II 111th CONGRESS 2d Session S. 3008 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES February 11, 2010 Mr. Cornyn (for himself and Mr. Brownback) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations A BILL To establish a program to support a transition to a freely elected, open democracy in Iran.

1.

Short title

This Act may be cited as the Iran Democratic Transition Act of 2010.

2.

Findings

Congress makes the following findings: (1)The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has a history of violating the human rights of its own citizens. (2)According to the Department of State’s 2008 Country Report on Human Rights Practices, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its agents— (A)have tortured detainees and prisoners; and (B)have committed numerous arbitrary and unlawful killings, including the killing of juveniles. (3)On January 28, 2010, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran hanged 2 men accused of participating in protests following the disputed June 12, 2009, presidential election. (4)On February 2, 2010, Ebrahim Raisi, a senior member of Iran’s judiciary, announced that 9 additional dissidents would soon be hanged for their opposition to the Islamic regime. (5)On June 12, 2009, the Islamic Republic of Iran staged a presidential election that— (A)was marred by— (i)fraud; (ii)the barring of candidate observers at many polling stations; (iii)a shut-down of Internet and text services by the regime; and (iv)violent repression of protests; and (B)despite widespread protests, resulted in the certification of incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as the winner. (6)The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran— (A)increasingly restricts the operation of international media within Iran, including the February 7, 2010, arrest of 7 people associated with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Persian language program, Radio Farda; and (B)imposes significant restrictions on Iranian press outlets, including— (i)the jailing and torturing of numerous media employees; and (ii)restricting Iranian citizens’ access to the Internet. (7)According to the Department of State’s 2009 International Religious Freedom report regarding Iran, in the 1-year period ending June 30, 2009— (A)respect for religious freedom in [Iran] continued to deteriorate; and (B)[g]overnment rhetoric and actions created a threatening atmosphere for nearly all non-Shi’a religious groups. (8)January 12, 2010, was the first day of a show trial for 7 Iranian Baha’i leaders accused of espionage, which could result in the imposition of the death penalty. (9)According to the 2008 Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism, published in April 2009, Iran— (A)remained the most significant state sponsor of terrorism; (B)has long employed terrorism to advance its key national security and foreign policy interests, which include regime survival, regional dominance, opposition to Arab-Israeli peace, and countering western influence, particularly in the Middle East; (C)continues to hinder the Middle East peace process by using the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Qods to arm, train, and fund militants and terrorist organizations, including Hamas, Lebanese Hizballah, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad; and (D)despite its pledge to support stabilization in Iraq, has used the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Qods to cultivate and support certain Iraqi Shi’a militant groups. (10)Iran’s support for militant and terrorist organizations— (A)has directly bolstered Hamas’ ability to strike Israel; and (B)includes the supply of arms to Hezbollah in direct violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701. (11)The report also states that— (A)despite a dramatic decrease in attacks in Iraq since August 2008, security remains fragile, in part because the Qods Force continued to provide lethal support to select Iraqi militant groups that target U.S., Iraqi and Coalition forces; and (B)Iranian weapons transfers to select Taliban members in Afghanistan in 2008 continued to threaten Afghan and NATO troops operating under UN mandate and undermine stabilization efforts in that country. (12)On October 26, 2005, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad stated, to those who doubt, to those who ask is it possible or those who do not believe, I say accomplishment of a world without America and Israel is both possible and feasible. (13)On June 2, 2008, Ahmadinejad stated that Israel— (A)will be wiped off the pages of history; and (B)is about to die and will soon be erased from the geographical scene. … Today, the time for the fall of the satanic power of the United States has come and the countdown to the annihilation of the emperor of power and wealth has started. (14)Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei— (A)gave a speech on March 4, 2009, in which he referred to the State of Israel as a cancerous tumor and indicated that negotiations with Israel were a big mistake; and (B)posted on his official website on January 27, 2010, the day will come when nations of the region will witness the destruction of the Zionist regime. (15)On September 21, 2009, Iran revealed to the International Atomic Energy Agency that it was constructing a second uranium enrichment at an underground site near Qom. (16)United States intelligence officials have said that despite this notification— (A)Iran originally intended for the facility to be kept secret; (B)the United States had been observing and analyzing the facility for several years; and (C)President Barack Obama has noted that the size and configuration of this facility is inconsistent with a peaceful program. (17)On February 3, 2010, Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair stated, in written testimony to Congress, Iran’s technical advancement, particularly in uranium enrichment, strengthens our 2007 NIE [National Intelligence Estimate] assessment that Iran has the scientific, technical and industrial capacity to eventually produce nuclear weapons, making the central issue its political will to do so. These advancements lead us to reaffirm our judgment from the 2007 NIE that Iran is technically capable of producing enough [highly enriched uranium] for a weapon in the next few years, if it chooses to do so.

3.

Declarations of policy toward Iran

Congress makes the following declarations: (1)The interests of the United States and international peace are threatened by the ongoing and destabilizing actions of the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, including its— (A)massive, systematic, and extraordinary violations of the human rights of its own citizens; (B)continued interference with the internal affairs of its neighbors, including Iraq and Afghanistan; (C)support for, and facilitation of, terrorist activities; and (D)attempts to develop weapons of mass destruction and long-range missile delivery systems. (2)It should be the policy of the United States to deny the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran the ability to continue— (A)to oppress the people of Iran and use violence and executions against pro-democracy protestors and regime opponents; (B)to interfere in the internal affairs of its neighbors, including Iraq and Afghanistan; (C)to finance, provide safe-haven, or otherwise support terrorist organizations; or (D)to develop chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons, and ballistic missile delivery systems. (3)It should be the policy of the United States— (A)to fully and publicly support efforts made by the people of Iran to oppose and remove the regime headed by Supreme Leader Ali Hoseyni Khamenei and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad from power in Iran; and (B)to promote the emergence of a freely elected, open, and democratic government to replace the political system of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

4.

Assistance to support a transition to a freely elected, open democratic government in Iran

(a)

Authorization To provide assistance

(1)

In general

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President is authorized to support a transition to a freely elected, open, democratic government in Iran by providing eligible Iranian democratic opposition organizations with the assistance set forth in this subsection. (2)

Assistance for broadcasting and other communications

(A)

In general

The President may grant assistance directly to Iranian democratic opposition organizations for the communication and dissemination of accurate and independent information to the Iranian people through radio, television, Internet, cellular telephone, short message service, and other media. (B)

Use of existing authority to support democracy

Notwithstanding any other provision of law that may restrict or prohibit aid to Iran, Congress urges the President to fully utilize existing authorities and funding, including under the Iran Freedom Support Act (Public Law 109–293) and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111–84), to support and promote democracy in Iran through assistance for pro-democracy broadcasting into Iran and the dissemination of accurate and independent information to the Iranian people through various media. (3)

Humanitarian assistance

Notwithstanding any other laws that may bar aid to Iran, Congress urges the President to use existing authorities under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) to provide humanitarian assistance to individuals or groups determined by the President to be victims of repression by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, particularly those individuals or groups eligible for assistance under paragraph (1). (4)

Authorization of appropriations

(A)

In general

There are authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State such sums as may be necessary for fiscal year 2010 to carry out this subsection. (B)

Availability of funds

Amounts authorized to be appropriated under this section— (i)are in addition to amounts otherwise available for the purposes described in this section; and (ii)shall remain available until expended. (b)

Notification requirement

Not later than 15 days before each obligation of assistance under this section, the President shall notify the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, in accordance with the procedures applicable to reprogramming notifications under section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394–1). (c)

Eligibility criteria

An Iranian democratic opposition organization may receive assistance under subsection (a) only if the President determines that the organization— (1)includes a broad spectrum of Iranian individuals or groups that have a demonstrable and proven record of— (A)opposition to the current Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran; and (B)commitment to fostering cooperation among democratic opponents of the current Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran; (2)is dedicated to democratic values and supports the adoption of a democratic form of government in Iran; (3)is dedicated to respect for human rights, including the fundamental equality of women; (4)supports freedom of the press, freedom of speech, freedom of association, and freedom of religion; (5)officially opposes the use of violence and terrorism and has not been designated as a foreign terrorist organization under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189) at any time; (6)advocates the adherence by Iran to nonproliferation regimes for nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and materiel; and (7)is committed to peaceful relations with the countries surrounding Iran. (d)

Restriction on assistance

Assistance may not be provided under this section to any organization or individual that has, at any time— (1)engaged in military cooperation with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran; or (2)engaged in or supported an act of terrorism.

5.

Special Envoy for Democracy and Human Rights in Iran

(a)

Establishment

The President may appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, a Special Envoy for Democracy and Human Rights in Iran (referred to in this section as the Special Envoy), who shall hold the rank of Ambassador. (b)

Duties

(1)

Management of policy on promotion of democracy and human rights

The primary responsibility of the Special Envoy shall be to manage United States policy on the promotion of democracy and human rights in Iran. (2)

Other duties

The Special Envoy shall— (A)advise the President and the Secretary of State, as appropriate; (B)in coordination with the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs and the Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, make recommendations regarding effective strategies and tactics to achieve a democratic transition in Iran; (C)support and promote international efforts to promote human rights and political freedoms in Iran, including coordination between the United States and the United Nations, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and countries in the region; (D)establish the regional framework described in section 6; (E)coordinate with appropriate offices of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the National Security Council, and such other agencies as may be necessary to coordinate the establishment and operation of the regional framework; (F)serve as point of contact for opposition groups, nongovernmental organizations, and individuals and organizations from the Iranian diaspora to acquire greater information and reporting on conditions in Iran; (G)coordinate efforts with appropriate departments and agencies of the United States Government, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and individuals and organizations from the Iranian diaspora to acquire greater information and reporting on conditions in Iran; (H)oversee funding for, and provide consultative authority with respect to, public and private broadcasting into Iran; and (I)review strategies for improving the protection of human rights in Iran, including technical training and exchange programs.

6.

Sense of Congress on establishment of regional framework on human rights

(a)

Finding

Congress finds that human rights initiatives can be undertaken on a multilateral basis, as demonstrated by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which established a regional framework for discussing human rights, scientific and educational cooperation, and economic and trade issues. (b)

Sense of Congress

It is the sense of Congress that the United States Government should explore the possibility of a regional human rights dialogue on Iran that is modeled on the Helsinki process established by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, engaging in all countries in the region in a common commitment to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms.

7.

Other support for transition in Iran

(a)

Sense of Congress

It is the sense of the Congress that, if the Iranian people successfully restore full democratic rule to Iran, the United States should fully support Iran’s transition to a freely elected, open democracy by providing— (1)immediate and substantial humanitarian assistance to the Iranian people; and (2)democracy transition assistance to eligible Iranian parties and movements with democratic goals. (b)

Report to Congress on plan for United States support

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a report to Congress that describes a clear plan for implementation of this Act, including aid programs, recipients, and strategies to promote the emergence of a freely elected, open, and democratic government in Iran. (c)

Report to Congress after transition in Iran

Not later than 90 days after the establishment of a transitional government in Iran, the President shall submit a report to Congress, in classified and unclassified form, that describes a comprehensive plan for United States support of— (1)the Iranian people during the transition to a new, freely elected, open, and democratic government; (2)the new Iranian government’s efforts— (A)to restore full human rights to the people of Iran; and (B)protect these rights in the future; (3)the new Iranian government’s commitment to dismantling Iran’s nuclear weapons program; and (4)the new Iranian government’s cessation of Iran’s historical financing and other support of Hamas, Hezbollah, and other groups designated as foreign terrorist organizations by the Secretary of State.