Whereas nuclear weapons are inherently indiscriminate and
represent a disproportionate use of force;
Whereas, since the end of the Cold War, the United States
has squandered a superb opportunity to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in
foreign and military affairs and failed to verifiably eliminate existing stocks
of nuclear weapons as well as prevent new nuclear dangers from arising, and
consequently the threat of nuclear disaster remains unacceptably high;
Whereas United States foreign policy is eroding the
network of security treaties that have helped to stem the spread of nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons, thus decreasing security for Americans and
non-Americans alike;
Whereas the United States has a vital security interest in
promoting the nonproliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons, since the
only genuine and permanent security from the threat of the use of nuclear
weapons is their elimination under strict and effective international
control;
Whereas the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT) (21 UST 483) entered into force and became part of United States
law on March 5, 1970;
Whereas more countries (a total of 188) have ratified the
NPT than any other arms limitation and disarmament agreement, a testament to
the significance of the NPT;
Whereas the United States has undertaken, in accordance
with article VI of the NPT, to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective
measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to
nuclear disarmament”;
Whereas the long-term viability of the nonproliferation
goal is at risk if the United States fails to implement its article VI
obligations;
Whereas the United States agreed, in connection with the
indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, to the “determined pursuit” of
“systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with
the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons”, including a pledge to complete
negotiations on a “universal and internationally and effectively verifiable
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty no later than 1996”;
Whereas, on July 8, 1996, the International Court of
Justice, in response to a request for an advisory opinion from the United
Nations General Assembly, concluded that—
(1)“the threat or use of nuclear weapons would
generally be considered contrary to the rules of international law applicable
in armed conflict”;
(2)“there exists an
obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to conclusion negotiations leading
to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective
international control”; and
(3)“[t]he legal
import of [the NPT article VI] obligation … is an obligation to achieve a
precise result—nuclear disarmament in all its aspects—by adopting a particular
course of conduct, namely, the pursuit of negotiations on the matter in good
faith”;
Whereas, from April 24 to May 19, 2000, the United States
and all NPT parties participating in the 2000 NPT Review Conference unanimously
agreed to 13 steps for the systematic implementation of article VI,
including—
(1)an unequivocal undertaking to eliminate
their nuclear arsenals;
(2)prompt
ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty;
(3)full
implementation of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II) (ratified
on January 26, 1996) and conclusion of negotiations on the Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty III (START III) as soon as possible, while preserving and
strengthening the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (23 UST 3435; entered into
force on October 3, 1972);
(4)taking concrete
measures to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons;
(5)taking
irreversible measures toward total nuclear disarmament;
(6)increasing
transparency regarding nuclear weapons capabilities; and
(7)diminishing the
role of nuclear weapons in security policies;
Whereas the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT),
signed on May 24, 2002 (ratified on March 6, 2003), by President George W.
Bush, fails to incorporate key elements of the START II and START III
agreements regarding the destruction of delivery vehicles and the dismantlement
of warheads, and it fails to provide new verification procedures necessary to
effect transparent, meaningful, and permanent reductions crucial to the
de-nuclearization process;
Whereas the SORT called for a decrease in the number of
deployed strategic nuclear warheads, but projected storage of thousands of
strategic warheads, including many capable of quick redeployment;
Whereas rather than affirming the United States
obligations under the NPT, the January 9, 2002, Department of Defense Nuclear
Posture Review (NPR) called for a New Strategic Triad consisting of nuclear and
conventional offensive strike systems integrated with active and passive
defenses and a revitalized defense infrastructure with new capabilities;
Whereas the NPR—
(1)projected indefinite retention of a large,
modern, and diverse nuclear force totalling many thousands of weapons;
(2)maintains and
expands the role of nuclear weapons in United States national security policy,
including the use of nuclear weapons in “immediate, potential, or unexpected
contingencies”;
(3)reiterated
Administration plans not to support ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty;
(4)pledged to
increase readiness to resume nuclear testing and proceed with development of a
Ballistic Missile Defense; and
(5)called for the
development of new nuclear weapons capabilities for a wide range of missions,
including nuclear earth-penetrating weapons to strike hardened and deeply
buried targets, and low-yield nuclear warheads;
Whereas rather than affirming the United States
obligations under the NPT, the September 2002 National Security Strategy of the
United States set forth an aggressive policy of preventive self-defense in
which “America will act against … emerging threats before they are fully
formed”;
Whereas rather than affirming the United States
obligations under the NPT, the December 2002 National Strategy to Combat
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) stated that “The United States … reserves the
right to respond with overwhelming force—including through resort to all of our
options—to the use of WMD against the United States, our forces abroad, and
friends and allies”, with both “conventional and nuclear response”
capabilities;
Whereas the above-detailed policies and programs of the
United States are—
(1)antithetical to United States obligations
under the NPT;
(2)contrary to
fundamental requirements of international law, because the United Nations
Charter does not permit preventive war;
(3)counterproductive,
because United States reliance on nuclear weapons encourages other countries to
acquire them, ultimately increasing the likelihood that a nuclear weapon will
be used against the United States;
(4)dangerous, because
the assertion of the United States of a right to engage in preventive war
encourages other countries to assert the same right; and
(5)immoral, because
they place a threat of mass destruction, and the assertion of a right to
initiate war, at the core of United States foreign policy;
Whereas nonproliferation strategies based on
internationally accepted standards of behavior, ranging from treaties to
enforcement mechanisms such as on-site inspections, technical surveillance,
intelligence sharing, and the destruction of all such weapons of mass
destruction, are designed to prevent the proliferation and development of all
forms of WMD, so that hostile countries and entities either are unable to
procure WMD or are required not to use WMD;
Whereas nonproliferation strategies emphasizing
reciprocity and cooperation that are consistent with international law have
been used successfully for the last 50 years, while counterproliferation
strategies based primarily on the unilateral use of force, outside the
framework of international organizations and agreements, are likely to lead to
the disintegration of existing arms control and nonproliferation mechanisms and
a renewed, more complex arms race; and
Whereas former United States national security officials
Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn, George Schultz, and Bill Perry called for
establishing a goal for the global elimination of nuclear weapons: Now,
therefore, be it
That the House of Representatives—
(1)requests the President to inform Congress
and the Secretary General of the United Nations regarding the efforts and
measures the United States has taken with respect to—
(A)implementation and
observance of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT) (21 UST 483);
(B)implementation and
observance of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 52/38O and subsequent
resolutions related to the July 1996 advisory opinion of the International
Court of Justice, which called upon all countries to fulfill their nuclear
disarmament obligation by commencing multilateral negotiations leading to the
early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention;
(C)implementation and
observance of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 55/33C and subsequent
resolutions welcoming the outcome of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, and
affirming that “a nuclear weapon free world will ultimately require the
underpinning of a universal and multilaterally negotiated legally binding
instrument”; and
(D)nuclear
disarmament;
(2)calls on the
President to implement and observe all NPT obligations and commitments and to
revise national policies on nuclear weapons accordingly; and
(3)urges the
President, in the interests of protecting and advancing human, national, and
global security, to—
(A)declare
unconditionally that the United States will not use nuclear weapons first, and
that pending their elimination, nuclear weapons serve only to deter a nuclear
attack by a hostile country or other entity;
(B)initiate and
conclude multilateral negotiations on sweeping, verifiable, and irreversible
steps that countries with nuclear capability shall take to reduce and
eventually eliminate strategic and tactical nuclear weapons and their delivery
systems;
(C)begin verifiable
and irreversible reductions in the United States strategic and tactical nuclear
weapons and their delivery systems;
(D)cooperate with the
Russian Federation to remove from deployment nuclear weapons that presently are
operational and ready to be launched on short notice;
(E)reaffirm the
moratorium on nuclear testing and work for ratification of the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty at the earliest possible date;
(F)terminate all
efforts aimed at enhancing the military capabilities of the United States
nuclear arsenal, including research and development for both low-yield nuclear
weapons and the “robust nuclear earth penetrator” (commonly referred to as
“bunker-busters”);
(G)terminate all
plans for upgrades to existing weapons research and production facilities, and
construction of new facilities, including those for plutonium pit manufacturing
and tritium production;
(H)terminate the
declared United States policy of preventive warfare as a response to threats
from weapons of mass destruction (WMD);
(I)obtain the
approval of the Senate or the entire Congress as a condition for withdrawal
from and termination of both existing and future security treaties;
(J)terminate
development of ballistic missile defenses and initiate multilateral
negotiations to eliminate ballistic missiles; and
(K)support
initiatives and multilateral negotiations to ban weapons in outer space.