1.Short title; table of
contents
(a)This Act may be cited
as the New START Treaty Implementation
Act
.
(b)The table of
contents for this Act is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
Sec. 3. Use of funds on the modernization of nuclear
weapons.
Sec. 4. Limitation on nuclear force reductions.
Sec. 5. Nuclear employment strategy.
Sec. 6. Force analysis and assessment of the capabilities of
the nuclear forces of the United States.
Sec. 7. Annual assessment and report on the delivery platforms
for nuclear weapons and the nuclear command and control system.
Sec. 8. Missile defense.
Sec. 9. Annual report on the plan for the modernization of the
nuclear weapons stockpile, nuclear weapons complex, and delivery
platforms.
Sec. 10. Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement nuclear
facility and Uranium Processing Facility.
Sec. 11. Policy on non-nuclear weapons systems.
Sec. 12. Non-strategic nuclear weapon reductions and extended
deterrence policy.
2.In this Act:
(1)The term congressional defense
committees has the meaning given that term in section 101(a)(16) of
title 10, United States Code.
(2)The term
covered nuclear systems means the following:
(A)B–52H or B–2 bomber aircraft and nuclear
air-launched cruise missiles.
(B)Trident ballistic
missile submarines, launch tubes, and Trident D–5 submarine-launched ballistic
missiles.
(C)Minuteman III
intercontinental ballistic missiles and associated silos.
(D)Nuclear warheads
or gravity bombs that can be delivered by the systems specified in subparagraph
(A), (B), or (C).
(E)Nuclear weapons delivered by means other
than the systems specified in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).
(3)The term
New START Treaty means the Treaty between the United States of
America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed at Prague April 8, 2010, with
Protocol, including Annex on Inspection Activities to the Protocol, Annex on
Notifications to the Protocol, and Annex on Telemetric Information to the
Protocol (Treaty Document 111–5).
3.Use of funds on
the modernization of nuclear weapons
(a)Congress finds the following:
(1)The President of
the United States, in a letter dated December 18, 2010, declared, I
recognize that nuclear modernization requires investment for the long-term, in
addition to this one-year budget increase. That is my commitment to the
Congress that my Administration will pursue these programs and capabilities for
as long as I am President. In future years, we will provide annual updates to
the [report required under section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111–84; 123 Stat. 2549)].
.
(2)Article 5, Section
1 of the New START Treaty declares, Subject to the provisions of this
Treaty, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be
carried out.
.
(3)Secretary of Defense Robert Gates declared
on October 28, 2008, To be blunt, there is absolutely no way we can
maintain a credible deterrent and reduce the number of weapons in our stockpile
without either resorting to testing our stockpile or pursuing a modernization
program.
.
(4)The November 2010 update to the report
required under section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111–84; 123 Stat. 2549) stated, Notably,
stockpile requirements to fully implement the [Nuclear Posture Review] and the
New START Treaty have been refined. … Based on this additional work, and the
development of new information and insights, the President is prepared to seek
additional resources for the Weapons Activities account, over and above the FY
2011 FYNSP, for the FY 2012 budget and for the remainder of the FYNSP period
(FY 2013 to FY 2016). Specifically, the President plans to request $7.6 billion
for FY 2012 (an increase of $0.6 billion over the planned FY 2012 funding level
…). Given the extremely tight budget environment facing the Federal Government,
these requests to the Congress demonstrate the priority the [Administration]
places on maintaining the safety, security, and effectiveness of the
deterrent.
.
(5)The Stockpile Stewardship Management Plan
for Fiscal Year 2011, dated May 2010, stated, The Laboratory Directors
will be expected to provide findings associated with the full range of [life
extension program] approaches, and to make a set of recommendations based
solely on their best technical assessments of the ability of each [life
extension program] approach to meet critical stockpile management goals
(weapons system safety, security, and effectiveness).
.
(6)Section 4204 of
the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2524) (as amended by section 3113 of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111–84;
123 Stat. 2704)) established a stockpile management program to provide
for the effective management of the weapons in the nuclear weapons
stockpile
.
(7)The objectives of
the stockpile management program are, first and foremost, to increase
the reliability, safety, and security of the nuclear weapons stockpile of the
United States
, as well as to further reduce the likelihood of
the resumption of underground nuclear weapons testing
, to
achieve reductions in the future size of the nuclear weapons
stockpile
, and to reduce the risk of an accidental detonation of
an element of the stockpile
.
(b)Sense of
Congress on life extension program deadlines
(1)It is the sense of Congress that the life extension
program deadlines described in paragraph (2) represent important deadlines that
must be met to sustain a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear stockpile and
credible deterrent.
(2)The life extension
program deadlines described in this paragraph are the deadlines identified in
the November 2010 update to the report required under section 1251 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111–84; 123
Stat. 2549) as follows:
(A)Completion of the W76 build in fiscal year
2018.
(B)Completion of the first production unit of
the B–61 in fiscal year 2017.
(C)Beginning of the study of life extension
options for the W78 in fiscal year 2012.
(D)Beginning of the study of a common warhead
for the W78 and the W88 in fiscal year 2012.
(E)Beginning of the development of an Arming,
Fuzing, and Firing system for the W88 in fiscal year 2012.
(3)Sense of
Congress on stockpile management programIt is the sense of
Congress that—
(A)the primary
objective of the stockpile management program to increase the reliability,
safety, and security of the nuclear weapons stockpile of the United States, as
specified in section 4204(a) of the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C.
2524(a)), is of great importance;
(B)all mechanisms
authorized by section 4204 of the Atomic Energy Defense Act for the stockpile
management program should be used to find the best means to increase the
reliability, safety, and security of the nuclear weapons stockpile; and
(C)section 4204 of
the Atomic Energy Defense Act does not give preference to any one mechanism for
increasing the reliability, safety, and security of the nuclear weapons
stockpile over any other such mechanism.
(c)It
is the policy of the United States—
(1)to accomplish the modernization and
replacement of the nuclear triad;
(2)to sustain a
robust stockpile stewardship program and to maintain and modernize the nuclear
weapons production capabilities and capacities that will both—
(A)ensure the safety,
reliability, and performance of the nuclear weapons of the United States at the
New START Treaty levels;
(B)meet requirements for hedging against
possible international developments or technical problems, in conformance with
the policies of the United States and in support of nuclear deterrence,
extended deterrence, assurance, and defense; and
(C)section 4204 of the Atomic Energy Defense
Act does not give preference to any one mechanism for increasing the
reliability, safety, and security of the nuclear weapons stockpile over any
other such mechanism;
(3)to maintain the nuclear weapons
laboratories of the United States and preserve the core nuclear weapons
competencies of such laboratories;
(4)that the President should not take any
action to retire or dismantle (or to prepare to retire or dismantle) any of the
covered nuclear systems unless modernization or replacement is occurring as
proposed in the plans under the report required by section 1251 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111–84; 123 Stat.
2549), the November 2010 update to such report, and the reports required under
section 495 of title 10, United States Code, as added by section 9; and
(5)that if the modernization plan is not
funded consistent with the annual report required under such section 495, such
failure would jeopardize the supreme interests of the United States and is
potential grounds for the withdrawal of the United States from the New START
Treaty in accordance with Article XIV of such Treaty.
(d)Authorization of
appropriationsFunds are hereby authorized to be appropriated to
the Department of Energy for fiscal year 2012 for the activities of the
National Nuclear Security Administration in carrying out programs necessary for
national security in the amount of $11,782,930,000, of which $7,629,716,000
shall be for weapons activities of the National Nuclear Security
Administration.
4.Limitation on
nuclear force reductions
(a)Congress makes the following
findings:
(1)As of September 30, 2009, the stockpile of
nuclear weapons of the United States had been reduced by 84 percent from its
maximum level in 1967 and by more than 75 percent from its level when the
Berlin Wall fell in November 1989.
(2)The number of non-strategic nuclear weapons
of the United States had declined by approximately 90 percent from September
30, 1991, to September 30, 2009.
(3)On March 29, 2011, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs Thomas Donilon stated, As we
implement New START, we're making preparations for the next round of nuclear
reductions. Under the President's direction, the Department of Defense will
review our strategic requirements and develop options for further reductions in
our current nuclear stockpile, which stands at approximately 5,000 warheads,
including both deployed and reserve warheads. To develop these options for
further reductions, we need to consider several factors, such as potential
changes in targeting requirements and alert postures that are required for
effective deterrence.
.
(b)Implementation
of New START Treaty
(1)
(A)Except as provided
by paragraph (2), the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy may not
obligate or expend amounts appropriated or otherwise made available to the
Department of Defense or the Department of Energy for any of fiscal years 2011
through 2017 to retire any covered nuclear system of the United States as
required by the New START Treaty.
(B)Nothing in subparagraph (A) shall be
construed to limit any action (including verification) required by the New
START Treaty other than retiring any covered nuclear system of the United
States.
(2)The
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy may jointly waive the
limitation under paragraph (1)(A) for a covered nuclear system if—
(A)the Secretaries
submit to the congressional defense committees written notice of the status of
carrying out the modernization plan described in the most recent report
required by section 495 of title 10, United States Code, as added by section 9;
and
(B)with respect to such notice—
(i)if
the notice describes that such plan is being carried out, a period of 30 days
has elapsed following the date on which the President submits to the
congressional defense committees such report that includes written notice of
the proposed retirement of such nuclear system, as required by subsection
(a)(1)(D) of such section 495; or
(ii)if the notice describes that such plan is
not being carried out, a period of 180 days has elapsed following the date on
which the President submits to the congressional defense committees the report
described in clause (i).
(3)In this subsection,
the term retire, with respect to a covered nuclear system,
includes retiring, dismantling, eliminating or preparing to retire, dismantle,
or eliminate.
(c)Prohibition on
reduction of stockpile hedge
(1)Except as provided in
paragraph (2), the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy may not
obligate or expend amounts appropriated or otherwise made available to the
Department of Defense or the Department of Energy to retire, dismantle, or
eliminate, or prepare to retire, dismantle, or eliminate, any nondeployed
strategic or non-strategic nuclear weapon until the date that is 90 days after
the date on which the Secretary of Energy submits to the congressional defense
committees written certification that—
(A)the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research
Replacement nuclear facility (in this subsection referred to as the
nuclear facility
) and the Uranium Processing Facility (in this
subsection referred to as the processing facility
) are fully
operational;
(B)the nuclear facility and the Plutonium
Facility–4 are together able to deliver to the nuclear weapons stockpile not
less than a total of 80 pits per year; and
(C)the processing
facility is able to deliver to the nuclear weapons stockpile not less than 80
refurbished or new canned subassemblies per year.
(2)The
prohibition under paragraph (1) does not apply to activities related to
surveillance of the nuclear weapons stockpile.
(d)Prohibition on
unilateral reduction of nuclear weapons
(1)Part I of subtitle A
of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following
new chapter:
24Nuclear posture
and missile defense
Sec.
491. Prohibition on unilateral reduction of nuclear
weapons.
491.Prohibition on
unilateral reduction of nuclear weaponsThe President may not retire, dismantle, or
eliminate, or prepare to retire, dismantle, or eliminate, any nuclear weapon of
the United States (including such deployed weapons and nondeployed weapons and
warheads in the nuclear weapons stockpile) if such action would reduce the
number of such weapons to a number that is less than the level described in the
New START Treaty (as defined in section 494(c)) unless such action is required
by a treaty or international agreement specifically approved with the advice
and consent of the Senate pursuant to Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the
Constitution.
.
(2)The table of chapters at the beginning of subtitle A
of title 10, United States Code, and at the beginning of part I of such
subtitle, are each amended by inserting after the item relating to chapter 23
the following new item:
24.
Nuclear posture and missile
defense491
.
5.Nuclear
employment strategy
(a)Congress makes the following
findings:
(1)Section 1057 of
H.R. 5136, as passed by the House of Representatives during the 111th Congress,
included a requirement that any future reductions of the nuclear forces of the
United States below the level described in the New START Treaty be contingent
on the certification by the Secretary of Defense that such reduction
does not require a change in targeting strategy from counterforce targeting to
countervalue targeting
.
(2)On March 29, 2011, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs Thomas Donilon stated, As we
implement New START, we're making preparations for the next round of nuclear
reductions. Under the President's direction, the Department of Defense will
review our strategic requirements and develop options for further reductions in
our current nuclear stockpile, which stands at approximately 5,000 warheads,
including both deployed and reserve warheads. To develop these options for
further reductions, we need to consider several factors, such as potential
changes in targeting requirements and alert postures that are required for
effective deterrence.
.
(b)Chapter 24 of title 10, United States Code, as added by
section 4, is amended by adding at the end the following new section:
492.Nuclear
employment strategyThe
President may not make any changes to the nuclear employment strategy of the
United States unless—
(1)the President
submits to the congressional defense committees a report on such proposed
changes, including—
(A)the implication of
such changes on the flexibility and resilience of the strategic forces of the
United States and the ability of such forces to support the goals of the United
States with respect to nuclear deterrence, extended deterrence, assurances for
allies, dissuasion of potential peer competitors, and defense; and
(B)certification that such proposed changes do
not require a change in targeting strategy from counterforce targeting to
countervalue targeting, nor do they result in the United States abandoning its
second-to-none
nuclear forces strategy; and
(2)a period of 90
days has elapsed after the date on which such report under paragraph (1) is
submitted.
.
(c)The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter
is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 491 the following
new item:
492. Nuclear employment
strategy.
.
6.Force analysis
and assessment of the capabilities of the nuclear forces of the United
States
(a)Not later than March
1, 2012, the Secretary of Defense shall conduct a force analysis and net
assessment of the current and proposed nuclear forces of the United States to
determine whether such forces are capable of meeting the nuclear deterrence,
extended deterrence, assurance, and defense objectives of the United States in
the context of the current and anticipated nuclear and non-nuclear forces of
the Russian Federation and other countries.
(b)The force analysis and net assessment under
subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1)Specific metrics to define and measure the
strategic sufficiency of the nuclear forces of the United States and the
sufficiency of forces necessary to meet the nuclear deterrence, extended
deterrence, assurance, and defense requirements of the United States.
(2)An identification and assessment of the
nuclear strategies of the United States, and the role of nuclear weapons in
those strategies, as of the date of the force analysis and net assessment,
including—
(A)how the United
States is prepared to limit damage to the United States and its allies if
deterrence fails; and
(B)if the United
States requires such capabilities, an assessment of such capabilities.
(3)An identification of the nuclear force
posture of the United States required to fulfill the nuclear deterrence,
extended deterrence, assurance, and defense strategies of the United States,
including the planning assumptions on which such posture is based.
(4)Force-on-force
exchange modeling analyses to determine the vulnerability, survivability, and
effectiveness of current and proposed nuclear capabilities of the United States
in various scenarios (including a surprise attack and an electromagnetic pulse
attack by potential adversaries, including Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, or
terrorists armed with nuclear weapons) and taking into account various nuclear
postures (including day-to-day alert and generated alert).
(5)An assessment of the implications of
disparities between the strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons of the
United States and the strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons of other
countries with respect to deterrence, extended deterrence, assurance, and
defense.
(6)An assessment of the implications that
various force levels of the nuclear forces of the United States have on nuclear
proliferation, and the effect that such lower force levels have on the
motivation or inclination of other countries to increase their nuclear
capabilities, and the contingency plans of the United States to respond to such
an increase.
(7)An assessment of the effect of the
conventional prompt global strike capabilities of the United States and other
countries on the ability of the United States to meet its deterrence, extended
deterrence, assurance, and defense requirements.
(8)An assessment of the effect of the
ballistic missile defense capabilities of the United States and other countries
on the strategic balance and on the nuclear deterrence, extended deterrence,
assurance, and defense strategies of the United States.
(9)An assessment of the flexibility and
resilience of the nuclear forces of the United States, including the potential
to upload nondeployed warheads and to modify weapons and warheads to meet
unexpected challenges.
(10)Such other matters as the Secretary of
Defense considers appropriate regarding the capabilities of the nuclear forces
of the United States.
(c)Participation of
other departments and agenciesIn conducting the force analysis
and net assessment under subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense shall provide
for the appropriate participation of the following:
(1)The Director of
National Intelligence.
(2)The Joint
Staff.
(3)The Missile
Defense Agency.
(4)The United States
Strategic Command.
(5)Such other
elements or components of the Department of Defense as the Secretary of Defense
considers appropriate.
(6)Such other
departments and agencies of the Federal Government as the Secretary of Defense
and the heads of such departments and agencies jointly consider
appropriate.
(7)The national security laboratories (as
defined in section 3281 of the National Nuclear Security Administration Act (50
U.S.C. 2471)).
(d)
(1)Not later than September 1, 2012, the Secretary of
Defense shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the
force analysis and net assessment.
(2)The report under paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form (including as much detail as possible), but may
include a classified annex.
(e)
(1)The
Secretary of Defense shall provide for the review by one or more federally
funded research and development centers of the force analysis and net
assessment conducted under subsection (a).
(2)The
review under paragraph (1) shall also include the participation of the
following:
(A)Such additional
individuals as the Secretary considers appropriate with expertise in matters
relating to—
(i)force analysis and
net assessment; and
(ii)the relationship between the force posture
of the United States and the nuclear deterrence, extended deterrence,
assurance, and defense goals of the United States.
(B)A separate
individual (who may be a member of Congress) appointed by each of the
following:
(i)The
Chairman of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.
(ii)The
Ranking Member of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.
(iii)The Chairman of
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
(iv)The
Ranking Member of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
(v)The
majority leader of the Senate.
(vi)The
minority leader of the Senate.
(vii)The Chairman of
the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.
(viii)The Ranking
Member of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives.
(ix)The
Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives.
(x)The
Ranking Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives.
(xi)The
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
(xii)The minority
leader of the House of Representatives.
(3)Not
later than 90 days after the date of the submittal to Congress of the report
under subsection (d)(1), the federally funded research and development center
conducting a review under paragraph (1) shall submit to the appropriate
committees of Congress a report on the results of the review.
(f)Appropriate
committees of congress definedIn this section, the term
appropriate committees of Congress means—
(1)the Committee on
Armed Services and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
and
(2)the Committee on
Armed Services and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House
of Representatives.
7.Annual assessment
and report on the delivery platforms for nuclear weapons and the nuclear
command and control system
(a)Chapter 24 of title 10, United States Code, as added by
section 4, is further amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
493.Annual
assessment and report on the delivery platforms for nuclear weapons and the
nuclear command and control system
(a)(1)Each covered official
shall annually assess the safety, security, reliability, sustainability,
performance, and military effectiveness of the systems described in paragraph
(2) for which such official has responsibility.
(2)The systems described in this
paragraph are the following:
(A)Each type of delivery platform for
nuclear weapons.
(B)The nuclear command and control
system.
(b)(1)Not
later than December 1 of each year, beginning in 2011, each covered official
shall submit to the Secretary of Defense and the Nuclear Weapons Council
established by section 179 of this title a report on the assessments conducted
under subsection (a).
(2)Each report under paragraph (1) shall
include the following:
(A)The results of the assessment.
(B)An
identification and discussion of any capability gaps or shortfalls with respect
to the systems described in subsection (a)(2) covered under the
assessment.
(C)An
identification and discussion of any risks with respect to meeting mission or
capability requirements.
(D)In
the case of an assessment by the Commander of the United States Strategic
Command, if the Commander identifies any deficiency with respect to a nuclear
weapons delivery platform covered under the assessment, a discussion of the
relative merits of any other nuclear weapons delivery platform type or
compensatory measure that would accomplish the mission of such nuclear weapons
delivery platform.
(E)An
identification and discussion of any matter having an adverse effect on the
capability of the covered official to accurately determine the matters covered
by the assessment.
(c)Report to
President and Congress(1)Not later than March 1 of each year,
beginning in 2012, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the President a
report containing—
(A)each report under subsection (b)
submitted during the previous year, as originally submitted to the
Secretary;
(B)any comments that the Secretary considers
appropriate with respect to each such report;
(C)any conclusions that the Secretary
considers appropriate with respect to the safety, security, reliability,
sustainability, performance, or military effectiveness of the systems described
in subsection (a)(2); and
(D)any other information that the
Secretary considers appropriate.
(2)Not later than March 15 of each year,
beginning in 2012, the President shall transmit to the congressional defense
committees the report submitted to the President under paragraph (1), including
any comments the President considers appropriate.
(3)Each report under this subsection may be in
classified form if the Secretary of Defense determines it necessary.
(d)In this section, the term covered official
means—
(1)the Commander of
the United States Strategic Command;
(2)the Director of
the Strategic Systems Program of the Navy; and
(3)the Commander of
the Global Strike Command of the Air
Force.
.
(b)The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter
is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 492 the following
new item:
493. Annual assessment and report on the
delivery platforms for nuclear weapons and the nuclear command and control
system.
.
8.
(a)Congress finds that the President, in a
letter dated December 18, 2010, pledged the following:
(1)The New START Treaty places no
limitations on the development or deployment of our missile defense
programs.
.
(2)Starting in 2011, we will begin
deploying the first phase of the [European phased, adaptive approach to missile
defense], to protect large parts of southern Europe from short- and
medium-range ballistic missile threats. In subsequent phases, we will deploy
longer-range and more effective land-based standard missile-3 interceptors in
Romania and Poland to protect Europe against medium- and intermediate-range
ballistic missiles. In the final phase, planed for the end of the decade,
further upgrades of the SM–3 interceptor will provide an ascent-phase intercept
capability to augment our defense of NATO European territory, as well as that
of the United States, against future threats of ICBMs launched from
Iran.
.
(3)Regardless of Russia’s actions in
this regard, as long as I am President, and as long as the Congress provides
the necessary funding, the United States will continue to develop and deploy
effective missile defenses to protect the United States, our deployed forces,
and our allies and partners. My Administration plans to deploy all four phases
of the [European phased, adaptive approach to missile defense].
.
(b)It
is the policy of the United States—
(1)that defenses against ballistic missiles
are essential for nuclear deterrence, extended deterrence, assurance, and
defense strategies;
(2)that any further
limitations on the missile defense capabilities of the United States are not in
the national security interests of the United States;
(3)that policies
based on mutual assured destruction or intentional vulnerability to strategic
attack can be contrary to the safety and security of both the United States and
the Russian Federation, and both countries share a common interest in defensive
capabilities that help both to move cooperatively as soon as possible away from
a strategic relationship based on mutual vulnerability;
(4)that the United
States will welcome steps by Russia to also adopt a fundamentally defensive
strategic posture that no longer views robust strategic defensive capabilities
as undermining the overall strategic balance;
(5)to improve the strategic defensive
capabilities of the United States both quantitatively and qualitatively during
the period that the New START treaty is in effect, and such improvements are
consistent with the Treaty;
(6)that no future
agreement with Russia on cooperative missile defense, non-strategic nuclear
weapons, further strategic weapons reductions, or any other matter shall
include any restrictions on the missile defense options of the United States in
Europe or elsewhere; and
(7)to defend the
United States and its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from all
missile threats, including from short-range ballistic missiles.
(c)It is the sense of
Congress that, given congressional concern about missile defense issues, the
President should offer both Houses of Congress regular briefings, not less than
twice each year, to the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services of
the Senate, and the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Armed Services of the
House, on all missile defense issues related to the New START Treaty and on the
progress of United States-Russia dialogue and cooperation regarding missile
defense.
(d)Limitations on
missile defense
(1)Chapter 24 of title 10, United States Code, as added by
section 4, is further amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
494.Certain
limitations on missile defense
(a)Any agreement with a
country or international organization or amendment to the New START Treaty
(including an agreement made by the Bilateral Consultative Commission
established by the New START Treaty) concerning the missile defense
capabilities of the United States shall not be binding on the United States,
and shall not enter into force with respect to the United States, unless after
the date of the enactment of this section, such agreement or amendment is
specifically approved with the advice and consent of the Senate pursuant to
Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution.
(b)Not later than January 31 of each year, beginning in
2012, the President shall submit to the congressional defense committees a
notification of—
(1)whether the
Russian Federation has recognized during the previous year the sovereign right
of the United States to pursue quantitative and qualitative improvements in
missile defense capabilities; and
(2)whether during any
treaty negotiations or other Government-to-Government contacts between the
United States and the Russian Federation (including under the auspices of the
Bilateral Consultative Commission established by the New START Treaty) during
the previous year a representative of the Russian Federation suggested that a
treaty or other international agreement include, with respect to the United
States—
(A)restricting
missile defense capabilities, military capabilities in space, or conventional
prompt global strike capabilities; or
(B)reducing the
number of non-strategic nuclear weapons deployed in Europe.
(c)The
term New START Treaty means the Treaty between the United States
of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed at Prague April 8, 2010, with
Protocol, including Annex on Inspection Activities to the Protocol, Annex on
Notifications to the Protocol, and Annex on Telemetric Information to the
Protocol (Treaty Document
111–5).
.
(2)The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter
is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 493 the following
new item:
494. Certain limitations on missile
defense.
.
(e)Restriction of
funds for certain treaty negotiations
(1)No
funds available to the Department of State or any other Federal department or
agency may be obligated or expended during fiscal year 2012 or any fiscal year
thereafter for travel expenses related to treaty negotiations concerning the
possible reduction of covered nuclear systems of the United States until the
date on which the certification under paragraph (2) is transmitted to
Congress.
(2)Not later than 30 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to Congress written
notification that negotiations described in paragraph (1) will not include
restricting the missile defense capabilities of the United States.
9.Annual report on
the plan for the modernization of the nuclear weapons stockpile, nuclear
weapons complex, and delivery platforms
(a)Chapter 24 of title
10, United States Code, as added by section 4, is further amended by adding at
the end the following new section:
495.Annual report
on the plan for the modernization of the nuclear weapons stockpile, nuclear
weapons complex, and delivery platforms
(a)Report on the
plan for the nuclear weapons stockpile, nuclear weapons complex, and delivery
platforms(1)Together with the budget of the President
submitted to Congress under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code,
the President, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary
of Energy, shall transmit to the congressional defense committees, the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the Committee on Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representatives a detailed report on the plan
to—
(A)enhance the safety, security, and
reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile of the United States;
(B)modernize the nuclear weapons
complex;
(C)maintain, modernize, or replace the
delivery platforms for nuclear weapons; and
(D)retire, dismantle, or eliminate any covered
nuclear system.
(2)Each report required under paragraph
(1) shall include the following:
(A)A detailed description of the plan to
enhance the safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile
of the United States.
(B)A
detailed description of the plan to modernize the nuclear weapons complex,
including improving the safety of facilities, modernizing the infrastructure,
and maintaining the key capabilities and competencies of the nuclear weapons
workforce, including designers and technicians.
(C)A
detailed description of the plan to maintain, modernize, and replace delivery
platforms for nuclear weapons.
(D)A
detailed estimate of budget requirements, including the costs associated with
the plans outlined under subparagraphs (A) through (C), over the 10-year period
following the date of the report.
(E)A
detailed description of the steps taken to implement the plan submitted in the
previous year.
(b)Advice of
directors of nuclear facilities and laboratoriesTogether with the budget of the President
submitted to Congress under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code,
during each fiscal year in which a report is transmitted under subsection (a),
the directors of the nuclear facilities and laboratories shall each submit to
the congressional defense committees, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, the
Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Energy an independent report on the
implementation of and the funding for the plans outlined under subparagraphs
(A) and (B) of subsection (a)(2).
(c)Each report required by this section shall
be submitted in unclassified form (including as much detail as possible), but
may include a classified annex.
(d)In this section:
(1)The term
covered nuclear systems means the following:
(A)B–52H or B–2 bomber aircraft and nuclear
air-launched cruise missiles.
(B)Trident ballistic
missile submarines, launch tubes, and Trident D–5 submarine-launched ballistic
missiles.
(C)Minuteman III
intercontinental ballistic missiles and associated silos.
(D)Nuclear warheads
or gravity bombs that can be delivered by the systems specified in subparagraph
(A), (B), or (C).
(E)Nuclear weapons delivered by means other
than the systems specified in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).
(2)The term
nuclear facilities and laboratories means the following:
(A)Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos,
New Mexico.
(B)Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque,
New Mexico.
(C)Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,
Livermore, California.
(D)The Kansas City Plant, Kansas City,
Missouri.
(E)The Nevada National Security Site,
Nevada.
(F)The Pantex Plant, Amarillo, Texas.
(G)The Savannah River Site, Aiken, South
Carolina.
(H)The Y–12 Plant, Oak Ridge,
Tennessee.
.
(b)The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter
is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 494 the following
new item:
495. Annual report on the plan for the
modernization of the nuclear weapons stockpile, nuclear weapons complex, and
delivery
platforms.
.
10.Chemistry and
Metallurgy Research Replacement nuclear facility and Uranium Processing
Facility
(a)Congress makes the following
findings:
(1)The Stockpile Stewardship Management Plan
for Fiscal Year 2011, dated May 2010, stated that the Chemistry and Metallurgy
Research Replacement building and the Uranium Processing Facility are
the highest physical infrastructure priorities
for the nuclear
enterprise.
(2)The November 2010 update to the report
required under section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111–84; 123 Stat. 2549) stated, The
Administration is committed to fully fund the construction of the Uranium
Processing Facility (UPF) and the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement
(CMRR).
.
(3)A Department of Energy briefing book
regarding the fiscal year 2012 budget stated, with respect to the Chemistry and
Metallurgy Research Replacement nuclear facility, The increased funding
level in the FY 2012–FY 2016 period is needed to support the required schedule
of construction completion in FY 2020 and a ramp-up to full operations by FY
2023.
.
(4)The briefing book
also stated, with respect to the Uranium Processing Facility, The
increased funding level in the FY 2012–FY 2016 period is needed to support the
NNSA’s priority to phase out operations in Building 9212 and move required
chemical processing activities from Building 9212 into UPF in FY 2020, with a
ramp-up to full operations in UPF by FY 2024.
.
(b)Of amounts authorized to
be appropriated for weapons activities of the National Nuclear Security
Administration, the Secretary of Energy shall—
(1)accelerate, to the extent possible, the
design and engineering phase of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research
Replacement nuclear facility (in this section referred to as the nuclear
facility
) and the Uranium Processing Facility (in this section referred
to as the processing facility
) in order for—
(A)the construction
of both facilities to be completed by not later than 2020;
(B)both the nuclear
facility and the processing facility to begin nuclear operations by not later
than 2020; and
(C)both the nuclear facility and the
processing facility to be fully operational by not later than 2023 and 2024,
respectively; and
(2)together with the budget of the President
submitted to Congress under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code,
for fiscal years 2013 through 2024, submit to the congressional defense
committees a report including—
(A)certification of
the acceleration described in paragraph (1); and
(B)identification of the funding amounts
necessary, including on a multiyear basis as appropriate, for the nuclear
facility and the processing facility upon completion of the design and
engineering phase of such facilities.
11.Policy on
non-nuclear weapons systemsIt
is the policy of the United States that conventionally armed, strategic-range
weapons systems not co-located with nuclear armed systems do not affect
strategic stability between the United States and the Russian
Federation.
12.Non-strategic
nuclear weapon reductions and extended deterrence policy
(a)Policy on
non-Strategic nuclear weaponsIt is the policy of the United
States—
(1)to pursue negotiations with the Russian
Federation aimed at the reduction of deployed and non-deployed non-strategic
nuclear forces of the Russian Federation;
(2)that non-strategic nuclear weapons should
be considered when weighing the balance of the nuclear forces of the United
States and Russia; and
(3)that any
geographical relocation or storage of non-strategic nuclear weapons by Russia
does not constitute a reduction or elimination of such weapons.
(b)Policy on
extended deterrence commitment to EuropeIt is the policy of the United States
that—
(1)it maintains its commitment to extended
deterrence, specifically the nuclear alliance of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, as an important component of ensuring and linking the national
security interests of the United States and the security of its European
allies;
(2)forward-deployed nuclear forces of the
United States shall remain based in Europe in support of the nuclear policy and
posture of NATO; and
(3)the presence of nuclear weapons of the
United States in Europe—combined with NATO’s unique nuclear sharing
arrangements under which non-nuclear members participate in nuclear planning
and possess specially configured aircraft capable of delivering nuclear
weapons—contributes to the cohesion of NATO and provides reassurance to allies
and partners who feel exposed to regional threats.
(c)Limitation on
reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal of nuclear forces based in
EuropeIn light of the policy
expressed in subsections (a) and (b), no action may be taken to effect or
implement the reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal of nuclear forces of the
United States that are based in Europe unless—
(1)the reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal
of such nuclear forces is requested by the government of the host nation in the
manner provided in the agreement between the United States and the host nation
regarding the forces; or
(2)the President certifies that—
(A)NATO member states have considered the
reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal in the High Level Group and NATO has
decided to support such reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal; and
(B)each NATO member state has separately
concurred that the remaining nuclear forces of the United States that are based
in Europe after such reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal would provide a
commensurate or better level of assurance and credibility as before such
reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal.
(d)Upon any decision to reduce, consolidate,
or withdraw the nuclear forces of the United States that are based in Europe,
the President shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate
and House of Representatives a notification containing—
(1)the certification required by subsection
(c)(2);
(2)justification for such reduction,
consolidation, or withdrawal; and
(3)an assessment of how NATO member states, in
light of such reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal, assess the credibility
of the deterrence capability of the United States in support of its commitments
undertaken pursuant to article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at
Washington, District of Columbia, on April 4, 1949, and entered into force on
August 24, 1949 (63 Stat. 2241; TIAS 1964).
(e)Notice and wait
requirementThe President may
not commence a reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal of the nuclear forces of
the United States that are based in Europe for which the certification required
by subsection (c)(2) is made until the expiration of a 180-day period beginning
on the date on which the President submits the report under subsection (d)
containing the certification.