[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Res. 573 Reported in Senate (RS)]
Calendar No. 588
111th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. RES. 573
Urging the development of a comprehensive strategy to ensure stability
in Somalia, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
June 29, 2010
Mr. Feingold (for himself, Ms. Klobuchar, Mr. Franken, and Mr. Cardin)
submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee
on Foreign Relations
September 24, 2010
Reported by Mr. Kerry, with an amendment and an amendment to the
preamble
[Strike out all after the resolving clause and insert the part printed
in italic]
[Strike the preamble and insert the part printed in italic]
_______________________________________________________________________
RESOLUTION
Urging the development of a comprehensive strategy to ensure stability
in Somalia, and for other purposes.
<DELETED>Whereas Somalia has been without a functioning central government since
1991, resulting in lawlessness and an increasingly desperate
humanitarian situation;
Whereas, despite the return of the internationally recognized Transitional
Federal Government (TFG) to Mogadishu and ongoing diplomatic efforts
through the Djibouti Peace Process, supported by the United Nations,
there has been little improvement in the governance or stability of
southern and central Somalia, and armed opposition groups continue to
exploit this situation;
Whereas the traditional mediation role played by Somali elders has been eroded
as the dynamics of conflict and the proliferation of weapons make it
difficult to influence warring parties;
Whereas, since 2007, armed violence has resulted in the deaths of at least
21,000 people in Somalia and the displacement of nearly 2,000,000
people, including over 500,000 refugees in Kenya, Yemen, Ethiopia,
Eritrea, Djibouti, Tanzania, and Uganda;
Whereas the United Nations estimates that 3,200,000 people, or 43 percent of the
population of Somalia, are in need of humanitarian assistance and
livelihood support to survive;
Whereas the United Nations reports that almost 1,000,000 displaced Somalis in
need of aid cannot be reached by United Nations refugee and food
agencies because of growing insecurity and the threat of kidnappings to
staff;
Whereas local humanitarian organizations are trying to meet the needs of the
Somali people by restoring basic social services in urban and rural
communities, which places them on the front lines of the conflict and
make them vulnerable targets for killings, kidnappings, or being accused
of working for foreign governments;
Whereas al Shabaab, which has been designated as a foreign terrorist
organization by the Department of State, and other armed groups continue
to wage war against the Transitional Federal Government in Mogadishu and
one another to gain control over territory in Somalia;
Whereas al Shabaab has claimed responsibility for many bombings--including
suicide attacks--in Mogadishu, as well as in central and northern
Somalia, typically targeting officials of the Government of Somalia and
perceived allies of the TFG;
Whereas, according to Human Rights Watch, al Shabaab is subjecting inhabitants
of areas under its control in southern Somalia to executions, cruel
punishments, including amputations and floggings, and repressive social
control;
Whereas the human rights situation in Somalia has dramatically worsened over the
past several years with increased numbers of killings, torture,
kidnappings, and rape;
Whereas the 2009 Department of State Country Terrorism Report notes that
``Somalia's fragile transitional Federal government, protracted state of
violent instability, its long, unguarded coastline, porous borders, and
proximity to the Arabian Peninsula, made the country an attractive
location for international terrorists seeking a transit or launching
point for operations in Somalia or elsewhere'';
Whereas the situation in southern and central Somalia, particularly the activity
of al Shabaab, poses direct threats to the stability of Puntland and
Somaliland regions, as well as the stability of neighboring states and
the wider region;
Whereas al Shabaab leaders have stated their intent to provide recruits and
support for al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen;
Whereas the Government of Eritrea has provided military and financial support
for armed opposition groups, including al Shabaab, in part as a proxy
front in its continuing tensions with Ethiopia;
Whereas, according to the most recent report by the United Nations Somalia
Monitoring Group, arms, ammunitions, and military or dual-use equipment
continue to enter Somalia at a fairly steady rate, primarily from Yemen
and Ethiopia;
Whereas, in July 2009, the Department of State confirmed that, in addition to
other support for the TFG, it had provided cash to purchase weapons and
ammunitions for the TFG's efforts ``to repel the onslaught of extremist
forces which are intent on destroying the Djibouti peace process'';
Whereas, according to most recent report by the United Nations Somalia
Monitoring Group, ``[d]espite infusions of foreign training and
assistance, government security forces remain ineffective, disorganized
and corrupt--a composite of independent militias loyal to senior
government officials and military officers who profit from the business
of war and resist their integration under a single command'';
Whereas, on April 24, 2010, President Barack Obama issued an executive order to
sanction or freeze the assets of militants who threaten, both directly
and indirectly, the stability of Somalia, as well as individuals
involved in piracy off Somalia's coast;
Whereas, in March 2009, at a hearing of the Committee on Homeland Security and
Government Affairs of the Senate, Andrew Liepman, Deputy Director of
Intelligence at the National Counterterrorism Center, noted that
``[s]ince 2006, a number of U.S. citizens [have] traveled to Somalia,
possibly to train in extremist training camps'';
Whereas, in September 2009, at a hearing of the Committee on Homeland Security
and Government Affairs of the Senate, the Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center Michael Leiter testified that ``the potential
for al-Qaeda operatives in Somalia to commission Americans to return to
the United States and launch attacks against the Homeland remains of
significant concern''; and
Whereas the extraordinary and ongoing crisis in Somalia has enormous
humanitarian consequences and direct national security implications for
the United States and our allies in the region: Now, therefore, be it
</DELETED>Whereas Somalia has been without a functioning central government
since 1991, resulting in lawlessness and an increasingly desperate
humanitarian situation;
Whereas, despite the return of the internationally recognized Transitional
Federal Government (TFG) to Mogadishu and ongoing diplomatic efforts
through the Djibouti Peace Process, supported by the United Nations,
there has been little improvement in the governance or stability of
southern and central Somalia, and armed opposition groups continue to
exploit this situation;
Whereas the traditional mediation role played by Somali elders has been eroded
as the dynamics of conflict and the proliferation of weapons make it
difficult to influence warring parties;
Whereas, since 2007, armed violence has resulted in the deaths of at least
21,000 people in Somalia and the displacement of nearly 2,000,000
people, including over 500,000 refugees in Kenya, Yemen, Ethiopia,
Eritrea, Djibouti, Tanzania, and Uganda;
Whereas the United Nations estimates that 3,200,000 people, or 43 percent of the
population of Somalia, are in need of humanitarian assistance and
livelihood support to survive;
Whereas the United Nations reports that almost 1,000,000 displaced Somalis in
need of aid cannot be reached by United Nations refugee and food
agencies because of growing insecurity and the threat of kidnappings to
staff;
Whereas local humanitarian organizations are trying to meet the needs of the
Somali people by restoring basic social services in urban and rural
communities, which places them on the front lines of the conflict and
make them vulnerable targets for killings, kidnappings, or being accused
of working for foreign governments;
Whereas al Shabaab, which has been designated as a foreign terrorist
organization by the Department of State, and other armed groups continue
to wage war against the Transitional Federal Government in Mogadishu and
one another to gain control over territory in Somalia;
Whereas al Shabaab has claimed responsibility for many bombings--including
suicide attacks--in Mogadishu, as well as in central and northern
Somalia, typically targeting officials of the Government of Somalia and
perceived allies of the TFG;
Whereas, according to Human Rights Watch, al Shabaab is subjecting inhabitants
of areas under its control in southern Somalia to executions, cruel
punishments, including amputations and floggings, and repressive social
control;
Whereas the human rights situation in Somalia has dramatically worsened over the
past several years with increased numbers of killings, torture,
kidnappings, and rape;
Whereas the 2009 Department of State Country Terrorism Report notes that
``Somalia's fragile transitional Federal government, protracted state of
violent instability, its long, unguarded coastline, porous borders, and
proximity to the Arabian Peninsula, made the country an attractive
location for international terrorists seeking a transit or launching
point for operations in Somalia or elsewhere'';
Whereas the situation in southern and central Somalia, particularly the activity
of al Shabaab, poses direct threats to the stability of Puntland and
Somaliland regions, as well as the stability of neighboring states and
the wider region;
Whereas al Shabaab leaders have stated their intent to provide recruits and
support for al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen;
Whereas the Government of Eritrea has provided military and financial support
for armed opposition groups, including al Shebaab, in part as a proxy
front in its continuing tensions with Ethiopia;
Whereas, according to the most recent report by the United Nations Somalia
Monitoring Group, arms, ammunitions, and military or dual-use equipment
continue to enter Somalia at a fairly steady rate, in violation of the
general and complete arms embargo imposed in 1992;
Whereas, in July 2009, the Department of State confirmed that, in addition to
other support for the TFG, it had provided cash to purchase weapons and
ammunitions for the TFG's efforts ``to repel the onslaught of extremist
forces which are intent on destroying the Djibouti peace process'';
Whereas, according to most recent report by the United Nations Somalia
Monitoring Group, ``[d]espite infusions of foreign training and
assistance, government security forces remain ineffective, disorganized
and corrupt -- a composite of independent militias loyal to senior
government officials and military officers who profit from the business
of war and resist their integration under a single command'';
Whereas, on April 13, 2010, President Barack Obama issued an executive order to
sanction or freeze the assets of militants who threaten, both directly
and indirectly, the stability of Somalia, as well as individuals
involved in piracy off Somalia's coast;
Whereas, in March 2009, at a hearing of the Committee on Homeland Security and
Government Affairs of the Senate, Andrew Liepman, Deputy Director of
Intelligence at the National Counterterrorism Center, noted that
``[s]ince 2006, a number of U.S. citizens [have] traveled to Somalia,
possibly to train in extremist training camps'';
Whereas, in September 2009, at a hearing of the Committee on Homeland Security
and Government Affairs of the Senate, the Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center Michael Leiter testified that ``the potential
for al-Qaeda operatives in Somalia to commission Americans to return to
the United States and launch attacks against the Homeland remains of
significant concern'';
Whereas al Shabaab has claimed responsibility for the bombings in Kampala,
Uganda on July 11, 2010, which killed 76 people, including one American,
and wounded scores of other people; and
Whereas the extraordinary and ongoing crisis in Somalia has enormous
humanitarian consequences and direct national security implications for
the United States and our allies in the region: Now therefore be it
Resolved, <DELETED>That the Senate--
<DELETED> (1) acknowledges the urgency of addressing the
threats to United States national security in Somalia and the
conditions that foster those threats;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) reaffirms its commitment to stand with all the
people of Somalia who aspire to a future free of terrorism and
violence through advancing political reconciliation and
building legitimate and inclusive governance
institutions;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) recognizes the difficult, but very important,
work being done by the African Union Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM) to help secure parts of Mogadishu, and reaffirms its
support for the mission;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) calls on the Transitional Federal Government
in Somalia--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) to cease immediately any use of child
soldiers;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) to ensure better accountability and
transparency for all received security
assistance;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) to renew its commitment to political
reconciliation; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (D) to take necessary steps toward
becoming a more legitimate and inclusive government in
the eyes of the people of Somalia;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (5) calls on all actors and governments in the
region, particularly the Government of Eritrea, to play a
productive role in helping to bring about peace and stability
to Somalia, including ceasing to provide any financial or
material support to armed opposition groups in
Somalia;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (6) welcomes efforts by the President to bring
greater focus and resources toward understanding and monitoring
the situation in Somalia;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (7) urges the President to develop a comprehensive
strategy to ensure that all United States humanitarian,
diplomatic, political, and counterterrorism programs in Somalia
and the wider Horn of Africa are coordinated and making
progress toward the long-term goal of establishing stability,
respect for human rights, and functional, inclusive governance
in Somalia;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (8) urges the President and Secretary of State, as
part of a comprehensive strategy--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) to provide greater support for a range
of diplomatic initiatives to engage clan leaders,
business leaders, and civil society leaders in Somalia
and the Somali Diaspora in political reconciliation and
consensus-building;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) to ensure better oversight,
monitoring, and transparency of all United States
security assistance provided to the TFG;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) to increase and strengthen the United
States diplomatic team working on Somalia, including
the appointment of a senior envoy, and to ensure that
these officials have the necessary resources, access,
and mandate;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (D) to pursue opportunities for periodic,
temporary United States Government travel to Somalia,
consistent with any security concerns;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (E) to expand and deepen our engagement
with the regions of Somaliland and Puntland and other
regional administrations in order to promote good
governance, effective law enforcement, respect for
human rights, and stability in these regions;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (F) to explore, in consultation with the
Secretary of the Treasury, increased options for
pressuring individuals, governments, and other actors
who undertake economic activities that support armed
opposition groups and violence in Somalia;
and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (G) to develop, in consultation with the
Administrator of the United States Agency for
International Development, creative and flexible
mechanisms for delivering basic humanitarian assistance
to the people of Somalia while minimizing the risk of
significant diversion to armed opposition
groups.</DELETED>
That the Senate--
(1) acknowledges the urgency of addressing the threats to
United States national security in Somalia and the conditions
that foster those threats;
(2) reaffirms its commitment to stand with all the people
of Somalia who aspire to a future free of terrorism and
violence through advancing political reconciliation and
building legitimate and inclusive governance institutions;
(3) recognizes the difficult, but very important, work
being done by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to
help secure parts of Mogadishu, and reaffirms its support for
the mission;
(4) calls on the Transitional Federal Government in
Somalia--
(A) to cease immediately any use of child soldiers;
(B) to ensure better accountability and
transparency for all received security assistance;
(C) to renew its commitment to political
reconciliation; and
(D) to take necessary steps toward becoming a more
legitimate and inclusive government in the eyes of the
people of Somalia;
(5) calls on all actors and governments in the region,
particularly the Government of Eritrea, to play a productive
role in helping to bring about peace and stability to Somalia,
including ceasing to provide any financial or material support
to al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups in Somalia;
(6) welcomes efforts by the President to bring greater
focus and resources toward understanding and monitoring the
situation in Somalia;
(7) urges the President to develop a comprehensive strategy
to ensure that all United States humanitarian, diplomatic,
political, and counterterrorism programs in Somalia and the
wider Horn of Africa are coordinated and making progress toward
the long-term goal of establishing stability, respect for human
rights, and functional, inclusive governance in Somalia;
(8) urges the President and Secretary of State, as part of
a comprehensive strategy--
(A) to provide greater support for a range of
diplomatic initiatives to engage clan leaders, business
leaders, and civil society leaders in Somalia and the
Somali Diaspora in political reconciliation and
consensus-building;
(B) to ensure better oversight, monitoring, and
transparency of all United States security assistance
provided to the TFG;
(C) to increase and strengthen the United States
diplomatic team working on Somalia, including the
appointment of a senior envoy, and to ensure that these
officials have the necessary resources, access, and
mandate;
(D) to pursue opportunities for periodic, temporary
United States Government travel to Somalia, consistent
with any security concerns;
(E) to expand and deepen our engagement with the
regional administration of Puntland and other regional
administrations in order to promote good governance,
effective law enforcement, respect for human rights,
and stability in these regions;
(F) to provide additional humanitarian,
development, and security assistance to the region of
Somaliland, recognizing the positive developments in
that region with respect to consolidating multi-party
democracy, which was evident in the recent election
there;
(G) to outline punitive measures and incentives
that can be used with the Government of Eritrea to
bring a halt to its financial and material support for
armed opposition groups in Somalia, including steps to
improve bilateral relations and to push for a
resolution of Eritrea's border dispute with Ethiopia
consistent with the arbitration decision of the
Ethiopia-Eritrea Border Commission;
(H) to explore, in consultation with the Secretary
of the Treasury, increased options for pressuring
individuals, governments, and other actors who
undertake economic activities that support al Shabaab
and other armed opposition groups in Somalia; and
(I) to develop, in consultation with the
Administrator of the United States Agency for
International Development, creative and flexible
mechanisms for delivering basic humanitarian and
development assistance to the people of Somalia while
minimizing the risk of significant diversion to armed
opposition groups.
Calendar No. 588
111th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. RES. 573
_______________________________________________________________________
RESOLUTION
Urging the development of a comprehensive strategy to ensure stability
in Somalia, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
September 24, 2010
Reported with an amendment and an amendment to the preamble