enum>(C)</enum><text>that the Secretary
has determined, for purposes of section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act
of 1979 (as continued in effect pursuant to the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), section 40 of the Arms Export
Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780), section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371), or other provision of law, is a government that has
repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="ID66a838b260294f7db339ac98e7c5d17e"><enum>(D)</enum><text>designated by the
Department of State pursuant to section 110 of the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7107) as a Tier 3 country; or</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="HF5D27F3D71F944E081DC3BA74D10D390"><enum>(E)</enum><text>that the President
has designated as a country of particular concern for religious freedom under
section 402(b) of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (22 U.S.C.
6442(b)); and</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="H316F101BCE0F44FC91815E945502F869"><enum>(3)</enum><text>the United Nations
Human Rights Council’s agenda or programme of work does not include a permanent
item with regard to the State of Israel.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="H537A00316A4F44A082F04A7F614F3447"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Special
Procedures</header><text>The Secretary shall withhold from a United States
contribution each year to a regular budget of the United Nations an amount that
is equal to the percentage of such contribution that the Secretary determines
would be allocated by the United Nations to support the United Nations
<quote>Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Palestinian
territories occupied since 1967</quote>, and any other United Nations Human
Rights Council <quote>Special Procedures</quote> used to display bias against
the United States or the State of Israel or to provide support for the
government of any United Nations Member State—</text>
<paragraph id="H1EA99ED86A8A43D29233DD1B9D41B1C0"><enum>(1)</enum><text>subject to
sanctions by the Security Council;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H7EFBB9F3FB044410B96153C7489E5250"><enum>(2)</enum><text>under a Security
Council-mandated investigation for human rights abuses;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H86637372C6FB4271A57CDE09E2E05F03"><enum>(3)</enum><text>that the Secretary
has determined, for purposes of section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act
of 1979 (as continued in effect pursuant to the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act), section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, section 620A
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, or other provision of law, is a
government that has repeatedly provided support for acts of international
terrorism;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="ID62eb7d35f976409ab825dca2ccb9d9c9"><enum>(4)</enum><text>designated by the
Department of State pursuant to section 110 of the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7107) as a Tier 3 country; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H4EC75921CA2B496ABCDB631007F09FC0"><enum>(5)</enum><text>that the President
has designated as a country of particular concern for religious freedom under
section 402(b) of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (22 U.S.C.
6442(b)).</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="HA7F964C43E214F448323FFC62B8EE22D"><enum>(d)</enum><header>Reversion of
funds</header><text>Funds appropriated for use as a United States contribution
to the United Nations but withheld from obligation and expenditure pursuant to
this section shall immediately revert to the United States Treasury and shall
not be considered arrears to be repaid to any United Nations entity.</text>
</subsection></section><enum>VI</enum><header>Goldstone
report</header>
<section id="HF8285F061B1F4874AED381D86D0A3DBB"><enum>601.</enum><header>Findings</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">Congress makes the following
findings:</text>
<paragraph id="H1EFBA01D2A8948F7AB6BEF92C1C3D6D0"><enum>(1)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">On January 12, 2009, the United Nations
Human Rights Council passed Resolution S–91, authorizing a <quote>fact-finding
mission</quote> regarding the conduct of the Government of Israel during
Operation Cast Lead between December 27, 2008, and January 18, 2009.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H75F731C7ECAA4003BC5C68BD6EE7671D"><enum>(2)</enum><text>The resolution
prejudged the outcome of the <quote>fact-finding mission</quote> by mandating
that it investigate <quote>violations of international humanitarian law by the
occupying power, Israel, against the Palestinian people</quote>.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HBD408CC79383493D825170F2C642CE94"><enum>(3)</enum><text>On September 15,
2009, the <quote>United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza
Conflict</quote> released its report, now known as the <quote>Goldstone
report</quote>, named for its chair, South African Richard Goldstone.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H084AB38A74BF44C7960E2F9CA9562AB6"><enum>(4)</enum><text>The report made
numerous unsubstantiated assertions against Israel, in particular accusing the
Government of Israel of committing war crimes by deliberately targeting
civilians during its operations in Gaza.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id3F385353A15F42BB935931D3080EA145"><enum>(5)</enum><text>The report
downplayed the overwhelming evidence that Hamas deliberately used Palestinian
civilians and civilian institutions as human shields against Israel and
deliberately targeted Israeli civilians with rocket fire for over eight years
prior to the operation.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H28F9F6B868B340EC82B8A2FB8791E7FC"><enum>(6)</enum><text>The United Nations
Human Rights Council voted to welcome the report, to endorse its
recommendations, and to condemn Israel without mentioning Hamas.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H9CD72638410949C687115D59F5BF9687"><enum>(7)</enum><text>As a result of the
report, the United Nations General Assembly has passed two resolutions
endorsing the report's findings, the United Nations Secretary-General has been
requested to submit several reports on implementation of its recommendations,
and the Human Rights Council is scheduled to follow up on implementation of the
report during future sessions.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="IDfa2ed1437a9a4d7eae3e478b396e50ad"><enum>(8)</enum><text>The findings of
the Goldstone report and the subsequent and continued United Nations member
state actions following up on those findings have caused and continue to cause
extensive harm to Israel's standing in the world and could potentially create
legal problems for Israel and its leaders.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="IDc58e053466474ed8babf2626105ebf3a"><enum>(9)</enum><text>On April 2, 2011,
Justice Richard Goldstone publicly retracted the central claims of the report
he authored.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="ID8b38e5e8afc04943873251211e319e99"><enum>(10)</enum><text>On April 14,
2011, the Senate passed by unanimous consent Senate Resolution 138 (112th
Congress), which stated that the Senate—</text>
<subparagraph id="ID966b83f3ef8840398f3b05dfa78173ea"><enum>(A)</enum><text><quote>calls on
the United Nations Human Rights Council members to reflect the author's
repudiation of the Goldstone report's central findings, rescind the report, and
reconsider further Council actions with respect to the report's
findings</quote>;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="ID6c25c554cbd14c9a97fac8a7d32c8771"><enum>(B)</enum><text><quote>urges
United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon to work with United Nations member
states to reform the United Nations Human Rights Council so that it no longer
unfairly, disproportionately, and falsely criticizes Israel on a regular
basis</quote>;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="ID8854066e27b94d1783c95db1d3dbe5a1"><enum>(C)</enum><text><quote>requests
Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon to do all in his power to redress the damage to
Israel's reputation caused by the Goldstone report</quote>;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="ID08aafabd3f1d4eb99641ae671a8e7029"><enum>(D)</enum><text><quote>asks the
Secretary-General to do all he can to urge member states to prevent any further
United Nations action on the report's findings</quote>; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="ID68f90466bcc64974b506d76ccda64077"><enum>(E)</enum><text><quote>urges the
United States to take a leadership role in getting the United Nations and its
bodies to prevent any further action on the report's findings and limit the
damage that this libelous report has caused to our close ally Israel and to the
reputation of the United Nations</quote>.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="H88042DA3E08F4E349F16FC78E6B63BCF"><enum>(11)</enum><text>Efforts to
delegitimize the democratic State of Israel and deny it the right to defend its
citizens and its existence can be used to delegitimize other democracies and
deny them the same right.</text>
</paragraph></section><section id="H3888A7ECD1434366B376B85FFB02E82A"><enum>602.</enum><header>Statement of
policy</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">It is the policy of the
United States to—</text>
<paragraph id="H784637BFB9CC4ACD9AFED9942C6E4317"><enum>(1)</enum><text>consider the
Goldstone Report irredeemably biased and unworthy of further consideration or
legitimacy;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HE1ACC27E51954709B92D126A920EE781"><enum>(2)</enum><text>strongly and
unequivocally oppose any consideration, legitimization, or endorsement of the
Goldstone Report, or any other measures stemming from this report, in
multilateral fora;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H758F92D253764BCAB6B9EE6DD0654A6D"><enum>(3)</enum><text>lead a high-level
diplomatic campaign in support of the revocation and repudiation, by the United
Nations General Assembly, of the Goldstone Report and any United Nations
resolutions stemming from the report, including—</text>
<subparagraph id="H7983223E53704F6BA4791408812E641E"><enum>(A)</enum><text>United Nations
General Assembly resolutions A/RES/64/10 and A/RES/64/254; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H74F1CA590F47455382F8FBC84DBC2A99"><enum>(B)</enum><text>United Nations
Human Rights Council resolutions A–HRC–S–12–1, A/HRC/13/L.30, and
A/HRC/16/L.31; and</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="HCD9EFA0A3C37426E8367E3850E27E63D"><enum>(4)</enum><text>lead a high-level
diplomatic effort to encourage other responsible countries not to endorse,
support, or legitimize the Goldstone Report or any other measures stemming from
the report.</text>
</paragraph></section><section id="H01D6354121A047999D4E5A32B7B97B34"><enum>603.</enum><header>Withholding of
funds; refund of United States taxpayer dollars</header>
<subsection id="H86CF2AEA6479495C9CE285E6EF0D93A9"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Withholding of
Funds</header><text>The Secretary shall withhold from the United States
contribution to the regular budget of the United Nations an amount that is
equal to the percentage of such contribution that the Secretary determines
would be or has been expended by the United Nations for any part of the
Goldstone Report or its preparatory or follow-on activities.</text>
</subsection><subsection id="H5FD9933FE19B4B6FA7F14F57EF64BB95"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Refund of United
States Taxpayer Dollars</header><text>Funds appropriated for use as a United
States contribution to the regular budget of the United Nations but withheld
from obligation and expenditure pursuant to subsection (a) shall immediately
revert to the United States Treasury and shall not be considered arrears to be
repaid to any United Nations entity.</text>
</subsection></section><enum>VII</enum><header>Durban
process</header>
<section id="H5C2234D7EA3844A3B7F98E385F001796"><enum>701.</enum><header>Findings</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">Congress makes the following
findings:</text>
<paragraph id="HE01D62C2E7F04125AC7BB83AEE3C51A2"><enum>(1)</enum><text>The United States
is opposed to racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related
intolerance, and has long been a party to the Convention on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HD0ED19013D214FBDA0F4685589C746B4"><enum>(2)</enum><text>Expensive and
politically skewed international conferences can deserve and undermine the
worthy goals that they are ostensibly convened to support.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HB1FFCDF92A4E43A0A42E305D97573C1A"><enum>(3)</enum><text>The goals of the
2001 United Nations World Conference Against Racism—held in Durban, South
Africa, and commonly referred to as <quote>Durban I</quote>—were undermined by
hateful, anti-Jewish rhetoric, and anti-Israel political agendas, prompting
both Israel and the United States to withdraw their delegations from the
Conference.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H64FC62BC99A0468E8FE03FEC1AF97D40"><enum>(4)</enum><text>The official
government declaration adopted by Durban I, the <quote>Durban Declaration and
Program of Action</quote>, focused on the <quote>plight of the Palestinian
people under foreign occupation</quote>, and thereby singled out one regional
conflict for discussion and implicitly launched a false accusation against
Israel of intolerance towards the Palestinians.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H0754CD33F77C4D7D9603FDEC5800FC32"><enum>(5)</enum><text>On September 3,
2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell explained the withdrawal of the United
States delegation from Durban I by stating that <quote>you do not combat racism
by conferences that produce declarations containing hateful language, some of
which is a throwback to the <quote>days of Zionism</quote> equals racism; or
supports the idea that we have made too much of the Holocaust; or suggests that
apartheid exists in Israel; or that singles out only one country in the
world—Israel—for censure and abuse</quote>.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H7F3DE0B73B1F43ED93478B212190D143"><enum>(6)</enum><text>The late United
States Representative Tom Lantos, who participated as a member of the United
States delegation to the Durban Conference, supported that delegation’s
withdrawal and wrote in 2002 that the conference <quote>provided the world with
a glimpse into the abyss of international hate, discrimination and, indeed,
racism</quote>.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H5D11AA83756C43E0A6833D9C1402DC4C"><enum>(7)</enum><text>On December 19,
2006, the United Nations General Assembly approved a resolution initiating
preparations for a Durban Review Conference (commonly referred to as
<term>Durban II</term>), which was held between April 20 and 24, 2009, in
Geneva, Switzerland.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H583BC7F255414832A53211A0A40FD328"><enum>(8)</enum><text>The chair of the
preparatory committee for Durban II was Libya, and the co-chairs included Iran
and Cuba.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H559C83B399664E0189F43D9A7D659079"><enum>(9)</enum><text>Throughout the
preparatory process for Durban II, member states of the Organization of the
Islamic Conference urged that the conference again focus criticism on Israel
and single out the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for discussion, and also urged
that the conference advocate global speech codes that would impose restrictions
contrary to fundamental freedoms recognized in the provisions of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H466C16224EF341A8AB8D95F2416AF4F8"><enum>(10)</enum><text>In testimony
before the House of Representatives on April 2, 2008, then-Assistant Secretary
of State for International Organizations Kirsten Silverier stated that the
United States had decided against participating in preparatory activities for
Durban II because <quote>[there is] absolutely no case to be made for
participating in something that is going to be a repeat of Durban I. We don't
have any confidence that this will be any better than Durban I</quote>.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H3AB8A55FD1074366B777D1415F8208BE"><enum>(11)</enum><text>During February
2009, the United States actively participated in intergovernmental
consultations on Durban II’s <quote>draft outcome document</quote> and engaged
in high-level diplomatic efforts to dramatically reverse the path of Durban II
by directing it towards meaningful efforts to combat intolerance and bigotry
and directing it away from efforts to undermine the cause of fighting
discrimination through singling out Israel for implicit criticism and calling
for restrictions on fundamental freedoms.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H79D867B787164834B9882B315168F136"><enum>(12)</enum><text>On February 27,
2009, a Department of State spokesman stated that, despite United States
efforts to redirect the path of Durban II, <quote>the document being negotiated
has gone from bad to worse, and the current text of the draft outcome document
is not salvageable. … A conference based on this text would be a missed
opportunity to speak clearly about the persistent problem of racism</quote> and
therefore, the United States would not participate in further consultations and
negotiations regarding the <quote>draft outcome document,</quote> and would not
participate in Durban II itself unless the <quote>draft outcome
document</quote> was radically shortened and revised to eliminate objectionable
material.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HC3F0C18AD5B747DFAB5608A4553DBEC7"><enum>(13)</enum><text>On April 17,
2009, the third and final session of the preparatory committee for Durban II
proposed a final <quote>draft outcome document</quote> that contained a number
of provisions advocating restrictions on freedom of expression, and that also
implicitly singled out and criticized Israel for racism by reaffirming, in its
very first paragraph, the 2001 Durban Declaration and Programme of
Action.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H2DDC97A12D254EB09E668FEB020020E4"><enum>(14)</enum><text>On April 19,
2009, President Barack Obama stated at a press conference, <quote>I would love
to be involved in a useful conference that addressed continuing issues of
racism and discrimination around the globe … we expressed in the run-up to this
conference our concerns that if you incorporated—if you adopted all the
language from 2001, that’s just not something we could sign up for … our
participation would have involved putting our imprimatur on something that we
just don’t believe … Hopefully … we can partner with other countries on to
actually reduce discrimination around the globe. But this wasn’t an opportunity
to do it.</quote>.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H010A4E8F60BC4321AB85C770B9E263C2"><enum>(15)</enum><text>Canada, Israel,
Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Australia, and New Zealand also did
not participate in Durban II, and the Czech Republic walked out of the
Conference during its proceedings, never to return.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HD43AB25AD0E14ED89A01788DF647C83B"><enum>(16)</enum><text>Libya was the
chair of the Main Committee of Durban II, and vice presidents of Durban II
included Libya, Iran, and Cuba.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H0872887C247C4C1E96C013B9A5CDB428"><enum>(17)</enum><text>On April 21,
2009, governments participating in Durban II adopted by consensus an
<quote>outcome document</quote> that contained a number of provisions
advocating restrictions on freedom of expression, and that also implicitly
singled out and criticized Israel for racism by reaffirming, in its very first
paragraph, the 2001 Durban Declaration and Program of Action.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H78E5497F37AC4099B374D5A3C3A0AF2B"><enum>(18)</enum><text>On December 18,
2009, the United Nations General Assembly approved Resolution A/RES/64/148,
which urged the <quote>full and effective implementation of the Durban
Declaration and Programme of Action</quote> and called for a <quote>one-day
plenary event to commemorate the ten-year anniversary [of Durban I] during the
high-level segment of the General Assembly to be devoted to racism, racial
discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance during its sixty-fifth
session, in 2011</quote>. The United States, joined by 12 other nations, voted
against this resolution.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HB595288708DD45BB93389E269997642C"><enum>(19)</enum><text>On December 24,
2010, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution A/RES/65/240,
authorizing the holding of a <quote>one-day high-level meeting of the General
Assembly to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the adoption of the Durban
Declaration and Programme of Action, at the level of Heads of State and
Government, on the second day of the general debate of the sixty-sixth
session</quote> in September of 2011. The resolution also states that the
meeting (commonly referred to as <term>Durban III</term>) will adopt a
<quote>political declaration aimed at mobilizing political will at the
national, regional, and international levels for the full and effective
implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action and its
follow-up processes</quote>. The resolution also requests that the United
Nations Secretary-General <quote>establish a programme of outreach, with the
involvement of Member States and United Nations funds and programmes as well as
civil society, including non-governmental organizations, to appropriately
commemorate the tenth anniversary of the adoption of the Durban Declaration and
Programme of Action</quote>. The resolution also requests that <quote>the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the
Department of Public Information of the Secretariat … launch a public
information campaign for the commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the
adoption of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action</quote>. The United
States, joined by 21 other nations, voted against this resolution.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H266718F88A0E4E9D91350FD834A40FA1"><enum>(20)</enum><text>The Government of
Canada has announced that it will not participate in the Durban III meeting.
Canada Minister of Citizenship, Immigration, and Multiculturalism Jason Kenney
stated, <quote>Our government has lost faith in the entire tainted Durban
process. Canada will not participate in this charade any longer. We will not
lend our country’s good name to a commemoration of what has widely been
characterized as a hatefest. … Canada is clearly committed to the fight against
racism, but the Durban process commemorates an agenda that actually promotes
racism rather than combats it.</quote>.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HA8CC6D1F0967497982E7F1771FD7DBA6"><enum>(21)</enum><text>The Government of
Israel has announced that it will not participate in the Durban III meeting,
stating, <quote>Israel is part of the international struggle against racism.
The Jewish people was itself a victim of racism throughout history. Israel
regrets that a resolution on an important subject—elimination of racism—has
been diverted and politicized by the automatic majority at the UN, by linking
it to the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action (2001) that many states
would prefer to forget. The Durban Conference of 2001, with its antisemitic
undertones and displays of hatred for Israel and the Jewish World, left us with
scars that will not heal quickly. … Under the present circumstances, as long as
the [Durban III] meeting is defined as part of the infamous <quote>Durban
process</quote>, Israel will not participate … .</quote>.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H8D5C7C6845CB4BCBBB31F5B58C8217C8"><enum>(22)</enum><text>On June 2, 2011,
the United States publicly announced that it would not participate in the
Durban III meeting. A Department of State deputy spokesman stated,
<quote>Durban process includes displays of intolerance and anti-Semitism, and
we don't want to see that commemorated. In our conversations about this
commemoration, we've not seen the kind of progress that we think is indicative.
We remain unconvinced that the conference is moving in a new
direction.</quote>.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H11F43A0F6C364837AADDA8A3B0D4FD52"><enum>(23)</enum><text>The Governments
of the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, and Italy have announced that they will
not participate in the Durban III meeting.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HCB89F5A467614CCA9D81E02896E6CC45"><enum>(24)</enum><text>The Durban I and
Durban II Conferences, and the preparatory and follow-on activities for both,
have made little or no demonstrable contribution to combating racism, racial
discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H87B9BD4014CB4A90B1441C435255C9F7"><enum>(25)</enum><text>The United States
is the largest contributor to the United Nations system, and is assessed for a
full 22 percent of the United Nations regular budget, which is funded by
assessed contributions from Member States.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H569E7570F18243BCBD2715FB80906853"><enum>(26)</enum><text>Funding for
Durban I, Durban II, and their preparatory and follow-on activities through the
United Nations regular budget has resulted in United States taxpayer dollars
being used for those purposes.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HCE72AB620D6640B697AD02837CF17C10"><enum>(27)</enum><text>Congress, through
its adoption of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (Public Law 110–161)
withheld from the United States assessed contribution for fiscal year 2008 to
the United Nations regular budget an amount equivalent to the United States
share of the United Nations Human Rights Council budget, including its share of
the Council-administered preparatory process for Durban II.</text>
</paragraph></section><section id="HDFD593D8F63C4653A8C63F3CFECDE404"><enum>702.</enum><header>Sense of
Congress; statement of policy</header>
<subsection id="H54F2AF6823A543BE869E01E1BD148B41"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Sense of
congress</header><text>It is the sense of Congress that—</text>
<paragraph id="H970D5AE6FB0A4A2CA826FCBE6DB0EB30"><enum>(1)</enum><text>the Durban I and
Durban II conferences, and their preparatory and follow-on activities, were
subverted by members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and
irredeemably distorted into a forum for anti-Israel, anti-Semitic, and
anti-freedom activity;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HEF3E3C7A453942DFA717F5C15AE027ED"><enum>(2)</enum><text>by walking out of
the Durban I conference, not participating in the Durban II conference, and
announcing that it would not participate in the Durban III meeting, the United
States Government upheld and reaffirmed the fundamental commitment of the
United States to combating racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and
related intolerance;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H3D4161A3FBE14A4A8D7A9CCB16DEB0E7"><enum>(3)</enum><text>the Governments of
Canada, Israel, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Australia, New
Zealand, and the Czech Republic should be commended for their decision to not
participate or cease participation in the Durban II conference;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H0403895B5E8545EABE5A88697C96014D"><enum>(4)</enum><text>the Governments of
Canada, Israel, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Italy, and any other
government that decides not to participate in the Durban III meeting, should be
commended for that decision; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HC53EE73776B54437A7A68328D1D60931"><enum>(5)</enum><text>the United States
Government should expeditiously and unequivocally announce that it will not
participate in, support, or legitimize any part of the Durban process.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="HFD5A1FF32117412EAC10856888AD6CF6"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Statement of
policy</header><text>It shall be the policy of the United States to—</text>
<paragraph id="H301A183F145544DBA2856D7501CE6FE9"><enum>(1)</enum><text>lead a high-level
diplomatic effort to encourage other responsible countries—</text>
<subparagraph id="H11FCD5D8DC11477D9DA58D162DDE54BE"><enum>(A)</enum><text>not to participate
in, support, legitimize, or fund any portion of the Durban III meeting, its
preparatory or follow-on activities, or any other part of the Durban process;
and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H40BF9AAC92244B4CBD5010E0C586384D"><enum>(B)</enum><text>to withhold from
their respective contributions to the regularly assessed biennial budget of the
United Nations an amount that is equal to the percentage of such respective
contributions that they determine would be or has been allocated by the United
Nations for any part of the Durban III meeting or its preparatory or follow-on
activities, or for any other part of the Durban process; and</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="H27E29F6F0C7B446CADD277332FBD2192"><enum>(2)</enum><text>lead a high-level
diplomatic effort to explore credible, alternative forums for combating racism,
racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance.</text>
</paragraph></subsection></section><section id="HE39BFDD7981F466D88FAC882017E1061"><enum>703.</enum><header>Non-participation
in the Durban process</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">None of
the funds made available in any provision of law may be used for United States
participation in the Durban III meeting, its preparatory or follow-on
activities, or any further part of the Durban process.</text>
</section><section id="H047FED2F791042E8993F44E0CD6ECD1D"><enum>704.</enum><header>Withholding of
funds; refund of United States taxpayer dollars</header>
<subsection id="HB373240BCFD14A77B75F06D179534050"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Withholding of
funds for the Durban process</header><text>The Secretary shall withhold from
the United States contribution to the regular budget of the United Nations an
amount that is equal to the percentage of such contribution that the Secretary
determines would be or has been expended by the United Nations for any part of
the Durban I or Durban II conferences, the Durban III meeting, their
preparatory or follow-on activities, or any other part of the Durban process,
including—</text>
<paragraph id="H469E579C8D274CAAAF0D1184FEFBD30E"><enum>(1)</enum><text>the <quote>public
information campaign for the commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the
adoption of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action</quote> requested by
United Nations General Assembly Resolution ARES/65/240;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H0B61572B43F24E319ACF6E16D1BBD2C1"><enum>(2)</enum><text>the
Intergovernmental Working Group on the Effective Implementation of the Durban
Declaration and Programme of Action;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H921187F7607941CD80D5139A7882D544"><enum>(3)</enum><text>the <quote>group
of independent eminent experts on the implementation of the Durban Declaration
and Programme of Action</quote>; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H971D086FE84340EAAE4A329952C8FF02"><enum>(4)</enum><text>the Ad Hoc
Committee on the Elaboration of Complementary Standards.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="HD063E6C642A644F6B2A15C6FB1073F7D"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Withholding of
funds for other biased and compromised activities</header><text>Until the
Secretary submits to the appropriate congressional committees a certification,
on a case-by-case basis, that the requirements described in subsection (d) have
been satisfied, the United States shall withhold from the United States
contribution to the regular budget of the United Nations an amount that is
equal to the percentage of such contribution that the Secretary determines has
been allocated by the United Nations for any conference, meeting, or other
multilateral forum, or the preparatory or follow-on activities of any
conference, meeting, or other multilateral forum, that is organized under the
aegis or jurisdiction of the United Nations or of any United Nations
entity.</text>
</subsection><subsection id="HF285270DF9984656981A5ABC119503BD"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Refund of United
States taxpayer dollars</header>
<paragraph id="H5909CC33225B488B80D5AA2F6CFCE01D"><enum>(1)</enum><header>Contributions to
regular budget of united nations</header><text>Funds appropriated for use as a
United States contribution to the regular budget of the United Nations but
withheld from obligation and expenditure pursuant to subsection (a) shall
immediately revert to the United States Treasury and shall not be considered
arrears to be repaid to any United Nations entity.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HDC02C3924C234BF58D86C600D1624BE1"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Contributions to
biennial budget of united nations</header><text>Funds appropriated for use as a
United States contribution to the regularly assessed biennial budget of the
United Nations but withheld from obligation and expenditure pursuant to
subsection (b) may be obligated and expended for that purpose upon the
certification described in subsection (d). Such funds shall revert to the
United States Treasury if no such certification is made by the date that is one
year after such appropriation, and shall not be considered arrears to be repaid
to any United Nations entity.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="HA927B4DEF36D48E9A9CA742544B33399"><enum>(d)</enum><header>Certification</header><text>The
certification referred to in subsection (b) is a certification made by the
Secretary to the appropriate congressional committees concerning the
following:</text>
<paragraph id="H02F135E83ED142399183FC76B2A8A5A6"><enum>(1)</enum><text>The specified
conference, meeting, or other multilateral forum did not reaffirm, call for the
implementation of, or otherwise support the Durban Declaration and Programme of
Action (2001) or the outcome document of the Durban II conference (2009) or the
Durban III meeting (2011).</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H421DCD9F9FE54EC8BF3830C57E7E3EC1"><enum>(2)</enum><text>The specified
conference or forum was not used to single out the United States or the State
of Israel for unfair or unbalanced criticism.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H71C371CB5CA143879F0927FA2296762D"><enum>(3)</enum><text>The specified
conference or forum was not used to propagate racism, racial discrimination,
anti-Semitism, denial of the Holocaust, incitement to violence or genocide,
xenophobia, or related intolerance.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H8B7B6FBCB3074DCCB92B48A7538968A9"><enum>(4)</enum><text>The specified
conference or forum was not used to advocate for restrictions on the freedoms
of speech, expression, religion, the press, assembly, or petition, or for
restrictions on other fundamental human rights and freedoms.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H39D9A3B1D71E4EC9A7E8DB2802FEAEA3"><enum>(5)</enum><text>The leadership of
the specified conference or forum does not include a Member State, or a
representative from a Member State—</text>
<subparagraph id="H3AD2E70831FD4D9887C10F2853CA1BB9"><enum>(A)</enum><text>subject to
sanctions by the Security Council;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H856BAAD52E7E4D308282AB6FB2F45D19"><enum>(B)</enum><text>under a Security
Council-mandated investigation for human rights abuses; or</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="HE542AC8D5E7B4BC7A33E5DB3F0BF8377"><enum>(C)</enum><text>the government of
which the Secretary has determined, for purposes of section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act of 1979 (as continued in effect pursuant to the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act), section 40 of the Arms Export
Control Act, section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, or other
provision of law, is a government that has repeatedly provided support for acts
of international terrorism.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph></subsection></section><enum>VIII</enum><header>United Nations
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Middle East</header>
<section id="H9996FD122BCC42668916C17394DD605F"><enum>801.</enum><header>Findings</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">Congress makes the following
findings:</text>
<paragraph id="H7E9C2073904B47D3B51405DEE5AFB59F"><enum>(1)</enum><text>United Nations
General Assembly Resolution 302 (1949) created the United Nations Relief and
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) with the
temporary, strictly humanitarian mandate to <quote>carry out … direct relief
and works programmes</quote> for Palestinian refugees.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HA5B84106B57E4BF7A672B7B16418409F"><enum>(2)</enum><text>UNRWA has
acknowledged that it is the <quote>only UN agency that reports directly to the
UN General Assembly, and whose beneficiary population stems from one
nation-group</quote>, and is responsible solely for Palestinian refugees, while
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is responsible for
other refugees across the world.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H4BEB14278B9B45CB8C4BBB19E32CF6E1"><enum>(3)</enum><text>UNHCR’s definition
of a refugee is, in accordance with the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees, any person who <quote>owing to a well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail
himself of the protection of that country</quote>.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H541075CC958744A1B1DFF8EE4033DE3E"><enum>(4)</enum><text>UNRWA’s much
broader definition of a <quote>Palestine refugee</quote> is any person, and his
descendants, whose <quote>normal place of residence was [the former British
Mandate of] Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948 and who lost
both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948
conflict.</quote>.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HECCDBC6F65D64FA8900797ED60D1D6D2"><enum>(5)</enum><text>UNRWA’s overly
inclusive definition of a <quote>Palestine refugee</quote> has resulted in an
increase in UNRWA’s reported number of <quote>Palestine refugees</quote> from
under 1,000,000 in 1950 to over 4,500,000 in 2011, encompassing multiple
generations of descendants of the original Palestinian refugees.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H7670A464A2414F11AB03F7E8586FDEB9"><enum>(6)</enum><text>Hundreds of
thousands of <quote>Palestine refugees</quote> are citizens of recognized
states.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H60198BFA611D407C8EB9D36D64C4F5F3"><enum>(7)</enum><text>UNRWA, unlike
UNHCR, does not offer refugees the option of resettlement and reintegration
into their country of refuge or a third country. Efforts by UN officials in the
1950s to offer resettlement and reintegration as an option for Palestinian
refugees were dropped under fierce opposition from Arab governments, and have
not been taken up since.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H00B0D5C19A4D4A8FAC48E0ABD209D44C"><enum>(8)</enum><text>Through its overly
inclusive definition of a <quote>Palestine refugee</quote> and its refusal to
offer refugees the option of resettlement and reintegration, UNRWA contributes
to the perpetuation of the suffering of Palestinian refugees, who have been
exploited by Arab governments and Palestinian militant groups for over six
decades as a political tool with which to assail Israel.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HEAD4D46A724943B5B50F656A3E5B98DA"><enum>(9)</enum><text>Almost all of
UNRWA’s almost 30,000 staff are Palestinian refugees themselves, presenting a
clear conflict of interest.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H3EB14767BC00420F97C762701232966C"><enum>(10)</enum><text>UNRWA’s total
annual budget, including its core programs, emergency activities and special
projects, exceeds $1,000,000,000.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HD13A2B0FDA734492BC9413AFF0CAD337"><enum>(11)</enum><text>The United States
has long been the largest single contributing country to UNRWA.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H893D9EEEB9DC463FBDBF3BE226E0A13C"><enum>(12)</enum><text>From 1950 to
2010, the United States has contributed almost $3,900,000,000 to UNRWA,
including an average of over $210,000,000 per year between fiscal years 2007
and 2010.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HE08C524513254789921E507A55D4CCFB"><enum>(13)</enum><text>Section 301(c) of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2221(c)) provides, <quote>No
contributions by the United States shall be made to the United Nations Relief
and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East except on the
condition that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency take all possible
measures to assure that no part of the United States contribution shall be used
to furnish assistance to any refugee who is receiving military training as a
member of the so-called Palestine Liberation Army or any other guerrilla type
organization or who has engaged in any act of terrorism.</quote>.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H8A72C74208D5435A918A12B4839728B7"><enum>(14)</enum><text>In contravention
of United States law, UNRWA does not ask its personnel or aid recipients if
they are members of foreign terrorist organizations.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H59DD4ADD38D347A995F9A14108EDFE82"><enum>(15)</enum><text>Even though the
United States remains the largest single contributing country to UNRWA, UNRWA
does not screen its prospective or present staff and aid recipients through
United States watch lists, including that of the Department of the Treasury’s
Office of Foreign Assets Control, and refused a United States request to do so
in 2005.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HCEF5263D7AF747E28FD3E0AD322D2695"><enum>(16)</enum><text>UNRWA claims that
it has fulfilled its obligations under section 301(c) of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 by screening personnel through the United Nations Consolidated List
pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267, but the names on
that list are largely members of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, not of Palestinian
foreign terrorist organizations such as Hamas, Fatah’s al-Aqsa Martyrs’
Brigades, or Palestinian Islamic Jihad.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H727B768284E944D0B136E97E8371E935"><enum>(17)</enum><text>Former UNRWA
commissioner-general Peter Hansen stated in 2004, <quote>I am sure that there
are Hamas members on the UNRWA payroll and I don’t see that as a
crime.</quote>.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H5B3B98E0B24B46759D4122F31877A565"><enum>(18)</enum><text>A number of UNRWA
personnel have been discovered to be affiliated with foreign terrorist
organizations, including the following people:</text>
<subparagraph id="H9061A6D5C77F4B3F849240244F9F6FA1"><enum>(A)</enum><text>Issa Batran (now
deceased), a commander of Hamas’s al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades and senior
rocket-maker who taught at an UNRWA school in Gaza;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="HBFD7F89C45A84408AF35122AFE7CE42F"><enum>(B)</enum><text>Humam Khalil Abu
Mulal al-Balawi (now deceased), who reportedly carried out a homicide bombing
that killed 7 Americans and one Jordanian at Forward Operating Base Chapman in
Afghanistan on December 30, 2009, reportedly worked as a physician at an UNRWA
clinic in Amman, Jordan, and had longstanding ties to violent Islamist
extremism;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="HB3431CDE9B98445B9E4CB2BC5695D551"><enum>(C)</enum><text>Said Siam (now
deceased), a longtime Hamas official who eventually served as Hamas’s Interior
Minister in Gaza, and who taught at an UNRWA school in Gaza;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="HE36B13BE43214DDBB27B69F0C9B2DBAD"><enum>(D)</enum><text>Awad al-Qiq (now
deceased), a rocket-builder for Palestinian Islamic Jihad who served as
headmaster of an UNRWA school in Gaza;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H8D793D9B52854963B6DF2D2E4DA998CB"><enum>(E)</enum><text>Nahd Atallah, an
UNRWA staff member in Gaza, who was arrested, convicted, and sentenced to 15
years’ imprisonment by a military court in Israel for using his UN travel
document to bypass Israeli checkpoints in Gaza in order to transport armed
Palestinian militants; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H6E59EFBA17D949EC9452243FD36128DA"><enum>(F)</enum><text>an UNRWA teacher
who reportedly praised homicide bombers and permitted Hamas leader Ahmed Yassin
(now deceased) to speak to an assembly of students at an UNRWA school. UNRWA
did not terminate the teacher’s employment, instead only giving him a letter of
censure.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="HB1C9453A67C14A74BFA794A419DC6308"><enum>(19)</enum><text>UNRWA staff
unions, including the teachers’ union, are frequently controlled by members
affiliated with Hamas.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H10F20A546DB74107ADE108992C8EE3E8"><enum>(20)</enum><text>UNRWA refugee
camps in Lebanon have frequently been controlled by foreign terrorist
organizations and used for numerous unacceptable activities.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HAD1A7528C456408D8DAF53E5081C00AE"><enum>(21)</enum><text>Former UNRWA
general counsel James Lindsay noted in a 2009 report that—</text>
<subparagraph id="H70B88FA5B34742C7B0DD74886874F89F"><enum>(A)</enum><text><quote>UNRWA …
obviously does not take <quote>all possible measures</quote> in
practice</quote> to assure that United States contributions do not provide
assistance to any refugee with ties to foreign terrorist organizations, in
accordance with section 301(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="HA7F482226BA5422F83DDD5724DEE7A6D"><enum>(B)</enum><text><quote>UNRWA makes
no attempt to weed out individuals who support extremist positions … UNRWA has
taken very few steps to detect and eliminate terrorists from the ranks of its
staff or its beneficiaries, and no steps at all to prevent members of terrorist
organizations, such as Hamas, from joining its staff.</quote>;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H7112C32434F140B8A951343BD78750FA"><enum>(C)</enum><text><quote>[i]t is
rare for an area staff member … to report or confirm that another staff member
has violated rules against political speech, let alone exhibited ties to
terrorism. Not surprisingly, external allegations of improper speech or
improper use of UNRWA facilities are difficult to prove, as virtually no one is
willing to be a witness against gang members.</quote>; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="HD994A7F5E4734EA9A3D02C4823648972"><enum>(D)</enum><text><quote>[t]here are
no formal procedures for deregistering or denying services to a properly
registered refugee, no matter what he or she does.</quote>.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="H4BAB9C01C89E48C7A6BF91FD06294CA6"><enum>(22)</enum><text>UNRWA continues
to hold accounts at the Arab Bank and the Commercial Bank of Syria (CBS),
financial institutions that the United States deems or believes to be complicit
in money laundering and terror financing.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H7F0F00CCBA8546958D3BE91F4E2D1B9F"><enum>(23)</enum><text>The Arab Bank is
reportedly at the center of United States investigations into how tens of
millions of dollars have flowed to Palestinian groups that allegedly used some
of those funds to pay off suicide bombers and their relatives, and is also
reportedly being sued in Federal court by United States victims of attacks in
Israel, with attorneys for the victims accusing the bank of facilitating acts
of international terrorism.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HFB7A050114A84260A11E73FCB1656565"><enum>(24)</enum><text>On May 11, 2004,
the Department of the Treasury designated CBS as a financial institution of
<quote>primary money laundering concern</quote> pursuant to section 311 of the
USA Patriot Act (Public Law 107–56; 115 Stat. 298), stating that <quote>CBS had
been used by terrorists and their sympathizers and acted as a conduit for the
laundering of proceeds generated from the illicit sale of Iraqi oil</quote> and
that <quote>numerous transactions that may be indicative of terrorist financing
and money laundering have been transferred through CBS, including two accounts
at CBS that reference a reputed financier for Usama bin Laden.</quote>.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H37D4EC39136845938AA11B42B728CBF6"><enum>(25)</enum><text>CBS is controlled
by the Government of Syria, a state sponsor of terrorism.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H13287F67273D429CAF1AF449DE2F45B4"><enum>(26)</enum><text>The curriculum of
UNRWA schools, which use the textbooks of their respective host governments or
authorities, has long contained materials that are anti-Israel, anti-Semitic,
and supportive of violent extremism.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H80083CE6B6634AE9BC1C72453291700E"><enum>(27)</enum><text>As far back as
over 40 years ago, former UNRWA commissioner-general Laurence Michelmore
admitted that UNRWA schools were supporting a <quote>bitterly hostile attitude
to Israel.</quote>.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HDEE4CC4B49A8445897485C2C8AF4DF64"><enum>(28)</enum><text>Former UNRWA
general counsel James Lindsay noted in a January 2009 report that
<quote>[t]eachers in UNRWA schools were often afraid to remove posters
glorifying <quote>martyrs</quote> (including suicide bombers) for fear of
retribution from armed supporters of the
<quote>martyrs</quote>.</quote>.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H05EFC02844834B53AB584D2B14153AB5"><enum>(29)</enum><text>UNRWA officials
have compromised UNRWA’s strictly humanitarian mandate by engaging in political
agitation, propaganda, and advocacy agitation against Israel and in favor of
Hamas, as reflected by the following actions:</text>
<subparagraph id="H3C50199A42404B4EAF936C1FCBD72D1C"><enum>(A)</enum><text>UNRWA officials
have repeatedly called for the United States and other nations to deal directly
with Hamas and have repeatedly called for political
<quote>reconciliation</quote> between Hamas and Fatah.</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H4985671B8DF84378A3FCD9C13E2553A4"><enum>(B)</enum><text>UNRWA officials
have repeatedly castigated Israel for the actions by the Government of Israel
to defend innocent civilians from rocket and mortar attacks from violent
extremist groups in Gaza and from other acts of international terrorism, and
has repeatedly blamed Israel, not Hamas and other violent extremist groups, for
present restrictions on access to Gaza.</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H28746C70AE3E4CE6AC71A4ACD73CD2E3"><enum>(C)</enum><text>Former UNRWA
general counsel James Lindsay noted in a 2009 report that, <quote>although it
occasionally issued mild, pro forma criticisms of Palestinian attacks (most of
which were clearly war crimes), [UNRWA] put more effort into criticizing
Israeli counterterrorism efforts (which were condemned using language
associated with war crimes, though any such crimes were far from proved) …
UNRWA never seems to acknowledge that Israel, since its 2005 withdrawal from
Gaza, has launched strikes on the territory largely in order to halt rocket
attacks and other assaults.</quote>.</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H9C18CA55DC53421A81A622B903DF7184"><enum>(D)</enum><text>Lindsay also noted
that <quote>UNRWA—through its leaders and press spokespersons—is constantly
involved in political speech. … These one-sided speeches on political matters
do not further the goals of a humanitarian and supposedly nonpolitical
agency.</quote>.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="HADEA59C46D254D819765EDC913C16332"><enum>(30)</enum><text>Despite UNRWA’s
contravention of United States law and activities that compromise its strictly
humanitarian mandate, UNRWA continues to receive United States contributions,
including $237,800,000 in fiscal year 2010.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HBA3B7CA3F5C14AB3827685B1413A047E"><enum>(31)</enum><text>The bilateral
<term>Framework for Cooperation</term> that the United States concluded with
UNRWA for 2010 actually <quote>commends</quote> UNRWA and does not commit UNRWA
to vetting its personnel and aid recipients through United States watch
lists.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H24FE040C53634140B2B5953FCCB5B65E"><enum>(32)</enum><text>Assistance from
the United States and other responsible nations allows UNRWA to claim that
criticisms of the agency’s behavior are unfounded. UNRWA spokesman Christopher
Gunness has dismissed concerns by stating, <quote>If these baseless allegations
were even halfway true, do you really think the U.S. and [European Commission]
would give us hundreds of millions of dollars per year?</quote>.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HB22EDF2A20DA4C45A1E147DC28D6B067"><enum>(33)</enum><text>Former UNRWA
general counsel James Lindsay noted in a 2009 report the following:</text>
<subparagraph id="H1A4B2A44562444438C6D04C11A61235B"><enum>(A)</enum><text><quote>The United
States, despite funding nearly 75 percent of UNRWA’s national budget and
remaining its largest single country donor, has mostly failed to make UNRWA
reflect U.S. foreign policy objectives. … Recent U.S. efforts to shape UNRWA
appear to have been ineffective … .</quote>;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="HCD99497159E3451382678B0D2749FA3C"><enum>(B)</enum><text><quote>[T]he
United States is not obligated to fund agencies that refuse to check its rolls
for individuals their donors do not wish to support.</quote>;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H2AD1BA11739648B88CD3DDBEFBEB9730"><enum>(C)</enum><text><quote>A number of
changes in UNRWA could benefit the refugees, the Middle East, and the United
States, but those changes will not occur unless the United States, ideally with
support from UNRWA’s other main financial supporter, the European Union,
compels the agency to enact reforms.</quote>; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H2B8735E81D824783B631E20DA0C6AE7C"><enum>(D)</enum><text><quote>If the
[UNRWA commissioner-general’s] power is used in ways that are conflict with the
donors’ political objectives, it is up to the donors to take the necessary
actions to ensure that their interests are respected. When they have done so,
UNRWA—given the tight financial leash it has been on for most of its
existence—has tended to follow their dictates, even if sometimes
slowly.</quote>.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="HC94DC7624D61402098974C8D3B9BEC83"><enum>(34)</enum><text>The Government of
Canada has recently placed restrictions on its contributions to UNRWA,
demonstrating consequences for UNRWA’s malfeasance and setting an example for
the United States and other donor governments.</text>
</paragraph></section><section id="H61FA62B656F2407B925539D08C0820C3"><enum>802.</enum><header>United States
contributions to UNRWA</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">Section
301 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2221) is amended by
amending subsection (c) to read as follows:</text>
<quoted-block id="H432A91244EEC4079A40E9579F0BEB025" style="OLC">
<subsection id="H957F7B28F4504F9E93665F5F39222D38"><enum>(c)</enum><paragraph commented="no" display-inline="yes-display-inline" id="HDDC157CEDFAF45ADBA3E16AF53D495B5"><enum>(1)</enum><text>Contributions by the
United States to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), to any successor or related entity, or to
the regular budget of the United Nations for the support of UNRWA or a
successor entity (through staff positions provided by the United Nations
Secretariat, or otherwise), may be provided only during a period for which a
certification described in paragraph (2) is in effect.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H70DC9390C0AC4B1DB14A32B5B4F87D8D" indent="up1"><enum>(2)</enum><text>A certification described in this
paragraph is a written determination by the Secretary of State, based on all
information available after diligent inquiry, and transmitted to the
appropriate congressional committees along with a detailed description of the
factual basis therefor, that—</text>
<subparagraph id="H0603F08D2EC54B2CA8B6EC1809488BB5"><enum>(A)</enum><text>no official, employee, consultant,
contractor, subcontractor, representative, or affiliate of UNRWA—</text>
<clause id="H10FE194B838C4658A37E075EC5AA808B"><enum>(i)</enum><text>is a member of a foreign terrorist
organization;</text>
</clause><clause id="H33698422D1AF487FA23171A7A4563E57"><enum>(ii)</enum><text>has propagated, disseminated, or
incited anti-American, anti-Israel, or anti-Semitic rhetoric or propaganda;
or</text>
</clause><clause id="H7BF19B19885C438D86A1D5E8E4A85478"><enum>(iii)</enum><text>has used any UNRWA resources,
including publications or Internet websites, to propagate or disseminate
political materials, including political rhetoric regarding the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict;</text>
</clause></subparagraph><subparagraph id="H9DFE2FC2484C433C850BEE484A1119A4"><enum>(B)</enum><text>no UNRWA school, hospital, clinic,
other facility, or other infrastructure or resource is being used by a foreign
terrorist organization for operations, planning, training, recruitment,
fundraising, indoctrination, communications, sanctuary, storage of weapons or
other materials, or any other purposes;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="HC1C689582FA04B82B6AF3E4E44FA9BA3"><enum>(C)</enum><text>UNRWA is subject to comprehensive
financial audits by an internationally recognized third party independent
auditing firm and has implemented an effective system of vetting and oversight
to prevent the use, receipt, or diversion of any UNRWA resources by any foreign
terrorist organization or members thereof;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H223BC7460CA146748FEDDCF8B1A94344"><enum>(D)</enum><text>no UNRWA-funded school or educational
institution uses textbooks or other educational materials that propagate or
disseminate anti-American, anti-Israel, or anti-Semitic rhetoric, propaganda or
incitement;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H64396ECAA4C34783818858ED2E120708"><enum>(E)</enum><text>no recipient of UNRWA funds or loans
is a member of a foreign terrorist organization; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H712C88BD084E4EAEA3AAAFB53CD238E1"><enum>(F)</enum><text>UNRWA holds no accounts or other
affiliations with financial institutions that the United States deems or
believes to be complicit in money laundering and terror financing.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="H2E94C322651049AE968B14DA6B69EB3E" indent="up1"><enum>(3)</enum><header>Definitions</header><text>In this
section:</text>
<subparagraph id="H470F39108FAF4CA0A0179E5A28C81BE8"><enum>(A)</enum><header>Appropriate congressional
committees</header><text>The term <term>appropriate congressional
committees</term> means—</text>
<clause id="HEEA4254A0EED484AB0082DCB60C67F8A"><enum>(i)</enum><text>the Committees on Foreign
Relations, Appropriations, and Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of
the Senate; and</text>
</clause><clause id="H975694B153BA404E8781455C753618E8"><enum>(ii)</enum><text>the Committees on Foreign Affairs,
Appropriations, and Oversight and Government Reform of the House of
Representatives.</text>
</clause></subparagraph><subparagraph id="HEDE95569E4984EF391AB1BEE02AEAB6B"><enum>(B)</enum><header>Foreign terrorist
organization</header><text>The term <term>foreign terrorist organization</term>
means an organization designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the
Secretary of State in accordance with section 219(a) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)).</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="H8D07644DAB774D97AC2226A767DA4A30" indent="up1"><enum>(4)</enum><header>Effective duration of
certification</header><text>The certification described in paragraph (2) shall
be effective for a period of 180 days from the date of transmission to the
appropriate congressional committees, or until the Secretary receives
information rendering that certification factually inaccurate, whichever is
earliest. In the event that a certification becomes ineffective, the Secretary
shall promptly transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a
description of any information that precludes the renewal or continuation of
the certification.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H996898598C0C40859C7ADD356FF168F2" indent="up1"><enum>(5)</enum><header>Limitation</header><text>During a
period for which a certification described in paragraph (2) is in effect, the
United States may not contribute to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency
for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) or a successor entity an annual
amount—</text>
<subparagraph id="H5DC9630D99EE474BB4C1D441019550DC"><enum>(A)</enum><text>greater than the highest annual
contribution to UNRWA made by a member country of the League of Arab
States;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H3882FE18F43F4CA0B4D8981D975EC9AD"><enum>(B)</enum><text>that, as a proportion of the total
UNRWA budget, exceeds the proportion of the total budget for the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) paid by the United States; or</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H7902279F2C4A457CB7C91BE58FBBABE6"><enum>(C)</enum><text>that exceeds 22 percent of the total
budget of
UNRWA.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph></subsection><after-quoted-block>.</after-quoted-block></quoted-block>
</section><section id="H01F59E238E4744D0B73490C75859EFC4"><enum>803.</enum><header>Sense of
Congress</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">It is the sense of
Congress that—</text>
<paragraph id="H161C0B6A15274E0D92D3FDDAD5F5F403"><enum>(1)</enum><text>the President and
the Secretary should lead a high-level diplomatic effort to encourage other
responsible nations to withhold contributions to UNRWA, to any successor or
related entity, or to the regular budget of the United Nations for the support
of UNRWA or a successor entity (through staff positions provided by the United
Nations Secretariat, or otherwise) until UNRWA has met the conditions listed in
subparagraphs (A) through (F) of section 301(c)(2) of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 (as added by section 802);</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H7ADCEA781B2F4A77B3797CCEE180EF5E"><enum>(2)</enum><text>citizens of
recognized states should be removed from UNRWA’s jurisdiction;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H726492A1DFF4471DB1216AD078AABA92"><enum>(3)</enum><text>UNRWA’s definition
of a <term>Palestine refugee</term> should be changed to that used for a
refugee by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees;
and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HEF7A548C6C5C4BBFAAD137629CA3A03D"><enum>(4)</enum><text>in order to
alleviate the suffering of Palestinian refugees, responsibility for those
refugees should be fully transferred to the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees.</text>
</paragraph></section><enum>IX</enum><header>International
Atomic Energy Agency</header>
<section id="HC75A0DD97497498C8CA2CEBAC8709586"><enum>901.</enum><header>Technical
Cooperation Program</header>
<subsection id="HC195A0336B0045F5B0B655E1121394FC"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Findings</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">Congress makes the following
findings:</text>
<paragraph id="H07E352C3727048FEA72ADE9B5A03D1F4"><enum>(1)</enum><text>The International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established in 1957 with the objectives of
seeking to <quote>accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to
peace, health and prosperity throughout the world</quote> and to <quote>ensure
… that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or
control is not used in such a way as to further any military
purpose.</quote>.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H5344E154D6574CE59DB3ECD12E34A4AB"><enum>(2)</enum><text>The United States,
via assessed contributions, is the largest financial contributor to the regular
budget of the IAEA.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H4359D8BD034E4A66A099D70D1A04A4D6"><enum>(3)</enum><text>In 1959, the IAEA
established what is now called the Technical Cooperation Program, financed
primarily through voluntary contributions by member states to the Technical
Cooperation Fund, to provide nuclear technical cooperation (TC) for peaceful
purposes to countries worldwide.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H188A29D2CC7442C0ABF2F2A1BA80A1F0"><enum>(4)</enum><text>The United States
is the largest financial contributor to the IAEA’s Technical Cooperation
Fund.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H5B514909582E446D9A94A42675613972"><enum>(5)</enum><text>A
March 2009 report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that
<quote>neither [the Department of State] nor IAEA seeks to systematically limit
TC assistance to countries the United States has designated as state sponsors
of terrorism—Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria—even though under U.S. law these
countries are subject to sanctions.</quote>.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H1B9074AC8FFE45CEA3839DB484452CB9"><enum>(6)</enum><text>The GAO report
also found that <quote>[t]ogether, [Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria] received more
than $55 million in TC assistance from 1997 through 2007</quote>. These four
countries have received continued assistance since 2007.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HBF18DAF18CF64FDEAF7DE65147B12CF2"><enum>(7)</enum><text>The GAO report
also found that <quote>proliferation concerns about the [Technical Cooperation
Program] have persisted because of the assistance it has provided to certain
countries and because nuclear equipment, technology, and expertise can be
dual-use—capable of serving peaceful purposes … but also useful in contributing
to nuclear weapons development.</quote>.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H2F3EC9BB98A0487E84E4C2A3C3A12DD7"><enum>(8)</enum><text>The GAO report
also found that <quote>[the Department of State] reported in 2007 that three TC
projects in [Iran] were directly related to the Iranian nuclear power plant at
Bushehr</quote>.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H393DEDE2E72D45D5865214DF9639A7AF"><enum>(9)</enum><text>The GAO report
also found, <quote>The proliferation concerns associated with the [Technical
Cooperation Program] are difficult for the United States to fully identify,
assess, and resolve … [because] there is no formal mechanism for obtaining TC
project information during the proposal development phase … [l]imited
[Department of] State documentation on how proliferation concerns of TC
proposals were resolved … [and s]hortcomings in U.S. policies and IAEA
procedures [including monitoring proliferation risks] related to TC program
fellowships.</quote>.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H7B8BFA3925404C99AC416C2A03B4EDC1"><enum>(10)</enum><text>The GAO report
noted that <quote>IAEA officials told us that the [Technical Cooperation
Program] does not attempt to exclude countries on the basis of their status as
U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism or other political
considerations,</quote> and that, according to the Deputy Director General for
the Technical Cooperation Program, <quote>there are no good countries and there
are no bad countries</quote> with respect to provision of technical cooperation
by the IAEA.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H41C3E3C21D374097B50921A8EFE8D1A8"><enum>(11)</enum><text>The GAO report
also found that <quote>given the limited information available on TC projects
and the dual-use nature of some nuclear technologies and expertise, we do not
believe [the Department of State] can assert with complete confidence that TC
assistance has not advanced [weapons of mass destruction] programs in
U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism</quote>.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H6AD1362F1F8642BABC43F137EDF133AF"><enum>(12)</enum><text>The GAO report
also found that <quote>the GAO did not share the Department of State’s
confidence in IAEA’s internal safeguards to prevent TC projects from
contributing to weapons development</quote>.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HAB834658965D4F6CBC76F71083B6EB33"><enum>(13)</enum><text>The Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) prohibits any of the funds
authorized to be appropriated for <quote>International Organizations and
Programs</quote> from being made available for the United States proportionate
share for programs for Libya, Iran, Cuba, or the Palestine Liberation
Organization, inter alia.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HE02C3A2F8C1E418295FA07474EC5EEE7"><enum>(14)</enum><text>The Foreign
Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1998
(Public Law 105–118) prohibits any of the funds made available by such Act for
the IAEA from being made available for programs and projects of the IAEA in
Cuba.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HAAFB681983144FF18D5B6ACB7D8BCD48"><enum>(15)</enum><text>The Foreign
Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (division G Public Law 105–277)
required the United States to withhold a proportionate share of funding to the
IAEA for projects in Cuba regarding the Juragua Nuclear Power Plant and the
Pedro Pi Nuclear Research Center.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H5A28524BD9A9438291964B7D0EF08A35"><enum>(16)</enum><text>The GAO report
described in paragraph (5) asked Congress <quote>to consider directing [the
Department of State] to withhold a share of future annual contributions to the
[Technical Cooperation Fund] that is proportionate to the amount of funding
provided from the fund for U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism and
other countries of concern, noting that such a withholding is a matter of
fundamental principle and intended to foster a more consistent U.S. policy
toward such nations</quote>.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H1D1DCC2F5E384A5BA20A4D4F065173EB"><enum>(17)</enum><text>The IAEA has
repeatedly reported that the Government of Iran continues its work on heavy
water-related projects and its enrichment of uranium, in violation of United
Nations Security Council Resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007),
1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010).</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H03E8054F6001447398D65F2E8227AA14"><enum>(18)</enum><text>United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006) decided <quote>that technical
cooperation provided to Iran by the IAEA or under its auspices shall only be
for food, agricultural, medical, safety or other humanitarian purposes [inter
alia] … but that no such technical cooperation shall be provided that relates
to … proliferation sensitive nuclear activities … .</quote>.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H8B15C3FE66834E60AC0C403CEC9CEBFD"><enum>(19)</enum><text>The IAEA Director
General reported to the IAEA Board of Governors on February 25, 2011, that the
Government of Iran now has approximately 7,000 centrifuges for enriching
uranium, is running almost 5,000 of them, and has increased its stockpile of
low-enriched uranium to over 3,600 kilograms, considered sufficient for further
enrichment into enough high-enriched uranium for more than one atomic bomb. The
Government of Iran has also reportedly produced a stockpile of over 40
kilograms of uranium enriched up to 20 percent U–235.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H36D1FE332E5144C19633D81050C4CAB1"><enum>(20)</enum><text>The IAEA Director
General has repeatedly reported to the IAEA Board of Governors, including in
his report of February 25, 2011, about the <quote>outstanding issues related to
possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme</quote>.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HD60A3480A5E74161842F9FB7DC955059"><enum>(21)</enum><text>The IAEA Director
General has repeatedly reported to the IAEA Board of Governors, including in
his report of February 25, 2011, that <quote>the [IAEA] remains concerned about
the possible existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed nuclear related
activities involving military-related organizations, including activities
related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile</quote>.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HB14F392F7CDB49C7955B4F1934F91ED6"><enum>(22)</enum><text>The IAEA Director
General has repeatedly reported to the IAEA Board of Governors, including in
his report of February 19, 2009, that <quote>Iran has not implemented the
Additional Protocol, which is a prerequisite for [the IAEA] to provide credible
assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Nor
has [Iran] agreed to [the IAEA’s] request that Iran provide, as a transparency
measure, access to additional locations related, inter alia, to the
manufacturing of centrifuges, research and development on uranium enrichment,
and uranium mining and milling, as also required by the Security
Council.</quote>.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H969232B12DBF49098AC287E00F73F447"><enum>(23)</enum><text>The IAEA Director
General has repeatedly reported to the IAEA Board of Governors, including in
his report of February 19, 2009, that <quote>as a result of the continued lack
of cooperation by Iran in connection with … issues which give rise to concerns
about possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear programme, [the IAEA] has
made no substantive progress on these issues.</quote>.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HDD6595359D9645DDA05B197C5504E76F"><enum>(24)</enum><text>Iran has refused
to comply with resolutions adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors on September
12, 2003, November 26, 2003, March 15, 2004, June 18, 2004, November 29, 2004,
August 11, 2005, September 24, 2005, February 4, 2006, and July 31, 2006,
regarding <quote>Iran’s many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply
with its NPT Safeguards Agreement</quote> and continues to block IAEA
inspections of its nuclear facilities, in violation of its NPT Safeguards
Agreement.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H2D89AB1DD0B94633923A060ADE848705"><enum>(25)</enum><text>In April 2008,
United States Government officials publicly revealed that Syria was building at
the Dair Alzour site, with assistance from the Government of North Korea, a
secret nuclear reactor that was based on a North Korean model capable of
producing plutonium for nuclear weapons and that was weeks away from becoming
operational before an Israeli air strike reportedly destroyed the reactor in
September 2007.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HE32D7C9AA05D49C4BBE374C7CB4BDA95"><enum>(26)</enum><text>On April 28,
2008, General Michael Hayden, the former Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency, stated that the Syrian reactor at Dair Alzour could have produced
enough plutonium for 1 or 2 bombs within a year of becoming operational.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H1BFEC90C7A414FF9B59FA999121BF6A0"><enum>(27)</enum><text>The IAEA Director
General reported to the IAEA Board of Governors on November 19, 2008, that the
Syrian facility at Dair Alzour bore features that resembled those of an
undeclared nuclear reactor, adding that <quote>Syria has not yet provided the
requested documentation in support of its declarations concerning the nature or
function of the destroyed building, nor agreed to a visit to the three other
locations which the IAEA has requested to visit</quote>.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H35AE7D1D91B94EEF8D4C20DD7EF1212A"><enum>(28)</enum><text>The IAEA Director
General publicly stated to the IAEA Board of Governors, on June 15, 2009, that
<quote>the limited information and access provided by Syria to date have not
enabled the Agency to determine the nature of the destroyed facility</quote> at
Dair Alzour site, that uranium particles have been found in samples taken from
a second site, the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor facility in Damascus, and
that the particles found at both sites <quote>are of a type not included in
Syria’s declared inventory of nuclear material</quote>.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H57EEA7EBA87D4FEAAE4B427535D6CCED"><enum>(29)</enum><text>Commercial
satellite photos published on February 23, 2011, indicate efforts by the
Government of Syria to conceal its activities at an additional site, Marj as
Sultan, which may be connected to the Dair Alzour facility.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HA3F73467C7DD4CDD83C5858845C00805"><enum>(30)</enum><text>The IAEA Director
General reported to the IAEA Board of Governors on February 25, 2011, that
<quote>Syria has not cooperated with the [IAEA] since June 2008 in connection
with the unresolved issues related to the Dair Alzour site and the other three
locations allegedly functionally related to it. As a consequences, the [IAEA]
has not been able to make progress towards resolving the outstanding issues
related to those sites.</quote>.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="HCC2FBA035A3F4E9DB1C9ADAE450FE653"><enum>(b)</enum><header>In
general</header><text>No funds from any United States assessed or voluntary
contribution to the IAEA may be used to support any assistance provided by the
IAEA through its Technical Cooperation program to any country, including North
Korea that—</text>
<paragraph id="HF0A08C53910D47A8B20DFA2161BDD904"><enum>(1)</enum><text>is a country the
government of which has been determined by the Secretary, for purposes of
section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, section 620A of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, or
other provision of law, is a government that has repeatedly provided support
for acts of international terrorism;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HBCEDA7E9F9874294A23BE07450C4A047"><enum>(2)</enum><text>is in breach of or
noncompliance with its obligations regarding—</text>
<subparagraph id="H2CA549EFCB6B4795BDD31630871245F6"><enum>(A)</enum><text>its safeguards
agreement with the IAEA;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H6B6FDF65F0A4482C9B6EC9907B4D50F5"><enum>(B)</enum><text>the Additional
Protocol;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H692A7B7AC4A040C485819A1248E2D8B5"><enum>(C)</enum><text>the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="HC89285001E0C4708A7F7B11C511DEA46"><enum>(D)</enum><text>any relevant
United Nations Security Council Resolution; or</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="HDD8841C85A31442480985F1EBC6F43A5"><enum>(E)</enum><text>the Charter of the
United Nations; or</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="HA820D95A982D41D4BCD2D74B264624C8"><enum>(3)</enum><text>is under
investigation for a breach of or noncompliance with the obligations specified
in paragraph (2).</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="H0CA569B3B86A4BD4B60E7ECF0AA0AABF"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Withholding of
voluntary contributions</header><text>Not later than 30 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall withhold from the United States
voluntary contribution to the IAEA an amount proportional to that spent by the
IAEA in the period from 2007 to 2008 on assistance through its Technical
Cooperation Program to countries described in subsection (b).</text>
</subsection><subsection id="H9D865FFF84A04910A512A4682C16954B"><enum>(d)</enum><header>Withholding of
assessed contributions</header><text>If, not later than 30 days of the date of
the enactment of this Act, the amount specified in subsection (c) has not been
withheld and the IAEA has not suspended all assistance provided through its
Technical Cooperation Program to the countries described in subsection (b), an
amount equal to that specified in subsection (c) shall be withheld from the
United States assessed contribution to the IAEA.</text>
</subsection><subsection id="H7E80016E9C6649C58C14BD4A2DF83DF9"><enum>(e)</enum><header>Waiver</header><text>The
provisions in subsections (c) and (d) may be waived if—</text>
<paragraph id="H660BA9FDE39742AEBE837E800FADC12E"><enum>(1)</enum><text>the IAEA has
suspended all assistance provided through its Technical Cooperation Program to
the countries described in subsection (b); or</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H9722C0C3121D4890A0C523785D0D5257"><enum>(2)</enum><text>the President
certifies that the countries described in subsection (b) no longer pose a
threat to the national security, interests, and allies of the United
States.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="HFFC2789B55114D86849F6F905E0B437C"><enum>(f)</enum><header>United States
actions at IAEA</header><text>The President shall direct the United States
Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of
the United States at the IAEA to block the allocation of funds for any
assistance provided by the IAEA through its Technical Cooperation Program to
any country described in subsection (b).</text>
</subsection><subsection id="H41ED785A689E45F9B163821D2FC8C9ED"><enum>(g)</enum><header>Report</header><text>Not
later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President
shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the
implementation of this section.</text>
</subsection></section><section id="H3773221D247249268DA975532FDE9218"><enum>902.</enum><header>United States
policy at the IAEA</header>
<subsection id="H2AAEAC8466EF45EA91689E4C21D09DC0"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Enforcement and
compliance</header>
<paragraph id="HADDDDC65B82D474A808DDF468298D319"><enum>(1)</enum><header>Office of
compliance</header>
<subparagraph id="HCF34837186A14AD6A0BFB35B77BA82E3"><enum>(A)</enum><header>Establishment</header><text>The
President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to use the voice, vote, and influence
of the United States at the IAEA to establish an Office of Compliance in the
Secretariat of the IAEA.</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H56EBB9EEF9C447C58C6F7D6B58046D06"><enum>(B)</enum><header>Operation</header><text>The
Office of Compliance shall—</text>
<clause id="H81FBCF4D443C4E068A497692ABEEC9C1"><enum>(i)</enum><text>function as an
independent body composed of technical experts who shall work in consultation
with IAEA inspectors to assess compliance by IAEA Member States and provide
recommendations to the IAEA Board of Governors concerning penalties to be
imposed on IAEA Member States that fail to fulfill their obligations under IAEA
Board resolutions;</text>
</clause><clause id="HEE7F40664CD0447C8823933CA3EABAC1"><enum>(ii)</enum><text>base its
assessments and recommendations on IAEA inspection reports; and</text>
</clause><clause id="H4331F95E8FBD4A4FB29F16E840BD3A93"><enum>(iii)</enum><text>take into
consideration information provided by IAEA Board Members that are 1 of the 5
nuclear weapons states as recognized by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (21 UST 483) (commonly referred to as the <term>Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty</term> or the <term>NPT</term>).</text>
</clause></subparagraph><subparagraph id="HE9A11C37E7924B60987D526704B4FE20"><enum>(C)</enum><header>Staffing</header><text>The
Office of Compliance shall be staffed from existing personnel in the Department
of Safeguards of the IAEA or the Department of Nuclear Safety and Security of
the IAEA.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="H2270287DA7664B79822954DB50FB6311"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Committee on
safeguards and verification</header><text>The President shall direct the United
States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and
influence of the United States at the IAEA to ensure that the Committee on
Safeguards and Verification established in 2005 shall develop and seek to put
into force a workplan of concrete measures that will—</text>
<subparagraph id="H6B414F06959E471796DF6F938A7A894B"><enum>(A)</enum><text>improve the
ability of the IAEA to monitor and enforce compliance by Member States of the
IAEA with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Statute of the
International Atomic Energy Agency; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="HD3BC26D164F8482EB897FF009CA59CA2"><enum>(B)</enum><text>enhance the
ability of the IAEA, beyond the verification mechanisms and authorities
contained in the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreements between the
IAEA and Member States of the IAEA, to detect with a high degree of confidence
undeclared nuclear activities by a Member State.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="HC189B0B8F7B3438B85A78C942FAF9F1B"><enum>(3)</enum><header>Penalties with
respect to the IAEA</header>
<subparagraph id="H8D58C880B4B34067AC4B91AE3931ADE7"><enum>(A)</enum><header>In
general</header><text>The President shall direct the United States Permanent
Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United
States at the IAEA to ensure that a Member State of the IAEA that is under
investigation for a breach of or noncompliance with its IAEA obligations or the
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations has its privileges
suspended, including—</text>
<clause id="HEDCF28D71A84426BBDAB2C02B35CC913"><enum>(i)</enum><text>limiting its
ability to vote on its case;</text>
</clause><clause id="HB25033C35A0943CAAB1AA6EA71937F2B"><enum>(ii)</enum><text>being prevented
from receiving any technical assistance; and</text>
</clause><clause id="HFFF8FFCB26D3415AB1131FC5C53F5A0B"><enum>(iii)</enum><text>being prevented
from hosting meetings.</text>
</clause></subparagraph><subparagraph id="H641FA80CBBFA4CB3A05305252E12AC3D"><enum>(B)</enum><header>Termination of
penalties</header><text>The penalties specified under subparagraph (A) shall be
terminated when such investigation is concluded and such Member State is no
longer in such breach or noncompliance.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="HDEF059BB305C492180FBC17234B6D107"><enum>(4)</enum><header>Penalties with
respect to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty</header><text>The President
shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the
voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to ensure that a
Member State of the IAEA that is found to be in breach of, in noncompliance
with, or has withdrawn from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty shall return to
the IAEA all nuclear materials and technology received from the IAEA, any
Member State of the IAEA, or any Member State of the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="H968DFC47279A4B82AABE6B18C1C40307"><enum>(b)</enum><header>United States
contributions</header>
<paragraph id="HBA0AFE6637604E53B7D9D3114B41CFF0"><enum>(1)</enum><header>Voluntary
contributions</header><text>Voluntary contributions of the United States to the
IAEA should primarily be used to fund activities relating to nuclear safety and
security or activities relating to nuclear verification.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H6E75BF37C586441BA87207807D006E85"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Limitation on
use of funds</header><text>The President shall direct the United States
Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of
the United States at the IAEA to—</text>
<subparagraph id="H5D0B26949E5842799B5D36B01F3E19CB"><enum>(A)</enum><text>ensure that funds
for safeguards inspections are prioritized for countries that have newly
established nuclear programs or are initiating nuclear programs; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="HA044F78C771E49D0908C43B234A0C420"><enum>(B)</enum><text>block the
allocation of funds for any other IAEA development, environmental, or nuclear
science assistance or activity to a country—</text>
<clause id="H04BF19D87582427E9CBC2B2C155BDA33"><enum>(i)</enum><text>the
government of which the Secretary has determined, for purposes of section 6(j)
of the Export Administration Act of 1979, section 620A of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, or other
provision of law, is a government that has repeatedly provided support for acts
of international terrorism and the government of which the Secretary has
determined has not dismantled and surrendered its weapons of mass destruction
programs under international verification;</text>
</clause><clause id="H1FE1CB699706464EA18AA3016A2E3CDF"><enum>(ii)</enum><text>that is under
investigation for a breach of or noncompliance with its IAEA obligations or the
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations; or</text>
</clause><clause id="HE1A46C51728A4E4F955B473CC2D44FD4"><enum>(iii)</enum><text>that is in
violation of its IAEA obligations or the purposes and principles of the Charter
of the United Nations.</text>
</clause></subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="HF4934AB222654D43A8C2351BA1936CB3"><enum>(3)</enum><header>Detail of
expenditures</header><text>The President shall direct the United States
Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of
the United States at the IAEA to secure, as part of the regular budget
presentation of the IAEA to Member States of the IAEA, a detailed breakdown by
country of expenditures of the IAEA for safeguards inspections and nuclear
security activities.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="H20DF858ECE0144108675B8797351995F"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Membership</header>
<paragraph id="H014EDB7636E8468ABB54D02A4857FD47"><enum>(1)</enum><header>In
general</header><text>The President shall direct the United States Permanent
Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United
States at the IAEA to block the membership on the Board of Governors of the
IAEA for a Member State of the IAEA that has not signed and ratified the
Additional Protocol and—</text>
<subparagraph id="HBF593F9B963C44B48D4BBD578577A8A2"><enum>(A)</enum><text>is under
investigation for a breach of or noncompliance with its IAEA obligations or the
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations; or</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H6AF1716AC4D1471C97DE964F9A8A8823"><enum>(B)</enum><text>that is in
violation of its IAEA obligations or the purposes and principles of the Charter
of the United Nations.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="HBBA42E416CA34D8E9C56E2FE858FFDDE"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Criteria</header><text>The
United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA shall make every effort to
modify the criteria for Board membership to reflect the principles described in
paragraph (1).</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="H8D72132732894CAAAD1B79E2E017E780"><enum>(d)</enum><header>Small quantities
protocol</header><text>The President shall direct the United States Permanent
Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United
States at the IAEA to make every effort to ensure that the IAEA changes the
policy regarding the Small Quantities Protocol in order to—</text>
<paragraph id="H71D1C8839BB24231BC5205E015B4FCCD"><enum>(1)</enum><text>rescind and
eliminate the Small Quantities Protocol;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H6592833F37CC4FF3994ECF2314C56E71"><enum>(2)</enum><text>require that any
IAEA Member State that has previously signed a Small Quantities Protocol to
sign, ratify, and implement the Additional Protocol, provide immediate access
for IAEA inspectors to its nuclear-related facilities, and agree to the
strongest inspections regime of its nuclear efforts; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H83FFF6D3DF19410CBD5C982D533AB1A6"><enum>(3)</enum><text>require that any
IAEA Member State that does not comply with paragraph (2) to be ineligible to
receive nuclear material, technology, equipment, or assistance from any IAEA
Member State and subject to the penalties described in subsection
(a)(3).</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="H346B680E536442289684F94C3E093883"><enum>(e)</enum><header>Nuclear program
of Iran</header>
<paragraph id="H452847087AD24EAAB629ABB2AF07DAA8"><enum>(1)</enum><header>United states
action</header><text>The President shall direct the United States Permanent
Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United
States at the IAEA to make every effort to ensure the adoption of a resolution
by the IAEA Board of Governors that, in addition to the restrictions already
imposed, makes Iran ineligible to receive any nuclear material, technology,
equipment, or assistance from any IAEA Member State and ineligible for any IAEA
assistance not related to safeguards inspections or nuclear security until the
IAEA Board of Governors determines that Iran—</text>
<subparagraph id="HE912EC6AC22A495994EA9C026DDBA008"><enum>(A)</enum><text>is providing full
access to IAEA inspectors to its nuclear-related facilities;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H2AE1A406EF6947419C63312AF484BAF2"><enum>(B)</enum><text>has fully
implemented and is in compliance with the Additional Protocol; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H4020853A57804716A625C4A4467E054E"><enum>(C)</enum><text>has permanently
ceased and dismantled all activities and programs related to nuclear-enrichment
and reprocessing.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="H6F1C194BF5D748A5954434497D4CD3DC"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Penalties</header><text>If
an IAEA Member State is determined to have violated the prohibition on
assistance to Iran described in paragraph (1) before the IAEA Board of
Governors determines that Iran has satisfied the conditions described in
subparagraphs (A) through (C) of such paragraph, such Member State shall be
subject to the penalties described in subsection (a)(3), shall be ineligible to
receive nuclear material, technology, equipment, or assistance from any IAEA
Member State, and shall be ineligible to receive any IAEA assistance not
related to safeguards inspections or nuclear security until such time as the
IAEA Board of Governors makes such determination with respect to Iran.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="HA361AE78D2FD4A31823E0BE7BBD90164"><enum>(f)</enum><header>Report</header><text>Not
later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually
for 2 years thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report on the implementation of this section.</text>
</subsection></section><section id="H13AB6D47F0D24720B5C1A801D8DC25B0"><enum>903.</enum><header>Sense of
Congress regarding the Nuclear Security Action Plan of the IAEA</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">It is the sense of Congress that the
national security interests of the United States are enhanced by the Nuclear
Security Action Plan of the IAEA and the Board of Governors should recommend,
and the General Conference should adopt, a resolution incorporating the Nuclear
Security Action Plan into the regular budget of the IAEA.</text>
</section><enum>X</enum><header>Peacekeeping</header>
<section id="H83B24E9389B04D45979A9E4554556618"><enum>1001.</enum><header>Reform of
United Nations peacekeeping operations</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">It is the sense of Congress that—</text>
<paragraph id="H5C0B57F258DB47F7896B5934759C1E59"><enum>(1)</enum><text>although United
Nations peacekeeping operations have contributed greatly toward the promotion
of peace and stability for over 6 decades and the majority of peacekeeping
personnel who have served under the United Nations flag have done so with honor
and courage, the record of United Nations peacekeeping has been severely
tarnished by operational failures and unconscionable acts of misconduct;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HEC7E743D1E0A44CBA3E2B4EC2034810F"><enum>(2)</enum><text>in response to
such failures, successive Secretaries General of the United Nations have
launched numerous reform efforts, including the high-level Panel on United
Nations Peace Operations, led by former Foreign Minister of Algeria Lakhdar
Brahimi, the 2005 report by the Special Advisor on the Prevention of Sexual
Exploitation and Abuse, His Royal Highness Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein of
Jordan, and the 2009 New Partnership Agenda, known as the <quote>New
Horizon</quote> reports;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HAA868CF7E1664EA4B2EF1D44853491F2"><enum>(3)</enum><text>despite the fact
that the United Nations has had over a decade to implement many of these
reforms, nearly four years to implement the reforms in the Zeid Report, and the
fact that Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, his predecessor Kofi Annan, and the
Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations repeatedly have expressed their
commitment <quote>to implementing fundamental, systematic changes as a matter
of urgency,</quote> a number of critical reforms continue to be blocked or
delayed by Members States who arguably benefit from maintenance of the status
quo;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H29076727AF0A4C638A387040F2DC5226"><enum>(4)</enum><text>further, audits of
procurement practices in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, conducted
by the Office of Internal Oversight Services, and the now-defunct United
Nations Procurement Task Force have uncovered <term>significant</term>
corruption schemes and criminal acts by United Nations peacekeeping personnel;
and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H5566ADB325AC4861B88DA03E01789197"><enum>(5)</enum><text>if the reputation
of and confidence in United Nations peacekeeping operations is to be restored,
fundamental and far-reaching reforms, particularly in the areas of planning,
management, procurement, training, conduct, and discipline, must be implemented
without further delay.</text>
</paragraph></section><section id="H14D2555CB770437E9A0C8629D9661DBA"><enum>1002.</enum><header>Policy
relating to reform of United Nations peacekeeping operations</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">It shall be the policy of the United States
to pursue reform of United Nations peacekeeping operations in the following
areas:</text>
<paragraph id="H6BA4B903CD3D4B1FA181FDCAB61986EC"><enum>(1)</enum><header>Planning and
management</header>
<subparagraph id="H3F330D0BC06F4B00BA5DBFF90529A5C4"><enum>(A)</enum><header>Global
audit</header><text>As the size, cost, and number of United Nations
peacekeeping operations have increased substantially over the past decade,
independent audits of each such operation should be conducted annually, with a
view toward <term>right-sizing</term> operations and ensuring that all
operations are efficient and cost effective.</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H0B2D10153A5942C3909B4580A775B80D"><enum>(B)</enum><header>Procurement and
transparency</header><text>The logistics established within the United Nations
Department of Field Support should be streamlined and strengthened to ensure
that all peacekeeping missions are resourced appropriately, transparently, and
in a timely fashion while individual accountability for waste, fraud, and abuse
within United Nations peacekeeping missions is uniformly enforced.</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H409DB62AFB1D44939F870E785A06E17C"><enum>(C)</enum><header>Review of
mandates and closing operations</header><text>In conjunction with the audit
described in subparagraph (A), the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping
Operations should conduct a comprehensive review of all United Nations
peacekeeping operation mandates, with a view toward identifying objectives that
are practical and achievable, and report its findings to the Security Council.
In particular, the review should consider the following:</text>
<clause id="HB6106014213F4A91A26BB4061FC79833"><enum>(i)</enum><text>Except in
extraordinary cases, including genocide, the United Nations Department of
Peacekeeping Operations should not be tasked with activities that are
impractical or unachievable without the cooperation of the Member State(s)
hosting a United Nations peacekeeping operation, or which amount to de-facto
trusteeship outside of the procedures established for such under Chapter XII of
the United Nations Charter, thereby creating unrealistic expectations and
obfuscating the primary responsibility of the Member States themselves in
creating and maintaining conditions for peace.</text>
</clause><clause id="HAD9737FF0D224772897EF00694C28BCF"><enum>(ii)</enum><text>Long-standing
operations that are static and cannot fulfill their mandate should be downsized
or closed.</text>
</clause><clause id="H4E7C6AFA42D94DADB50B751877CB10D3"><enum>(iii)</enum><text>Where there is
legitimate concern that the withdrawal from a country of an otherwise static
United Nations peacekeeping operation would result in the resumption of major
conflict, a burden-sharing arrangement that reduces the level of assessed
contributions, similar to that currently supporting the United Nations
Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, should be explored and instituted.</text>
</clause></subparagraph><subparagraph id="H402649B9236C4FC791E3A8BE0B0CAA41"><enum>(D)</enum><header>Leadership</header><text>As
peacekeeping operations become larger and increasingly complex, the Secretariat
should adopt a minimum standard of qualifications for senior leaders and
managers, with particular emphasis on specific skills and experience, and
current senior leaders and managers who do not meet those standards should be
removed.</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="HE91CCCF7C4F642418CDBCD09B3A1B958"><enum>(E)</enum><header>Pre-deployment
training</header><text>Pre-deployment training on interpretation of the mandate
of the operation, specifically in the areas of use of force, civilian
protection and field conditions, the Code of Conduct, HIV/AIDS, and human
rights should be mandatory, and all personnel, regardless of category or rank,
should be required to sign an oath that each has received and understands such
training as a condition of participation in the operation.</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H141BA9384AC44EBE9CFEFF128E5F6411"><enum>(F)</enum><header>Gratis military
personnel</header><text>The General Assembly should seek to strengthen the
capacity the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and ease the
extraordinary burden currently placed upon the limited number of headquarters
staff by lifting restrictions on the utilization of gratis military personnel
by the Department so that the Department may accept secondments from Member
States of military personnel with expertise in mission planning, logistics, and
other operational specialties.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="H2D8F129B582542959F73F4F311D8CFD5"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Conduct and
discipline</header>
<subparagraph id="HB030AAD261B0490B8E7F51574324DFF9"><enum>(A)</enum><header>Adoption of a
uniform code of conduct</header><text>A single, uniform Code of Conduct that
has the status of a binding rule and applies equally to all personnel serving
in United Nations peacekeeping operations, regardless of category or rank,
including military personnel, should be adopted and incorporated into legal
documents governing participation in such an operation, including all contracts
and Memorandums of Understanding, promulgated and effectively enforced.</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="HD04B330E79D54E628E0E0035586CB0C9"><enum>(B)</enum><header>Understanding
the code of conduct</header><text>All personnel, regardless of category or
rank, should receive training on the Code of Conduct prior to deployment with a
peacekeeping operation, in addition to periodic follow-on training. In
particular—</text>
<clause id="HF2FDEDF7659E4C6686EAAD88EEB8AE50"><enum>(i)</enum><text>all
personnel, regardless of category or rank, should be provided with a personal
copy of the Code of Conduct that has been translated into the national language
of such personnel, regardless of whether such language is an official language
of the United Nations;</text>
</clause><clause id="H7C2D4B5692494A28B4EFE39CEB4EEAF7"><enum>(ii)</enum><text>all
personnel, regardless of category or rank, should sign an oath that each has
received a copy of the Code of Conduct, that each pledges to abide by the Code
of Conduct, and that each understands the consequences of violating the Code of
Conduct, including immediate termination of participation in and permanent
exclusion from all current and future peacekeeping operations, as well as the
assumption of personal liability and victims compensation, where appropriate,
as a condition of appointment to any such operation; and</text>
</clause><clause id="HFD1297100E8E40A6BB1828F6576A2A2D"><enum>(iii)</enum><text>peacekeeping
operations should continue and enhance educational outreach programs to reach
local communities where peacekeeping personnel of such operations are based,
including explaining prohibited acts on the part of United Nations peacekeeping
personnel and identifying the individual to whom the local population may
direct complaints or file allegations of exploitation, abuse, or other acts of
misconduct.</text>
</clause></subparagraph><subparagraph id="H107A64B4303E4571A3E9C9B6C7CFEEF6"><enum>(C)</enum><header>Monitoring
mechanisms</header><text>Dedicated monitoring mechanisms, such as the Conduct
and Discipline Teams already deployed to support United Nations peacekeeping
operations in Haiti, Sudan, Kosovo, Liberia, Lebanon, Timor Leste, Cote
d’Ivoire, Western Sahara, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, should be
present in each operation to monitor compliance with the Code of Conduct, and
should report simultaneously to the Head of Mission, the United Nations
Department of Field Support, the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping
Operations, and the Associate Director of the Office of Internal Oversight
Services for Peacekeeping Operations.</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="HA929DAA21A374864A8E8F9D306633512"><enum>(D)</enum><header>Investigations</header><text>A
permanent, professional, and independent investigative body should be
established and introduced into United Nations peacekeeping operations. In
particular—</text>
<clause id="H7BD7A266017145B8A57A5471A0A3DCB1"><enum>(i)</enum><text>The
investigative body should include professionals with experience in
investigating sex crimes and the illegal exploitation of resources, as
appropriate, as well as experts who can provide guidance on standards of proof
and evidentiary requirements necessary for any subsequent legal action.</text>
</clause><clause id="H0E5EC257E9984ECC991FBE1BE4C579B8"><enum>(ii)</enum><text>Provisions should
be included in all Memorandums of Understanding, including a Model Memorandum
of Understanding, that obligate Member States that contribute troops to a
peacekeeping operation to designate a military prosecutor who will participate
in any investigation into credible allegations of misconduct brought against an
individual of such Member State, so that evidence is collected and preserved in
a manner consistent with the military law of such Member State.</text>
</clause><clause id="HF747BF1C24014C7EB5730BF73077A257"><enum>(iii)</enum><text>The
investigative body should be regionally based to ensure rapid deployment and
should be equipped with modern forensics equipment for the purpose of
positively identifying perpetrators and, where necessary, for determining
paternity.</text>
</clause><clause id="H74F7D424FCE8411B91517B484B8E8524"><enum>(iv)</enum><text>The
investigative body should report directly to the Associate Director of the
Office of Internal Oversight Services for Peacekeeping Operations, while
providing copies of any reports to the Department of Field Support, the
Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Head of Mission, and the Member
State concerned.</text>
</clause></subparagraph><subparagraph id="H0FCA6865E12F4060AA3850CDB6E51733"><enum>(E)</enum><header>Follow-up</header><text>The
Conduct and Discipline Unit in the headquarters of the United Nations
Department of Field Support should be appropriately staffed, resourced, and
tasked with—</text>
<clause id="H9881765DE0EF48BBAFAD8BFBD621E15F"><enum>(i)</enum><text>promulgating
measures to prevent misconduct;</text>
</clause><clause id="HEC2254F083484640A37FFCC24C7396A4"><enum>(ii)</enum><text>receiving reports
by field personnel and coordinating the Department’s response to allegations of
misconduct;</text>
</clause><clause id="H7575E7835DA24B27B9343FE5722CE3E7"><enum>(iii)</enum><text>gathering
follow-up information on completed investigations, particularly by focusing on
disciplinary actions against the individual concerned taken by the United
Nations or by the Member State that is contributing troops to which such
individual belongs, and sharing such information with the Security Council, the
Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Head of Mission, and the community
hosting the peacekeeping operation; and</text>
</clause><clause id="H693BB2274FDD4CCDA9B3C01D1020D6BA"><enum>(iv)</enum><text>contributing
pertinent data on conduct and discipline to the database required pursuant to
subparagraph (H).</text>
</clause></subparagraph><subparagraph id="H416B20D3BB0747BEA1470795D4B23F84"><enum>(F)</enum><header>Financial
liability and victims assistance</header><text>Although peacekeeping operations
should provide immediate medical assistance to victims of sexual abuse or
exploitation, the responsibility for providing longer-term treatment, care, or
restitution lies solely with the individual found guilty of the misconduct. In
particular:</text>
<clause id="HCB306EDB63BC4E07BBC8C4AEA17A7D20"><enum>(i)</enum><text>The
United Nations should not assume responsibility for providing long-term
treatment or compensation under the Sexual Exploitation and Abuse Victim
Assistance Mechanism by utilizing assessed contributions to United Nations
peacekeeping operations, thereby shielding individuals from personal liability
and reinforcing an atmosphere of impunity.</text>
</clause><clause id="H78AB7737ED9A4A878E1A9F6243570864"><enum>(ii)</enum><text>If
an individual responsible for misconduct has been repatriated, reassigned,
redeployed, or is otherwise unable to provide assistance, responsibility for
providing assistance to a victim should be assigned to the Member State that
contributed the contingent to which such individual belonged or to the manager
concerned.</text>
</clause><clause id="H1FC7D1F8B9BE4A149DACA1B3E860F25D"><enum>(iii)</enum><text>In
the case of misconduct by a member of a military contingent, appropriate funds
shall be withheld from the troop contributing country concerned.</text>
</clause><clause id="H5D1043CB06214126A765475DA81C3E0D"><enum>(iv)</enum><text>In
the case of misconduct by a civilian employee or contractor of the United
Nations, appropriate wages shall be garnished from such individual or fines
shall be imposed against such individual, consistent with existing United
Nations Staff Rules, and retirement funds shall not be shielded from
liability.</text>
</clause></subparagraph><subparagraph id="HDC28F024AF084AA4ABF9A851425FC5C4"><enum>(G)</enum><header>Managers and
commanders</header><text>The manner in which managers and commanders handle
cases of misconduct by those serving under them should be included in their
individual performance evaluations, so that managers and commanders who take
decisive action to deter and address misconduct are rewarded, while those who
create a permissive environment or impede investigations are penalized or
relieved of duty, as appropriate.</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H4384D3758C724B4FAEEE077884F651EB"><enum>(H)</enum><header>Database</header><text>A
centralized database, including personnel photos, fingerprints, and biometric
data, should be created and maintained within the United Nations Department of
Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support, and other relevant
United Nations bodies without further delay to track cases of misconduct,
including the outcome of investigations and subsequent prosecutions, to ensure
that personnel who have engaged in misconduct or other criminal activities,
regardless of category or rank, are permanently barred from participation in
future peacekeeping operations.</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="HA72F5C09A2B64D1D81A9E239ECCD7207"><enum>(I)</enum><header>Cooperation of
member states</header><text>If a Member State routinely refuses to cooperate
with the directives contained herein or acts to shield its nationals from
personal liability, that Member State should be barred from contributing troops
or personnel to future peacekeeping operations.</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="HE5FFE17AC578401682DC951BE51B4B97"><enum>(J)</enum><header>Welfare</header><text>Peacekeeping
operations should continue to seek to maintain a minimum standard of welfare
for mission personnel to ameliorate conditions of service, while adjustments
are made to the discretionary welfare payments currently provided to Member
States that contribute troops to offset the cost of operation-provided
recreational facilities, as necessary and appropriate.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph></section><section id="HB9A31FC1C2084D0CA64360ADEC96D92B"><enum>1003.</enum><header>Certification</header>
<subsection id="HE06335BE75BE4DD8B86C4D86D20DDDB4"><enum>(a)</enum><header>New or expanded
peacekeeping operations contingent upon presidential certification of
peacekeeping operations reforms</header>
<paragraph id="H0FD45D4DBC51477D9DEED88222C59AED"><enum>(1)</enum><header>No new or
expanded peacekeeping operations</header>
<subparagraph id="H706D328F7A9A4954A643F575FCA87589"><enum>(A)</enum><header>Certification</header><text>Except
as provided in subparagraph (B), until the Secretary certifies that the
requirements described in paragraph (2) have been satisfied, the President
shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations
to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the United
Nations to oppose the creation of new, or expansion of existing, United Nations
peacekeeping operations.</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H71404013BD374A8585E9507F732179D8"><enum>(B)</enum><header>Exception and
notification</header><text>The requirements described under paragraph (2) may
be waived with respect to a particular peacekeeping operation if the President
determines that failure to deploy new or additional peacekeepers in such
situation will significantly contribute to the widespread loss of human life,
genocide, or the endangerment of a vital national security interest of the
United States. If the President makes such a determination, the President
shall, not later than 15 days before the exercise of such waiver, notify the
appropriate congressional committees of such determination and resulting
waiver.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="HE7D7278E91BE45F3BA86DA5B9F7D02C4"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Certification of
peacekeeping operations reforms</header><text>The certification referred to in
paragraph (1) is a certification made by the Secretary to the appropriate
congressional committees that the following reforms, or an equivalent set of
reforms, related to peacekeeping operations have been adopted by the United
Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations or the General Assembly, as
appropriate:</text>
<subparagraph id="H37C9F1F8538D4799B1AB1A84BD5A5031"><enum>(A)</enum><text>A single, uniform
Code of Conduct that has the status of a binding rule and applies equally to
all personnel serving in United Nations peacekeeping operations, regardless of
category or rank, has been adopted by the General Assembly and duly
incorporated into all contracts and a Model Memorandum of Understanding, and
mechanisms have been established for training such personnel concerning the
requirements of the Code and enforcement of the Code.</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="HCD53BBBFB3304A02B9C260B67AC2A220"><enum>(B)</enum><text>All personnel,
regardless of category or rank, serving in a peacekeeping operation have been
trained concerning the requirements of the Code of Conduct and each has been
given a personal copy of the Code, translated into the national language of
such personnel.</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="HA5C760FE608D402EA60058565F601093"><enum>(C)</enum><text>All personnel,
regardless of category or rank, are required to sign an oath that each has
received a copy of the Code of Conduct, that each pledges to abide by the Code,
and that each understands the consequences of violating the Code, including
immediate termination of participation in and permanent exclusion from all
current and future peacekeeping operations, as well as the assumption of
personal liability for victims compensation as a condition of the appointment
to such operation.</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H335FC85E45924D1F80AB9B6E97F66694"><enum>(D)</enum><text>All peacekeeping
operations have designed and implemented educational outreach programs to reach
local communities where peacekeeping personnel of such operations are based to
explain prohibited acts on the part of United Nations peacekeeping personnel
and to identify the individual to whom the local population may direct
complaints or file allegations of exploitation, abuse, or other acts of
misconduct.</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="HEB7D45FB9CB244D1BE7D1DAD043BEDEE"><enum>(E)</enum><text>The creation of a
centralized database, including personnel photos, fingerprints, and biometric
data, has been completed and is being maintained in the United Nations
Department of Peacekeeping Operations that tracks cases of misconduct,
including the outcomes of investigations and subsequent prosecutions, to ensure
that personnel, regardless of category or rank, who have engaged in misconduct
or other criminal activities are permanently barred from participation in
future peacekeeping operations.</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H5BDFA48B28EF414D9777222C419535D0"><enum>(F)</enum><text>A Model Memorandum
of Understanding between the United Nations and each Member State that
contributes troops to a peacekeeping operation has been adopted by the United
Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations that specifically obligates each
such Member State to—</text>
<clause id="HA40F7FE9E3EC483198790BCF28E89CAB"><enum>(i)</enum><text>uphold the uniform
Code of Conduct which shall apply equally to all personnel serving in United
Nations peacekeeping operations, regardless of category or rank;</text>
</clause><clause id="HAAC97633903143DBA467DBEF2C3F4753"><enum>(ii)</enum><text>designate a
competent legal authority, preferably a prosecutor with expertise in the area
of sexual exploitation and abuse where appropriate, to participate in any
investigation into an allegation of misconduct brought against an individual of
such Member State;</text>
</clause><clause id="HE15EDF2C0EA5481AB4E32EB531302810"><enum>(iii)</enum><text>refer to its
competent national or military authority for possible prosecution, if
warranted, any investigation of a violation of the Code of Conduct or other
criminal activity by an individual of such Member State;</text>
</clause><clause id="HB42D0A6D9DC446109D76A06DD64F963C"><enum>(iv)</enum><text>report to the
Department of Field Support and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations on
the outcome of any such investigation;</text>
</clause><clause id="H68FD4B569BE343DAB1E2E2C380497A2E"><enum>(v)</enum><text>undertake to
conduct on-site court martial proceedings, where practical and appropriate,
relating to allegations of misconduct alleged against an individual of such
Member State; and</text>
</clause><clause id="HD955A7D3E9364AF0960336451CEF95F9"><enum>(vi)</enum><text>assume
responsibility for the provision of appropriate assistance to a victim of
misconduct committed by an individual of such Member State.</text>
</clause></subparagraph><subparagraph id="H123E62153493423CA749D8DF10780656"><enum>(G)</enum><text>A professional and
independent investigative and audit function has been established within the
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Office of Internal
Oversight Services to monitor United Nations peacekeeping operations.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph></subsection></section>