1.Short title; table of
contents
(a)This Act may be cited
as the Maintaining the President’s
Commitment to Our Nuclear Deterrent and National Security Act of
2012
.
(b)The table of
contents for this Act is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
Sec. 3. Commitments for nuclear weapons stockpile
modernization.
Sec. 4. Limitation and report in the event of insufficient
funding for modernization of nuclear weapons stockpile.
Sec. 5. Progress of modernization.
Sec. 6. Limitation on strategic delivery system
reductions.
Sec. 7. Prevention of asymmetry of nuclear weapon stockpile
reductions.
Sec. 8. Consideration of expansion of nuclear forces of other
countries.
Sec. 9. Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear
Facility and Uranium Processing Facility.
Sec. 10. Nuclear warheads on intercontinental ballistic
missiles of the United States.
Sec. 11. Nonstrategic nuclear weapon reductions and extended
deterrence policy.
2.In this Act:
(1)The term congressional defense
committees has the meaning given that term in section 101(a)(16) of
title 10, United States Code.
(2)The term New START Treaty
means the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian
Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms, signed on April 8, 2010, and entered into force on February 5,
2011.
3.Commitments for
nuclear weapons stockpile modernizationCongress finds the following:
(1)In 2008, then Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates warned that to be blunt, there is absolutely no way we can
maintain a credible deterrent and reduce the number of weapons in our stockpile
without either resorting to testing our stockpile or pursuing a modernization
program.
.
(2)Secretary Gates also warned in September
2009 that modernization is a prerequisite to nuclear force reductions, stating
that modernizing the nuclear capability of the United States is an
enabler of arms control and our ability to reduce the size of our
nuclear stockpile. When we have more confidence in the long-term viability of
our weapons systems, then our ability to reduce the number of weapons we must
keep in the stockpile is enhanced.
.
(3)President Obama’s 2010 Nuclear Posture
Review stated that—
(A)In order to sustain a safe, secure,
and effective U.S. nuclear stockpile as long as nuclear weapons exist, the
United States must possess a modern physical infrastructure—comprised of the
national security laboratories and a complex of supporting facilities.
;
and
(B)[I]mplementation of the Stockpile
Stewardship Program and the nuclear infrastructure investments recommended in
the NPR will allow the United States to shift away from retaining large numbers
of non-deployed warheads as a hedge against technical or geopolitical surprise,
allowing major reductions in the nuclear stockpile. These investments are
essential to facilitating reductions while sustaining deterrence under New
START and beyond.
.
(4)Section 1251 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111–84; 123 Stat. 2549)
required the President to submit a report to Congress on the plan for the
nuclear weapons stockpile, nuclear weapons complex, and delivery platforms at
the time a follow-on treaty to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty was
submitted by the President to the Senate. The President submitted such report
in May 2010 and submitted updates in November 2010 and February 2011.
(5)Such section 1251 also contained a sense of
Congress that the enhanced safety, security, and reliability of the
nuclear weapons stockpile, modernization of the nuclear weapons complex, and
maintenance of nuclear delivery systems are key to enabling further reductions
in the nuclear forces of the United States.
.
(6)Forty-one Senators wrote to President Obama
on December 15, 2009, stating, we don’t believe further reductions can
be in the national security interest of the U.S. in the absence of a
significant program to modernize our nuclear deterrent.
.
(7)Former Secretary of Defense and Secretary
of Energy James Schlesinger stated, while testifying before the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate in April 2010, I believe that it is
immensely important for the Senate to ensure, what the Administration has
stated as its intent, i.e., that there be a robust plan with a continuation of
its support over the full 10 years, before it proceeds to ratify this START
follow-on treaty.
.
(8)Former Secretary of State James Baker
stated in testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate in
May 2010 that because our security is based upon the safety and
reliability of our nuclear weapons, it is important that our Government budget
enough money to guarantee that those weapons can carry out their
mission.
.
(9)Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
also stated in May 2010 while testifying before the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate that as part of a number of recommendations, my
colleagues, Bill Perry, George Shultz, Sam Nunn, and I have called for
significant investments in a repaired and modernized nuclear weapons
infrastructure and added resources for the three national
laboratories.
.
(10)Then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates,
while testifying before the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate in June
2010, stated, I see this treaty as a vehicle to finally be able to get
what we need in the way of modernization that we have been unable to get
otherwise. . . . We are essentially the only nuclear power in the world that is
not carrying out these kinds of modernization programs.
.
(11)Secretary Gates further stated that
I've been up here for the last four springs trying to get money for this
and this is the first time I think I've got a fair shot of actually getting
money for our nuclear arsenal.
.
(12)The Directors of the national nuclear
weapons laboratories wrote to the chairman and ranking member of the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate in December 2010 that We are very
pleased by the update to the Section 1251 Report, as it would enable the
laboratories to execute our requirements for ensuring a safe, secure, reliable
and effective stockpile under the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan. In
particular, we are pleased because it clearly responds to many of the concerns
that we and others have voiced in the past about potential future-year funding
shortfalls, and it substantially reduces risks to the overall program. In
summary, we believe that the proposed budgets provide adequate support to
sustain the safety, security, reliability and effectiveness of America’s
nuclear deterrent within the limit of 1,550 deployed strategic warheads
established by the New START Treaty with adequate confidence and acceptable
risk.
.
(13)President Obama pledged, in a December 2010
letter to several Senators, I recognize that nuclear modernization
requires investment for the long-term. . . . That is my commitment to the
Congress—that my Administration will pursue these programs and capabilities for
as long as I am President.
.
(14)Secretary Gates added in May 2011 that,
this modernization program was very carefully worked out between
ourselves and the Department of Energy; and, frankly, where we came out on that
played a fairly significant role in the willingness of the Senate to ratify the
New START agreement.
.
(15)The Administrator for Nuclear Security,
Thomas D’Agostino, testified before Congress in November 2011 that, it
is critical to accept the linkage between modernizing our current stockpile in
order to achieve the policy objective of decreasing the number of weapons we
have in our stockpile, while still ensuring that the deterrent is safe, secure,
and effective.
.
4.Limitation and
report in the event of insufficient funding for modernization of nuclear
weapons stockpile
(a)It is the sense of Congress that—
(1)consistent with Condition 9 of the
Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the New START Treaty of the
Senate, agreed to on December 22, 2011, the United States is committed to
ensuring the safety, security, reliability, and credibility of its nuclear
forces; and
(2)the United States
is committed to—
(A)proceeding with a robust stockpile
stewardship program and maintaining and modernizing nuclear weapons production
capabilities and capacities of the United States to ensure the safety,
security, reliability, and credibility of the nuclear arsenal of the United
States at the New START Treaty levels and meeting requirements for hedging
against possible international developments or technical problems;
(B)reinvigorating and sustaining the nuclear
security laboratories of the United States and preserving the core nuclear
weapons competencies therein; and
(C)providing the resources needed to achieve
these objectives, at a minimum at the levels set forth in the President's
10-year plan provided to Congress in November 2010 pursuant to section 1251 of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111–84;
123 Stat. 2549).
(b)Insufficient
funding report and limitation
(1)Paragraph (2) of
section 1045(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012
(50 U.S.C. 2523b) is amended to read as follows:
(2)
(A)During
each year in which the New START Treaty is in force, if the President
determines that an appropriations Act is enacted that fails to meet the
resource levels set forth in the November 2010 update to the plan referred to
in section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010
(Public Law 111–84; 123 Stat. 2549) or if at any time determines that more
resources are required to carry out such plan than were estimated, the
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, within 60
days of making such a determination, a report detailing—
(i)a
plan to remedy the resource shortfall;
(ii)if more resources
are required to carry out the plan than were estimated—
(I)the proposed level
of funding required; and
(II)an identification of the stockpile work,
campaign, facility, site, asset, program, operation, activity, construction, or
project for which additional funds are required;
(iii)any effects
caused by the shortfall on the safety, security, reliability, or credibility of
the nuclear forces of the United States; and
(iv)whether and why,
in light of the shortfall, remaining a party to the New START Treaty is in the
national interest of the United States.
(B)If
the President submits a report under subparagraph (A), none of the funds made
available for fiscal year 2012 or any fiscal year thereafter for the Department
of Defense or the National Nuclear Security Administration may be used to
reduce the number of deployed nuclear warheads until—
(i)after the date on
which such report is submitted, the President certifies in writing to the
appropriate congressional committees that the resource shortfall identified in
such report has been addressed; and
(ii)a period of 120 days has elapsed following
the date on which such certification is made.
(C)The limitation in subparagraph (B) shall
not apply to—
(i)reductions made to ensure the safety,
security, reliability, and credibility of the nuclear weapons stockpile and
strategic delivery systems, including activities related to surveillance,
assessment, certification, testing, and maintenance of nuclear warheads and
strategic delivery systems; or
(ii)nuclear warheads
that are retired or awaiting dismantlement on the date of the report under
subparagraph (A).
(D)In this paragraph:
(i)The term
appropriate congressional committees means—
(I)the congressional
defense committees; and
(II)the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives.
(ii)The term New START Treaty
means the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian
Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms, signed on April 8, 2010, and entered into force on February 5,
2011.
.
(2)The amendment made by
paragraph (1) shall take effect on October 1, 2012.
5.Progress of
modernization
(a)Congress finds the following:
(1)In 2008, then Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates warned that to be blunt, there is absolutely no way we can
maintain a credible deterrent and reduce the number of weapons in our stockpile
without either resorting to testing our stockpile or pursuing a modernization
program.
.
(2)The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review stated that
the President has directed a review of post-New START arms control
objectives, to consider future reductions in nuclear weapons. Several factors
will influence the magnitude and pace of future reductions in U.S. nuclear
forces below New START levels
, including—
(A)First, any future nuclear reductions
must continue to strengthen deterrence of potential regional adversaries,
strategic stability vis-à-vis Russia and China, and assurance of our allies and
partners. This will require an updated assessment of deterrence requirements;
further improvements in U.S., allied, and partner non-nuclear capabilities;
focused reductions in strategic and non-strategic weapons; and close
consultations with allies and partners. The United States will continue to
ensure that, in the calculations of any potential opponent, the perceived gains
of attacking the United States or its allies and partners would be far
outweighed by the unacceptable costs of the response.
;
(B)Second, implementation of the
Stockpile Stewardship Program and the nuclear infrastructure investments
recommended in the NPR will allow the United States to shift away from
retaining large numbers of non-deployed warheads as a hedge against technical
or geopolitical surprise, allowing major reductions in the nuclear stockpile.
These investments are essential to facilitating reductions while sustaining
deterrence under New START and beyond.
; and
(C)Third, Russia’s nuclear force will
remain a significant factor in determining how much and how fast we are
prepared to reduce U.S. forces. Because of our improved relations, the need for
strict numerical parity between the two countries is no longer as compelling as
it was during the Cold War. But large disparities in nuclear capabilities could
raise concerns on both sides and among U.S. allies and partners, and may not be
conducive to maintaining a stable, long-term strategic relationship, especially
as nuclear forces are significantly reduced. Therefore, we will place
importance on Russia joining us as we move to lower levels.
.
(3)The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review also stated
that the Administration would conduct follow-on analysis to set goals
for future nuclear reductions below the levels expected in New START, while
strengthening deterrence of potential regional adversaries, strategic stability
vis-à-vis Russia and China, and assurance of our allies and
partners.
.
(4)The Secretary of Defense has warned in
testimony before the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives regarding the sequestration mechanism under section 251A of the
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 that if this
sequester goes into effect and it doubles the number of cuts, then it’ll truly
devastate our national defense, because it will then require that we have to go
at our force structure. We will have to hollow it out … [i]t will badly damage
our capabilities for the future. . . . And if you have a smaller force, you’re
not going to be able to be out there responding in as many areas as we do
now.
.
(5)The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review also stated
that by modernizing our aging nuclear facilities and investing in human
capital, we can substantially reduce the number of nuclear weapons we retain as
a hedge.
.
(6)The President requested the promised
$7,600,000,000 for weapons activities of the National Nuclear Security
Administration in fiscal year 2012 but signed an appropriations Act for fiscal
year 2012 that provided only $7,233,997,000, a substantial reduction to only
the second year of the ten-year plan under section 1251 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111–84; 123 Stat.
2549).
(7)The President requested only $7,577,341,000
for weapons activities of the National Nuclear Security Administration in
fiscal year 2013 while the President’s section 1251 plan promised
$7,900,000,000.
(8)The President’s section 1251 plan further
promised to request $8,400,000,000 in fiscal year 2014, $8,700,000,000 in
fiscal year 2015, $8,900,000,000 in fiscal year 2016, at least $8,900,000,000
in fiscal year 2017, at least $9,200,000,000 in fiscal year 2018, at least
$9,400,000,000 in fiscal year 2019, at least $9,400,000,000 in fiscal year
2020, and at least $9,500,000,000 in fiscal year 2021.
(9)While the administration has not yet shared
with Congress the terms of reference of the so-called Nuclear Posture Review
Implementation Study, or the Department of Defense’s instructions for that
review, the only publicly available statements by the administration, including
language from the Nuclear Posture Review, suggest the review was specifically
instructed by the President and his senior political appointees to only
consider reductions to the nuclear forces of the United States.
(10)When asked at a hearing if the New START
Treaty allowed the United States to maintain a nuclear arsenal that is
more than is needed to guarantee an adequate deterrent,
then Commander
of the United States Strategic Command, General Kevin P. Chilton said, I
do not agree that it is more than is needed. I think the arsenal that we have
is exactly what is needed today to provide the deterrent.
.
(b)Nuclear
employment strategySection
491 of title 10, United States Code, is amended—
(1)by striking
On the date
and inserting (a)
Report.—On the
date
;
(2)by inserting after
subsection (a) the following new subsection (b):
(b)With respect to a new nuclear employment
strategy described in a report submitted to Congress under subsection (a), none
of the funds made available for fiscal year 2012 or any fiscal year thereafter
for the Department of Defense may be used to implement such strategy until a
period of one year has elapsed following the date on which such report is
submitted to Congress.
;
and
(3)in the heading, by
striking reports
on
.
(c)During each of fiscal years 2012 through
2021, none of the funds made available for each such fiscal year for the
Department of Defense may be used to carry out the results of the decisions
made pursuant to the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Study until the
date on which the President certifies to the congressional defense committees
that—
(1)the President has included the resources
necessary to carry out the February 2011 update to the report required under
section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010
(Public Law 111–84; 123 Stat. 2549) in the budget of the President submitted to
Congress under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, for such fiscal
year;
(2)the resources
described in paragraph (1) have been provided to the President in an
appropriations Act; and
(3)the sequestration
mechanism under section 251A of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act of 1985 has been repealed or the sequestration mechanism under such
section for the security category has otherwise been terminated.
6.Limitation on
strategic delivery system reductions
(a)Congress finds the following:
(1)The Nuclear Posture Review of 2010 said,
with respect to modernizing the triad, for planned reductions under New
START, the United States should retain a smaller Triad of SLBMs, ICBMs, and
heavy bombers. Retaining all three Triad legs will best maintain strategic
stability at reasonable cost, while hedging against potential technical
problems or vulnerabilities.
.
(2)The Senate stated in Declaration 13 of the
Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the New START Treaty that
In accordance with paragraph 1 of Article V of the New START Treaty,
which states that, ‘Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and
replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out,’ it is the sense of
the Senate that United States deterrence and flexibility is assured by a robust
triad of strategic delivery vehicles. To this end, the United States is
committed to accomplishing the modernization and replacement of its strategic
nuclear delivery vehicles, and to ensuring the continued flexibility of United
States conventional and nuclear delivery systems.
.
(3)The Senate required the President, prior to
the entry into force of the New START Treaty, to certify to the Senate that the
President intended to modernize or replace the triad of strategic nuclear
delivery systems.
(4)The President made this certification in a
message to the Senate on February 2, 2011, in which the President stated,
I intend to (a) modernize or replace the triad of strategic nuclear
delivery systems: a heavy bomber and air-launched cruise missile, an ICBM, and
a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and SLBM; and (b) maintain
the United States rocket motor industrial base.
.
(b)
(1)Part I of subtitle A
of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following
new chapter:
24
Sec.
491. Strategic delivery system reductions.
491.Strategic
delivery system reductions
(a)Beginning
fiscal year 2013, the President shall annually certify in writing to the
congressional defense committees whether plans to modernize or replace
strategic delivery systems are fully resourced and being executed at a level
equal to or more than the levels set forth in the November 2010 update to the
plan referred to in section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111–84; 123 Stat. 2549), including plans
regarding—
(1)a heavy bomber and
air-launched cruise missile;
(2)an intercontinental ballistic
missile;
(3)a submarine-launched ballistic
missile;
(4)a ballistic missile submarine; and
(5)maintaining—
(A)the nuclear
command and control system; and
(B)the rocket motor
industrial base of the United States.
(b)If the President certifies under subsection
(a) that plans to modernize or replace strategic delivery systems are not fully
resourced or being executed, none of the funds made available for fiscal year
2012 or any fiscal year thereafter for the Department of Defense may be used to
reduce, convert, or eliminate strategic delivery systems, whether deployed or
nondeployed, pursuant to the New START Treaty or otherwise until a period of
120 days has elapsed following the date on which such certification is
made.
(c)The limitation in subsection (b) shall not
apply to—
(1)reductions made to
ensure the safety, security, reliability, and credibility of the nuclear
weapons stockpile and strategic delivery systems, including activities related
to surveillance, assessment, certification, testing, and maintenance of nuclear
warheads and delivery systems; or
(2)strategic delivery systems that are retired
or awaiting dismantlement on the date of the certification under subsection
(a).
(d)In
this section:
(1)The term New
START Treaty means the Treaty between the United States of America and
the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms, signed on April 8, 2010, and entered into force on
February 5, 2011.
(2)The term strategic delivery
system means a delivery platform for nuclear
weapons.
.
(2)
(A)The table of chapters at the beginning of subtitle A of
title 10, United States Code, and at the beginning of part I of such subtitle,
are each amended by inserting after the item relating to chapter 23 the
following new item:
24.
Nuclear
posture491
.
(B)Chapter 23 of title 10,
United States Code, is amended as follows:
(i)Section 490a is
transferred to chapter 24, inserted after section 491, and redesignated as
section 492.
(ii)Section 491, as
amended by section 5(b), is transferred to chapter 24, inserted after section
492, and redesignated as section 493.
(iii)The table of sections at the beginning of
such chapter is amended by striking the items relating to sections 490a and
491.
(C)The table of sections at
the beginning of chapter 24 of title 10, United States Code, as added by
paragraph (1), is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 491
the following:
492. Biennial assessment and report on the
delivery platforms for nuclear weapons and the nuclear command and control
system.
493. Nuclear employment strategy of the
United States: modification of
strategy.
.
(3)Section 1041(b) of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112–81;
125 Stat. 1574) is amended by striking section 490a of title 10, United
States Code, as added by subsection (a),
and inserting section
492 of title 10, United States Code,
.
7.Prevention of
asymmetry of nuclear weapon stockpile reductions
(a)Congress finds the following:
(1)Then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
warned in 2008 that, There is no way to ignore efforts by rogue states
such as North Korea and Iran to develop and deploy nuclear weapons or Russian
or Chinese strategic modernization programs. To be sure, we do not consider
Russia or China as adversaries, but we cannot ignore these developments and the
implications they have for our national security.
.
(2)The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review stated
that, large disparities in nuclear capabilities could raise concerns on
both sides and among U.S. allies and partners, and may not be conducive to
maintaining a stable, long-term strategic relationship, especially as nuclear
forces are significantly reduced.
.
(3)The Senate stated in the Resolution of
Advice and Consent to Ratification of the New START Treaty that, It is
the sense of the Senate that, in conducting the reductions mandated by the New
START Treaty, the President should regulate reductions in United States
strategic offensive arms so that the number of accountable strategic offensive
arms under the New START Treaty possessed by the Russian Federation in no case
exceeds the comparable number of accountable strategic offensive arms possessed
by the United States to such an extent that a strategic imbalance endangers the
national security interests of the United States.
.
(4)At a hearing before the Committee on Armed
Services of the House of Representatives in 2011, Secretary of Defense Leon
Panetta said, with respect to unilateral nuclear reductions by the United
States, I don’t think we ought to do that unilaterally—we ought to do
that on the basis of negotiations with the Russians and others to make sure we
are all walking the same path.
.
(b)Section 1045 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (50 U.S.C. 2523b) is amended by adding
at the end the following new subsection:
(d)Prevention of
asymmetry in reductions
(1)During any year in which the President
recommends to reduce the number of nuclear weapons in the active and inactive
stockpiles of the United States by a number that is greater than one percent of
the number of nuclear weapons in such stockpiles, the President shall certify
in writing to the congressional defense committees whether such reductions will
cause the number of nuclear weapons in such stockpiles to be fewer than the
number of nuclear weapons in the active and inactive stockpiles of the Russian
Federation.
(2)If the President certifies under paragraph
(1) that the recommended number of nuclear weapons in the active and inactive
stockpiles of the United States is fewer than the number of nuclear weapons in
the active and inactive stockpiles of the Russian Federation, none of the funds
made available for fiscal year 2012 or any fiscal year thereafter for the
Department of Defense or the National Nuclear Security Administration may be
used to carry out any reduction to such stockpiles of the United States
until—
(A)after the date on which such certification
is made, the President transmits to the congressional defense committees a
report by the Commander of the United States Strategic Command, without change,
detailing whether the recommended reduction would create a strategic imbalance
between the total nuclear forces of the United States and the total nuclear
forces of the Russian Federation; and
(B)a period of 180
days has elapsed following the date on which such report is transmitted.
(3)The limitation in paragraph (2) shall not
apply to—
(A)reductions made to ensure the safety,
security, reliability, and credibility of the nuclear weapons stockpile and
strategic delivery systems, including activities related to surveillance,
assessment, certification, testing, and maintenance of nuclear warheads and
strategic delivery systems; or
(B)nuclear warheads that are retired or
awaiting dismantlement on the date of the certification under paragraph
(1).
.
8.Consideration of
expansion of nuclear forces of other countries
(a)Congress finds the following:
(1)The Resolution of Advice and Consent to
Ratification of the New START Treaty of the Senate said, It is the sense
of the Senate that if, during the time the New START Treaty remains in force,
the President determines that there has been an expansion of the strategic
arsenal of any country not party to the New START Treaty so as to jeopardize
the supreme interests of the United States, then the President should consult
on an urgent basis with the Senate to determine whether adherence to the New
START Treaty remains in the national interest of the United
States.
.
(2)In 2011, experts testified before the
Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives that—
(A)Russia is
modernizing every leg of its nuclear triad with new, more advanced
systems
, including new ballistic missile submarines, new heavy
intercontinental ballistic missiles carrying up to 15 warheads each, new
shorter range ballistic missiles, and new low-yield warheads; and
(B)China is
steadily increasing the numbers and capabilities of the ballistic missiles it
deploys and is upgrading older ICBMs to newer, more advanced systems. China
also appears to be actively working to develop a submarine-based nuclear
deterrent force, something it has never had. . . . A recent unclassified
Department of Defense report says that this network of tunnels could be in
excess of 5,000 kilometers and is used to transport nuclear weapons and
forces.
.
(b)
(1)Chapter 24 of title 10, United States Code, as added by
section 6(b)(1), is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
494.Consideration
of expansion of nuclear forces of other countries
(a)During any year
in which the President recommends any reductions in the nuclear forces of the
United States, none of the funds made available for fiscal year 2012 or any
fiscal year thereafter for the Department of Defense or the National Nuclear
Security Administration may be used for such recommended reduction until the
date on which—
(1)the President transmits to the
congressional defense committees a report detailing, for each country with
nuclear weapons—
(A)the number of each
type of nuclear weapons possessed by such country;
(B)the modernization
plans for such weapons of such country;
(C)the production
capacity of nuclear warheads and strategic delivery systems (as defined in
section 491(c) of this title) of such country; and
(D)the nuclear
doctrine of such country; and
(2)the Commander of the United States
Strategic Command certifies to the congressional defense committees whether
such recommended reductions in the nuclear forces of the United States
will—
(A)impair the ability of the United States to
address—
(i)unplanned
strategic or geopolitical events; or
(ii)technical
challenge; or
(B)degrade the
deterrence or assurance provided by the United States to friends and allies of
the United States.
(b)The reports required by subsection (a)(1)
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
.
(2)The table of sections at the beginning of
chapter 24 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the
item relating to section 493 the following:
494. Consideration of expansion of nuclear
forces of other
countries.
.
9.Chemistry and
Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility and Uranium Processing
Facility
(a)Congress finds the following:
(1)Administrator for Nuclear Security Thomas
D’Agostino testified before the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives in February 2008 that Infrastructure improvements are a
major part of the complex transformation plan that we have, and we've made
important progress, but we have a lot more to do. Some major facilities that we
have date back to World War II and cannot readily meet today's safety and
security requirements. Let me give you just two quick examples, if I could. A
sufficient capability to work with plutonium is an essential part of a national
security enterprise and is required for as long as we retain a nuclear
deterrent, and most likely even longer. Currently, we have a very small
production capacity at Los Alamos, about 10 pits per year, at our TA–55 area.
Our building at Los Alamos, the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility, is
well over 50 years old and is insufficient to support the national security
requirements for the stockpile and for future national security mission areas.
So, whether we continue on our existing path or move towards a replacement
modern warhead-type stockpile, we still need the capacity to produce about 50
to 80 pits per year, which is less than one-tenth of our Cold War level, as
well as the ability to carry out pit surveillance, which is an essential part
of maintaining our stockpile.
.
(2)Then Commander of the United States
Strategic Command General Kevin P. Chilton also testified in February 2008 that
When you have a responsive complex that has the capacity to flex to
production as you may need it or adjust your deployed force posture in the
future, should you need it—in other words, if we go to a lower number, you need
to be certain that you can come back up, should the strategic environment
change, and you can't necessarily without that flexible or responsive
infrastructure behind it, and that's probably one of my great concerns. And
then how you posture both the portion of your stockpile that you hold in
reserve and your confidence in the weapons that you have deployed is very much
a function of modernizing, in my view, the weapons systems that we have
available today, which are, as the secretary described, of Cold War legacy
design, and the associated issues with them.
.
(3)The Congressional Commission on the
Strategic Posture of the United States reported in May 2009, with respect to
the timing of the replacement of the nuclear weapons infrastructure of the
United States, that This raises an obvious question about whether these
two replacement programs might proceed in sequence rather than concurrently.
There are strong arguments for moving forward concurrently. Existing facilities
are genuinely decrepit and are maintained in a safe and secure manner only at
high cost. Moreover, the improved production capabilities they promise are
integral to the program of refurbishment and modernization described in the
preceding chapter. If funding can be found for both, this would best serve the
national interest in maintaining a safe, secure, and reliable stockpile of
weapons in the most effective and efficient manner.
.
(4)The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review
states—
(A)The
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), in close coordination with
DoD, will provide a new stockpile stewardship and management plan to Congress
within 90 days, consistent with the increases in infrastructure investment
requested in the President’s FY 2011 budget. As critical infrastructure is
restored and modernized, it will allow the United States to begin to shift away
from retaining large numbers of non-deployed warheads as a technical hedge,
allowing additional reductions in the U.S. stockpile of non-deployed nuclear
weapons over time.
;
(B)In order to sustain a safe, secure,
and effective U.S. nuclear stockpile as long as nuclear weapons exist, the
United States must possess a modern physical infrastructure—comprised of the
national security laboratories and a complex of supporting
facilities.
;
(C)Funding the
Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Project at Los Alamos National
Laboratory to replace the existing 50-year old Chemistry and Metallurgy
Research facility in 2021.
;
(D)Developing
a new Uranium Processing Facility at the Y–12 Plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee to
come on line for production operations in 2021.
;
(E)Without an
ability to produce uranium components, any plan to sustain the stockpile, as
well as support for our Navy nuclear propulsion, will come to a halt. This
would have a significant impact, not just on the weapons program, but in
dealing with nuclear dangers of many kinds.
; and
(F)The non-deployed stockpile currently
includes more warheads than required for the above purposes, due to the limited
capacity of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) complex to
conduct LEPs for deployed weapons in a timely manner. Progress in restoring
NNSA’s production infrastructure will allow these excess warheads to be retired
along with other stockpile reductions planned over the next
decade.
.
(5)In the memorandum of agreement between the
Department of Defense and the Department of Energy concerning the modernization
of the nuclear weapon stockpile of the United States dated May 3, 2010, then
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Secretary of Energy Steven Chu agreed
that DOE Agrees to . . . increase pit production capacity . . . plan and
program to ramp up to a minimum of 50–80 PPY in 2022.
.
(6)The plan required under section 1251 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111–84; 123
Stat. 2549) submitted by the President states that the Chemistry and Metallurgy
Research Replacement building and the Uranium Processing Facility will complete
construction by 2021 and will achieve full operational functionality by
2024.
(7)The Senate required that, prior to the
entry into force of the New START Treaty, the President certifies to the Senate
that the President intends to—
(A)accelerate to the extent possible the
design and engineering phase of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research
Replacement building and the Uranium Processing Facility; and
(B)request full funding, including on a
multiyear basis as appropriate, for the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research
Replacement building and the Uranium Processing Facility upon completion of the
design and engineering phase for such facilities.
(8)The President did request full funding for
such facilities on February 2, 2011, when the President stated, I intend
to (a) accelerate, to the extent possible, the design and engineering phase of
the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) building and the
Uranium Processing Facility (UPF); and (b) request full funding, including on a
multi-year basis as appropriate, for the CMRR building and the UPF upon
completion of the design and engineering phase for such
facilities.
.
(b)Section 1045 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (50 U.S.C. 2523b) is further amended by
adding at the end the following new subsection:
(e)
(1)Beginning
fiscal year 2013, the President shall annually certify in writing to the
congressional defense committees whether—
(A)the construction
of both the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement building and the
Uranium Processing Facility will be completed by not later than 2021;
and
(B)both facilities will be fully operational
by not later than 2024.
(2)If the President certifies under paragraph
(1) that the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement building and the
Uranium Processing Facility will be completed by later than 2021 or be fully
operational by later than 2024, none of the funds made available for fiscal
year 2012 or any fiscal year thereafter for the National Nuclear Security
Administration may be used to reduce the nondeployed nuclear warheads in the
nuclear weapons stockpile of the United States until a period of 120 days has
elapsed following the date of such certification.
(3)The limitation in paragraph (2) shall not
apply to—
(A)reductions made to ensure the safety,
security, reliability, and credibility of the nuclear weapons stockpile and
delivery systems, including activities related to surveillance, assessment,
certification, testing, and maintenance of nuclear warheads and strategic
delivery systems; or
(B)nuclear warheads
that are retired or awaiting dismantlement on the date of the certification
under paragraph (1).
(4)The requirement in paragraph (1) shall
terminate on the date on which the President certifies in writing to the
congressional defense committees that the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research
Replacement building and the Uranium Processing Facility are both fully
operational.
.
10.Nuclear warheads
on intercontinental ballistic missiles of the United States
(a)It is the sense of
Congress that reducing the number of nuclear warheads contained on each
intercontinental ballistic missile of the United States does not promote
strategic stability if at the same time other nuclear weapons states, including
the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, are rapidly
increasing the warhead-loading of their land-based missile forces.
(b)
(1)Chapter 24 of title 10, United States Code, as added by
section 6(b)(1), is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
495.Nuclear
warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles of the United States
(a)During any year in
which the President proposes to reduce the number of nuclear warheads contained
on an intercontinental ballistic missile of the United States, none of the
funds made available for fiscal year 2012 or any fiscal year thereafter for the
Department of Defense or the National Nuclear Security Administration may be
used for such proposed reduction if the reduction results in such missile
having only a single nuclear warhead unless the President certifies in writing
to the congressional defense committees that the Russian Federation and the
People’s Republic of China are both also carrying out a similar
reduction.
(b)The limitation in subsection (a) shall not
apply to reductions made to ensure the safety, security, reliability, and
credibility of the nuclear weapons stockpile and delivery systems, including
activities related to surveillance, assessment, certification, testing, and
maintenance of nuclear warheads and strategic delivery
systems.
.
(2)The table of sections at the beginning of
chapter 24 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the
item relating to section 494 the following:
495. Nuclear warheads on intercontinental
ballistic missiles of the United
States.
.
11.Nonstrategic
nuclear weapon reductions and extended deterrence policy
(a)Congress
finds the following:
(1)The NATO Strategic Concept of 2010 endorsed
the continued role of nuclear weapons in the security of the NATO alliance,
stating—
(A)The supreme guarantee of the
security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the
Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent strategic
nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of
their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the
Allies.
;
(B)We will ensure that NATO has the
full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to
the safety and security of our populations. Therefore, we will … maintain an
appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces
; and
(C)[NATO will] ensure the broadest
possible participation of Allies in collective defence planning on nuclear
roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces, and in command, control and
consultation arrangements.
.
(2)However, the 2010 Strategic Concept also
walked away from the decades-long policy encapsulated by the 1999 Strategic
Concept that said, The presence of United States conventional and
nuclear forces in Europe remains vital to the security of Europe, which is
inseparably linked to that of North America.
.
(3)Former Secretary of Defense William Perry
said in March 2011 testimony before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces of the
Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives that the
reason we have nuclear weapons in Europe in the first place, is not because the
rest of our weapons are not capable of deterrence, but because, during the Cold
War at least, our allies in Europe felt more assured when we had nuclear
weapons in Europe. That is why they were deployed there in the first place.
Today the issue is a little different. The issue is the Russians in the
meantime have built a large number of nuclear weapons, and we keep our nuclear
weapons there as somewhat of a political leverage for dealing with an ultimate
treaty in which we may get Russia and the United States to eliminate tactical
nuclear weapons. My own view is it would be desirable if both the United States
and Russia would eliminate tactical nuclear weapons, but I see it as very
difficult to arrive at that conclusion if we were to simply eliminate all of
our tactical nuclear weapons unilaterally.
.
(4)During testimony before the Subcommittee on
Strategic Forces of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives in July 2011—
(A)former Department of Defense official Frank
Miller stated, as long as U.S. allies believe that those weapons need to
be there, we need to make sure that we provide that security.
;
and
(B)former Department of Defense official Mort
Halperin stated, I do not think we should be willing to trade our
withdrawal of our nuclear weapons from Europe for some reduction, even a
substantial reduction, in Russian tactical nuclear weapons because if it is . .
. that the credibility of the American nuclear deterrent for our NATO allies
depends on the presence of nuclear weapons in Europe, that will not change if
the Russians cut their tactical nuclear arsenal by two thirds, or even
eliminate it because they will still have their strategic weapons, which, while
they can't have intermediate range missiles, they can find a way to target them
on the NATO countries.
.
(5)Section 1237(b) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112–81) expressed the sense
of Congress that—
(A)the commitment of the United States to
extended deterrence in Europe and the nuclear alliance of NATO is an important
component of ensuring and linking the national security of the United States
and its European allies;
(B)the nuclear forces of the United States are
a key component of the NATO nuclear alliance; and
(C)the presence of the nuclear weapons of the
United States in Europe—combined with NATO's unique nuclear sharing
arrangements under which non-nuclear members participate in nuclear planning
and possess specially configured aircraft capable of delivering nuclear
weapons—provides reassurance to NATO allies who feel exposed to regional
threats.
(b)Chapter 24 of title 10, United States Code,
as added by section 6(b)(1), is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
496.Limitation on
reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal of nuclear forces based in
Europe
(a)Policy on
nonstrategic nuclear weaponsIt is the policy of the United
States—
(1)to pursue negotiations with the Russian
Federation aimed at the reduction of Russian deployed and nondeployed,
nonstrategic nuclear forces;
(2)that nonstrategic nuclear weapons should be
considered when weighing the balance of the nuclear forces of the United States
and the Russian Federation;
(3)that any geographical relocation or storage
of nonstrategic nuclear weapons by the Russian Federation does not constitute a
reduction or elimination of such weapons;
(4)the vast advantage of the Russian
Federation in nonstrategic nuclear weapons constitutes a threat to the United
States and its allies and a growing asymmetry in Western Europe; and
(5)the forward-deployed nuclear forces of the
United States are an important contributor to the assurance of the allies of
the United States and constitute a check on proliferation and a tool in dealing
with neighboring states hostile to NATO.
(b)Policy on
extended deterrence commitment to EuropeIt is the policy of the United States
that—
(1)it maintain its commitment to extended
deterrence, specifically the nuclear alliance of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, as an important component of ensuring and linking the national
security interests of the United States and the security of its European
allies;
(2)forward-deployed nuclear forces of the
United States shall remain based in Europe in support of the nuclear policy and
posture of NATO;
(3)the presence of nuclear weapons of the
United States in Europe—combined with NATO’s unique nuclear sharing
arrangements under which non-nuclear members participate in nuclear planning
and possess specially configured aircraft capable of delivering nuclear
weapons—contributes to the cohesion of NATO and provides reassurance to allies
and partners who feel exposed to regional threats; and
(4)only the President and Congress can
articulate when and how the United States will employ the nuclear forces of the
United States and no multilateral organization, not even NATO, can articulate a
declaratory policy concerning the use of nuclear weapons that binds the United
States.
(c)Limitation on
reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal of nuclear forces based in
EuropeIn light of the policy
expressed in subsections (a) and (b), none of the funds made available for
fiscal year 2012 or any fiscal year thereafter for the Department of Defense
may be used to effect or implement the reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal
of nuclear forces of the United States that are based in Europe unless—
(1)the reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal
of such nuclear forces is requested by the government of the host nation in the
manner provided in the agreement between the United States and the host nation
regarding the forces;
(2)the President certifies that—
(A)NATO member states have considered the
reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal in the High Level Group;
(B)NATO has decided
to support such reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal;
(C)the remaining nuclear forces of the United
States that are based in Europe after such reduction, consolidation, or
withdrawal would provide a commensurate or better level of assurance and
credibility as before such reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal; and
(D)there has been reciprocal action by the
Russian Federation, not including the Russian Federation relocating nuclear
forces from one location to another; or
(3)the reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal
of such nuclear forces is specifically authorized by an Act of Congress.
(d)Upon any decision to reduce, consolidate,
or withdraw the nuclear forces of the United States that are based in Europe,
the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
notification containing—
(1)the certification required by paragraph (2)
of subsection (c) if such reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal is based upon
such paragraph;
(2)justification for such reduction,
consolidation, or withdrawal; and
(3)an assessment of how NATO member states, in
light of such reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal, assess the credibility
of the deterrence capability of the United States in support of its commitments
undertaken pursuant to article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at
Washington, District of Columbia, on April 4, 1949, and entered into force on
August 24, 1949 (63 Stat. 2241; TIAS 1964).
(e)Notice and wait
requirementThe President may
not commence a reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal of the nuclear forces of
the United States that are based in Europe for which the certification required
by subsection (c)(2) is made until the expiration of a 180-day period beginning
on the date on which the President submits the notification under subsection
(d) containing the certification.
(f)Appropriate
Congressional CommitteesIn this section, the term
appropriate congressional committees means—
(1)the Committees on
Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate; and
(2)the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the
Senate.
.
(c)The table of
sections at the beginning of chapter 24 of title 10, United States Code, is
amended by inserting after the item relating to section 495 the
following:
496. Limitation on reduction,
consolidation, or withdrawal of nuclear forces based in
Europe.
.