111th CONGRESS 2d Session S. 2799 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES AN ACT To expand the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, to provide for the divestment of assets in Iran by State and local governments and other entities, to identify locations of concern with respect to transshipment, reexportation, or diversion of certain sensitive items to Iran, and for other purposes.

1.

Short title; table of contents

(a)

Short title

This Act may be cited as the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2009. (b)

Table of contents

The table of contents for this Act is as follows: Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. Sec. 2. Findings. Sec. 3. Sense of Congress regarding illicit nuclear activities and violations of human rights in Iran. TITLE I—Sanctions Sec. 101. Definitions. Sec. 102. Expansion of sanctions under the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996. Sec. 103. Economic sanctions relating to Iran. Sec. 104. Liability of parent companies for violations of sanctions by foreign subsidiaries. Sec. 105. Prohibition on procurement contracts with persons that export sensitive technology to Iran. Sec. 106. Increased capacity for efforts to combat unlawful or terrorist financing. Sec. 107. Reporting requirements. Sec. 108. Sense of Congress regarding the imposition of sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran. Sec. 109. Policy of the United States regarding Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps and its affiliates. Sec. 110. Policy of the United States with respect to Iran and Hezbollah. Sec. 111. Sense of Congress regarding the imposition of multilateral sanctions with respect to Iran. TITLE II—Divestment from certain companies that invest in Iran Sec. 201. Definitions. Sec. 202. Authority of State and local governments to divest from certain companies that invest in Iran. Sec. 203. Safe harbor for changes of investment policies by asset managers. Sec. 204. Sense of Congress regarding certain ERISA plan investments. TITLE III—Prevention of transshipment, reexportation, or diversion of sensitive items to Iran Sec. 301. Definitions. Sec. 302. Identification of locations of concern with respect to transshipment, reexportation, or diversion of certain items to Iran. Sec. 303. Destinations of Possible Diversion Concern and Destinations of Diversion Concern. Sec. 304. Report on expanding diversion concern system to countries other than Iran. TITLE IV—Effective date; sunset Sec. 401. Effective date; sunset.

2.

Findings

Congress makes the following findings: (1)The illicit nuclear activities of the Government of Iran and its support for international terrorism represent threats to the security of the United States, its strong ally Israel, and other allies of the United States around the world. (2)The United States and other responsible countries have a vital interest in working together to prevent the Government of Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. (3)The International Atomic Energy Agency has repeatedly called attention to Iran's illicit nuclear activities and, as a result, the United Nations Security Council has adopted a range of sanctions designed to encourage the Government of Iran to cease those activities and comply with its obligations under the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 (commonly known as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty). (4)The serious and urgent nature of the threat from Iran demands that the United States work together with its allies to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. (5)The United States and its major European allies, including the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, have advocated that sanctions be strengthened should international diplomatic efforts fail to achieve verifiable suspension of Iran's uranium enrichment program and an end to its illicit nuclear activities. (6)There is an increasing interest by States, local governments, educational institutions, and private institutions to seek to disassociate themselves from companies that conduct business activities in the energy sector of Iran, since such business activities may directly or indirectly support the efforts of the Government of Iran to achieve a nuclear weapons capability. (7)Black market proliferation networks continue to flourish in the Middle East, allowing countries like Iran to gain access to sensitive dual-use technologies. (8)The Government of Iran continues to engage in serious, systematic, and ongoing violations of human rights and religious freedom, including illegitimate prolonged detention, torture, and executions. Such violations have increased in the aftermath of the presidential election in Iran on June 12, 2009.

3.

Sense of Congress regarding illicit nuclear activities and violations of human rights in Iran

It is the sense of Congress that— (1)international diplomatic efforts to address Iran's illicit nuclear efforts and support for international terrorism are more likely to be effective if the President is empowered with the explicit authority to impose additional sanctions on the Government of Iran; (2)additional measures should be adopted by the United States to prevent the diversion and transshipment of sensitive dual-use technologies to Iran; (3)the concerns of the United States regarding Iran are strictly the result of the actions of the Government of Iran; (4)the people of the United States— (A)have a long history of friendship and exchange with the people of Iran; (B)regret that developments in recent decades have created impediments to that friendship; (C)hold the people of Iran, their culture, and their ancient and rich history in the highest esteem; and (D)remain deeply concerned about continuing human rights abuses in Iran; (5)the President should— (A)continue to press the Government of Iran to respect the internationally recognized human rights and religious freedoms of its citizens; (B)identify the officials of the Government of Iran that are responsible for continuing and severe violations of human rights and religious freedom in Iran; and (C)take appropriate measures to respond to such violations, including by— (i)prohibiting officials the President identifies as being responsible for such violations from entry into the United States; and (ii)freezing the assets of those officials; and (6)additional funding should be provided to the Secretary of State to document, collect, and disseminate information about human rights abuses in Iran, including serious abuses that have taken place since the presidential election in Iran conducted on June 12, 2009.

Passed the Senate January 28, 2010. Secretary