[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1750 Introduced in House (IH)]

112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1750

   To strengthen the strategic force posture of the United States by 
  implementing and supplementing certain provisions of the New START 
   Treaty and the Resolution of Ratification, and for other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 5, 2011

Mr. Turner (for himself and Mr. McKeon) introduced the following bill; 
which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services, and in addition 
 to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, for a period to be subsequently 
   determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such 
 provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
   To strengthen the strategic force posture of the United States by 
  implementing and supplementing certain provisions of the New START 
   Treaty and the Resolution of Ratification, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

    (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``New START Treaty 
Implementation Act''.
    (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as 
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
Sec. 3. Use of funds on the modernization of nuclear weapons.
Sec. 4. Limitation on nuclear force reductions.
Sec. 5. Nuclear employment strategy.
Sec. 6. Force analysis and assessment of the capabilities of the 
                            nuclear forces of the United States.
Sec. 7. Annual assessment and report on the delivery platforms for 
                            nuclear weapons and the nuclear command and 
                            control system.
Sec. 8. Missile defense.
Sec. 9. Annual report on the plan for the modernization of the nuclear 
                            weapons stockpile, nuclear weapons complex, 
                            and delivery platforms.
Sec. 10. Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement nuclear facility 
                            and Uranium Processing Facility.
Sec. 11. Policy on non-nuclear weapons systems.
Sec. 12. Non-strategic nuclear weapon reductions and extended 
                            deterrence policy.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) The term ``congressional defense committees'' has the 
        meaning given that term in section 101(a)(16) of title 10, 
        United States Code.
            (2) The term ``covered nuclear systems'' means the 
        following:
                    (A) B-52H or B2 bomber aircraft and nuclear air-
                launched cruise missiles.
                    (B) Trident ballistic missile submarines, launch 
                tubes, and Trident D-5 submarine-launched ballistic 
                missiles.
                    (C) Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic 
                missiles and associated silos.
                    (D) Nuclear warheads or gravity bombs that can be 
                delivered by the systems specified in subparagraph (A), 
                (B), or (C).
                    (E) Nuclear weapons delivered by means other than 
                the systems specified in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).
            (3) The term ``New START Treaty'' means the Treaty between 
        the United States of America and the Russian Federation on 
        Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic 
        Offensive Arms, signed on April 8, 2010.

SEC. 3. USE OF FUNDS ON THE MODERNIZATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) The President of the United States, in a letter dated 
        December 18, 2010, declared that, ``I recognize that nuclear 
        modernization requires investment for the long-term, in 
        addition to this one-year budget increase. That is my 
        commitment to the Congress that my Administration will pursue 
        these programs and capabilities for as long as I am President. 
        In future years, we will provide annual updates to the [report 
        required under section 1251 of the National Defense 
        Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-84; 123 
        Stat. 2549)].''.
            (2) Article 5, Section 1 of the New START Treaty declares 
        that, ``Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization 
        and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried 
        out.''.
            (3) The Secretary of Defense declared on October 28, 2008, 
        that, ``To be blunt, there is absolutely no way we can maintain 
        a credible deterrent and reduce the number of weapons in our 
        stockpile without either resorting to testing our stockpile or 
        pursuing a modernization program.''.
            (4) The November 2010 update to the report required under 
        section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
        Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-84; 123 Stat. 2549) said that, 
        ``Notably, stockpile requirements to fully implement the 
        [Nuclear Posture Review] and the New START Treaty have been 
        refined . . . Based on this additional work, and the 
        development of new information and insights, the President is 
        prepared to seek additional resources for the Weapons 
        Activities account, over and above the FY2011 FYNSP, for the FY 
        2012 budget and for the remainder of the FYNSP period (FY2013 
        to FY 2016). Specifically, the President plans to request $7.6 
        billion for FY 2012 (an increase of $0.6 billion over the 
        planned FY 2012 funding level . . .). Given the extremely tight 
        budget environment facing the Federal Government, these 
        requests to the Congress demonstrate the priority the 
        [Administration] places on maintaining the safety, security, 
        and effectiveness of the deterrent.''.
            (5) The Stockpile Stewardship Management Plan for Fiscal 
        Year 2011, dated May 2010, said that, ``The Laboratory 
        Directors will be expected to provide findings associated with 
        the full range of [life extension program] approaches, and to 
        make a set of recommendations based solely on their best 
        technical assessments of the ability of each [life extension 
        program] approach to meet critical stockpile management goals 
        (weapons system safety, security, and effectiveness).''.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--
            (1) In general.--It is the sense of Congress that the life 
        extension program deadlines described in paragraph (2) 
        represent important deadlines that must be met to sustain a 
        safe, secure, and reliable nuclear stockpile and credible 
        deterrent.
            (2) Deadlines described.--The life extension program 
        deadlines described in this paragraph are the deadlines 
        identified in the November 2010 update to the report required 
        under section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
        for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-84; 123 Stat. 2549) as 
        follows:
                    (A) Completion of the W76 build in fiscal year 
                2018.
                    (B) Completion of the first production unit of the 
                B-61 in fiscal year 2017.
                    (C) Beginning of the study of life extension 
                options for the W78 in fiscal year 2012.
                    (D) Beginning of the study of a common warhead for 
                the W78 and the W88 in fiscal year 2012.
                    (E) Beginning of the development of an Arming, 
                Fuzing, and Firing system for the W88 in fiscal year 
                2012.
    (c) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to accomplish the modernization and replacement of the 
        nuclear triad;
            (2) to sustain a robust stockpile stewardship program and 
        to maintain and modernize the nuclear weapons production 
        capabilities and capacities that will both--
                    (A) ensure the safety, reliability, and performance 
                of the nuclear weapons of the United States at the New 
                START Treaty levels; and
                    (B) meet requirements for hedging against possible 
                international developments or technical problems, in 
                conformance with the policies of the United States and 
                in support of nuclear deterrence, extended deterrence, 
                assurance, and defense;
            (3) to maintain the nuclear weapons laboratories of the 
        United States and preserve the core nuclear weapons 
        competencies of such laboratories;
            (4) that the President should not take any action to retire 
        or dismantle (or to prepare to retire or dismantle) any of the 
        covered nuclear systems unless modernization or replacement is 
        occurring as proposed in the plans under the report required by 
        section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
        Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-84; 123 Stat. 2549), the 
        November 2010 update to such report, and the reports required 
        under section 495 of title 10, United States Code, as added by 
        section 9; and
            (5) that if the modernization plan is not funded consistent 
        with the annual report required under such section 495, such 
        failure would jeopardize the supreme interests of the United 
        States and is potential grounds for the withdrawal of the 
        United States from the New START Treaty in accordance with 
        Article XIV of such Treaty.
    (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--Funds are hereby authorized 
to be appropriated to the Department of Energy for fiscal year 2012 for 
the activities of the National Nuclear Security Administration in 
carrying out programs necessary for national security in the amount of 
$11,782,930,000, of which $7,629,716,000 shall be for weapons 
activities of the National Nuclear Security Administration.

SEC. 4. LIMITATION ON NUCLEAR FORCE REDUCTIONS.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) As of September 30, 2009, the stockpile of nuclear 
        weapons of the United States has been reduced by 84 percent 
        from its maximum level in 1967 and by more than 75 percent from 
        its level when the Berlin Wall fell in November 1989.
            (2) The number of non-strategic nuclear weapons of the 
        United States has declined by approximately 90 percent from 
        September 30, 1991, to September 30, 2009.
            (3) On March 29, 2011, the Assistant to the President for 
        National Security Affairs stated, ``As we implement New START, 
        we're making preparations for the next round of nuclear 
        reductions. Under the President's direction, the Department of 
        Defense will review our strategic requirements and develop 
        options for further reductions in our current nuclear 
        stockpile, which stands at approximately 5,000 warheads, 
        including both deployed and reserve warheads. To develop these 
        options for further reductions, we need to consider several 
        factors, such as potential changes in targeting requirements 
        and alert postures that are required for effective 
        deterrence.''.
    (b) Implementation of New START Treaty.--
            (1) Limitation.--
                    (A) Except as provided by paragraph (2), the 
                Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy may 
                not obligate or expend amounts appropriated or 
                otherwise made available to the Department of Defense 
                or the Department of Energy for any of fiscal years 
                2011 through 2017 to retire any covered nuclear system 
                of the United States as required by the New START 
                Treaty.
                    (B) Nothing in subparagraph (A) shall be construed 
                to limit any action (including verification) required 
                by the New START Treaty other than retiring any covered 
                nuclear system of the United States.
            (2) Waiver.--The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of 
        Energy may jointly waive the limitation under paragraph (1)(A) 
        for a covered nuclear system if--
                    (A) the Secretaries submit to the congressional 
                defense committees written notice of the status of 
                carrying out the modernization plan described in the 
                most recent report required by section 495 of title 10, 
                United States Code, as added by section 9; and
                    (B) with respect to such notice--
                            (i) if the notice describes that such plan 
                        is being carried out, a period of 30 days has 
                        elapsed following the date on which the 
                        President submits to the congressional defense 
                        committees such report that includes written 
                        notice of the proposed retirement of such 
                        nuclear system, as required by subsection 
                        (a)(1)(D) of such section 495; or
                            (ii) if the notice describes that such plan 
                        is not being carried out, a period of 180 days 
                        has elapsed following the date on which the 
                        President submits to the congressional defense 
                        committees the report described in clause (i).
            (3) Retire defined.--In this subsection, the term 
        ``retire'', with respect to a covered nuclear system, includes 
        retiring, dismantling, eliminating or preparing to retire, 
        dismantle, or eliminate.
    (c) Prohibition on Reduction of Stockpile Hedge.--The Secretary of 
Defense and the Secretary of Energy may not obligate or expend amounts 
appropriated or otherwise made available to the Department of Defense 
or the Department of Energy to retire, dismantle, or eliminate, or 
prepare to retire, dismantle, or eliminate, any nondeployed strategic 
or non-strategic nuclear weapon until the date that is 90 days after 
the date on which the Secretary of Energy submits to the congressional 
defense committees written certification that--
            (1) the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement 
        nuclear facility (in this subsection referred to as the 
        ``nuclear facility'') and the Uranium Processing Facility (in 
        this subsection referred to as the ``processing facility'') are 
        fully operational;
            (2) the nuclear facility and the Plutonium Facility-4 are 
        together able to deliver to the nuclear weapons stockpile not 
        less than a total of 80 pits per year; and
            (3) the processing facility is able to deliver to the 
        nuclear weapons stockpile not less than 80 refurbished or new 
        canned subassemblies per year.
    (d) Prohibition on Unilateral Reduction of Nuclear Weapons.--
            (1) In general.--Part I of subtitle A of title 10, United 
        States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new 
        chapter:

           ``CHAPTER 24--NUCLEAR POSTURE AND MISSILE DEFENSE

``Sec.
``491. Prohibition on unilateral reduction of nuclear weapons.
``Sec. 491. Prohibition on unilateral reduction of nuclear weapons
    ``The President may not retire, dismantle, or eliminate, or prepare 
to retire, dismantle, or eliminate, any nuclear weapon of the United 
States (including such deployed weapons and nondeployed weapons and 
warheads in the nuclear weapons stockpile) if such action would reduce 
the number of such weapons to a number that is less than the level 
described in the New START Treaty (as defined in section 494(c)) unless 
such action is--
            ``(1) required by a treaty or international agreement 
        specifically approved with the advice and consent of the Senate 
        pursuant to Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the 
        Constitution; or
            ``(2) specifically authorized by an Act of Congress.''.
            (2) Clerical amendments.--The table of chapters at the 
        beginning of subtitle A of title 10, United States Code, and at 
        the beginning of part I of such subtitle, are each amended by 
        inserting after the item relating to chapter 23 the following 
        new item:

``24. Nuclear posture and missile defense...................     491''.

SEC. 5. NUCLEAR EMPLOYMENT STRATEGY.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) Section 1057 of H.R. 5136, as passed by the House of 
        Representatives during the 111th Congress, included a 
        requirement that any future reductions of the nuclear forces of 
        the United States below the level described in the New START 
        Treaty be contingent on the certification by the Secretary of 
        Defense that ``such reduction does not require a change in 
        targeting strategy from counterforce targeting to countervalue 
        targeting''.
            (2) On March 29, 2011, the Assistant to the President for 
        National Security Affairs stated, ``As we implement New START, 
        we're making preparations for the next round of nuclear 
        reductions. Under the President's direction, the Department of 
        Defense will review our strategic requirements and develop 
        options for further reductions in our current nuclear 
        stockpile, which stands at approximately 5,000 warheads, 
        including both deployed and reserve warheads. To develop these 
        options for further reductions, we need to consider several 
        factors, such as potential changes in targeting requirements 
        and alert postures that are required for effective 
        deterrence.''.
    (b) Changes to Strategy.--Chapter 24 of title 10, United States 
Code, as added by section 4, is further amended by adding at the end 
the following new section:
``Sec. 492. Nuclear employment strategy
    ``The President may not make any changes to the nuclear employment 
strategy of the United States unless--
            ``(1) the President submits to the congressional defense 
        committees a report on such proposed changes, including--
                    ``(A) the implication of such changes on the 
                flexibility and resilience of the strategic forces of 
                the United States and the ability of such forces to 
                support the goals of the United States with respect to 
                nuclear deterrence, extended deterrence, assurance, and 
                defense; and
                    ``(B) certification that such proposed changes do 
                not require a change in targeting strategy from 
                counterforce targeting to countervalue targeting; and
            ``(2) a period of 90 days has elapsed after the date on 
        which such report under paragraph (1) is submitted.''.
    (c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the beginning of 
such chapter is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 
491 the following new item:

``492. Nuclear employment strategy.''.

SEC. 6. FORCE ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT OF THE CAPABILITIES OF THE 
              NUCLEAR FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES.

    (a) In General.--Not later than March 1, 2012, the Secretary of 
Defense shall conduct a force analysis and net assessment of the 
current and proposed nuclear forces of the United States to determine 
whether such forces are capable of meeting the nuclear deterrence, 
extended deterrence, assurance, and defense objectives of the United 
States in the context of the current and anticipated nuclear and non-
nuclear forces of the Russian Federation and other countries.
    (b) Elements.--The force analysis and net assessment under 
subsection (a) shall include the following:
            (1) Specific metrics to define and measure the strategic 
        sufficiency of the nuclear forces of the United States and the 
        sufficiency of forces necessary to meet the nuclear deterrence, 
        extended deterrence, assurance, and defense requirements of the 
        United States.
            (2) An identification and assessment of the nuclear 
        strategies of the United States, and the role of nuclear 
        weapons in those strategies, as of the date of the force 
        analysis and net assessment, including--
                    (A) how the United States is prepared to limit 
                damage to the United States and its allies if 
                deterrence fails; and
                    (B) if the United States requires such 
                capabilities, an assessment of such capabilities.
            (3) An identification of the nuclear force posture of the 
        United States required to fulfill the nuclear deterrence, 
        extended deterrence, assurance, and defense strategies of the 
        United States, including the planning assumptions on which such 
        posture is based.
            (4) Force-on-force exchange modeling analyses to determine 
        the vulnerability, survivability, and effectiveness of current 
        and proposed nuclear capabilities of the United States in 
        various scenarios (including a surprise attack and an 
        electromagnetic pulse attack by potential adversaries, 
        including Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, or terrorists armed 
        with nuclear weapons) and taking into account various nuclear 
        postures (including day-to-day alert and generated alert).
            (5) An assessment of the implications of disparities 
        between the strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons of the 
        United States and the strategic and non-strategic nuclear 
        weapons of other countries with respect to deterrence, extended 
        deterrence, assurance, and defense.
            (6) An assessment of the implications that various force 
        levels of the nuclear forces of the United States have on 
        nuclear proliferation, and the effect that such lower force 
        levels have on the motivation or inclination of other countries 
        to increase their nuclear capabilities, and the contingency 
        plans of the United States to respond to such an increase.
            (7) An assessment of the effect of the conventional prompt 
        global strike capabilities of the United States and other 
        countries on the ability of the United States to meet its 
        deterrence, extended deterrence, assurance, and defense 
        requirements.
            (8) An assessment of the effect of the ballistic missile 
        defense capabilities of the United States and other countries 
        on the strategic balance and on the nuclear deterrence, 
        extended deterrence, assurance, and defense strategies of the 
        United States.
            (9) An assessment of the flexibility and resilience of the 
        nuclear forces of the United States, including the potential to 
        upload nondeployed warheads and to modify weapons and warheads 
        to meet unexpected challenges.
            (10) Such other matters as the Secretary of Defense 
        considers appropriate regarding the capabilities of the nuclear 
        forces of the United States.
    (c) Participation of Other Departments and Agencies.--In conducting 
the force analysis and net assessment under subsection (a), the 
Secretary of Defense shall provide for the appropriate participation of 
the following:
            (1) The Director of National Intelligence.
            (2) The Joint Staff.
            (3) The Missile Defense Agency.
            (4) The United States Strategic Command.
            (5) Such other elements or components of the Department of 
        Defense as the Secretary of Defense considers appropriate.
            (6) Such other departments and agencies of the Federal 
        Government as the Secretary of Defense and the heads of such 
        departments and agencies jointly consider appropriate.
            (7) The national security laboratories (as defined in 
        section 3281 of the National Nuclear Security Administration 
        Act (50 U.S.C. 2471)).
    (d) Report.--
            (1) Report required.--Not later than September 1, 2012, the 
        Secretary shall submit to the appropriate committees of 
        Congress a report on the force analysis and net assessment.
            (2) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be 
        submitted in unclassified form (including as much detail as 
        possible), but may include a classified annex.
    (e) Independent Review.--
            (1) Review.--The Secretary of Defense shall provide for the 
        review by one or more federally funded research and development 
        centers of the force analysis and net assessment conducted 
        under subsection (a).
            (2) Participants.--The review under paragraph (1) shall 
        also include the participation of the following:
                    (A) Such additional individuals as the Secretary 
                considers appropriate with expertise in matters 
                relating to--
                            (i) force analysis and net assessment; and
                            (ii) the relationship between the force 
                        posture of the United States and the nuclear 
                        deterrence, extended deterrence, assurance, and 
                        defense goals of the United States.
                    (B) A separate individual (who may be a Member of 
                Congress) appointed by each of the following:
                            (i) The Chairman of the Committee on Armed 
                        Services of the Senate.
                            (ii) The Ranking Member of the Committee on 
                        Armed Services of the Senate.
                            (iii) The Chairman of the Committee on 
                        Foreign Relations of the Senate.
                            (iv) The Ranking Member of the Committee on 
                        Foreign Relations of the Senate.
                            (v) The Majority Leader of the Senate.
                            (vi) The Minority Leader of the Senate.
                            (vii) The Chairman of the Committee on 
                        Armed Services of the House of Representatives.
                            (viii) The Ranking Member of the Committee 
                        on Armed Services of the House of 
                        Representatives.
                            (ix) The Chairman of the Committee on 
                        Foreign Affairs of the House of 
                        Representatives.
                            (x) The Ranking Member of the Committee on 
                        Foreign Affairs of the House of 
                        Representatives.
                            (xi) The Speaker of the House of 
                        Representatives.
                            (xii) The Minority Leader of the House of 
                        Representatives.
            (3) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
        submittal to Congress of the report under subsection (d)(1), 
        the federally funded research and development center conducting 
        a review under paragraph (1) shall submit to the appropriate 
        committees of Congress a report on the results of the review.
    (f) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Armed Services and the Select 
        Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent 
        Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
        Representatives.

SEC. 7. ANNUAL ASSESSMENT AND REPORT ON THE DELIVERY PLATFORMS FOR 
              NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE NUCLEAR COMMAND AND CONTROL 
              SYSTEM.

    (a) In General.--Chapter 24 of title 10, United States Code, as 
added by section 4, is further amended by adding at the end the 
following new section:
``Sec. 493. Annual assessment and report on the delivery platforms for 
              nuclear weapons and the nuclear command and control 
              system
    ``(a) Annual Assessments.--(1) Each covered official shall annually 
assess the safety, security, reliability, sustainability, performance, 
and military effectiveness of the systems described in paragraph (2) 
for which such official has responsibility.
    ``(2) The systems described in this paragraph are the following:
            ``(A) Each type of delivery platform for nuclear weapons.
            ``(B) The nuclear command and control system.
    ``(b) Annual Report.--(1) Not later than December 1 of each year, 
beginning in 2011, each covered official shall submit to the Secretary 
of Defense and the Nuclear Weapons Council established by section 179 
of this title a report on the assessments conducted under subsection 
(a).
    ``(2) Each report under paragraph (1) shall include the following:
            ``(A) The results of the assessment.
            ``(B) An identification and discussion of any capability 
        gaps or shortfalls with respect to the systems described in 
        subsection (a)(2) covered under the assessment.
            ``(C) An identification and discussion of any risks with 
        respect to meeting mission or capability requirements.
            ``(D) In the case of an assessment by the Commander of the 
        United States Strategic Command, if the Commander identifies 
        any deficiency with respect to a nuclear weapons delivery 
        platform covered under the assessment, a discussion of the 
        relative merits of any other nuclear weapons delivery platform 
        type or compensatory measure that would accomplish the mission 
        of such nuclear weapons delivery platform.
            ``(E) An identification and discussion of any matter having 
        an adverse effect on the capability of the covered official to 
        accurately determine the matters covered by the assessment.
    ``(c) Report to President and Congress.--(1) Not later than March 1 
of each year, beginning in 2012, the Secretary of Defense shall submit 
to the President a report containing--
            ``(A) each report under subsection (b) submitted during the 
        previous year, as originally submitted to the Secretary;
            ``(B) any comments that the Secretary considers appropriate 
        with respect to each such report;
            ``(C) any conclusions that the Secretary considers 
        appropriate with respect to the safety, security, reliability, 
        sustainability, performance, or military effectiveness of the 
        systems described in subsection (a)(2); and
            ``(D) any other information that the Secretary considers 
        appropriate.
    ``(2) Not later than March 15 of each year, beginning in 2012, the 
President shall transmit to the congressional defense committees the 
report submitted to the President under paragraph (1), including any 
comments the President considers appropriate.
    ``(3) Each report under this subsection may be in classified form 
if the Secretary of Defense determines it necessary.
    ``(d) Covered Official Defined.--In this section, the term `covered 
official' means--
            ``(1) the Commander of the United States Strategic Command;
            ``(2) the Director of the Strategic Systems Program of the 
        Navy; and
            ``(3) the Commander of the Global Strike Command of the Air 
        Force.''.
    (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the beginning of 
such chapter is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 
492 the following new item:

``493. Annual assessment and report on the delivery platforms for 
                            nuclear weapons and the nuclear command and 
                            control system.''.

SEC. 8. MISSILE DEFENSE.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds that the President, in a letter dated 
December 18, 2010, pledged the following:
            (1) ``The New START Treaty places no limitations on the 
        development or deployment of our missile defense programs.''.
            (2) ``Starting in 2011, we will begin deploying the first 
        phase of the [European phased, adaptive approach to missile 
        defense], to protect large parts of southern Europe from short- 
        and medium-range ballistic missile threats. In subsequent 
        phases, we will deploy longer-range and more effective land-
        based standard missile-3 interceptors in Romania and Poland to 
        protect Europe against medium- and intermediate-range ballistic 
        missiles. In the final phase, planed for the end of the decade, 
        further upgrades of the SM-3 interceptor will provide an 
        ascent-phase intercept capability to augment our defense of 
        NATO European territory, as well as that of the United States, 
        against future threats of ICBMs launched from Iran.''.
            (3) ``Regardless of Russia's actions in this regard, as 
        long as I am President, and as long as the Congress provides 
        the necessary funding, the United States will continue to 
        develop and deploy effective missile defenses to protect the 
        United States, our deployed forces, and our allies and 
        partners. My Administration plans to deploy all four phases of 
        the [European phased, adaptive approach to missile defense].''.
    (b) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) that defenses against ballistic missiles are essential 
        for nuclear deterrence, extended deterrence, assurance, and 
        defense strategies;
            (2) that any further limitations on the missile defense 
        capabilities of the United States are not in the national 
        security interests of the United States;
            (3) that policies based on mutual assured destruction or 
        intentional vulnerability to strategic attack can be contrary 
        to the safety and security of both the United States and the 
        Russian Federation, and both countries share a common interest 
        in defensive capabilities that help both to move cooperatively 
        as soon as possible away from a strategic relationship based on 
        mutual vulnerability;
            (4) that the United States will welcome steps by Russia to 
        also adopt a fundamentally defensive strategic posture that no 
        longer views robust strategic defensive capabilities as 
        undermining the overall strategic balance;
            (5) to improve the strategic defensive capabilities of the 
        United States both quantitatively and qualitatively during the 
        period that the New START treaty is in effect, and such 
        improvements are consistent with the Treaty;
            (6) that no future agreement with Russia on cooperative 
        missile defense, non-strategic nuclear weapons, further 
        strategic weapons reductions, or any other matter shall include 
        any restrictions on the missile defense options of the United 
        States in Europe or elsewhere; and
            (7) to defend the United States and its allies in the North 
        Atlantic Treaty Organization from all missile threats, 
        including from short-range ballistic missiles.
    (c) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that, given 
congressional concern about missile defense issues, the President 
should offer both Houses of Congress regular briefings, not less than 
twice each year, to the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed 
Services of the Senate, and the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Armed 
Services of the House, on all missile defense issues related to the New 
START Treaty and on the progress of United States-Russia dialogue and 
cooperation regarding missile defense.
    (d) Limitations on Missile Defense.--
            (1) In general.--Chapter 24 of title 10, United States 
        Code, as added by section 4, is further amended by adding at 
        the end the following new section:
``Sec. 494. Certain limitations on missile defense
    ``(a) In General.--Any agreement with a country or international 
organization or amendment to the New START Treaty (including an 
agreement made by the Bilateral Consultative Commission established by 
the New START Treaty) concerning the limitation of the missile defense 
capabilities of the United States shall not be binding on the United 
States, and shall not enter into force with respect to the United 
States, unless after the date of the enactment of this section, such 
agreement or amendment is--
            ``(1) specifically approved with the advice and consent of 
        the Senate pursuant to Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the 
        Constitution; or
            ``(2) specifically authorized by an Act of Congress.
    ``(b) Annual Notification.--Not later than January 31 of each year, 
beginning in 2012, the President shall submit to the congressional 
defense committees a notification of--
            ``(1) whether the Russian Federation has recognized during 
        the previous year the sovereign right of the United States to 
        pursue quantitative and qualitative improvements in missile 
        defense capabilities; and
            ``(2) whether during any treaty negotiations or other 
        Government-to-Government contacts between the United States and 
        the Russian Federation (including under the auspices of the 
        Bilateral Consultative Commission established by the New START 
        Treaty) during the previous year a representative of the 
        Russian Federation suggested that a treaty or other 
        international agreement include, with respect to the United 
        States--
                    ``(A) restricting missile defense capabilities, 
                military capabilities in space, or conventional prompt 
                global strike capabilities; or
                    ``(B) reducing the number of non-strategic nuclear 
                weapons deployed in Europe.
    ``(c) New START Treaty Defined.--In this section, the term `New 
START Treaty' means the Treaty between the United States of America and 
the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and 
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed on April 8, 2010.''.
            (2) Clerical amendment.--The table of sections at the 
        beginning of such chapter is amended by inserting after the 
        item relating to section 493 the following new item:

``494. Certain limitations on missile defense.''.
    (e) Restriction of Funds for Certain Treaty Negotiations.--
            (1) Restriction.--No funds available to the Department of 
        State or any other Federal department or agency may be 
        obligated or expended during fiscal year 2012 or any fiscal 
        year thereafter for travel expenses related to treaty 
        negotiations concerning the possible reduction of covered 
        nuclear systems of the United States until the date on which 
        the certification under paragraph (2) is transmitted to 
        Congress.
            (2) Certification.--Not later than 30 days after the date 
        of the enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to 
        Congress written notification that negotiations described in 
        paragraph (1) will not include restricting the missile defense 
        capabilities of the United States.

SEC. 9. ANNUAL REPORT ON THE PLAN FOR THE MODERNIZATION OF THE NUCLEAR 
              WEAPONS STOCKPILE, NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX, AND DELIVERY 
              PLATFORMS.

    (a) Annual Report.--Chapter 24 of title 10, United States Code, as 
added by section 4, is further amended by adding at the end the 
following new section:
``Sec. 495. Annual report on the plan for the modernization of the 
              nuclear weapons stockpile, nuclear weapons complex, and 
              delivery platforms
    ``(a) Report on the Plan for the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, Nuclear 
Weapons Complex, and Delivery Platforms.--(1) Together with the budget 
of the President submitted to Congress under section 1105(a) of title 
31, United States Code, the President, in consultation with the 
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy, shall transmit to the 
congressional defense committees, the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
the Senate, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives a detailed report on the plan to--
            ``(A) enhance the safety, security, and reliability of the 
        nuclear weapons stockpile of the United States;
            ``(B) modernize the nuclear weapons complex;
            ``(C) maintain, modernize, or replace the delivery 
        platforms for nuclear weapons; and
            ``(D) retire, dismantle, or eliminate any covered nuclear 
        system.
    ``(2) Each report required under paragraph (1) shall include the 
following:
            ``(A) A detailed description of the plan to enhance the 
        safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons 
        stockpile of the United States.
            ``(B) A detailed description of the plan to modernize the 
        nuclear weapons complex, including improving the safety of 
        facilities, modernizing the infrastructure, and maintaining the 
        key capabilities and competencies of the nuclear weapons 
        workforce, including designers and technicians.
            ``(C) A detailed description of the plan to maintain, 
        modernize, and replace delivery platforms for nuclear weapons.
            ``(D) A detailed estimate of budget requirements, including 
        the costs associated with the plans outlined under 
        subparagraphs (A) through (C), over the 10-year period 
        following the date of the report.
            ``(E) A detailed description of the steps taken to 
        implement the plan submitted in the previous year.
    ``(b) Advice of Directors of Nuclear Facilities and Laboratories.--
Together with the budget of the President submitted to Congress under 
section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, during each fiscal 
year in which a report is transmitted under subsection (a), the 
directors of the nuclear facilities and laboratories shall each submit 
to the congressional defense committees, the Committee on Foreign 
Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
of Representatives, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of 
Energy an independent report on the implementation of and the funding 
for the plans outlined under subparagraphs (A) and (B) of subsection 
(a)(2).
    ``(c) Form.--The reports required by this section shall be 
submitted in unclassified form (including as much detail as possible), 
but may include a classified annex.
    ``(d) Definitions.--In this section:
            ``(1) The term `covered nuclear systems' means the 
        following:
                    ``(A) B-52H or B2 bomber aircraft and nuclear air-
                launched cruise missiles.
                    ``(B) Trident ballistic missile submarines, launch 
                tubes, and Trident D-5 submarine-launched ballistic 
                missiles.
                    ``(C) Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic 
                missiles and associated silos.
                    ``(D) Nuclear warheads or gravity bombs that can be 
                delivered by the systems specified in subparagraph (A), 
                (B), or (C).
                    ``(E) Nuclear weapons delivered by means other than 
                the systems specified in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).
            ``(2) The term `nuclear facilities and laboratories' means 
        the following:
                    ``(A) Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, 
                New Mexico.
                    ``(B) Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, 
                New Mexico.
                    ``(C) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 
                Livermore, California.
                    ``(D) The Kansas City Plant, Kansas City, Missouri.
                    ``(E) The Nevada National Security Site, Nevada.
                    ``(F) The Pantex Plant, Amarillo, Texas.
                    ``(G) The Savannah River Site, Aiken, South 
                Carolina.
                    ``(H) The Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee.''.
    (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the beginning of 
such chapter is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 
494 the following new item:

``495. Annual report on the plan for the modernization of the nuclear 
                            weapons stockpile, nuclear weapons complex, 
                            and delivery platforms.''.

SEC. 10. CHEMISTRY AND METALLURGY RESEARCH REPLACEMENT NUCLEAR FACILITY 
              AND URANIUM PROCESSING FACILITY.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) The Stockpile Stewardship Management Plan for Fiscal 
        Year 2011, dated May 2010, said that the Chemistry and 
        Metallurgy Research Replacement building and the Uranium 
        Processing Facility are ``the highest physical infrastructure 
        priorities'' for the nuclear enterprise.
            (2) The November 2010 update to the report required under 
        section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
        Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-84; 123 Stat. 2549) said that, 
        ``The Administration is committed to fully fund the 
        construction of the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) and the 
        Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR).''.
            (3) A Department of Energy briefing book regarding the 
        fiscal year 2012 budget stated that, with respect to the 
        Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement nuclear facility, 
        ``The increased funding level in the FY 2012-FY 2016 period is 
        needed to support the required schedule of construction 
        completion in FY 2020 and a ramp-up to full operations by FY 
        2023.''.
            (4) The briefing book also stated that, with respect to the 
        Uranium Processing Facility, ``The increased funding level in 
        the FY 2012-FY 2016 period is needed to support the NNSA's 
        priority to phase out operations in Building 9212 and move 
        required chemical processing activities from Building 9212 into 
        UPF in FY 2020, with a ramp-up to full operations in UPF by FY 
        2024.''.
    (b) CMRR and UPF.--Of amounts authorized to be appropriated for 
weapons activities of the National Nuclear Security Administration, the 
Secretary of Energy shall--
            (1) accelerate, to the extent possible, the design and 
        engineering phase of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research 
        Replacement nuclear facility (in this section referred to as 
        the ``nuclear facility'') and the Uranium Processing Facility 
        (in this section referred to as the ``processing facility'') in 
        order for--
                    (A) the construction of both facilities to be 
                completed by not later than 2020;
                    (B) both the nuclear facility and the processing 
                facility to begin nuclear operations by not later than 
                2020; and
                    (C) both the nuclear facility and the processing 
                facility to be fully operational by not later than 2023 
                and 2024, respectively; and
            (2) together with the budget of the President submitted to 
        Congress under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, 
        for fiscal years 2013 through 2024, submit to the congressional 
        defense committees a report including--
                    (A) certification of the acceleration described in 
                paragraph (1); and
                    (B) identification of the funding amounts 
                necessary, including on a multiyear basis as 
                appropriate, for the nuclear facility and the 
                processing facility upon completion of the design and 
                engineering phase of such facilities.

SEC. 11. POLICY ON NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS.

    It is the policy of the United States that conventionally armed, 
strategic-range weapons systems not co-located with nuclear armed 
systems do not affect strategic stability between the United States and 
the Russian Federation.

SEC. 12. NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPON REDUCTIONS AND EXTENDED 
              DETERRENCE POLICY.

    (a) Policy on Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons.--It is the policy of 
the United States--
            (1) to pursue negotiations with the Russian Federation 
        aimed at the reduction of Russian deployed and non-deployed 
        non-strategic nuclear forces;
            (2) that non-strategic nuclear weapons should be considered 
        when weighing the balance of the nuclear forces of the United 
        States and Russia; and
            (3) that any geographical relocation or storage of non-
        strategic nuclear weapons by Russia does not constitute a 
        reduction or elimination of such weapons.
    (b) Policy on Extended Deterrence Commitment to Europe.--It is the 
policy of the United States that--
            (1) it maintain its commitment to extended deterrence, 
        specifically the nuclear alliance of the North Atlantic Treaty 
        Organization, as an important component of ensuring and linking 
        the national security interests of the United States and the 
        security of its European allies;
            (2) forward-deployed nuclear forces of the United States 
        shall remain based in Europe in support of the nuclear policy 
        and posture of NATO; and
            (3) the presence of nuclear weapons of the United States in 
        Europe--combined with NATO's unique nuclear sharing 
        arrangements under which non-nuclear members participate in 
        nuclear planning and possess specially configured aircraft 
        capable of delivering nuclear weapons--contributes to the 
        cohesion of NATO and provides reassurance to allies and 
        partners who feel exposed to regional threats.
    (c) Limitation on Reduction, Consolidation, or Withdrawal of 
Nuclear Forces Based in Europe.--In light of the policy expressed in 
subsections (a) and (b), no action may be taken to effect or implement 
the reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal of nuclear forces of the 
United States that are based in Europe unless--
            (1) the reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal of such 
        nuclear forces is requested by the government of the host 
        nation in the manner provided in the agreement between the 
        United States and the host nation regarding the forces; or
            (2) the President certifies that--
                    (A) NATO member states have considered the 
                reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal in the High 
                Level Group and NATO has decided to support such 
                reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal; and
                    (B) each NATO member state has separately concurred 
                that the remaining nuclear forces of the United States 
                that are based in Europe after such reduction, 
                consolidation, or withdrawal would provide a 
                commensurate or better level of assurance and 
                credibility as before such reduction, consolidation, or 
                withdrawal.
    (d) Notification.--Upon any decision to reduce, consolidate, or 
withdraw the nuclear forces of the United States that are based in 
Europe, the President shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services 
of the Senate and House of Representatives a notification containing--
            (1) the certification required by subsection (c)(2);
            (2) justification for such reduction, consolidation, or 
        withdrawal; and
            (3) an assessment of how NATO member states, in light of 
        such reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal, assess the 
        credibility of the deterrence capability of the United States 
        in support of its commitments undertaken pursuant to article 5 
        of the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington, District of 
        Columbia, on April 4, 1949, and entered into force on August 
        24, 1949 (63 Stat. 2241; TIAS 1964).
    (e) Notice and Wait Requirement.--The President may not commence a 
reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal of the nuclear forces of the 
United States that are based in Europe for which the certification 
required by subsection (c)(2) is made until the expiration of a 180-day 
period beginning on the date on which the President submits the report 
under subsection (d) containing the certification.
                                 <all>