[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.J. Res. 67 Introduced in House (IH)]
112th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. J. RES. 67
Authorizing the limited use of the United States Armed Forces in
support of the NATO mission in Libya.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
June 21, 2011
Mr. Hastings of Florida introduced the following joint resolution;
which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition
to the Committee on Armed Services, for a period to be subsequently
determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such
provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned
_______________________________________________________________________
JOINT RESOLUTION
Authorizing the limited use of the United States Armed Forces in
support of the NATO mission in Libya.
Whereas peaceful demonstrations that began in Libya, inspired by similar
movements in Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere in the Middle East, quickly
spread to cities around the country, calling for greater political
reform, opportunity, justice, and the rule of law;
Whereas Muammar Qaddafi, his sons, and forces loyal to them responded to the
peaceful demonstrations by authorizing and initiating violence against
civilian non-combatants in Libya, including the use of airpower and
foreign mercenaries;
Whereas, on February 25, 2011, President Barack Obama imposed unilateral
economic sanctions on, and froze the assets of, Muammar Qaddafi and his
family, as well as the Government of Libya and its agencies to hold the
Qaddafi regime accountable for its continued use of violence against
unarmed civilians and its human rights abuses and to safeguard the
assets of the people of Libya;
Whereas, on February 26, 2011, the United Nations Security Council passed
Resolution 1970, which mandates international economic sanctions and an
arms embargo;
Whereas, in response to Qaddafi's assault on civilians in Libya, a ``no-fly
zone'' in Libya was called for by the Gulf Cooperation Council on March
7, 2011; by the head of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on
March 8, 2011; and by the Arab League on March 12, 2011;
Whereas Qaddafi's advancing forces, after recapturing cities in eastern Libya
that had been liberated by the Libyan opposition, were preparing to
attack Benghazi, a city of 700,000 people and the seat of the opposition
government in Libya, the Interim Transitional National Council;
Whereas Qaddafi stated that he would show ``no mercy'' to his opponents in
Benghazi, and that his forces would go ``door to door'' to find and kill
dissidents;
Whereas, on March 17, 2011, the United Nations Security Council passed
Resolution 1973, which mandates ``all necessary measures'' to protect
civilians in Libya, implement a ``no-fly zone'', and enforce an arms
embargo against the Qaddafi regime;
Whereas President Obama notified key congressional leaders in a meeting at the
White House on March 18, 2011, of his intent to begin targeted military
operations in Libya and made clear that the United States ``is not going
to deploy ground troops into Libya'';
Whereas the United States Armed Forces, together with coalition partners,
launched Operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya on March 19, 2011, to protect
civilians in Libya from immediate danger and enforce an arms embargo and
a ``no-fly zone'';
Whereas, on March 28, 2011, President Obama stated, ``America has an important
strategic interest in preventing Qaddafi from overrunning those who
oppose him. A massacre would have driven thousands of additional
refugees across Libya's borders, putting enormous strains on the
peaceful--yet fragile--transitions in Egypt and Tunisia. The democratic
impulses that are dawning across the region would be eclipsed by the
darkest form of dictatorship, as repressive leaders concluded that
violence is the best strategy to cling to power . . . So while I will
never minimize the costs involved in military action, I am convinced
that a failure to act in Libya would have carried a far greater price
for America.'';
Whereas, on March 31, 2011, the United States transferred authority for
Operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya to NATO command, with the mission
continuing as Operation Unified Protector;
Whereas, in a letter to joint bipartisan congressional leaders on May 20, 2011,
President Obama expressed support for a Senate resolution on the use of
force in Libya and stated that, ``Since April 4, U.S. participation has
consisted of: (1) non-kinetic support to the NATO-led operation,
including intelligence, logistical support, and search and rescue
assistance (2) aircraft that have assisted in the suppression and
destruction of air defenses in support of the no-fly zone and (3) since
April 23, precision strikes by unmanned aerial vehicles against a
limited set of clearly defined targets in support of the NATO-led
coalition's efforts.''; and
Whereas, on June 9, 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recognized the
Transitional National Council ``as the legitimate interlocutor for the
Libyan people during this interim period.'': Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the men and women of the United States Armed Forces and
coalition partners who are engaged in military operations to
protect the people of Libya have demonstrated extraordinary
bravery and should be commended;
(2) the United States Government should continue to support
the aspirations of the people of Libya for political reform and
self-government based on democratic and human rights;
(3) the goal of United States policy in Libya, as stated by
the President, is to achieve the departure from power of
Muammar Qaddafi and his family, including through the use of
diplomatic and economic pressure, so that a peaceful transition
can begin to an inclusive government that ensures freedom,
opportunity, and justice for the people of Libya; and
(4) the funds of the Qaddafi regime that have been frozen
by the United States should be returned to the people of Libya
for their benefit, including humanitarian and reconstruction
assistance, and the President should explore the possibility
with the Transitional National Council of using some of such
funds to reimburse NATO countries for expenses incurred in
Operation Odyssey Dawn and Operation Unified Protector.
SEC. 2. AUTHORIZATION FOR THE LIMITED USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES
IN LIBYA.
(a) Authority.--The President is authorized to continue the limited
use of the United States Armed Forces in Libya, in support of United
States national security policy interests, as part of the NATO mission
to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011) as
requested by the Transitional National Council, the Gulf Cooperation
Council, and the Arab League.
(b) Expiration of Authority.--The authorization for such limited
use of United States Armed Forces in Libya expires one year after the
date of the enactment of this joint resolution.
SEC. 3. OPPOSITION TO THE USE OF UNITED STATES GROUND TROOPS.
Consistent with the policy and statements of the President,
Congress does not support deploying, establishing, or maintaining the
presence of units and members of the United States Armed Forces on the
ground in Libya unless the purpose of the presence is limited to the
immediate personal defense of United States Government officials
(including diplomatic representatives) or to rescuing members of NATO
forces from imminent danger.
SEC. 4. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.
The President shall consult frequently with Congress regarding
United States efforts in Libya, including by providing regular
briefings and reports as requested, and responding to inquiries
promptly. Such briefings and reports shall include the following
elements:
(1) An updated description of United States national
security interests in Libya.
(2) An updated statement of United States policy objectives
in Libya, both during and after Qaddafi's rule, and a detailed
plan to achieve them.
(3) An updated and comprehensive list of the activities of
the United States Armed Forces in Libya.
(4) An updated and detailed assessment of the groups in
Libya that are opposed to the Qaddafi regime, including
potential successor governments.
(5) A full and updated explanation of the President's legal
and constitutional rationale for conducting military operations
in Libya consistent with the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C.
1541 et seq.).
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