1.This Act may be cited as the
Foreign Intelligence and Information
Commission Act
.
2.In this Act:
(1)2005 National
Intelligence StrategyThe term 2005 National Intelligence
Strategy means the National Intelligence Strategy of the United States
of America released by the Director of National Intelligence on October 26,
2005.
(2)2006 Annual
Report of the United States Intelligence Community and 2006 Annual
ReportThe terms 2006 Annual Report of the United States
Intelligence Community
and 2006 Annual Report mean the
2006 Annual Report of the United States Intelligence Community released by the
Director of National Intelligence in February 2007.
(3)The
term Commission means the Foreign Intelligence and Information
Commission established in section 4(a).
(4)Foreign
intelligence, intelligenceThe terms foreign
intelligence
and intelligence have the meaning given those
terms in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
401a).
(5)The
term information includes information of relevance to the foreign
policy of the United States collected and conveyed through diplomatic reporting
and other reporting by personnel of the Government of the United States who are
not employed by an element of the intelligence community, including public and
open-source information.
(6)Strategic Plan
of the Department of StateThe term Strategic Plan of the
Department of State means the Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2007–2012
of the Department of State and the United States Agency for International
Development revised on May 7, 2007.
3.Congress makes the following
findings:
(1)Accurate, timely,
and comprehensive foreign intelligence and information are critical to the
national security of United States and the furtherance of the foreign policy
goals of the United States.
(2)It is in the
national security and foreign policy interest of the United States to ensure
the global deployment of personnel of the Government of the United States who
are responsible for collecting and reporting foreign intelligence and
information, including personnel from the intelligence community, the
Department of State, and other agencies and departments of the Government of
the United States, and that adequate resources are committed to effect such
collection and reporting.
(3)The 2005 National
Intelligence Strategy and the 2006 Annual Report of the United States
Intelligence Community identified 5 major missions of the intelligence
community to support the national security requirements of the United States,
the first 2 of which, defeating terrorism and preventing and countering the
spread of weapons of mass destruction, are global and transnational in
nature.
(4)The third major
mission identified by the 2005 National Intelligence Strategy and the 2006
Annual Report, bolstering the growth of democracy and sustaining peaceful
democratic states, requires a global commitment of collection, reporting, and
analytical capabilities.
(5)The 2005 National
Intelligence Strategy and the 2006 Annual Report identify as a major mission
the need to anticipate developments of strategic concern and identify
opportunities as well as vulnerabilities for decision makers
.
(6)The 2006 Annual
Report provides the following:
(A)In a world
in which developments in distant reaches of the globe can quickly affect
American citizens and interests at home and abroad, the Intelligence Community
must alert policy makers to problems before they escalate and provide insights
into their causes and effects. Analysis must do more than just describe what is
happening and why; it must identify a range of opportunities for (and likely
consequences of) diplomatic, military, law enforcement, economic, financial, or
homeland security action. To support policymakers, the Intelligence Community
should develop, sustain, and maintain access to expertise on every region,
every transnational security issue, and every threat to the American
people.
.
(B)We still
need to re-balance, integrate, and optimize collection capabilities to meet
current and future customer and analytic priorities. Collection is . . . what
gives the [Intelligence Community] its competitive advantage
in
protecting the United States and its interests.
.
(C)One
challenge to improving the coverage of emerging and strategic issues across the
Intelligence Community has been the diversion of resources to current crisis
support …
.
(D)Collection
against terrorists in places like Iraq and Afghanistan took a substantial share
of the [Intelligence Community's] resources and efforts in FY
2006.
.
(E)With so
many [Intelligence Community] resources dedicated to the War on Terror and WMD
programs in closed regimes, the [Intelligence] Community's collection efforts
still have to devote significant attention to potential or emerging threats of
strategic consequence.
.
(7)On January 23,
2007, the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Collection testified to
the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate that there is a need
to get the Intelligence Community back to what I grew up calling global
reach
, stating that we don't have that today
. She
further testified that our challenge is … with [Congress] help [to get
back] to a place where we can do global reach, and pay attention to places that
we are not.
.
(8)On February 14,
2008, the Director of National Intelligence testified to the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the Senate that certainly current crisis support
takes a disproportionate share
of intelligence resources over emerging
and strategic issues.
(9)In responses to
questions posed by the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate in
advance of the February 5, 2009, hearing on the nomination of Leon Panetta to
be Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Mr. Panetta stated that
I am also concerned that we have not devoted sufficient resources to a
broader set of national intelligence challenges—such as Russia, China, the
global economic downturn, as well as unstable and weak governments in places
such as Africa and Latin America.
.
(10)On February 12,
2009, the Director of National Intelligence testified to the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the Senate that I'd say the most significant gaps are
the areas that are not traditional State threats, that we have not figured out
the right way to collect information and we have not grown the analysts to do
it. … We’re not as good with non-state actors.
.
(11)On March 26,
2009, the Director of National Intelligence stated that We re-evaluate
that National Intelligence Priority Framework formally ever six months and
informally, as we have. And its quite remarkable, if you—you know those
time-lapse pictures where things change? If you showed a time-lapse picture of
that National Intelligence Priority Framework, you’d see, sort of, colors
shifting over time as things came up, in terms of their threat or in terms of
an opportunity that they—so I just, I think it’s a mistake to tie us down to,
this is my important priority. There are enduring things we have to spend a lot
of time on because you can’t instantly generate intelligence about a country
that’s very good at keeping its secrets that you know is going to be a factor
for a long time. And we have to work on those—we have to work on those every
time. We have to keep an excellent baseline understanding of what’s going on in
the world, but then we need to be able to flex.
.
(12)The National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (hereinafter referred to
as the 9/11 Commission
) reported that To find sanctuary,
terrorist organizations have fled to some of the least governed, most lawless
places in the world. The intelligence community has prepared a world map that
highlights possible terrorist havens, using no secret intelligence—just
indicating areas that combine rugged terrain, weak governance, room to hide or
receive supplies, and low population density with a town or city near enough to
allow necessary interaction with the outside world. Large areas scattered
around the world meet these criteria.
.
(13)The 9/11
Commission recommended that the U.S. Government must identify and
prioritize actual or potential terrorist sanctuaries. For each, it should have
a realistic strategy to keep possible terrorists insecure and on the run, using
all elements of national power. We should reach out, listen to, and work with
other countries that can help.
.
(14)On May 6, 2008,
the Acting Director of the National Counterterrorism Center testified to the
Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate that I wish I had more
resources to dedicate to longer-term threats, absolutely,
that
much of the information about the instability that can lead to safe
havens or ideological radicalization comes not from covert collection but from
open collection, best done by Foreign Service officers,
and that there
should be ways to direct resources toward whoever is best positioned to learn
about safe-haven conditions.
(15)On November 1,
2005, the Director of National Intelligence Open Source Center was established
with functions that include collection, analysis and research, training,
and information technology management to facilitate government-wide access and
use
of openly available information.
(16)The Strategic
Plan of the Department of State provides as a strategic goal that Our
diplomatic and development activities will reduce the threat or impact of
violent conflict by developing early warning … capability.
.
(17)On January 22,
2009, James Steinberg, a nominee to be Deputy Secretary of State, testified to
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that if we're going to
be effective in this move towards smart power, then we have to understand how
we reprioritize our resources to be able to achieve that … If we only think
about the crisis of the moment, then we're not prepared as new challenges
emerge. And we've seen this time and time again, that issues that were not
immediately on the radar screen don't get the attention they deserve. … So the
idea of looking forward and trying to figure out over the long-term where our
priorities need to be, how do we anticipate some of these challenges, and then
judge how we have sort of assigned resources to take care of not only those
current needs but also those long-term challenges I think has to be very
important and part of a strategic planning strategy … although we have a very
strong intelligence community, that there is a tremendous resource of people
who've lived and worked out in the countries that we're dealing with and that,
for a variety of reasons, the intelligence community is not always the best
equipped to do that. They bring their own special skills. But the Foreign
Service officers, and also people from outside the government, are enormous
sources of information and value. And we need to find better ways, in my
judgment, to have more contact with people in the private sector, from the
NGOs, from the business community, from universities and the like, as part of
our being able to touch and feel what's going on the ground.
.
(18)On January 22,
2009, Jacob Lew, a nominee to be Deputy Secretary of State, testified to the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that I believe strongly
that resources have to follow priorities. The decision of where we need to be
and what kinds of skills we need have to fit into a comprehensive strategy. …
We need to work with our other Cabinet agency partners. There are 20 government
agencies that have resources that work in or through our embassies. We don't
need to recreate the wheel; we need to cooperate with each other and make sure
that we have enough Foreign Service, civil service and locally engaged staff so
that we can effectively coordinate the efforts that the United States puts on
the ground. I think that it all begins with the strategic planning process. If
we don't have a clear vision of what we need and what we want, were not going
to be able to make the right resource allocation decisions. And we have to be
able to look beyond this week, next week, or even next year. … We need to reach
not just into the building but all the way into the field and make it clear
that we have every intention of bringing the resources of the State Department
to bear as we deal with these kinds of problems and challenges abroad, that we
have knowledge in our embassies, in our consulates, about a range of issues,
not just political issues—economic issues, scientific issues, cultural
issues—that give us the broadest understanding of what's going on in an
increasingly global world.
.
(19)The Legal
Attache offices and sub-offices of the Federal Bureau of Investigation are
currently located in 75 cities around the world, providing coverage for more
than 200 countries, territories, and islands.
(20)On October 4,
2007, Thomas V. Fuentes, Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation for Office of International Operations, testified to the
Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism of the Committee
on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives that the core
mission
of the Legal Attache offices is to establish and
maintain liaison with principal law enforcement and security services in
designated foreign countries … enabl[ing] the FBI to effectively and
expeditiously conduct its responsibilities in combating international
terrorism, organized crime, cyber crime, and general criminal matters,
and that while they do not conduct foreign intelligence
gathering,
typical duties
include … conducting
investigations in coordination with the host government; sharing investigative
leads and information; briefing Embassy counterparts from other agencies,
including law enforcement agencies, as appropriate, and Ambassadors … providing
situation reports concerning cultural protocol; [and] assessing political and
security climates.
.
(21)The July 2008
Preliminary Findings by the Project on National Security Reform, entitled
Enduring Security in an Unpredictable World: the Urgent Need for
National Security Reform,
included the following:
(A)The lack of a
national security strategy that clearly links ends, ways, and means and
assigned roles and responsibilities to each department has encouraged a
proliferation of department-level strategies. These department strategies are
uncoordinated and do not systematically generate capabilities required for
national objectives.
(B)The resource
allocation process is not driven by any overall national plan or strategy for
achieving broad objectives, and the results or effectiveness of the budgeting
process cannot be measured against such objectives.
(C)The national
security system tends to overemphasize traditional security threats and under
emphasize emerging challenges.
4.Establishment
and functions of the Commission
(a)There
is established in the legislative branch a Foreign Intelligence and Information
Commission.
(b)The
Commission shall—
(1)evaluate any
current processes or systems for the strategic integration of the intelligence
community, including the Open Source Center, and other elements of the United
States Government, including the Department of State, with regard to the
collection, reporting and analysis of foreign intelligence and
information;
(2)provide
recommendations to improve or develop such processes or systems to include the
development of an inter-agency strategy that identifies—
(A)the collection,
reporting, and analysis requirements of the United States Government;
(B)the elements of
the United States Government best positioned to meet collection and reporting
requirements;
(C)collection and
reporting missions for the intelligence community and other elements of the
United States Government based on the requirements of the United States
Government, comparative institutional advantages, and other relevant
factors;
(D)analytical
capabilities needed to achieve the requirements of the United States
Government; and
(E)inter-agency
budget and resource allocations necessary to achieve such collection,
reporting, and analytical requirements;
(3)evaluate the
extent to which current intelligence collection, reporting, and analysis
strategies are aimed at providing global coverage and anticipating future
threats, challenges, and crises;
(4)provide
recommendations on how to incorporate into the inter-agency strategy the means
to anticipate future threats, challenges, and crises, including by identifying
and supporting collection, reporting, and analytical capabilities which are
global in scope and which are directed at emerging, long-term, and strategic
targets;
(5)provide
recommendations on strategies for sustaining human and budgetary resources to
effect the global collection and reporting missions identified in the
inter-agency strategy, including the prepositioning of collection and reporting
capabilities;
(6)provide
recommendations for developing, clarifying, and, if necessary, bolstering
current and future collection and reporting roles and capabilities of elements
of the United States Government outside the intelligence community deployed
overseas;
(7)provide
recommendations related to the role of individual country missions in
contributing to the inter-agency strategy;
(8)evaluate the
extent to which the establishment of new embassies and out-of-embassy posts are
able to contribute to expanded global coverage and increased collection and
reporting and provide recommendations related to the establishment of new
embassies and out-of-embassy posts;
(9)provide
recommendations related to the establishment of any new executive branch
entity, or the expansion of the authorities of any existing executive branch
entity, as needed to improve the strategic integration described in paragraph
(1) and develop and oversee the implementation of the inter-agency
strategy;
(10)provide
recommendations on any legislative changes necessary to establish any new
entity or to expand the authorities of any existing entity, as described in
paragraph (9);
(11)provide
recommendations on processes for developing and presenting to Congress budget
requests for each relevant element of the United States Government that reflect
the allocations identified in the inter-agency strategy and for congressional
oversight of the development and implementation of the strategy; and
(12)provide
recommendations on any institutional reforms related to the collection and
reporting roles of individual elements of the United States Government outside
the intelligence community, as well as any budgetary, legislative, or other
changes needed to achieve such reforms.
5.Members and
staff of the Commission
(a)Members of the
Commission
(1)The
Commission shall be composed of 10 members as follows:
(A)Two members
appointed by the majority leader of the Senate.
(B)Two members
appointed by the minority leader of the Senate.
(C)Two members
appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
(D)Two members
appointed by the minority leader of the House of Representatives.
(E)One nonvoting
member appointed by the Director of National Intelligence.
(F)One nonvoting
member appointed by the Secretary of State.
(2)
(A)Members of the Commission shall be individuals
who—
(i)are
private citizens; and
(ii)have—
(I)knowledge and
experience in foreign information and intelligence collection, reporting, and
analysis, including clandestine collection and classified analysis, diplomatic
reporting and analysis, and collection of public and open source
information;
(II)knowledge and
experience in issues related to the national security and foreign policy of the
United States gained by serving as a senior official of the Department of
State, a member of the Foreign Service, an employee or officer of an
appropriate agency or department of the United States, or an independent
organization with expertise in the field of international affairs; or
(III)knowledge and
experience with foreign policy decisionmaking.
(B)The individuals appointed to the Commission should be
selected with a view to establishing diversity of experience with regard to
various geographic regions, functions, and issues.
(3)The appointments under subsection (a) shall be made
not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(4)Members shall be appointed for the life of the
Commission.
(5)Any
vacancy of the Commission shall not affect the powers of the Commission and
shall be filled in the manner in which the original appointment was
made.
(6)The
members of the Commission shall designate 1 of the voting members to serve as
the chair of the Commission.
(7)Six
members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum for purposes of transacting
the business of the Commission.
(8)The
Commission shall meet at the call of the chair and shall meet regularly, not
less than once every 3 months, during the life of the Commission.
(b)
(1)The chair of the Commission may, without regard to the
civil service laws and regulations, appoint and terminate an executive director
and, in consultation with the executive director, appoint and terminate such
other additional personnel as may be necessary to enable the Commission to
perform its duties. In addition to the executive director and 1 full-time
support staff for the executive director, there shall be additional staff with
relevant intelligence and foreign policy experience to help support the
Commission's work.
(2)Selection of
the executive directorThe executive director shall be selected
with the approval of a majority of the members of the Commission.
(3)
(A)The executive director shall be compensated at the rate
payable for level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5,
United States Code.
(B)The
chair of the Commission may fix the compensation of other staff of the
Commission without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of
chapter 53 of title 5, United States Code, relating to classification of
positions and General Schedule pay rates, except that the rate of pay for such
personnel may not exceed the rate payable for level IV of the Executive
Schedule under section 5315 of such title.
(c)This Commission is authorized to procure temporary or
intermittent services of experts and consultants as necessary to the extent
authorized by section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, at rates not to
exceed the maximum annual rate of basic pay payable under section 5376 of such
title.
(d)Staff and
services of other agencies or department of the United
StatesUpon the request of the Commission, the head of an agency
or department of the United States may detail, on a reimbursable or
nonreimbursable basis, any of the personnel of that department or agency to the
Commission to assist it in carrying out this Act. The detail of any such
personnel shall be without interruption or loss of civil service or Foreign
Service status or privilege.
(e)The appropriate agencies or departments of the United
States shall cooperate with the Commission in expeditiously providing to the
members and staff of the Commission appropriate security clearances to the
extent possible pursuant to existing procedures and requirements.
6.Powers and
duties of the Commission
(a)
(1)The Commission may, for the purpose of carrying out this
Act—
(A)hold hearings,
sit and act at times and places in the United States and in countries in which
the United States has a diplomatic presence, take testimony, and receive
evidence as the Commission considers advisable to carry out this Act;
and
(B)subject to
subsection (b)(1), require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance and
testimony of such witnesses and the production of such books, records,
correspondence, memoranda , papers, and documents, as the Commission considers
necessary.
(b)
(1)
(A)A subpoena may be issued under this section only—
(i)by
the agreement of the chair of the Commission; and
(ii)by
the affirmative vote of 5 members of the Commission.
(B)Subject
to subparagraph (A), subpoenas issued under this section may be issued under
the signature of the chair or any member designated by a majority of the
Commission and may be served by any person designated by the chair or by a
member designated by a majority of the Commission.
(2)
(A)In the case of contumacy or failure to obey a subpoena
issued under this section, the United States district court for the judicial
district in which the subpoenaed person resides, is served, or may be found, or
where the subpoena is returnable, may issue an order requiring such person to
appear at any designated place to testify or to produce documentary or other
evidence. Any failure to obey the order of the court may be punished by the
court as a contempt of that court.
(B)In the case of any failure of any witness to comply
with any subpoena or to testify when summoned under authority of this section,
the Commission may, by majority vote, certify a statement of fact constituting
such failure to the appropriate United States attorney, who may bring the
matter before the grand jury for its action, under the same statutory authority
and procedures as if the United States attorney had received a certification
under sections 102, 103, or 104 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (2
U.S.C. 192, 193, and 194).
(c)Information
from Federal agenciesThe Commission may secure directly from any
agency or department of the United States such information as the Commission
considers necessary to carry out this Act. Upon request of the chair of the
Commission, the head of such agency or department shall furnish such
information to the Commission, subject to applicable law.
(d)The Commission may use the United States mails in the
same manner and under the same conditions as an agency or department of the
United States.
(e)The Administrator of the General Services Administration
shall provide to the Commission on a reimbursable basis (or, in the discretion
of the Administrator, on a nonreimbursable basis) such administrative support
services as the Commission may request to carry out this Act.
(f)Administrative
proceduresThe Commission may adopt such rules and regulations,
relating to administrative procedure, as may be reasonably necessary to enable
it to carry out this Act.
(g)
(1)The members and staff of the Commission may, with the
approval of the Commission, conduct such travel as is necessary to carry out
this Act.
(2)Members
of the Commission shall serve without pay but shall be allowed travel expenses,
including per diem in lieu of subsistence, at rates authorized for employees of
agencies under subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code, while
away from their homes or regular places of business in the performance of
services for the Commission.
(h)No
member of the Commission may receive a gift or benefit by reason of such
member's service on the Commission.
7.
(a)
(1)Not later than 1 year after the members of the Commission
are appointed under section 5(a), the Commission shall submit an interim report
to the congressional intelligence committees setting forth the preliminary
findings and recommendations of the Commission described in section
4(b).
(2)Not later than 4 months after the submission of the report
required by paragraph (1), the Commission shall submit a final report setting
forth the final findings and recommendations of the Commission described in
section 4(b) to the following:
(A)The
President.
(B)The Director of
National Intelligence.
(C)The Secretary of
State.
(D)The congressional
intelligence committees.
(E)The Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate.
(F)The Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
(b)Individual or
dissenting viewsEach member of the Commission may include that
member's dissenting views in a report required by paragraph (1) or (2) of
subsection (a).
(c)The reports required by paragraphs (1) and (2) of
subsection (a), including any finding or recommendation of such report, shall
be submitted in both an unclassified and a classified form.
8.The Commission shall terminate 60 days after
the submission of the report required by section 7(a)(2).
9.Nonapplicability
of Federal Advisory Committee ActThe Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C.
App.) shall not apply to the Commission.
10.
(a)Transfer from
the national intelligence programOf the amounts available for
the National Intelligence Program for fiscal year 2009, $4,000,000 shall be
available for transfer to the Commission to carry out this Act.
(b)The
amounts made available to the Commission pursuant to subsection (a) shall
remain available until the termination of the Commission.