Whereas Somalia has been without a
functioning central government since 1991, resulting in lawlessness and an
increasingly desperate humanitarian situation;
Whereas, despite the return of the
internationally recognized Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to Mogadishu
and ongoing diplomatic efforts through the Djibouti Peace Process, supported by
the United Nations, there has been little improvement in the governance or
stability of southern and central Somalia, and armed opposition groups continue
to exploit this situation;
Whereas the traditional mediation role
played by Somali elders has been eroded as the dynamics of conflict and the
proliferation of weapons make it difficult to influence warring parties;
Whereas, since 2007, armed violence has
resulted in the deaths of at least 21,000 people in Somalia and the
displacement of nearly 2,000,000 people, including over 500,000 refugees in
Kenya, Yemen, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Tanzania, and Uganda;
Whereas the United Nations estimates that
3,200,000 people, or 43 percent of the population of Somalia, are in need of
humanitarian assistance and livelihood support to survive;
Whereas the United Nations reports that
almost 1,000,000 displaced Somalis in need of aid cannot be reached by United
Nations refugee and food agencies because of growing insecurity and the threat
of kidnappings to staff;
Whereas local humanitarian organizations
are trying to meet the needs of the Somali people by restoring basic social
services in urban and rural communities, which places them on the front lines
of the conflict and make them vulnerable targets for killings, kidnappings, or
being accused of working for foreign governments;
Whereas al Shabaab, which has been
designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the Department of State, and
other armed groups continue to wage war against the Transitional Federal
Government in Mogadishu and one another to gain control over territory in
Somalia;
Whereas al Shabaab has claimed
responsibility for many bombings—including suicide attacks—in Mogadishu, as
well as in central and northern Somalia, typically targeting officials of the
Government of Somalia and perceived allies of the TFG;
Whereas, according to Human Rights Watch,
al Shabaab is subjecting inhabitants of areas under its control in southern
Somalia to executions, cruel punishments, including amputations and floggings,
and repressive social control;
Whereas the human rights situation in
Somalia has dramatically worsened over the past several years with increased
numbers of killings, torture, kidnappings, and rape;
Whereas the 2009 Department of State
Country Terrorism Report notes that Somalia’s fragile transitional
Federal government, protracted state of violent instability, its long,
unguarded coastline, porous borders, and proximity to the Arabian Peninsula,
made the country an attractive location for international terrorists seeking a
transit or launching point for operations in Somalia or
elsewhere
;
Whereas the situation in southern and
central Somalia, particularly the activity of al Shabaab, poses direct threats
to the stability of Puntland and Somaliland regions, as well as the stability
of neighboring states and the wider region;
Whereas al Shabaab leaders have stated
their intent to provide recruits and support for al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula in Yemen;
Whereas the Government of Eritrea has
provided military and financial support for armed opposition groups, including
al Shebaab, in part as a proxy front in its continuing tensions with
Ethiopia;
Whereas, according to the most recent
report by the United Nations Somalia Monitoring Group, arms, ammunitions, and
military or dual-use equipment continue to enter Somalia at a fairly steady
rate, in violation of the general and complete arms embargo imposed in
1992;
Whereas, in July 2009, the Department of
State confirmed that, in addition to other support for the TFG, it had provided
cash to purchase weapons and ammunitions for the TFG’s efforts to repel
the onslaught of extremist forces which are intent on destroying the Djibouti
peace process
;
Whereas, according to most recent report
by the United Nations Somalia Monitoring Group, [d]espite infusions of
foreign training and assistance, government security forces remain ineffective,
disorganized and corrupt — a composite of independent militias loyal to senior
government officials and military officers who profit from the business of war
and resist their integration under a single command
;
Whereas, on April 13, 2010, President
Barack Obama issued an executive order to sanction or freeze the assets of
militants who threaten, both directly and indirectly, the stability of Somalia,
as well as individuals involved in piracy off Somalia’s coast;
Whereas, in March 2009, at a hearing of
the Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs of the Senate, Andrew
Liepman, Deputy Director of Intelligence at the National Counterterrorism
Center, noted that [s]ince 2006, a number of U.S. citizens [have]
traveled to Somalia, possibly to train in extremist training
camps
;
Whereas, in September 2009, at a hearing
of the Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs of the Senate, the
Director of the National Counterterrorism Center Michael Leiter testified that
the potential for al-Qaeda operatives in Somalia to commission Americans
to return to the United States and launch attacks against the Homeland remains
of significant concern
;
Whereas al Shabaab has claimed
responsibility for the bombings in Kampala, Uganda on July 11, 2010, which
killed 76 people, including one American, and wounded scores of other people;
and
Whereas the extraordinary and ongoing
crisis in Somalia has enormous humanitarian consequences and direct national
security implications for the United States and our allies in the region: Now
therefore be it
That the Senate—
(1)acknowledges the urgency
of addressing the threats to United States national security in Somalia and the
conditions that foster those threats;
(2)reaffirms its commitment
to stand with all the people of Somalia who aspire to a future free of
terrorism and violence through advancing political reconciliation and building
legitimate and inclusive governance institutions;
(3)recognizes the difficult,
but very important, work being done by the African Union Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM) to help secure parts of Mogadishu, and reaffirms its support for the
mission;
(4)calls on the Transitional
Federal Government in Somalia—
(A)to cease immediately any
use of child soldiers;
(B)to ensure better
accountability and transparency for all received security assistance;
(C)to renew its commitment
to political reconciliation; and
(D)to take necessary steps
toward becoming a more legitimate and inclusive government in the eyes of the
people of Somalia;
(5)calls on all actors and
governments in the region, particularly the Government of Eritrea, to play a
productive role in helping to bring about peace and stability to Somalia,
including ceasing to provide any financial or material support to al Shabaab
and other armed opposition groups in Somalia;
(6)welcomes efforts by the
President to bring greater focus and resources toward understanding and
monitoring the situation in Somalia;
(7)urges the President to
develop a comprehensive strategy to ensure that all United States humanitarian,
diplomatic, political, and counterterrorism programs in Somalia and the wider
Horn of Africa are coordinated and making progress toward the long-term goal of
establishing stability, respect for human rights, and functional, inclusive
governance in Somalia;
(8)urges the President and
Secretary of State, as part of a comprehensive strategy—
(A)to provide greater
support for a range of diplomatic initiatives to engage clan leaders, business
leaders, and civil society leaders in Somalia and the Somali Diaspora in
political reconciliation and consensus-building;
(B)to ensure better
oversight, monitoring, and transparency of all United States security
assistance provided to the TFG;
(C)to increase and
strengthen the United States diplomatic team working on Somalia, including the
appointment of a senior envoy, and to ensure that these officials have the
necessary resources, access, and mandate;
(D)to pursue opportunities
for periodic, temporary United States Government travel to Somalia, consistent
with any security concerns;
(E)to expand and deepen our
engagement with the regional administration of Puntland and other regional
administrations in order to promote good governance, effective law enforcement,
respect for human rights, and stability in these regions;
(F)to provide additional
humanitarian, development, and security assistance to the region of Somaliland,
recognizing the positive developments in that region with respect to
consolidating multi-party democracy, which was evident in the recent election
there;
(G)to outline punitive
measures and incentives that can be used with the Government of Eritrea to
bring a halt to its financial and material support for armed opposition groups
in Somalia, including steps to improve bilateral relations and to push for a
resolution of Eritrea's border dispute with Ethiopia consistent with the
arbitration decision of the Ethiopia-Eritrea Border Commission;
(H)to explore, in
consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, increased options for
pressuring individuals, governments, and other actors who undertake economic
activities that support al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups in
Somalia; and
(I)to develop, in
consultation with the Administrator of the United States Agency for
International Development, creative and flexible mechanisms for delivering
basic humanitarian and development assistance to the people of Somalia while
minimizing the risk of significant diversion to armed opposition groups.