[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6067 Introduced in House (IH)]

112th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 6067

To enhance the security of the Western Hemisphere and bolster regional 
 capacity and cooperation to counter current and emerging threats, to 
     promote cooperation in the Western Hemisphere to prevent the 
 proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, to secure 
 universal adherence to agreements regarding nuclear nonproliferation, 
                        and for other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             June 29, 2012

 Ms. Ros-Lehtinen (for herself, Mr. McKeon, Mr. Chabot, Mr. Mack, Mr. 
   Burton of Indiana, Mr. Rivera, Mr. Diaz-Balart, Mr. McCaul, Mrs. 
Schmidt, Mr. Duncan of South Carolina, Mr. Turner of New York, and Mr. 
  Bilirakis) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on the 
Judiciary, Financial Services, and Oversight and Government Reform, for 
a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for 
consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the 
                          committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
To enhance the security of the Western Hemisphere and bolster regional 
 capacity and cooperation to counter current and emerging threats, to 
     promote cooperation in the Western Hemisphere to prevent the 
 proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, to secure 
 universal adherence to agreements regarding nuclear nonproliferation, 
                        and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND TABLE OF CONTENTS.

    (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Western Hemisphere 
Security Cooperation Act of 2012''.
    (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as 
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title and table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
          TITLE I--COUNTERTERRORISM IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Sec. 101. Findings.
Sec. 102. Statement of policy relating to Iran, Hezbollah, and other 
                            foreign terrorist organizations.
Sec. 103. Statement of policy relating to certain international 
                            agreements.
Sec. 104. Notifications relating to travel by Cuban Government 
                            officials within or to the United States.
Sec. 105. Preventing oil benefits, land expropriation, and terrorism 
                            expansion.
Sec. 106. Amendments to annual country reports on terrorism.
Sec. 107. Amendments to international drug control certification 
                            procedures.
Sec. 108. Amendment to international narcotics control strategy report.
Sec. 109. International Law Enforcement Academy in San Salvador, El 
                            Salvador.
Sec. 110. United States efforts in the Western Hemisphere.
Sec. 111. Amendments to the Department of State Rewards Program.
Sec. 112. Establishment of a Western Hemisphere Regional Coordination 
                            Center.
Sec. 113. Transfer of funds to the Central American Regional Security 
                            Initiative.
Sec. 114. Administration of security assistance programs for Central 
                            American countries.
Sec. 115. Restriction on assistance for the Guatemalan Army.
TITLE II--NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 
                       IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Sec. 201. Findings.
Sec. 202. Statement of policy regarding the proliferation of weapons-
                            related nuclear, chemical, and biological 
                            materials, technology, and facilities.
Sec. 203. Statement of policy regarding the small quantities protocol.
Sec. 204. Securing adherence to agreements regarding nuclear 
                            nonproliferation by countries in the 
                            Western Hemisphere.
Sec. 205. Halting the proliferation of nuclear fuel fabrication.
Sec. 206. Cooperation with the Proliferation Security Initiative.
Sec. 207. Establishment of the Western Hemisphere Nonproliferation 
                            Partnership Initiative.
Sec. 208. Foreign policy controls.
Sec. 209. Limitation on arms transfers.
Sec. 210. Restrictions on nuclear cooperation with countries assisting 
                            the nuclear program of Venezuela or Cuba.
               TITLE III--ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

Sec. 301. Actions regarding the Organization of American States.
                   TITLE IV--MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

Sec. 401. Prohibitions on engagement with certain Western Hemisphere 
                            countries.
Sec. 402. Report.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

    Except as otherwise provided, in this Act:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs; and
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations.
            (2) Nonhumanitarian assistance.--The term ``nonhumanitarian 
        assistance'' means--
                    (A) any assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act 
                of 1961 (including programs under title IV of chapter 2 
                of part I of such Act, relating to the Overseas Private 
                Investment Corporation), other than--
                            (i) disaster relief assistance, including 
                        any assistance under chapter 9 of part I of 
                        such Act;
                            (ii) assistance which involves the 
                        provision of food (including monetization of 
                        food) or medicine; and
                            (iii) assistance for refugees;
                    (B) sales, or financing on any terms, under the 
                Arms Export Control Act; and
                    (C) financing under the Export-Import Bank Act of 
                1945.
            (3) State sponsor of terrorism.--The term ``state sponsor 
        of terrorism'' means a country the government of which has been 
        determined by the Secretary of State, for purposes of section 
        6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (as continued in 
        effect under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act), 
        section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, section 40 
        of the Arms Export Control Act, or any other provision of law, 
        is a government that has repeatedly provided support for acts 
        of international terrorism.

          TITLE I--COUNTERTERRORISM IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

SEC. 101. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds the following:
            (1) In 2004, a Lebanese individual, having entered the 
        United States illegally from Mexico, was charged with 
        supporting Hezbollah financially and was described by the 
        United States Attorney as a ``fighter, recruiter and 
        fundraiser''.
            (2) In December 2006, the Department of the Treasury 
        designated nine individuals and two entities as part of a 
        network that is ``a major financial artery to Hezbollah in 
        Lebanon'' and announced an effort to target Hezbollah 
        fundraising in the tri-border area of Brazil, Argentina, and 
        Paraguay.
            (3) In 2007, the Chavez regime established routine civilian 
        airline flights between Venezuela and designated State Sponsors 
        of Terrorism, Iran, and Syria.
            (4) In November 2007, Interpol's General Assembly agreed to 
        issue red capture notices for the arrest of a Hezbollah leader 
        and five former senior Iranian officials charged by Argentina 
        in the 1994 Argentine Mutual Jewish Association (AMIA) 
        terrorist attack, in which 85 innocent people were killed and 
        300 more were wounded.
            (5) In February 2008, Director of National Intelligence 
        Mike McConnell reported to Congress in his presentation of the 
        Intelligence Community's Annual Threat Assessment that the 
        governments of Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Bolivia, ``to varying 
        degrees, have engaged in sharply anti-U.S. rhetoric, aligned 
        with Venezuela and Cuba--and increasingly Iran--on 
        international issues, and advocated measures that directly 
        clash with U.S. initiatives''.
            (6) In February 2008, a United States Federal law-
        enforcement official shared, ``We've known for some time that 
        Islamic extremists groups were gaining momentum and exploiting 
        the region . . . Iran is no exception--now with Cuba and 
        Venezuela, the door is open.''.
            (7) Venezuela has concluded nearly 200 bilateral agreements 
        with Iran on military cooperation, the sharing of intelligence, 
        expanding financial cooperation, and initiating cultural 
        exchanges, among others.
            (8) According to United States intelligence officials, Iran 
        possesses the potential to use its close relationship with 
        Venezuela to facilitate the smuggling of people, drugs, and 
        weapons into the Western Hemisphere through terrorist proxy 
        groups.
            (9) In March 2008, the Colombian army led a raid against 
        the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and seized computers 
        containing documents that suggest evidence of $300,000,000 in 
        payments to the extremist organization from the Venezuelan 
        Government, high-level contacts by the FARC with officials from 
        Ecuador and Venezuela, and efforts by the FARC to obtain 50 
        kilograms of uranium.
            (10) In June 2008, the Department of the Treasury 
        designated two Venezuela-based supporters of Hezbollah, Ghazi 
        Nasr al Din and Fawzi Kan'an, along with two travel agencies 
        owned and controlled by Kan'an, explaining it is ``extremely 
        troubling to see the Government of Venezuela employing and 
        providing safe harbor to Hezbollah facilitators and 
        fundraisers''.
            (11) In October 2008, the Department of the Treasury 
        designated Banco Internacional de Desarollo, C.A., a financial 
        institution located in Venezuela, to be owned or controlled by 
        or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or 
        indirectly, the Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI). EDBI 
        was designated for its role in  helping Iran  violate United 
        Nations sanctions and handle its illicit transactions.
            (12) In May 2010, for the fifth year in a row, the 
        Department of State determined, pursuant to section 40A of the 
        Arms Export Control Act, that Venezuela was not cooperating 
        fully with United States antiterrorism efforts.
            (13) In February 2011, the Department of the Treasury 
        identified the Lebanese Canadian Bank as a financial 
        institution of ``primarily money laundering concern'' under 
        section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, for its role in 
        facilitating the money laundering activities of an 
        international narcotics trafficking network with ties to 
        Hezbollah. This network is involved in moving illicit drugs and 
        money laundering from South America to Europe and the Middle 
        East through West Africa.
            (14) In April 2011, General Douglas Fraser, General of U.S. 
        Southern Command, testified before Congress that there are 
        ``growing opportunities for military-to-military connections'' 
        between Iran and Venezuela and that there are ``flights between 
        Iran and Venezuela on a weekly basis and visas are not required 
        for entrance into Venezuela or Bolivia or Nicaragua''.
            (15) In October 2011, the Drug Enforcement Administration 
        and the Federal Bureau of Investigation charged two individuals 
        for suspected participation in an Iranian Qods Force plot to 
        murder the Saudi Arabian Ambassador on United States soil.
            (16) In December 2011, Univision aired a documentary titled 
        The Iranian Threat that exposed a plan to launch a cyber attack 
        against the United States Government and nuclear facilities 
        involving Iran, Cuba, and Venezuela.
            (17) In January 2012, the Venezuelan Consul General in 
        Miami, was declared persona non grata by the Department of 
        State for her participation in a cyber attack and was expelled 
        from the United States.
            (18) A 2012 Drug Enforcement Administration report 
        identified 38 percent of the organizations on the Foreign 
        Terrorist Organizations list as having possible ties to the 
        drug trade, underscoring the fact that the fight against 
        terrorism must also include a corresponding fight against 
        illicit drugs.
            (19) In January 2012, Director of National Intelligence 
        James R. Clapper reported to Congress in his presentation of 
        the Intelligence Community's Annual Threat Assessment that 
        ``some Iranian officials have changed their calculus and are 
        now willing to conduct an attack in the United States''.
            (20) In January 2012, Henry Rangel Silva became the Defense 
        Minister of Venezuela. The Department of Treasury had 
        previously designated Silva a ``drug kingpin'' in 2008 due to 
        his involvement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
        Colombia.
            (21) In March 2012, General Douglas Fraser, General of U.S. 
        Southern Command, testified before Congress that ``connections 
        with Hezbollah and Hamas who have been in the region for a 
        number of years primarily still focused on supporting, 
        conducting illicit activity to provide funding support and 
        logistic support back to parent organizations within the Middle 
        East''.
            (22) The Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism of the 
        Organization of American States (OAS) commits all State parties 
        to establish domestic regulatory institutions that eradicate 
        the financing of terrorist offenses, cooperate with fellow 
        signatories to control borders, provide mutual legal assistance 
        in counterterrorism efforts and prosecution of terrorist 
        offenses, and conform to all other stipulations of the 
        convention designed to prevent, punish, and eliminate terrorist 
        offenses.
            (23) The countries within the Western Hemisphere that have 
        ratified the Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism of the 
        OAS are Antigua & Barbuda, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, 
        Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, 
        Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, 
        Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad & Tobago, 
        the United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

SEC. 102. STATEMENT OF POLICY RELATING TO IRAN, HEZBOLLAH, AND OTHER 
              FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS.

    It shall be the policy of the United States to--
            (1) undertake a whole-of-government approach to deny Iran, 
        or its proxies such as Hezbollah, or any other foreign 
        terrorist organization, agent, or instrumentality of either, 
        the resources to engage in activities that--
                    (A) threaten United States national security, its 
                interests, and its allies;
                    (B) provide safe haven within the territories and 
                boundaries of countries within the Western Hemisphere; 
                and
                    (C) provide financial support in order to carry out 
                illicit activities around the globe; and
            (2) deter foreign investments and cooperation of countries 
        within the Western Hemisphere that would enhance the ability of 
        Iran, or any agent or instrumentality thereof, to develop 
        nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.

SEC. 103. STATEMENT OF POLICY RELATING TO CERTAIN INTERNATIONAL 
              AGREEMENTS.

    To enhance the security of the Western Hemisphere and bolster 
regional capacity to counter terrorism, it shall be the policy of the 
United States to promote the signing, ratification, and implementation 
by all countries in the Western Hemisphere of the following:
            (1) OAS AG/RES. 1840 (XXXII-O/02) Inter-American Convention 
        Against Terrorism.
            (2) Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 40 Recommendations 
        on Money Laundering (ML) and 9 Special Recommendations (SR) on 
        Terrorist Financing (TF).
            (3) The 1963 ICAO Convention on Offences and Certain Other 
        Acts Committed on Board Aircraft.
            (4) The 1970 ICAO Convention for the Suppression of 
        Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft.
            (5) The 1971 ICAO Convention for the Suppression of 
        Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation.
            (6) The 1973 United Nations Convention on the Prevention 
        and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected 
        Person, including Diplomatic Agents.
            (7) The 1979 United Nations International Convention 
        Against the Taking of Hostages.
            (8) The 1988 ICAO Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful 
        Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil 
        Aviation, Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression 
        of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation.
            (9) The 1988 IMO Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
        Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation.
            (10) The 1988 IMO Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful 
        Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the 
        Continental Shelf.
            (11) The 1991 ICAO Convention on the Marking of Plastic 
        Explosives for the Purpose of Detection.
            (12) The 1997 United Nations International Convention for 
        the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings.
            (13) The 1999 United Nations International Convention for 
        the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.
            (14) The 2001 United Nations S/Res/1373 Creation of Counter 
        Terrorism Committee (CTC).
            (15) The 2005 United Nations S/Res/1624 Prohibition of 
        incitement to commit terrorist act or acts.
            (16) The 2010 ICAO Convention for the Suppression of 
        Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation.

SEC. 104. NOTIFICATIONS RELATING TO TRAVEL BY CUBAN GOVERNMENT 
              OFFICIALS WITHIN OR TO THE UNITED STATES.

    (a) Travel Within United States.--The Secretary of State shall 
notify the appropriate congressional committees not less than 15 days 
prior to granting approval for travel by any Cuban official assigned to 
the Cuban Interests Section in Washington, DC or the Cuban United 
Nations Missions in New York, New York outside a 25-mile radius of the 
Cuban Interests Section in Washington, DC or the Cuban United Nations 
Missions in New York, New York, respectively.
    (b) Travel to the United States.--The Secretary of State shall 
notify the appropriate congressional committees not less than 15 days 
prior to issuing a visa for travel of any Cuban Government official to 
the United States
    (c) Matters To Be Included.--Each notification required under 
subsection (a) and (b) shall include the following:
            (1) The name and rank of the Cuban official for which the 
        travel is approved.
            (2) The expected dates, destination, and purpose of the 
        travel.
            (3) A separate certification that the travel does not pose 
        a threat to United States interests and policy priorities and 
        the travel has been approved by the Director of the Federal 
        Bureau of Investigation, the Assistant Secretary of State for 
        Diplomatic Security, and the head of any other relevant 
        department or agency. The certification may be provided in a 
        classified annex to the notification if applicable.

SEC. 105. PREVENTING OIL BENEFITS, LAND EXPROPRIATION, AND TERRORISM 
              EXPANSION.

    (a) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United 
States to--
            (1) undertake the necessary measures to deny the Government 
        of Cuba, the Cuban Communist Party, or any agent or 
        instrumentality of either, the financial resources to engage in 
        activities that threaten--
                    (A) United States national security, its interests, 
                and its allies;
                    (B) Florida's marine environment, including the 
                most extensive living coral reef system in North 
                American waters and the third largest in the world;
                    (C) the environment and natural resources of the 
                submerged lands located off Cuba's coast; and
                    (D) to prolong the dictatorship that oppresses the 
                Cuban people; and
            (2) deter foreign investments that would enhance the 
        ability of the Government of Cuba, or any agent or 
        instrumentality thereof, to develop its petroleum resources.
    (b) Exclusion From the United States of Aliens Who Contribute to 
the Ability of Cuba To Develop Petroleum Resources Located Off Cuba's 
Coast.--
            (1) In general.--The Cuban Liberty and Democratic 
        Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (22 U.S.C. 6021 et seq.) is 
        amended by inserting after section 401 the following:

``SEC. 402. EXCLUSION FROM THE UNITED STATES OF ALIENS WHO CONTRIBUTE 
              TO THE ABILITY OF CUBA TO DEVELOP PETROLEUM RESOURCES 
              LOCATED OFF CUBA'S COAST.

    ``(a) In General.--The Secretary of State shall deny a visa to, and 
the Secretary of Homeland Security shall exclude from the United 
States, any alien who the Secretary of State determines is a person 
who--
            ``(1) is an officer or principal of an entity, or a 
        shareholder who owns a controlling interest in an entity, that, 
        on or after the date of the enactment of the Western Hemisphere 
        Security Cooperation Act of 2012, has made or makes an 
        investment that equals or exceeds $1,000,000 (or any 
        combination of investments that in the aggregate equals or 
        exceeds $1,000,000 in any 12-month period), that contributes to 
        the enhancement of the ability of the Government of Cuba, or 
        any agent or instrumentality thereof, to develop petroleum 
        resources of the submerged lands located off Cuba's coast; or
            ``(2) is a spouse, minor child, or agent of a person 
        described in paragraph (1).
    ``(b) Waiver.--The Secretary of State may waive the application of 
subsection (a) if the Secretary certifies and reports to the 
appropriate congressional committees, on a case-by-case basis, that the 
admission to the United States of a person described in subsection 
(a)--
            ``(1) is necessary for critical medical reasons or for 
        purposes of litigation of an action under title III of this 
        Act; or
            ``(2) is appropriate if the requirements of sections 204, 
        205, and 206 of this Act have been satisfied.
    ``(c) Definitions.--In this subsection:
            ``(1) Agent and instrumentality.--The terms `agent' and 
        `instrumentality' shall include the Cuban Communist Party.
            ``(2) Develop.--The term `develop', with respect to 
        petroleum resources, means the exploration for, or the 
        extraction, refining, or transportation by pipeline or other 
        means of, petroleum resources.
            ``(3) Investment.--The term `investment' means any of the 
        following activities if such activity is undertaken pursuant to 
        an agreement, or pursuant to the exercise of rights under such 
        an agreement, that was or is entered into with the Government 
        of Cuba (or any agency or instrumentality thereof) or a 
        nongovernmental entity in Cuba, on or after the date of the 
        enactment of the Western Hemisphere Security Cooperation Act of 
        2012:
                    ``(A) The entry into a contract that includes 
                responsibility for the development of petroleum 
                resources of the submerged lands located off Cuba's 
                coast, or the entry into a contract providing for the 
                general supervision and guarantee of another person's 
                performance of such a contract.
                    ``(B) The purchase of a share of ownership, 
                including an equity interest, in such development.
                    ``(C) The entry into a contract providing for the 
                participation in royalties, earnings, or profits in 
                such development, without regard to the form of the 
                participation.
                    ``(D) The entry into, performance, or financing of 
                a contract to sell or purchase goods, services, or 
                technology related to such development.
            ``(4) Petroleum resources.--The term `petroleum resources' 
        includes petroleum and natural gas resources, petroleum by 
        products, and liquified natural gas.''.
            (2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents for the 
        Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 
        is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 401 
        the following:

``Sec. 402. Exclusion from the United States of aliens who contribute 
                            to the ability of Cuba to develop petroleum 
                            resources located off Cuba's coast.''.
            (3) Effective date.--The amendments made by this subsection 
        shall apply to aliens seeking admission to the United States on 
        or after the date of the enactment of this Act.
    (c) Imposition of Sanctions and Prohibition on Facilitation of 
Development of Cuba's Petroleum Resources.--
            (1) In general.--If the President determines that a person 
        has, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, made an 
        investment that equals or exceeds $1,000,000 (or any 
        combination of investments that in the aggregate equals or 
        exceeds $1,000,000 in any 12-month period) that contributes to 
        the enhancement of the ability of the Government of Cuba, or 
        any agent or instrumentality thereof, to develop petroleum 
        resources of the submerged lands located off Cuba's coast, or 
        has made an investment of any amount of money that contributes 
        to such an enhancement and has trafficked in confiscated United 
        States property, the President shall impose two or more of the 
        following sanctions:
                    (A) Prohibition on loans and guarantees.--Prohibit 
                the issuance by the Overseas Private Investment 
                Corporation, the Export-Import Bank of the United 
                States, or any other United States instrument of any 
                loan, guarantee, insurance, extension of credit, or 
                participation in the extension of credit in connection 
                with the export of any goods or services to any 
                sanctioned person.
                    (B) Export sanction.--Prohibit the issuance by the 
                United States Government of any specific license and or 
                other specific permission or authority to export any 
                goods or technology to a sanctioned person under--
                            (i) the Export Administration Act of 1979 
                        (as continued in effect under the International 
                        Emergency Economic Powers Act);
                            (ii) the Arms Export Control Act;
                            (iii) the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; or
                            (iv) any other statute that requires the 
                        prior review and approval of the United States 
                        Government as a condition for the export or 
                        reexport of goods or services.
                    (C) Prohibitions on financial institutions.--The 
                following prohibitions may be imposed against a 
                sanctioned person that is a financial institution:
                            (i) Prohibition on designation as primary 
                        dealer.--Prohibit the Board of Governors of the 
                        Federal Reserve System and the Federal Reserve 
                        Bank of New York from designating, or 
                        permitting the continuation of any prior 
                        designation of, such financial institution as a 
                        primary dealer in United States Government debt 
                        instruments.
                            (ii) Prohibition on service as a repository 
                        of government funds.--Prohibit such financial 
                        institution from serving as agent of the United 
                        States Government or serving as repository for 
                        United States Government funds.
                The imposition of either sanction under subparagraph 
                (A) or (B) shall be treated as one sanction for 
                purposes of this section, and the imposition of both 
                such sanctions shall be treated as two sanctions for 
                purposes of this section.
                    (D) Procurement sanction.--Prohibit the United 
                States Government from procuring, or entering into any 
                contract for the procurement of, any goods or services 
                from a sanctioned person.
            (2) Termination of sanctions.--Sanctions imposed pursuant 
        to paragraph (1) shall terminate if the President determines 
        and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that 
        the requirements of sections 204, 205, and 206 of the Cuban 
        Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (22 
        U.S.C. 6064, 6065, and 6066) have been satisfied.
            (3) Prohibition on facilitation by united states persons of 
        cuba's ability to develop petroleum resources.--It shall be 
        unlawful for any United States person to provide materials, 
        technical equipment, or other assistance that contributes to 
        the enhancement of Cuba's ability to develop petroleum 
        resources of the submerged lands located off Cuba's coast.
            (4) Reports by secretary of state.--For each of the fiscal 
        years 2013, 2014, and 2015, the Secretary of State shall submit 
        to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the 
        Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the Senate a report relating to--
                    (A) investments that equal or exceed $1,000,000 (or 
                any combination of investments that in the aggregate 
                equals or exceeds $1,000,000 in any 12-month period) 
                that contribute to the enhancement of the ability of 
                the Government of Cuba, or any agent or instrumentality 
                thereof, to develop petroleum resources of the 
                submerged lands located off Cuba's coast, including 
                information relating to the values of such investments, 
                the identity of the persons making such investments, 
                and proposed investments that would satisfy such 
                criteria, and information relating to any sanctions 
                that have been imposed pursuant to subsection (a) as a 
                result of such investments; and
                    (B) investments of any amount of money, in 
                conjunction with trafficking in confiscated United 
                States property, that contribute to such an 
                enhancement, including information relating to the 
                values of such investments, the identity of the persons 
                making such investments, and the identity of such 
                confiscated property, and information relating to any 
                sanctions that have been imposed pursuant to paragraph 
                (1) as a result of such investments.
            (5) Assessments of environmental impacts of development of 
        cuba's petroleum resources.--
                    (A) In general.--Not later than one year after the 
                date of the enactment of this Act, and annually 
                thereafter, the Secretary of State, in consultation 
                with the Secretary of the Interior and the 
                Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, 
                shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
                the Committee on Natural Resources of the House of 
                Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations 
                and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of 
                the Senate a report containing an assessment of the 
                impact that the development of Cuba's petroleum 
                resources has had on the environment and natural 
                resources of the submerged lands located off Cuba's 
                coast and Florida's marine environment.
                    (B) Use of environmental impact statements.--In 
                preparing the assessment, the Secretary of State shall 
                use as a model environmental impact statements prepared 
                pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 
                1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.).
            (6) Definitions.--In this subsection--
                    (A) the terms ``appropriate congressional 
                committees'', ``confiscated'', ``person'', 
                ``property'', and ``traffics'' have the meaning given 
                such terms in section 4 of the Cuban Liberty and 
                Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (22 U.S.C. 
                6023), except that the term ``person'' shall also 
                include, for purposes of this subsection, a foreign 
                subsidiary of a person and United States subsidiary of 
                a foreign person;
                    (B) the terms ``develop'', ``investment'', and 
                ``petroleum resources'' have the meaning given such 
                terms in section 402(c) of such Act, as added by 
                subsection (b) of this section; and
                    (C) the terms ``agent'' and ``instrumentality'' 
                shall include the Cuban Communist Party.

SEC. 106. AMENDMENTS TO ANNUAL COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM.

    (a) In General.--Section 140(b) of the Foreign Relations 
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. 2656f(b)) is 
amended--
            (1) in paragraph (4)(D), by striking ``and'' at the end;
            (2) in paragraph (5), by striking the period at the end and 
        inserting a semicolon;
            (3) by redesignating the second paragraph (3) and the 
        second paragraph (4) as paragraphs (6) and (7), respectively;
            (4) in paragraph (6), as so redesignated, by striking 
        ``and'' at the end;
            (5) in paragraph (7), as so redesignated, by striking the 
        period at the end and inserting a semicolon; and
            (6) by adding after such paragraph (7) the following new 
        paragraphs:
            ``(8) a comprehensive assessment of all United States 
        assistance available to combat terrorism in each country that 
        is a subject of such report; and
            ``(9) with respect to countries in the Western Hemisphere 
        that are the subjects of such report, the level in each such 
        country of threat posed by radical Islamist terrorism.''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this subsection shall 
apply with respect to each report required to be transmitted to 
Congress under section 140 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 
Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 on or after the date of the enactment of 
this Act

SEC. 107. AMENDMENTS TO INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL CERTIFICATION 
              PROCEDURES.

    Section 706 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 
2003 (Public Law 107-228; 22 U.S.C. 2291j-1) is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (2)--
                    (A) in subparagraph (A)(ii); by striking ``and'' at 
                the end;
                    (B) by redesignating subparagraph (B) as 
                subparagraph (C);
                    (C) by inserting after subparagraph (A) the 
                following new subparagraph:
                    ``(B) designate each country, if any, identified in 
                such report in which a link has been determined to 
                exist between illicit drug trafficking organizations 
                and a designated foreign terrorist organization and 
                that has failed demonstrably, during the previous 12 
                months, to make substantial efforts--
                            ``(i) to adhere to its obligations under 
                        international counterterrorism agreements; and
                            ``(ii) to implement effective 
                        counterterrorism measures, including action on 
                        such issues as the rule of law, denying safe 
                        haven to terrorists, financing and money 
                        laundering, and law enforcement; and''; and
                    (D) in subparagraph (C), as so redesignated, by 
                inserting before the period at the end the following: 
                ``under subparagraph (A) or (B)'';
            (2) in paragraph (3)--
                    (A) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``or'' at the 
                end;
                    (B) in subparagraph (B)(ii), by striking the period 
                at the end and inserting ``; or''; and
                    (C) by adding at the end the following new 
                subparagraph:
                    ``(C) subsequent to the designation being made 
                under paragraph (2)(B), the country has made 
                substantial efforts--
                            ``(i) to adhere to its obligations under 
                        international counterterrorism agreements; and
                            ``(ii) to implement effective 
                        counterterrorism measures, including action on 
                        such issues as the rule of law, denying safe 
                        haven to terrorists, financing and money 
                        laundering, and law enforcement.'';
            (3) by redesignating paragraph (8) as paragraph (9); and
            (4) by inserting after paragraph (7) the following new 
        paragraph:
            ``(8) Bilateral agreements.--If a country designated under 
        subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (2) does not receive a 
        determination under subparagraphs (B) or (C) of paragraph (3), 
        the Secretary of State shall negotiate with such country a 
        bilateral agreement describing actions to be taken by the 
        United States and such country to satisfy such determinations 
        during the one year period following such a designation. Such a 
        bilateral agreement should include a needs assessment, a 
        bilateral action plan, the provision of United States training 
        and assistance, the use of International Law Enforcement 
        Academy facilities in the region, and an exchange of model laws 
        and best practices.''.

SEC. 108. AMENDMENT TO INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT.

    Section 489(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
2291h(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
            ``(9) A separate section that contains information relating 
        to any links between drug trafficking organizations, or money 
        laundering and terrorists, terrorist acts, or designated 
        foreign terrorist organizations (as such term is used in 
        section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 
        1189)), and any actions taken by the United States Government 
        or foreign government to address such links.''.

SEC. 109. INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ACADEMY IN SAN SALVADOR, EL 
              SALVADOR.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the 
International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in San Salvador, El 
Salvador, should continue to serve as a critical component of United 
States regional counterterrorism efforts.
    (b) Negotiation.--The Secretary of State shall coordinate with the 
heads of other appropriate United States Government agencies to ensure 
that counterterrorism, including radical Islamist extremism within the 
Western Hemisphere, nonproliferation, prison reform, prison fire 
safety, prison corrections training, the threat of gang violence, and 
border security courses are instituted as part of the core curriculum 
at the International Law Enforcement Academy in San Salvador.

SEC. 110. UNITED STATES EFFORTS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE.

    (a) Determination.--For any country in the Western Hemisphere that 
the President has determined--
            (1) is engaged in military cooperation with a state sponsor 
        of terrorism,
            (2) is engaged in nonmarket-based trade with a state 
        sponsor of terrorism,
            (3) is carrying out policies that threaten United States 
        national security interests, or
            (4) is not fully cooperating with United States 
        counterterrorism or nonproliferation efforts,
the President is authorized to impose any of the sanctions described in 
subsection (b).
    (b) Sanctions.--For any country in the Western Hemisphere with 
respect to which the President has made a determination in accordance 
with subsection (a), the President is authorized to--
            (1) suspend United States nonhumanitarian foreign 
        assistance to the government of that country; and
            (2) prohibit the sale, provision, or transfer of articles, 
        including the issuance of any specific license or grant of any 
        other specific permission or authority to export any goods or 
        technology under--
                    (A) the Export Administration Act of 1979 (as 
                continued in effect under the International Emergency 
                Economic Powers Act);
                    (B) the Arms Export Control Act;
                    (C) the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; or
                    (D) any other statute that requires the prior 
                review and approval of the United States Government as 
                a condition for the export or re-export of goods or 
                services.

SEC. 111. AMENDMENTS TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE REWARDS PROGRAM.

    (a) In General.--Section 36 of the State Department Basic 
Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2708) is amended--
            (1) in subsection (a)(2), by inserting ``serious violations 
        of international humanitarian law, transnational organized 
        crime,'' after ``international narcotics trafficking,'';
            (2) in subsection (b)--
                    (A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by 
                striking ``Attorney General'' and inserting ``heads of 
                other relevant departments or agencies'';
                    (B) in paragraphs (4) and (5), by striking 
                ``paragraph (1), (2), or (3)'' each place it appears 
                and inserting ``paragraph (1), (2), (3), (8), (9), 
                (10), or (11)'';
                    (C) in paragraph (6)--
                            (i) by inserting ``or transnational 
                        organized crime group'' after ``terrorist 
                        organization''; and
                            (ii) by striking ``or'' at the end;
                    (D) in paragraph (7)--
                            (i) in the matter preceding subparagraph 
                        (A), by striking ``, including the use by the 
                        organization of illicit narcotics production or 
                        international narcotics trafficking'' and 
                        inserting ``or transnational organized crime 
                        group, including the use by such organization 
                        or group of illicit narcotics production or 
                        international narcotics trafficking'';
                            (ii) in subparagraph (A), by inserting ``or 
                        transnational organized crime'' after 
                        ``international terrorism''; and
                            (iii) in subparagraph (B)--
                                    (I) by inserting ``or transnational 
                                organized crime group'' after 
                                ``terrorist organization''; and
                                    (II) by striking the period at the 
                                end and inserting a semicolon; and
                    (E) by adding at the end the following new 
                paragraphs:
            ``(8) the arrest or conviction in any country of any 
        individual wanted on terrorism charges pursuant to red notices 
        duly issued by Interpol, if such reward would help advance 
        United States interests or the interests of United States 
        allies in the global struggle against international terrorism;
            ``(9) the arrest or conviction in any country of any 
        individual for participating in, primarily outside the United 
        States, transnational organized crime;
            ``(10) the arrest or conviction in any country of any 
        individual conspiring to participate in or attempting to 
        participate in transnational organized crime; or
            ``(11) the arrest or conviction in any country, or the 
        transfer to or conviction by an international criminal tribunal 
        (including a hybrid or mixed tribunal), of any foreign national 
        accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide, as 
        defined under the statute of such tribunal.'';
            (3) in subsection (e)(1), by striking the last sentence; 
        and
            (4) in subsection (k)--
                    (A) by redesignating paragraphs (5) and (6) as 
                paragraphs (7) and (8), respectively; and
                    (B) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following 
                new paragraphs:
            ``(5) Transnational organized crime.--The term 
        `transnational organized crime' means--
                    ``(A) racketeering activity (as such term is 
                defined in section 1961 of title 18, United States 
                Code) that involves at least one jurisdiction outside 
                the United States; or
                    ``(B) any other criminal offense punishable by a 
                term of imprisonment of at least four years under 
                Federal, State, or local law that involves at least one 
                jurisdiction outside the United States and that is 
                intended to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial 
                or other material benefit.
            ``(6) Transnational organized crime group.--The term 
        `transnational organized crime group' means a group of persons 
        that includes one or more citizens of a foreign country, exists 
        for a period of time, and acts in concert with the aim of 
        engaging in transnational organized crime.''.
    (b) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section or the 
amendments made by this section shall be construed as authorizing the 
use of any activity precluded under the American Servicemembers' 
Protection Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-206).

SEC. 112. ESTABLISHMENT OF A WESTERN HEMISPHERE REGIONAL COORDINATION 
              CENTER.

    (a) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United 
States to--
            (1) carry out a comprehensive and integrated approach to 
        United States counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and 
        nonproliferation efforts, both domestically and abroad; and
            (2) seek to engage leaders of the governments of countries 
        in the Western Hemisphere to develop a comprehensive 
        multilateral strategy to counter current and emerging threats 
        and prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and 
        biological weapons.
    (b) Purpose.--A Western Hemisphere Regional Coordination Center 
shall serve as a joint operational facility dedicated to coordinating 
efforts, capacity, and intelligence among participating countries to 
counter current and emerging threats and prevent the proliferation of 
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons throughout the Western 
Hemisphere.
    (c) Establishment.--The Secretary of State shall negotiate with the 
leaders of the governments of other countries of the Western Hemisphere 
on a bilateral or multilateral basis, as appropriate, international 
agreements under which such governments work in partnership to 
establish a center to be known as the ``Western Hemisphere Regional 
Coordination Center'' (RCC).
    (d) Participation of United States Government Agencies.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary of State, in consultation 
        with the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of 
        Defense, shall determine which departments and agencies of the 
        United States Government, including the Department of Defense, 
        the Department of Energy, the Department of Homeland Security, 
        the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Justice, the 
        Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Federal Bureau of 
        Investigation, are necessary to ensure the establishment and 
        operation of the RCC. The Secretary of State, in consultation 
        with the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of 
        Defense, shall negotiate agreements with the heads of such 
        agencies to ensure their full participation and cooperation in 
        such establishment and operation.
            (2) Assignment of regional attaches and advisors.--The 
        Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of 
        Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, may transfer 
        to the RCC regional attaches and advisors serving at United 
        States diplomatic and consular missions in the Western 
        Hemisphere.
    (e) Structure.--
            (1) Management of the rcc.--It is the sense of Congress 
        that the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary 
        of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, should be 
        responsible for the management of the RCC, including 
        development of the budget, priorities, and programs of the RCC.
            (2) Staffing and duties.--
                    (A) In general.--The RCC shall have one United 
                States Director, at least one but not more than two 
                United States Deputy Directors, and one host country 
                General Director. The United States Director and United 
                States Deputy Directors may be employees of any of the 
                United States national security agencies and shall be 
                chosen by the Secretary of State, in consultation with 
                the Director of National Intelligence and Secretary of 
                Defense. The Director and Deputy Directors of the RCC 
                shall keep the Chief of Mission of the United States 
                Embassy in the host country of the RCC fully informed 
                of activities and operations of such RCC.
                    (B) Staff of foreign countries.--It is the sense of 
                Congress that the Secretary of State should seek to 
                ensure that staff of the RCC who are representatives of 
                governments of other countries of the Western 
                Hemisphere are comprised of individuals who are members 
                of vetted units of such governments that are approved 
                by the United States Government.
    (f) United States Contributions.--The United States should 
contribute existing funds, personnel, and other resources to the RCC in 
order to avoid duplicative efforts to maximize the presence of the 
United States to improve regional security and cooperation within the 
Western Hemisphere.

SEC. 113. TRANSFER OF FUNDS TO THE CENTRAL AMERICAN REGIONAL SECURITY 
              INITIATIVE.

    For fiscal year 2013 and each subsequent fiscal year, 50 percent of 
the amount of funds made available for ``Development Assistance'' to 
carry out environmental programs and 50 percent of the amount of funds 
made available for the Global Climate Change Fund for the Western 
Hemisphere may be transferred to, and merged with, funds made available 
for ``International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement'' to carry 
out the Central American Regional Security Initiative.

SEC. 114. ADMINISTRATION OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR CENTRAL 
              AMERICAN COUNTRIES.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) According to the Government Accountability Office 
        report dated July 2010 regarding the Merida Initiative, 
        Department of State officials at posts in Central American 
        countries expressed frustration with the Narcotics Affairs 
        Section (NAS) of the United States Embassy in Mexico City 
        serving as the account manager for International Narcotics 
        Control and Law Enforcement funds destined for Central America 
        because ``it adds an extra layer'' to an already complex 
        funding process.
            (2) Some Department of State officials at posts in Central 
        America stated that this situation has created a bottleneck on 
        the progress of bilateral procurement and training.
            (3) United States officials at posts in three Central 
        American countries noted that returning funds to embassy 
        control would speed up procurement, and facilitate travel, 
        training, and exchange programs.
    (b) Requirement.--For fiscal year 2013 and each subsequent fiscal 
year, funds made available for ``International Narcotics Control and 
Law Enforcement'' to carry out security assistance programs for any 
country of Central America may be administered only through the United 
States embassy for such Central American country.

SEC. 115. RESTRICTION ON ASSISTANCE FOR THE GUATEMALAN ARMY.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report that narrowly defines 
Guatemala's strategy for addressing--
            (1) border security and external threats;
            (2) respect for human rights;
            (3) cooperation with civilian investigations and 
        prosecutions of cases involving current and retired officers 
        and with the International Commission against Impunity in 
        Guatemala (CICIG); and
            (4) public disclosure of all military archives pertaining 
        to the internal armed conflict.
    (b) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the Senate.

TITLE II--NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 
                       IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

SEC. 201. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds the following:
            (1) Venezuela and Iran have established extensive 
        political, military, and economic cooperation.
            (2) Venezuela, under the government of Hugo Chavez, has 
        publicly supported Iran's development of a capacity to enrich 
        uranium, which many observers believe is part of a nuclear 
        weapons program.
            (3) In May 2005, Chavez stated that he was seeking 
        assistance from Iran to establish a nuclear program in 
        Venezuela.
            (4) On February 4, 2006, Venezuela was one of only three 
        countries to vote against a resolution by the Board of 
        Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, 
        to report Iran to the United Nations Security Council for 
        violating its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
        Treaty.
            (5) On February 15, 2006, the Speaker of the Iranian 
        parliament, Gholam Ali Haddad-Adel, stated that his government 
        was prepared to discuss providing technical assistance to a 
        Venezuelan nuclear program.
            (6) On a visit to Iran in February 2008, Abel El Zabayar, a 
        member of Venezuela's National Assembly and Mining Commission, 
        stated that Iran will ``practically give away'' its civilian 
        nuclear technology and that ``if relations with Iran lead to 
        sharing nuclear technology with us, we would then give it away 
        to our brothers in Latin America once we are successful.''.
            (7) El Zabayar stated that Venezuela had taken steps toward 
        establishing a civilian nuclear program and that cooperation in 
        this area was being discussed with the Governments of Iran and 
        Belarus.
            (8) Venezuela reportedly has large deposits of uranium ore 
        in the Guiana Shield region.
            (9) In October 2009 Hugo Chavez stated Venezuela was 
        ``working with several countries, with Iran, with Russia'' in 
        their exploration for uranium.
            (10) In December 2009, Iran and Ecuador signed a mining 
        agreement that establishes a framework for potential uranium 
        cooperation.
            (11) In 1985 the Brazilian government announced that it had 
        terminated a clandestine nuclear weapons program run by the 
        military since 1975.
            (12) In August 2005 a former high-ranking Brazilian nuclear 
        official stated that the military had continued to develop 
        elements of a nuclear weapons program into the 1990s.
            (13) On November 20, 2007, Brazilian General Jose Benedito 
        de Barros Moreira publicly called for Brazil to develop the 
        technological capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons.
            (14) The centrifuges at Brazil's Resende uranium enrichment 
        plant can be reconfigured to produce highly enriched uranium in 
        quantities sufficient to produce several nuclear weapons 
        annually.
            (15) Brazil has denied inspectors from the IAEA full access 
        to its uranium enrichment centrifuges at Resende on the grounds 
        that it is protecting commercial secrets.
            (16) The standoff with the IAEA was resolved only by the 
        IAEA agreeing to limit its verification methods to indirect 
        inspections without direct inspection of the centrifuges, which 
        many nonproliferation experts fear could be used as a precedent 
        by Iran and other countries to prevent IAEA inspectors from 
        examining their suspect nuclear facilities.
            (17) A prototype nuclear reactor is being developed at the 
        Armar Research Center for use in Brazil's nuclear-powered 
        submarine program.
            (18) On February 24, 2008, the Governments of Argentina and 
        Brazil agreed to begin negotiations regarding the joint 
        development of a nuclear reactor and construction of a uranium 
        enrichment plant.
            (19) In February 2008, President Christina Kirchner of 
        Argentina and Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva of Brazil agreed to the 
        establishment of a joint uranium enrichment plant.
            (20) In 2010 Brazil facilitated a joint declaration for 
        Iran to send uranium to Turkey for enrichment. After the 
        announcement, Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorin stated 
        ``in our view, the agreement eliminates any ground for 
        sanctions against Iran.''.
            (21) In 2011 Brazil expanded its uranium enrichment 
        capacity to an industrial level.
            (22) Until 1990 the Argentine Government conducted a 
        clandestine nuclear weapons program.
            (23) In December 1985 Argentina and Iran signed a nuclear 
        cooperation agreement in which Argentina agreed to supply Iran 
        with highly enriched uranium.
            (24) In 1987 and 1988 Argentina signed three agreements 
        with Iran for converting a nuclear reactor to use enriched 
        uranium, for building pilot plants for uranium-dioxide 
        conversion and fuel fabrication.
            (25) Assistance by Argentina to the Iranian nuclear program 
        was reduced, but not terminated, following pressure by the 
        United States.
            (26) Several countries in Latin America, including Brazil 
        and Argentina, have not signed and implemented an Additional 
        Protocol which provides IAEA inspectors with enhanced access to 
        nuclear facilities.
            (27) Some Western Hemisphere countries have not ratified 
        the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
        Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on 
        their Destruction, also referred to as The Chemical Weapons 
        Convention.
            (28) Several countries in Latin America have not signed and 
        ratified The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development 
        and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin 
        Weapons and on their Destruction (also referred to as the 
        Biological Weapons Convention).

SEC. 202. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS-
              RELATED NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS, 
              TECHNOLOGY, AND FACILITIES.

    (a) In General.--To enhance the prevention of the proliferation of 
weapons-related nuclear, chemical, and biological materials, 
technology, and facilities, it shall be the policy of the United States 
to--
            (1) promote the negotiation and implementation by all 
        countries of--
                    (A) a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the 
                International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); and
                    (B) an Additional Protocol to the safeguards 
                agreement;
            (2) secure guarantees by all countries of unrestricted 
        access by IAEA personnel to all nuclear-related materials and 
        facilities in territories under the control of the host 
        country;
            (3) promote the implementation by all countries of United 
        Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 which was amended on 
        April 20, 2011, by United Nations Security Council Resolution 
        1977 and which reaffirms that the proliferation of nuclear, 
        chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery 
        constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and 
        extends the mandate of the Resolution 1540 Committee for a 
        period of 10 years to 2021;
            (4) promote the accession to and ratification and 
        implementation of--
                    (A) the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
                Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of 
                Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (also 
                referred to as the Chemical Weapons Convention);
                    (B) the 1980 IAEA Convention on the Physical 
                Protection of Nuclear Material;
                    (C) the 2005 United Nations International 
                Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear 
                Terrorism; and
                    (D) the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
                Development and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
                (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction 
                (also referred to as the Biological Weapons 
                Convention).
    (b) Additional Protocol Defined.--In this section, the term 
``Additional Protocol'' means the Protocol Additional to an agreement 
between a country and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the 
Application of Safeguards.

SEC. 203. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING THE SMALL QUANTITIES PROTOCOL.

    (a) In General.--Because a Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) sets 
aside many of the operative provisions of a general safeguards 
agreement, the ability of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
to verify that nuclear materials and facilities in a country with an 
SQP are not being diverted for illicit purposes is significantly 
impaired. For this reason, it shall be the policy of the United States 
to--
            (1) oppose the negotiation by the IAEA of an SQP for any 
        country that did not have an SQP as of January 1, 2012; and
            (2) encourage every country with an SQP to withdraw 
        formally from or renegotiate that agreement for the purpose of 
        increasing transparency and eliminating any exemption or 
        provision that could restrict the ability of the IAEA to verify 
        that a country's nuclear materials and facilities are not being 
        diverted to impermissible uses.
    (b) Countries Described.--For purposes of subsection (a)(1), as of 
January 1, 2012, the countries with an SQP are the following: Antigua & 
Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominica, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, 
Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. 
Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago, and 
the United States.

SEC. 204. SECURING ADHERENCE TO AGREEMENTS REGARDING NUCLEAR 
              NONPROLIFERATION BY COUNTRIES IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE.

    (a) In General.--The President shall use all available political, 
economic, and diplomatic tools to ensure that each country in the 
Western Hemisphere--
            (1) has signed and implemented a comprehensive safeguards 
        agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA);
            (2) has signed and implemented an Additional Protocol to 
        its safeguards agreement;
            (3) guarantees unrestricted access for IAEA personnel to 
        all nuclear-related facilities;
            (4) has implemented the provisions of United Nations 
        Security Council Resolution 1540;
            (5) has acceded to, ratified, and fully implemented the 
        conventions referred to in section 202(a)(4);
            (6) does not negotiate with the IAEA an SQP if that country 
        did not have an SQP as of January 1, 2012; and
            (7) withdraws formally from or renegotiates an SQP 
        agreement if a country has such an agreement.
    (b) Sanctions.--For any Western Hemisphere country that has not 
satisfied all of the requirements specified in subsection (a), the 
President is authorized to--
            (1) suspend United States nonhumanitarian foreign 
        assistance to the government of that country; and
            (2) prohibit the sale, provision, or transfer of articles, 
        including the issuance of any specific license or grant of any 
        other specific permission or authority to export any goods or 
        technology under--
                    (A) the Export Administration Act of 1979 (as 
                continued in effect under the International Emergency 
                Economic Powers Act);
                    (B) the Arms Export Control Act;
                    (C) the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; or
                    (D) any other statute that requires the prior 
                review and approval of the United States Government as 
                a condition for the export or re-export of goods or 
                services.

SEC. 205. HALTING THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR FUEL FABRICATION.

    (a) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United 
States to oppose the development or acquisition by any country of a 
capacity to fabricate nuclear fuel if such country did not have such 
capacity as of January 1, 2012.
    (b) Prevention of Capacity To Fabricate Nuclear Fuel.--The 
President shall use all available political, economic, and diplomatic 
tools, and shall use the voice, vote, and influence of the United 
States in all international organizations and associations of which it 
is a member, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, to prevent the development or 
acquisition by any country of a capacity to fabricate nuclear fuel if 
such country did not have such capacity as of January 1, 2012.
    (c) Nuclear Technical Cooperation With the IAEA.--The President 
shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to 
use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to 
block the allocation of funds for any IAEA development, environmental, 
or nuclear science assistance or activity to a country the government 
of which--
            (1) the Secretary of State has determined, for purposes of 
        section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (as 
        continued in effect under the International Emergency Economic 
        Powers Act), section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
        1961, section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, or any other 
        provision of law, is a government that has repeatedly provided 
        support for acts of international terrorism;
            (2) is actively cooperating with a government as described 
        in paragraph (1);
            (3) is under investigation for a breach of or noncompliance 
        with its IAEA obligations or the purposes and principles of the 
        Charter of the United Nations; or
            (4) is in violation of its IAEA obligations or the purposes 
        and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

SEC. 206. COOPERATION WITH THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) From its inception on May 31, 2003, the Proliferation 
        Security Initiative, also referred to as the PSI, has 
        repeatedly demonstrated its effectiveness in preventing the 
        proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
            (2) In his February 11, 2004, address at the National 
        Defense University regarding additional measures to enhance 
        global efforts against the proliferation of weapons of mass 
        destruction President Bush proposed that ``the work of the 
        Proliferation Security Initiative be expanded to address more 
        than shipments and transfers. Building on the tools we've 
        developed to fight terrorists, we can take direct action 
        against proliferation networks. We need greater cooperation not 
        just among intelligence and military services, but in law 
        enforcement, as well. PSI participants and other willing 
        nations should use the Interpol and all other means to bring to 
        justice those who traffic in deadly weapons, to shut down their 
        labs, to seize their materials, to freeze their assets. We must 
        act on every lead. We will find the middlemen, the suppliers 
        and the buyers.''.
            (3) The number of countries participating in PSI has 
        steadily increased, thereby greatly enhancing its 
        effectiveness.
            (4) Many countries in the Western Hemisphere formally or 
        informally cooperate with the PSI.
            (5) Expanded law enforcement cooperation throughout the 
        Western Hemisphere, including by means of greater coordination 
        of policies, improved communications, and enhanced capabilities 
        would significantly promote the objectives of the PSI.
    (b) Sense of Congress Concerning Strengthening Cooperation 
Regarding Nonproliferation.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) it is in the national security interest of the United 
        States to establish comprehensive cooperation to prevent the 
        proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological materials in 
        the Western Hemisphere; and
            (2) the Secretary of State should seek to secure the formal 
        or informal cooperation by Western Hemisphere countries for the 
        purpose of securing the goals of the Proliferation Security 
        Initiative announced by the President on May 31, 2003.

SEC. 207. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE NONPROLIFERATION 
              PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVE.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of State is authorized, in 
consultation with relevant United States Government agencies, to 
negotiate with the leaders of the governments of countries in the 
Western Hemisphere on a bilateral or multilateral basis, as 
appropriate, international agreements under which such governments work 
in partnership to establish an initiative to be known as the ``Western 
Hemisphere Nonproliferation Partnership Initiative'' (NPI).
    (b) Purpose.--
            (1) In general.--The NPI shall--
                    (A) encourage the establishment of contacts and 
                cooperative relationships, including the sharing of 
                intelligence, between the responsible individuals and 
                agencies of each participant country with their 
                counterparts in the United States Government and in 
                other participating countries; and
                    (B) encourage bilateral and multilateral support, 
                cooperation, and coordination of national programs and 
                efforts to promote effective and in-depth cooperation 
                to counter the illicit acquisition or trade of weapons-
                related nuclear, chemical, or biological materials, 
                technology, or facilities.
            (2) Cooperative programs.--The cooperative programs 
        referred to under paragraph (1)(B) shall include the following:
                    (A) Training for government officials and agents 
                from participating countries regarding the development 
                and operation of NPI programs.
                    (B) Assistance in developing a comprehensive legal 
                and regulatory framework in each country, as 
                appropriate, to enable the establishment and effective 
                implementation of export controls and the capacity to 
                track nuclear, chemical, and biological materials, 
                equipment, technology, and facilities.
                    (C) Provision of equipment, development of 
                infrastructure, and the acquisition of other resources 
                required by participating countries to effectively 
                carry out the tasks referred to in subparagraphs (A) 
                and (B).

SEC. 208. FOREIGN POLICY CONTROLS.

    (a) Terrorist States.--Section 6(j)(4) of the Export Administration 
Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)(4)) is amended--
            (1) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking 
        ``the Speaker'' and inserting ``the chairman of the Committee 
        on Foreign Affairs''; and
            (2) in subparagraph (B)--
                    (A) in clause (i), by striking ``6-month period; 
                and'' and inserting ``36-month period;'';
                    (B) in clause (ii), by striking the period at the 
                end and inserting a semicolon; and
                    (C) by adding after clause (ii) the following:
                            ``(iii) that government is not a `country 
                        of proliferation concern' as defined in section 
                        1055(g)(2) of the National Defense 
                        Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (50 
                        U.S.C. 2371(g)(2)); and
                            ``(iv) that government has provided 
                        assurances that it will not knowingly 
                        facilitate, directly or indirectly, the 
                        proliferation of nuclear materials, items, or 
                        technology in the future.''.
    (b) Conforming Amendments.--
            (1) Foreign assistance act of 1961.--Section 620A(c) of the 
        Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371(c)) is amended--
                    (A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by 
                striking ``the Speaker'' and inserting ``the chairman 
                of the Committee on Foreign Affairs''; and
                    (B) in paragraph (2)--
                            (i) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``6-
                        month period; and'' and inserting ``36-month 
                        period;'';
                            (ii) in subparagraph (B), by striking the 
                        period at the end and inserting a semicolon; 
                        and
                            (iii) by adding after subparagraph (B) the 
                        following:
                    ``(C) that government is not a `country of 
                proliferation concern' as defined in section 1055(g)(2) 
                of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
                Year 2010 (50 U.S.C. 2371(g)(2)); and
                    ``(D) that government has provided assurances that 
                it will not knowingly facilitate, directly or 
                indirectly, the proliferation of nuclear materials, 
                items, or technology in the future.''.
            (2) Arms export control act.--Section 40(f)(1) of the Arms 
        Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780(f)(1)) is amended--
                    (A) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by 
                striking ``the Speaker'' and inserting ``the chairman 
                of the Committee on Foreign Affairs''; and
                    (B) in subparagraph (B)--
                            (i) in clause (i), by striking ``6-month 
                        period; and'' and inserting ``36-month 
                        period;'';
                            (ii) in clause (ii), by striking the period 
                        at the end and inserting a semicolon;
                            (iii) by adding after clause (ii) the 
                        following:
                            ``(iii) that government is not a `country 
                        of proliferation concern' as defined in section 
                        1055(g)(2) of the National Defense 
                        Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (50 
                        U.S.C. 2371(g)(2)); and
                            ``(iv) that government has provided 
                        assurances that it will not knowingly 
                        facilitate, directly or indirectly, the 
                        proliferation of nuclear materials, items, or 
                        technology in the future.''.

SEC. 209. LIMITATION ON ARMS TRANSFERS.

    (a) In General.--No letter of offer to sell major defense equipment 
to a foreign government of the Western Hemisphere may be issued 
pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) and no 
license to export major defense equipment to a foreign government of 
the Western Hemisphere may be issued pursuant to such Act in a fiscal 
year until the President makes the certification required under 
subsection (b) for such fiscal year.
    (b) Certification.--The certification required by this section is a 
certification by the President that the foreign government of the 
Western Hemisphere--
            (1) is not carrying out policies aimed at undermining 
        United States national security interests; and
            (2) is cooperating fully with United States 
        nonproliferation efforts.
    (c) Waiver.--The President may waive the prohibition under 
subsection (b) with respect to a specific transaction if the President 
determines that such transaction is important to the national security 
interests of the United States.

SEC. 210. RESTRICTIONS ON NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH COUNTRIES ASSISTING 
              THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM OF VENEZUELA OR CUBA.

    (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law or any 
international agreement, no agreement for cooperation between the 
United States and the government of any country that is assisting the 
nuclear or biological program of Venezuela or Cuba or transferring 
advanced conventional weapons or missiles to Venezuela or Cuba may be 
submitted to the President or to Congress pursuant to section 123 of 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153), no such agreement may 
enter into force with such country, no license may be issued for export 
directly or indirectly to such country of any nuclear material, 
facilities, components, or other goods, services, or technology that 
would be subject to such agreement, and no approval may be given for 
the transfer or retransfer directly or indirectly to such country of 
any nuclear material, facilities, components, or other goods, services, 
or technology that would be subject to such agreement, until the 
President determines and reports to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 
the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
the Senate that the government of the country that is assisting the 
nuclear program of Venezuela or Cuba or transferring advanced 
conventional weapons or missiles to Venezuela or Cuba--
            (1) has suspended all nuclear assistance to Venezuela or 
        Cuba and all transfers of advanced conventional weapons and 
        missiles to Venezuela or Cuba; and
            (2) is committed to maintaining such suspension until 
        Venezuela or Cuba has implemented measures that would permit 
        the President to make the determination described in paragraph 
        (1).
    (b) Rules of Construction.--The restrictions described in 
subsection (a)--
            (1) shall apply in addition to all other applicable 
        procedures, requirements, and restrictions required by the 
        Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and any other law; and
            (2) shall not be construed as affecting the validity of 
        agreements for cooperation that are in effect on the date of 
        the enactment of this Act.
    (c) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Agreement for cooperation.--The term ``agreement for 
        cooperation'' has the meaning given that term in section 11 b. 
        of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014 b.).
            (2) Assisting the nuclear program of venezuela or cuba.--
        The term ``assisting the nuclear program of Venezuela or Cuba'' 
        means the intentional transfer to Venezuela or Cuba by a 
        government, or by a person subject to the jurisdiction of a 
        government with the knowledge and acquiescence of such 
        government, of goods, services, or technology listed on the 
        Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear 
        Material, Equipment and Technology (published by the 
        International Atomic Energy Agency as Information Circular 
        INFCIRC/254/Rev. 3/Part 1, and subsequent revisions) or 
        Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, 
        Material, and Related Technology (published by the 
        International Atomic Energy Agency as Information Circular 
        INFCIR/254/Rev. 3/Part 2, and subsequent revisions).
            (3) Country that is assisting the nuclear program of 
        venezuela or cuba or transferring advanced conventional weapons 
        or missiles to venezuela or cuba.--The term ``country that is 
        assisting the nuclear program of Venezuela or Cuba or 
        transferring advanced conventional weapons or missiles to 
        Venezuela or Cuba'' means--
                    (A) Russia; and
                    (B) any other country determined by the President 
                to be assisting the nuclear program of Venezuela or 
                Cuba or transferring advanced conventional weapons or 
                missiles to Venezuela or Cuba.
            (4) Transferring advanced conventional weapons or missiles 
        to venezuela or cuba.--The term ``transferring advanced 
        conventional weapons or missiles to Venezuela or Cuba'' means 
        the intentional transfer to Venezuela or Cuba by a government, 
        or by a person subject to the jurisdiction of a government with 
        the knowledge and acquiescence of such government, of goods, 
        services, or technology listed on--
                    (A) the Wassenaar Arrangement list of Dual Use 
                Goods and Technologies and Munitions list of July 12, 
                1996, and subsequent revisions; or
                    (B) the Missile Technology Control Regime Equipment 
                and Technology Annex of June 11, 1996, and subsequent 
                revisions.

               TITLE III--ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

SEC. 301. ACTIONS REGARDING THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES.

    (a) Declaration Regarding Terrorism.--The Secretary of State shall 
direct the United States Representative to the Organization of American 
States (OAS) to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States 
at the OAS to move for a declaration at the first meeting of Member 
States of the OAS convened after the date of the enactment of this Act 
calling on countries to systematically deny the use of their 
territories by terrorists or terrorist organizations.
    (b) Transfer of Funds for United States Voluntary Contributions to 
the OAS.--
            (1) In general.--For fiscal year 2013 and each subsequent 
        fiscal year, 50 percent of the amount of funds made available 
        for United States assessed contributions to the OAS may be 
        transferred to, and merged with, funds made available for 
        United States voluntary contributions to the OAS.
            (2) Use of funds.--
                    (A) In general.--For fiscal year 2013 and each 
                subsequent fiscal year, it is the sense of Congress 
                that the United States Representative to the OAS should 
                allocate funds made available for United States 
                voluntary contributions to the OAS so as to give 
                priority to contributions to the organizations 
                specified in subparagraph (B).
                    (B) Organizations specified.--The organizations 
                referred to in subparagraph (A) are the following:
                            (i) The OAS Inter-American Committee 
                        Against Terrorism (CICTE).
                            (ii) The OAS Inter-American Drug Abuse 
                        Control Commission (CICAD).
                            (iii) The OAS Fund for Strengthening 
                        Democracy.
                            (iv) The Inter-American Commission on Human 
                        Rights.
    (c) Prohibition on United States Contribution.--
            (1) In general.--No contributions by the United States may 
        be made to the OAS if Cuba is admitted as an active Member 
        State to the OAS or participates at the Summit of the Americas 
        with the consent of the OAS unless the Secretary of State 
        determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional 
        committees that a democratically elected government in Cuba has 
        been established.
            (2) Definition.--In this subsection, the term 
        ``democratically elected government in Cuba'', in addition to 
        meeting the requirements of section 205(a) of the Cuban Liberty 
        and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (22 U.S.C. 
        6065(a)), means a government which meets the requirements of 
        section 206 of such Act (22 U.S.C. 6066).

                   TITLE IV--MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

SEC. 401. PROHIBITIONS ON ENGAGEMENT WITH CERTAIN WESTERN HEMISPHERE 
              COUNTRIES.

    Nothing in this Act shall be construed as weakening or removing any 
prohibitions on United States engagement with or assistance to any 
country in the Western Hemisphere that the Secretary of State has 
designated as a state sponsor of terrorism for a minimum of five 
consecutive years.

SEC. 402. REPORT.

    (a) In General.--For each of the fiscal years 2013, 2014, and 2015, 
the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a report on the activities carried out to achieve the 
objectives described in titles I and II that describe--
            (1) the extent to which each such objective has been 
        achieved;
            (2) the steps taken by the United States and countries in 
        the Western Hemisphere in the preceding calendar year to 
        accomplish such objectives;
            (3) the extent of cooperation by other countries in the 
        Western Hemisphere toward achieving such objectives; and
            (4) the steps the United States will take in the current 
        calendar year to accomplish such objectives.
    (b) Preparation and Form of Report.--The report required under 
subsection (a) shall rely on public information to the extent possible, 
and may include a classified annex, if necessary.
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