[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4178 Introduced in House (IH)]
112th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 4178
To strengthen the strategic force posture of the United States by
ensuring the safety, security, reliability, and credibility of the
nuclear weapons stockpile.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
March 8, 2012
Mr. Turner of Ohio (for himself, Mr. Brooks, Mr. Lamborn, Mr. Franks of
Arizona, Mr. Forbes, Mr. Fleming, Mr. Rehberg, and Mr. Miller of
Florida) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the
Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the
Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall
within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To strengthen the strategic force posture of the United States by
ensuring the safety, security, reliability, and credibility of the
nuclear weapons stockpile.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Maintaining the
President's Commitment to Our Nuclear Deterrent and National Security
Act of 2012''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
Sec. 3. Commitments for nuclear weapons stockpile modernization.
Sec. 4. Limitation and report in the event of insufficient funding for
modernization of nuclear weapons stockpile.
Sec. 5. Progress of modernization.
Sec. 6. Limitation on strategic delivery system reductions.
Sec. 7. Prevention of asymmetry of nuclear weapon stockpile reductions.
Sec. 8. Consideration of expansion of nuclear forces of other
countries.
Sec. 9. Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility
and Uranium Processing Facility.
Sec. 10. Nuclear warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles of the
United States.
Sec. 11. Nonstrategic nuclear weapon reductions and extended deterrence
policy.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) The term ``congressional defense committees'' has the
meaning given that term in section 101(a)(16) of title 10,
United States Code.
(2) The term ``New START Treaty'' means the Treaty between
the United States of America and the Russian Federation on
Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms, signed on April 8, 2010, and entered into force
on February 5, 2011.
SEC. 3. COMMITMENTS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE MODERNIZATION.
Congress finds the following:
(1) In 2008, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned
that ``to be blunt, there is absolutely no way we can maintain
a credible deterrent and reduce the number of weapons in our
stockpile without either resorting to testing our stockpile or
pursuing a modernization program.''.
(2) Secretary Gates also warned in September 2009 that
modernization is a prerequisite to nuclear force reductions,
stating that modernizing the nuclear capability of the United
States is an ``enabler of arms control and our ability to
reduce the size of our nuclear stockpile. When we have more
confidence in the long-term viability of our weapons systems,
then our ability to reduce the number of weapons we must keep
in the stockpile is enhanced.''.
(3) President Obama's 2010 Nuclear Posture Review stated
that--
(A) ``In order to sustain a safe, secure, and
effective U.S. nuclear stockpile as long as nuclear
weapons exist, the United States must possess a modern
physical infrastructure--comprised of the national
security laboratories and a complex of supporting
facilities.''; and
(B) ``[I]mplementation of the Stockpile Stewardship
Program and the nuclear infrastructure investments
recommended in the NPR will allow the United States to
shift away from retaining large numbers of non-deployed
warheads as a hedge against technical or geopolitical
surprise, allowing major reductions in the nuclear
stockpile. These investments are essential to
facilitating reductions while sustaining deterrence
under New START and beyond.''.
(4) Section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-84; 123 Stat. 2549)
required the President to submit a report to Congress on the
plan for the nuclear weapons stockpile, nuclear weapons
complex, and delivery platforms at the time a follow-on treaty
to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty was submitted by the
President to the Senate. The President submitted such report in
May 2010 and submitted updates in November 2010 and February
2011.
(5) Such section 1251 also contained a sense of Congress
that ``the enhanced safety, security, and reliability of the
nuclear weapons stockpile, modernization of the nuclear weapons
complex, and maintenance of nuclear delivery systems are key to
enabling further reductions in the nuclear forces of the United
States.''.
(6) Forty-one Senators wrote to President Obama on December
15, 2009, stating, ``we don't believe further reductions can be
in the national security interest of the U.S. in the absence of
a significant program to modernize our nuclear deterrent.''.
(7) Former Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Energy
James Schlesinger stated, while testifying before the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate in April 2010, ``I believe
that it is immensely important for the Senate to ensure, what
the Administration has stated as its intent, i.e., that there
be a robust plan with a continuation of its support over the
full 10 years, before it proceeds to ratify this START follow-
on treaty.''.
(8) Former Secretary of State James Baker stated in
testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate in May 2010 that ``because our security is based upon
the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons, it is
important that our Government budget enough money to guarantee
that those weapons can carry out their mission.''.
(9) Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger also stated
in May 2010 while testifying before the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate that ``as part of a number of
recommendations, my colleagues, Bill Perry, George Shultz, Sam
Nunn, and I have called for significant investments in a
repaired and modernized nuclear weapons infrastructure and
added resources for the three national laboratories.''.
(10) Then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, while
testifying before the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate
in June 2010, stated, ``I see this treaty as a vehicle to
finally be able to get what we need in the way of modernization
that we have been unable to get otherwise. . . . We are
essentially the only nuclear power in the world that is not
carrying out these kinds of modernization programs.''.
(11) Secretary Gates further stated that ``I've been up
here for the last four springs trying to get money for this and
this is the first time I think I've got a fair shot of actually
getting money for our nuclear arsenal.''.
(12) The Directors of the national nuclear weapons
laboratories wrote to the chairman and ranking member of the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate in December 2010
that ``We are very pleased by the update to the Section 1251
Report, as it would enable the laboratories to execute our
requirements for ensuring a safe, secure, reliable and
effective stockpile under the Stockpile Stewardship and
Management Plan. In particular, we are pleased because it
clearly responds to many of the concerns that we and others
have voiced in the past about potential future-year funding
shortfalls, and it substantially reduces risks to the overall
program. In summary, we believe that the proposed budgets
provide adequate support to sustain the safety, security,
reliability and effectiveness of America's nuclear deterrent
within the limit of 1,550 deployed strategic warheads
established by the New START Treaty with adequate confidence
and acceptable risk.''.
(13) President Obama pledged, in a December 2010 letter to
several Senators, ``I recognize that nuclear modernization
requires investment for the long-term. . . . That is my
commitment to the Congress--that my Administration will pursue
these programs and capabilities for as long as I am
President.''.
(14) Secretary Gates added in May 2011 that, ``this
modernization program was very carefully worked out between
ourselves and the Department of Energy; and, frankly, where we
came out on that played a fairly significant role in the
willingness of the Senate to ratify the New START agreement.''.
(15) The Administrator for Nuclear Security, Thomas
D'Agostino, testified before Congress in November 2011 that,
``it is critical to accept the linkage between modernizing our
current stockpile in order to achieve the policy objective of
decreasing the number of weapons we have in our stockpile,
while still ensuring that the deterrent is safe, secure, and
effective.''.
SEC. 4. LIMITATION AND REPORT IN THE EVENT OF INSUFFICIENT FUNDING FOR
MODERNIZATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) consistent with Condition 9 of the Resolution of Advice
and Consent to Ratification of the New START Treaty of the
Senate, agreed to on December 22, 2011, the United States is
committed to ensuring the safety, security, reliability, and
credibility of its nuclear forces; and
(2) the United States is committed to--
(A) proceeding with a robust stockpile stewardship
program and maintaining and modernizing nuclear weapons
production capabilities and capacities of the United
States to ensure the safety, security, reliability, and
credibility of the nuclear arsenal of the United States
at the New START Treaty levels and meeting requirements
for hedging against possible international developments
or technical problems;
(B) reinvigorating and sustaining the nuclear
security laboratories of the United States and
preserving the core nuclear weapons competencies
therein; and
(C) providing the resources needed to achieve these
objectives, at a minimum at the levels set forth in the
President's 10-year plan provided to Congress in
November 2010 pursuant to section 1251 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public
Law 111-84; 123 Stat. 2549).
(b) Insufficient Funding Report and Limitation.--
(1) In general.--Paragraph (2) of section 1045(a) of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (50
U.S.C. 2523b) is amended to read as follows:
``(2) Insufficient funding.--
``(A) Report.--During each year in which the New
START Treaty is in force, if the President determines
that an appropriations Act is enacted that fails to
meet the resource levels set forth in the November 2010
update to the plan referred to in section 1251 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010
(Public Law 111-84; 123 Stat. 2549) or if at any time
determines that more resources are required to carry
out such plan than were estimated, the President shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees,
within 60 days of making such a determination, a report
detailing--
``(i) a plan to remedy the resource
shortfall;
``(ii) if more resources are required to
carry out the plan than were estimated--
``(I) the proposed level of funding
required; and
``(II) an identification of the
stockpile work, campaign, facility,
site, asset, program, operation,
activity, construction, or project for
which additional funds are required;
``(iii) any effects caused by the shortfall
on the safety, security, reliability, or
credibility of the nuclear forces of the United
States; and
``(iv) whether and why, in light of the
shortfall, remaining a party to the New START
Treaty is in the national interest of the
United States.
``(B) Limitation.--If the President submits a
report under subparagraph (A), none of the funds made
available for fiscal year 2012 or any fiscal year
thereafter for the Department of Defense or the
National Nuclear Security Administration may be used to
reduce the number of deployed nuclear warheads until--
``(i) after the date on which such report
is submitted, the President certifies in
writing to the appropriate congressional
committees that the resource shortfall
identified in such report has been addressed;
and
``(ii) a period of 120 days has elapsed
following the date on which such certification
is made.
``(C) Exception.--The limitation in subparagraph
(B) shall not apply to--
``(i) reductions made to ensure the safety,
security, reliability, and credibility of the
nuclear weapons stockpile and strategic
delivery systems, including activities related
to surveillance, assessment, certification,
testing, and maintenance of nuclear warheads
and strategic delivery systems; or
``(ii) nuclear warheads that are retired or
awaiting dismantlement on the date of the
report under subparagraph (A).
``(D) Definitions.--In this paragraph:
``(i) The term `appropriate congressional
committees' means--
``(I) the congressional defense
committees; and
``(II) the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate and the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
House of Representatives.
``(ii) The term `New START Treaty' means
the Treaty between the United States of America
and the Russian Federation on Measures for the
Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms, signed on April 8, 2010, and
entered into force on February 5, 2011.''.
(2) Effective date.--The amendment made by paragraph (1)
shall take effect on October 1, 2012.
SEC. 5. PROGRESS OF MODERNIZATION.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) In 2008, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned
that ``to be blunt, there is absolutely no way we can maintain
a credible deterrent and reduce the number of weapons in our
stockpile without either resorting to testing our stockpile or
pursuing a modernization program.''.
(2) The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review stated that ``the
President has directed a review of post-New START arms control
objectives, to consider future reductions in nuclear weapons.
Several factors will influence the magnitude and pace of future
reductions in U.S. nuclear forces below New START levels'',
including--
(A) ``First, any future nuclear reductions must
continue to strengthen deterrence of potential regional
adversaries, strategic stability vis-a-vis Russia and
China, and assurance of our allies and partners. This
will require an updated assessment of deterrence
requirements; further improvements in U.S., allied, and
partner non-nuclear capabilities; focused reductions in
strategic and non-strategic weapons; and close
consultations with allies and partners. The United
States will continue to ensure that, in the
calculations of any potential opponent, the perceived
gains of attacking the United States or its allies and
partners would be far outweighed by the unacceptable
costs of the response.'';
(B) ``Second, implementation of the Stockpile
Stewardship Program and the nuclear infrastructure
investments recommended in the NPR will allow the
United States to shift away from retaining large
numbers of non-deployed warheads as a hedge against
technical or geopolitical surprise, allowing major
reductions in the nuclear stockpile. These investments
are essential to facilitating reductions while
sustaining deterrence under New START and beyond.'';
and
(C) ``Third, Russia's nuclear force will remain a
significant factor in determining how much and how fast
we are prepared to reduce U.S. forces. Because of our
improved relations, the need for strict numerical
parity between the two countries is no longer as
compelling as it was during the Cold War. But large
disparities in nuclear capabilities could raise
concerns on both sides and among U.S. allies and
partners, and may not be conducive to maintaining a
stable, long-term strategic relationship, especially as
nuclear forces are significantly reduced. Therefore, we
will place importance on Russia joining us as we move
to lower levels.''.
(3) The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review also stated that the
Administration would ``conduct follow-on analysis to set goals
for future nuclear reductions below the levels expected in New
START, while strengthening deterrence of potential regional
adversaries, strategic stability vis-a-vis Russia and China,
and assurance of our allies and partners.''.
(4) The Secretary of Defense has warned in testimony before
the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives
regarding the sequestration mechanism under section 251A of the
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 that
``if this sequester goes into effect and it doubles the number
of cuts, then it'll truly devastate our national defense,
because it will then require that we have to go at our force
structure. We will have to hollow it out . . . [i]t will badly
damage our capabilities for the future. . . . And if you have a
smaller force, you're not going to be able to be out there
responding in as many areas as we do now.''.
(5) The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review also stated that ``by
modernizing our aging nuclear facilities and investing in human
capital, we can substantially reduce the number of nuclear
weapons we retain as a hedge.''.
(6) The President requested the promised $7,600,000,000 for
weapons activities of the National Nuclear Security
Administration in fiscal year 2012 but signed an appropriations
Act for fiscal year 2012 that provided only $7,233,997,000, a
substantial reduction to only the second year of the ten-year
plan under section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-84; 123 Stat. 2549).
(7) The President requested only $7,577,341,000 for weapons
activities of the National Nuclear Security Administration in
fiscal year 2013 while the President's section 1251 plan
promised $7,900,000,000.
(8) The President's section 1251 plan further promised to
request $8,400,000,000 in fiscal year 2014, $8,700,000,000 in
fiscal year 2015, $8,900,000,000 in fiscal year 2016, at least
$8,900,000,000 in fiscal year 2017, at least $9,200,000,000 in
fiscal year 2018, at least $9,400,000,000 in fiscal year 2019,
at least $9,400,000,000 in fiscal year 2020, and at least
$9,500,000,000 in fiscal year 2021.
(9) While the administration has not yet shared with
Congress the terms of reference of the so-called Nuclear
Posture Review Implementation Study, or the Department of
Defense's instructions for that review, the only publicly
available statements by the administration, including language
from the Nuclear Posture Review, suggest the review was
specifically instructed by the President and his senior
political appointees to only consider reductions to the nuclear
forces of the United States.
(10) When asked at a hearing if the New START Treaty
allowed the United States ``to maintain a nuclear arsenal that
is more than is needed to guarantee an adequate deterrent,''
then Commander of the United States Strategic Command, General
Kevin P. Chilton said, ``I do not agree that it is more than is
needed. I think the arsenal that we have is exactly what is
needed today to provide the deterrent.''.
(b) Nuclear Employment Strategy.--Section 491 of title 10, United
States Code, is amended--
(1) by striking ``On the date'' and inserting ``(a)
Report.--On the date'';
(2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new
subsection (b):
``(b) Limitation.--With respect to a new nuclear employment
strategy described in a report submitted to Congress under subsection
(a), none of the funds made available for fiscal year 2012 or any
fiscal year thereafter for the Department of Defense may be used to
implement such strategy until a period of one year has elapsed
following the date on which such report is submitted to Congress.'';
and
(3) in the heading, by striking ``reports on''.
(c) Limitation.--During each of fiscal years 2012 through 2021,
none of the funds made available for each such fiscal year for the
Department of Defense may be used to carry out the results of the
decisions made pursuant to the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review
Implementation Study until the date on which the President certifies to
the congressional defense committees that--
(1) the President has included the resources necessary to
carry out the February 2011 update to the report required under
section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-84; 123 Stat. 2549) in the
budget of the President submitted to Congress under section
1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, for such fiscal year;
(2) the resources described in paragraph (1) have been
provided to the President in an appropriations Act; and
(3) the sequestration mechanism under section 251A of the
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 has
been repealed or the sequestration mechanism under such section
for the security category has otherwise been terminated.
SEC. 6. LIMITATION ON STRATEGIC DELIVERY SYSTEM REDUCTIONS.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) The Nuclear Posture Review of 2010 said, with respect
to modernizing the triad, ``for planned reductions under New
START, the United States should retain a smaller Triad of
SLBMs, ICBMs, and heavy bombers. Retaining all three Triad legs
will best maintain strategic stability at reasonable cost,
while hedging against potential technical problems or
vulnerabilities.''.
(2) The Senate stated in Declaration 13 of the Resolution
of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the New START Treaty
that ``In accordance with paragraph 1 of Article V of the New
START Treaty, which states that, `Subject to the provisions of
this Treaty, modernization and replacement of strategic
offensive arms may be carried out,' it is the sense of the
Senate that United States deterrence and flexibility is assured
by a robust triad of strategic delivery vehicles. To this end,
the United States is committed to accomplishing the
modernization and replacement of its strategic nuclear delivery
vehicles, and to ensuring the continued flexibility of United
States conventional and nuclear delivery systems.''.
(3) The Senate required the President, prior to the entry
into force of the New START Treaty, to certify to the Senate
that the President intended to modernize or replace the triad
of strategic nuclear delivery systems.
(4) The President made this certification in a message to
the Senate on February 2, 2011, in which the President stated,
``I intend to (a) modernize or replace the triad of strategic
nuclear delivery systems: a heavy bomber and air-launched
cruise missile, an ICBM, and a nuclear-powered ballistic
missile submarine (SSBN) and SLBM; and (b) maintain the United
States rocket motor industrial base.''.
(b) Limitation.--
(1) In general.--Part I of subtitle A of title 10, United
States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new
chapter:
``CHAPTER 24--NUCLEAR POSTURE
``Sec.
``491. Strategic delivery system reductions.
``Sec. 491. Strategic delivery system reductions
``(a) Annual Certification.--Beginning fiscal year 2013, the
President shall annually certify in writing to the congressional
defense committees whether plans to modernize or replace strategic
delivery systems are fully resourced and being executed at a level
equal to or more than the levels set forth in the November 2010 update
to the plan referred to in section 1251 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-84; 123 Stat.
2549), including plans regarding--
``(1) a heavy bomber and air-launched cruise missile;
``(2) an intercontinental ballistic missile;
``(3) a submarine-launched ballistic missile;
``(4) a ballistic missile submarine; and
``(5) maintaining--
``(A) the nuclear command and control system; and
``(B) the rocket motor industrial base of the
United States.
``(b) Limitation.--If the President certifies under subsection (a)
that plans to modernize or replace strategic delivery systems are not
fully resourced or being executed, none of the funds made available for
fiscal year 2012 or any fiscal year thereafter for the Department of
Defense may be used to reduce, convert, or eliminate strategic delivery
systems, whether deployed or nondeployed, pursuant to the New START
Treaty or otherwise until a period of 120 days has elapsed following
the date on which such certification is made.
``(c) Exception.--The limitation in subsection (b) shall not apply
to--
``(1) reductions made to ensure the safety, security,
reliability, and credibility of the nuclear weapons stockpile
and strategic delivery systems, including activities related to
surveillance, assessment, certification, testing, and
maintenance of nuclear warheads and delivery systems; or
``(2) strategic delivery systems that are retired or
awaiting dismantlement on the date of the certification under
subsection (a).
``(d) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) The term `New START Treaty' means the Treaty between
the United States of America and the Russian Federation on
Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms, signed on April 8, 2010, and entered into force
on February 5, 2011.
``(2) The term `strategic delivery system' means a delivery
platform for nuclear weapons.''.
(2) Clerical amendments.--
(A) Table of chapters.--The table of chapters at
the beginning of subtitle A of title 10, United States
Code, and at the beginning of part I of such subtitle,
are each amended by inserting after the item relating
to chapter 23 the following new item:
``24. Nuclear posture....................................... 491''.
(B) Chapter 23.--Chapter 23 of title 10, United
States Code, is amended as follows:
(i) Section 490a is transferred to chapter
24, inserted after section 491, and
redesignated as section 492.
(ii) Section 491, as amended by section
5(b), is transferred to chapter 24, inserted
after section 492, and redesignated as section
493.
(iii) The table of sections at the
beginning of such chapter is amended by
striking the items relating to sections 490a
and 491.
(C) Chapter 24.--The table of sections at the
beginning of chapter 24 of title 10, United States
Code, as added by paragraph (1), is amended by
inserting after the item relating to section 491 the
following:
``492. Biennial assessment and report on the delivery platforms for
nuclear weapons and the nuclear command and
control system.
``493. Nuclear employment strategy of the United States: modification
of strategy.''.
(3) Conforming amendment.--Section 1041(b) of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-
81; 125 Stat. 1574) is amended by striking ``section 490a of
title 10, United States Code, as added by subsection (a),'' and
inserting ``section 492 of title 10, United States Code,''.
SEC. 7. PREVENTION OF ASYMMETRY OF NUCLEAR WEAPON STOCKPILE REDUCTIONS.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) Then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned in 2008
that, ``There is no way to ignore efforts by rogue states such
as North Korea and Iran to develop and deploy nuclear weapons
or Russian or Chinese strategic modernization programs. To be
sure, we do not consider Russia or China as adversaries, but we
cannot ignore these developments and the implications they have
for our national security.''.
(2) The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review stated that, ``large
disparities in nuclear capabilities could raise concerns on
both sides and among U.S. allies and partners, and may not be
conducive to maintaining a stable, long-term strategic
relationship, especially as nuclear forces are significantly
reduced.''.
(3) The Senate stated in the Resolution of Advice and
Consent to Ratification of the New START Treaty that, ``It is
the sense of the Senate that, in conducting the reductions
mandated by the New START Treaty, the President should regulate
reductions in United States strategic offensive arms so that
the number of accountable strategic offensive arms under the
New START Treaty possessed by the Russian Federation in no case
exceeds the comparable number of accountable strategic
offensive arms possessed by the United States to such an extent
that a strategic imbalance endangers the national security
interests of the United States.''.
(4) At a hearing before the Committee on Armed Services of
the House of Representatives in 2011, Secretary of Defense Leon
Panetta said, with respect to unilateral nuclear reductions by
the United States, ``I don't think we ought to do that
unilaterally--we ought to do that on the basis of negotiations
with the Russians and others to make sure we are all walking
the same path.''.
(b) Certification.--Section 1045 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (50 U.S.C. 2523b) is amended by
adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(d) Prevention of Asymmetry in Reductions.--
``(1) Certification.--During any year in which the
President recommends to reduce the number of nuclear weapons in
the active and inactive stockpiles of the United States by a
number that is greater than one percent of the number of
nuclear weapons in such stockpiles, the President shall certify
in writing to the congressional defense committees whether such
reductions will cause the number of nuclear weapons in such
stockpiles to be fewer than the number of nuclear weapons in
the active and inactive stockpiles of the Russian Federation.
``(2) Limitation.--If the President certifies under
paragraph (1) that the recommended number of nuclear weapons in
the active and inactive stockpiles of the United States is
fewer than the number of nuclear weapons in the active and
inactive stockpiles of the Russian Federation, none of the
funds made available for fiscal year 2012 or any fiscal year
thereafter for the Department of Defense or the National
Nuclear Security Administration may be used to carry out any
reduction to such stockpiles of the United States until--
``(A) after the date on which such certification is
made, the President transmits to the congressional
defense committees a report by the Commander of the
United States Strategic Command, without change,
detailing whether the recommended reduction would
create a strategic imbalance between the total nuclear
forces of the United States and the total nuclear
forces of the Russian Federation; and
``(B) a period of 180 days has elapsed following
the date on which such report is transmitted.
``(3) Exception.--The limitation in paragraph (2) shall not
apply to--
``(A) reductions made to ensure the safety,
security, reliability, and credibility of the nuclear
weapons stockpile and strategic delivery systems,
including activities related to surveillance,
assessment, certification, testing, and maintenance of
nuclear warheads and strategic delivery systems; or
``(B) nuclear warheads that are retired or awaiting
dismantlement on the date of the certification under
paragraph (1).''.
SEC. 8. CONSIDERATION OF EXPANSION OF NUCLEAR FORCES OF OTHER
COUNTRIES.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) The Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of
the New START Treaty of the Senate said, ``It is the sense of
the Senate that if, during the time the New START Treaty
remains in force, the President determines that there has been
an expansion of the strategic arsenal of any country not party
to the New START Treaty so as to jeopardize the supreme
interests of the United States, then the President should
consult on an urgent basis with the Senate to determine whether
adherence to the New START Treaty remains in the national
interest of the United States.''.
(2) In 2011, experts testified before the Committee on
Armed Services of the House of Representatives that--
(A) ``Russia is modernizing every leg of its
nuclear triad with new, more advanced systems'',
including new ballistic missile submarines, new heavy
intercontinental ballistic missiles carrying up to 15
warheads each, new shorter range ballistic missiles,
and new low-yield warheads; and
(B) ``China is steadily increasing the numbers and
capabilities of the ballistic missiles it deploys and
is upgrading older ICBMs to newer, more advanced
systems. China also appears to be actively working to
develop a submarine-based nuclear deterrent force,
something it has never had. . . . A recent unclassified
Department of Defense report says that this network of
tunnels could be in excess of 5,000 kilometers and is
used to transport nuclear weapons and forces.''.
(b) Report and Certification.--
(1) In general.--Chapter 24 of title 10, United States
Code, as added by section 6(b)(1), is amended by adding at the
end the following new section:
``Sec. 494. Consideration of expansion of nuclear forces of other
countries
``(a) Report and Certification.--During any year in which the
President recommends any reductions in the nuclear forces of the United
States, none of the funds made available for fiscal year 2012 or any
fiscal year thereafter for the Department of Defense or the National
Nuclear Security Administration may be used for such recommended
reduction until the date on which--
``(1) the President transmits to the congressional defense
committees a report detailing, for each country with nuclear
weapons--
``(A) the number of each type of nuclear weapons
possessed by such country;
``(B) the modernization plans for such weapons of
such country;
``(C) the production capacity of nuclear warheads
and strategic delivery systems (as defined in section
491(c) of this title) of such country; and
``(D) the nuclear doctrine of such country; and
``(2) the Commander of the United States Strategic Command
certifies to the congressional defense committees whether such
recommended reductions in the nuclear forces of the United
States will--
``(A) impair the ability of the United States to
address--
``(i) unplanned strategic or geopolitical
events; or
``(ii) technical challenge; or
``(B) degrade the deterrence or assurance provided
by the United States to friends and allies of the
United States.
``(b) Form.--The reports required by subsection (a)(1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.''.
(2) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 24 of
title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the
item relating to section 493 the following:
``494. Consideration of expansion of nuclear forces of other
countries.''.
SEC. 9. CHEMISTRY AND METALLURGY RESEARCH REPLACEMENT NUCLEAR FACILITY
AND URANIUM PROCESSING FACILITY.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) Administrator for Nuclear Security Thomas D'Agostino
testified before the Committee on Armed Services of the House
of Representatives in February 2008 that ``Infrastructure
improvements are a major part of the complex transformation
plan that we have, and we've made important progress, but we
have a lot more to do. Some major facilities that we have date
back to World War II and cannot readily meet today's safety and
security requirements. Let me give you just two quick examples,
if I could. A sufficient capability to work with plutonium is
an essential part of a national security enterprise and is
required for as long as we retain a nuclear deterrent, and most
likely even longer. Currently, we have a very small production
capacity at Los Alamos, about 10 pits per year, at our TA-55
area. Our building at Los Alamos, the Chemistry and Metallurgy
Research Facility, is well over 50 years old and is
insufficient to support the national security requirements for
the stockpile and for future national security mission areas.
So, whether we continue on our existing path or move towards a
replacement modern warhead-type stockpile, we still need the
capacity to produce about 50 to 80 pits per year, which is less
than one-tenth of our Cold War level, as well as the ability to
carry out pit surveillance, which is an essential part of
maintaining our stockpile.''.
(2) Then Commander of the United States Strategic Command
General Kevin P. Chilton also testified in February 2008 that
``When you have a responsive complex that has the capacity to
flex to production as you may need it or adjust your deployed
force posture in the future, should you need it--in other
words, if we go to a lower number, you need to be certain that
you can come back up, should the strategic environment change,
and you can't necessarily without that flexible or responsive
infrastructure behind it, and that's probably one of my great
concerns. And then how you posture both the portion of your
stockpile that you hold in reserve and your confidence in the
weapons that you have deployed is very much a function of
modernizing, in my view, the weapons systems that we have
available today, which are, as the secretary described, of Cold
War legacy design, and the associated issues with them.''.
(3) The Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture
of the United States reported in May 2009, with respect to the
timing of the replacement of the nuclear weapons infrastructure
of the United States, that ``This raises an obvious question
about whether these two replacement programs might proceed in
sequence rather than concurrently. There are strong arguments
for moving forward concurrently. Existing facilities are
genuinely decrepit and are maintained in a safe and secure
manner only at high cost. Moreover, the improved production
capabilities they promise are integral to the program of
refurbishment and modernization described in the preceding
chapter. If funding can be found for both, this would best
serve the national interest in maintaining a safe, secure, and
reliable stockpile of weapons in the most effective and
efficient manner.''.
(4) The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review states--
(A) ``The National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA), in close coordination with DoD, will provide a
new stockpile stewardship and management plan to
Congress within 90 days, consistent with the increases
in infrastructure investment requested in the
President's FY 2011 budget. As critical infrastructure
is restored and modernized, it will allow the United
States to begin to shift away from retaining large
numbers of non-deployed warheads as a technical hedge,
allowing additional reductions in the U.S. stockpile of
non-deployed nuclear weapons over time.'';
(B) ``In order to sustain a safe, secure, and
effective U.S. nuclear stockpile as long as nuclear
weapons exist, the United States must possess a modern
physical infrastructure--comprised of the national
security laboratories and a complex of supporting
facilities.'';
(C) ``Funding the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research
Replacement Project at Los Alamos National Laboratory
to replace the existing 50-year old Chemistry and
Metallurgy Research facility in 2021.'';
(D) ``Developing a new Uranium Processing Facility
at the Y-12 Plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee to come on
line for production operations in 2021.'';
(E) ``Without an ability to produce uranium
components, any plan to sustain the stockpile, as well
as support for our Navy nuclear propulsion, will come
to a halt. This would have a significant impact, not
just on the weapons program, but in dealing with
nuclear dangers of many kinds.''; and
(F) ``The non-deployed stockpile currently includes
more warheads than required for the above purposes, due
to the limited capacity of the National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA) complex to conduct LEPs
for deployed weapons in a timely manner. Progress in
restoring NNSA's production infrastructure will allow
these excess warheads to be retired along with other
stockpile reductions planned over the next decade.''.
(5) In the memorandum of agreement between the Department
of Defense and the Department of Energy concerning the
modernization of the nuclear weapon stockpile of the United
States dated May 3, 2010, then Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates and Secretary of Energy Steven Chu agreed that ``DOE
Agrees to . . . increase pit production capacity . . . plan and
program to ramp up to a minimum of 50-80 PPY in 2022.''.
(6) The plan required under section 1251 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-
84; 123 Stat. 2549) submitted by the President states that the
Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement building and the
Uranium Processing Facility will complete construction by 2021
and will achieve full operational functionality by 2024.
(7) The Senate required that, prior to the entry into force
of the New START Treaty, the President certifies to the Senate
that the President intends to--
(A) accelerate to the extent possible the design
and engineering phase of the Chemistry and Metallurgy
Research Replacement building and the Uranium
Processing Facility; and
(B) request full funding, including on a multiyear
basis as appropriate, for the Chemistry and Metallurgy
Research Replacement building and the Uranium
Processing Facility upon completion of the design and
engineering phase for such facilities.
(8) The President did request full funding for such
facilities on February 2, 2011, when the President stated, ``I
intend to (a) accelerate, to the extent possible, the design
and engineering phase of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research
Replacement (CMRR) building and the Uranium Processing Facility
(UPF); and (b) request full funding, including on a multi-year
basis as appropriate, for the CMRR building and the UPF upon
completion of the design and engineering phase for such
facilities.''.
(b) Limitation.--Section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (50 U.S.C. 2523b) is further amended by adding
at the end the following new subsection:
``(e) CMRR and UPF.--
``(1) Annual certification.--Beginning fiscal year 2013,
the President shall annually certify in writing to the
congressional defense committees whether--
``(A) the construction of both the Chemistry and
Metallurgy Research Replacement building and the
Uranium Processing Facility will be completed by not
later than 2021; and
``(B) both facilities will be fully operational by
not later than 2024.
``(2) Limitation.--If the President certifies under
paragraph (1) that the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research
Replacement building and the Uranium Processing Facility will
be completed by later than 2021 or be fully operational by
later than 2024, none of the funds made available for fiscal
year 2012 or any fiscal year thereafter for the National
Nuclear Security Administration may be used to reduce the
nondeployed nuclear warheads in the nuclear weapons stockpile
of the United States until a period of 120 days has elapsed
following the date of such certification.
``(3) Exception.--The limitation in paragraph (2) shall not
apply to--
``(A) reductions made to ensure the safety,
security, reliability, and credibility of the nuclear
weapons stockpile and delivery systems, including
activities related to surveillance, assessment,
certification, testing, and maintenance of nuclear
warheads and strategic delivery systems; or
``(B) nuclear warheads that are retired or awaiting
dismantlement on the date of the certification under
paragraph (1).
``(4) Termination.--The requirement in paragraph (1) shall
terminate on the date on which the President certifies in
writing to the congressional defense committees that the
Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement building and the
Uranium Processing Facility are both fully operational.''.
SEC. 10. NUCLEAR WARHEADS ON INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES OF THE
UNITED STATES.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that reducing
the number of nuclear warheads contained on each intercontinental
ballistic missile of the United States does not promote strategic
stability if at the same time other nuclear weapons states, including
the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, are rapidly
increasing the warhead-loading of their land-based missile forces.
(b) Limitation.--
(1) In general.--Chapter 24 of title 10, United States
Code, as added by section 6(b)(1), is amended by adding at the
end the following new section:
``Sec. 495. Nuclear warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles of
the United States
``(a) In General.--During any year in which the President proposes
to reduce the number of nuclear warheads contained on an
intercontinental ballistic missile of the United States, none of the
funds made available for fiscal year 2012 or any fiscal year thereafter
for the Department of Defense or the National Nuclear Security
Administration may be used for such proposed reduction if the reduction
results in such missile having only a single nuclear warhead unless the
President certifies in writing to the congressional defense committees
that the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China are both
also carrying out a similar reduction.
``(b) Exception.--The limitation in subsection (a) shall not apply
to reductions made to ensure the safety, security, reliability, and
credibility of the nuclear weapons stockpile and delivery systems,
including activities related to surveillance, assessment,
certification, testing, and maintenance of nuclear warheads and
strategic delivery systems.''.
(2) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 24 of
title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the
item relating to section 494 the following:
``495. Nuclear warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles of the
United States.''.
SEC. 11. NONSTRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPON REDUCTIONS AND EXTENDED DETERRENCE
POLICY.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) The NATO Strategic Concept of 2010 endorsed the
continued role of nuclear weapons in the security of the NATO
alliance, stating--
(A) ``The supreme guarantee of the security of the
Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of
the Alliance, particularly those of the United States;
the independent strategic nuclear forces of the United
Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of
their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and
security of the Allies.'';
(B) ``We will ensure that NATO has the full range
of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against
any threat to the safety and security of our
populations. Therefore, we will . . . maintain an
appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces'';
and
(C) ``[NATO will] ensure the broadest possible
participation of Allies in collective defence planning
on nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear
forces, and in command, control and consultation
arrangements.''.
(2) However, the 2010 Strategic Concept also walked away
from the decades-long policy encapsulated by the 1999 Strategic
Concept that said, ``The presence of United States conventional
and nuclear forces in Europe remains vital to the security of
Europe, which is inseparably linked to that of North
America.''.
(3) Former Secretary of Defense William Perry said in March
2011 testimony before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces of
the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives
that ``the reason we have nuclear weapons in Europe in the
first place, is not because the rest of our weapons are not
capable of deterrence, but because, during the Cold War at
least, our allies in Europe felt more assured when we had
nuclear weapons in Europe. That is why they were deployed there
in the first place. Today the issue is a little different. The
issue is the Russians in the meantime have built a large number
of nuclear weapons, and we keep our nuclear weapons there as
somewhat of a political leverage for dealing with an ultimate
treaty in which we may get Russia and the United States to
eliminate tactical nuclear weapons. My own view is it would be
desirable if both the United States and Russia would eliminate
tactical nuclear weapons, but I see it as very difficult to
arrive at that conclusion if we were to simply eliminate all of
our tactical nuclear weapons unilaterally.''.
(4) During testimony before the Subcommittee on Strategic
Forces of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives in July 2011--
(A) former Department of Defense official Frank
Miller stated, ``as long as U.S. allies believe that
those weapons need to be there, we need to make sure
that we provide that security.''; and
(B) former Department of Defense official Mort
Halperin stated, ``I do not think we should be willing
to trade our withdrawal of our nuclear weapons from
Europe for some reduction, even a substantial
reduction, in Russian tactical nuclear weapons because
if it is . . . that the credibility of the American
nuclear deterrent for our NATO allies depends on the
presence of nuclear weapons in Europe, that will not
change if the Russians cut their tactical nuclear
arsenal by two thirds, or even eliminate it because
they will still have their strategic weapons, which,
while they can't have intermediate range missiles, they
can find a way to target them on the NATO countries.''.
(5) Section 1237(b) of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81) expressed the
sense of Congress that--
(A) the commitment of the United States to extended
deterrence in Europe and the nuclear alliance of NATO
is an important component of ensuring and linking the
national security of the United States and its European
allies;
(B) the nuclear forces of the United States are a
key component of the NATO nuclear alliance; and
(C) the presence of the nuclear weapons of the
United States in Europe--combined with NATO's unique
nuclear sharing arrangements under which non-nuclear
members participate in nuclear planning and possess
specially configured aircraft capable of delivering
nuclear weapons--provides reassurance to NATO allies
who feel exposed to regional threats.
(b) Limitation.--Chapter 24 of title 10, United States Code, as
added by section 6(b)(1), is amended by adding at the end the following
new section:
``Sec. 496. Limitation on reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal of
nuclear forces based in Europe
``(a) Policy on Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons.--It is the policy of
the United States--
``(1) to pursue negotiations with the Russian Federation
aimed at the reduction of Russian deployed and nondeployed,
nonstrategic nuclear forces;
``(2) that nonstrategic nuclear weapons should be
considered when weighing the balance of the nuclear forces of
the United States and the Russian Federation;
``(3) that any geographical relocation or storage of
nonstrategic nuclear weapons by the Russian Federation does not
constitute a reduction or elimination of such weapons;
``(4) the vast advantage of the Russian Federation in
nonstrategic nuclear weapons constitutes a threat to the United
States and its allies and a growing asymmetry in Western
Europe; and
``(5) the forward-deployed nuclear forces of the United
States are an important contributor to the assurance of the
allies of the United States and constitute a check on
proliferation and a tool in dealing with neighboring states
hostile to NATO.
``(b) Policy on Extended Deterrence Commitment to Europe.--It is
the policy of the United States that--
``(1) it maintain its commitment to extended deterrence,
specifically the nuclear alliance of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, as an important component of ensuring and linking
the national security interests of the United States and the
security of its European allies;
``(2) forward-deployed nuclear forces of the United States
shall remain based in Europe in support of the nuclear policy
and posture of NATO;
``(3) the presence of nuclear weapons of the United States
in Europe--combined with NATO's unique nuclear sharing
arrangements under which non-nuclear members participate in
nuclear planning and possess specially configured aircraft
capable of delivering nuclear weapons--contributes to the
cohesion of NATO and provides reassurance to allies and
partners who feel exposed to regional threats; and
``(4) only the President and Congress can articulate when
and how the United States will employ the nuclear forces of the
United States and no multilateral organization, not even NATO,
can articulate a declaratory policy concerning the use of
nuclear weapons that binds the United States.
``(c) Limitation on Reduction, Consolidation, or Withdrawal of
Nuclear Forces Based in Europe.--In light of the policy expressed in
subsections (a) and (b), none of the funds made available for fiscal
year 2012 or any fiscal year thereafter for the Department of Defense
may be used to effect or implement the reduction, consolidation, or
withdrawal of nuclear forces of the United States that are based in
Europe unless--
``(1) the reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal of such
nuclear forces is requested by the government of the host
nation in the manner provided in the agreement between the
United States and the host nation regarding the forces;
``(2) the President certifies that--
``(A) NATO member states have considered the
reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal in the High
Level Group;
``(B) NATO has decided to support such reduction,
consolidation, or withdrawal;
``(C) the remaining nuclear forces of the United
States that are based in Europe after such reduction,
consolidation, or withdrawal would provide a
commensurate or better level of assurance and
credibility as before such reduction, consolidation, or
withdrawal; and
``(D) there has been reciprocal action by the
Russian Federation, not including the Russian
Federation relocating nuclear forces from one location
to another; or
``(3) the reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal of such
nuclear forces is specifically authorized by an Act of
Congress.
``(d) Notification.--Upon any decision to reduce, consolidate, or
withdraw the nuclear forces of the United States that are based in
Europe, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a notification containing--
``(1) the certification required by paragraph (2) of
subsection (c) if such reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal
is based upon such paragraph;
``(2) justification for such reduction, consolidation, or
withdrawal; and
``(3) an assessment of how NATO member states, in light of
such reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal, assess the
credibility of the deterrence capability of the United States
in support of its commitments undertaken pursuant to article 5
of the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington, District of
Columbia, on April 4, 1949, and entered into force on August
24, 1949 (63 Stat. 2241; TIAS 1964).
``(e) Notice and Wait Requirement.--The President may not commence
a reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal of the nuclear forces of the
United States that are based in Europe for which the certification
required by subsection (c)(2) is made until the expiration of a 180-day
period beginning on the date on which the President submits the
notification under subsection (d) containing the certification.
``(f) Appropriate Congressional Committees.--In this section, the
term `appropriate congressional committees' means--
``(1) the Committees on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives and the Senate; and
``(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate.''.
(c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the beginning of
chapter 24 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting
after the item relating to section 495 the following:
``496. Limitation on reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal of nuclear
forces based in Europe.''.
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