Whereas, on October 11, 2002, the House of Representatives
passed H.J. Res. 114, Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq
Resolution of 2002, authorizing the President to use military force to “defend
the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed
by Iraq” and “to enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council
resolutions against Iraq”;
Whereas, on March 17, 2003, President George W. Bush gave
Saddam Hussein and his sons, Uday and Qusay, an ultimatum to leave Iraq within
48 hours to avoid war;
Whereas in providing the rationale for this ultimatum,
President Bush pointed to the universal consensus of intelligence gathered by
the United States and other governments which concluded Iraq continued to
develop, possess, and conceal weapons of mass destruction and the means to
deliver them; the threat posed to the United States and other countries by the
growing threat of chemical, biological or nuclear terrorist attacks launched by
or in collusion with the Hussein regime; the failure of peaceful efforts to
disarm the Iraqi regime; the unanimously approved United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1441, which found that Iraq “has been and remains in
material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including
resolution 687, in particular through Iraq’s failure to cooperate with United
Nations inspectors and the IAEA, and to complete the [disarmament] actions
required under paragraphs 8 to 13 of resolution 687”; the Hussein regime’s use
of weapons of mass destruction against Iraq’s neighbors and against Iraq’s
people; the regime’s history of reckless aggression in the Middle East; the
aid, training, and harbor the regime had given to terrorists, including
operatives of Al Qaeda; the United States Congress’ overwhelming vote on
October 11, 2002, to support the use of force in Iraq; the need to disarm
Saddam Hussein in order to diminish the terrorist and security threat to
America and the world; and the United States of America’s sovereign authority
to use force in assuring its own national security;
Whereas, on March 19, 2003, after Saddam Hussein and his
sons refused to leave Iraq, the United States led an international coalition
military force in launching Operation Iraqi Freedom to disarm and topple the
Hussein regime, bring freedom to the people of Iraq, and establish a democratic
government in Iraq capable of defending and sustaining itself and acting as an
ally in the War on Terror;
Whereas the Hussein regime was toppled on or about April
9, 2003;
Whereas a Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was
subsequently established in Iraq to provide governance and to facilitate the
transition of Iraq into a democracy capable of providing its own internal
security, sustaining itself, and acting as an ally in the War on Terror;
Whereas from March 19, 2003 to the present time, the
United States and Coalition Forces from 39 countries have engaged many enemies
on the battlefields of Iraq, including the “Fedayeen Saddam” and other militias
loyal to Saddam and the Baathist resistance; various localized Sunni militias
providing protection to certain Sunni neighborhoods and population groups;
terrorist organizations, including Al Qaeda in Iraq; Shiite militias, including
Moqtada Al Sadr’s Mahdi Army; Shiite vigilante groups acting much like their
Sunni counterparts; Iranian supported Shiite groups, including the Supreme
Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq’s Badr Corps; and members of, as well as
forces trained and supplied by, the Qods Force of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard
and other Iranian agents;
Whereas, on December 28, 2004, Al Qaeda released an audio
message from Osama Bin Laden in which he stated, “The most important and
serious issue today for the world is this Third World War . . . . It is raging
in the land of the two rivers [Iraq]. The world's millstone and pillar is in
Baghdad, the capital of the caliphate.” He said “the whole world is watching
this war,” and it will end in “victory and glory or misery and
humiliation.”;
Whereas by December 2006, the security situation in Iraq
had severely deteriorated largely as the result of increased Sunni-Shiite
sectarian violence sparked by the February 22, 2006, bombing by Al Qaeda in
Iraq of the Askariya Shitte mosque in Samarra and fueled by the many violent
acts that followed which were perpetrated by Al Qaeda in Iraq and the various
other sectarian and political enemy groups competing for power and attempting
to defeat United States and coalition forces in Iraq;
Whereas in their report, The Way Forward—A New Approach,
the members of the Iraq Study Group stated they could “support a short-term
redeployment or surge of American combat forces to stabilize Baghdad, or to
speed up the training and equipping mission, if the United States commander in
Iraq determines that such steps would be effective”;
Whereas as a result of the deteriorating security
situation in Iraq, President Bush announced “A New Way Forward”, on January 10,
2007, which called for a surge of 28,500 American troops into Iraq to execute
new counter insurgency strategies, as outlined in FM 3–24
Counterinsurgency, under the command of that document’s principal author,
General David Petraeus;
Whereas President Bush showed great leadership, judgment,
and fortitude as commander in chief in ordering the adoption of the “surge
strategy”, despite being counseled by some of his top military advisors not to
pursue the troop build up;
Whereas the goal of the “surge strategy” was to increase
the size of the American military force on the ground in Iraq to secure the
Iraqi population by killing or capturing the terrorists and militia who had
unleashed the destructive wave of violence in Iraq since 2006, and to move
American forces into Iraqi neighborhoods to partner with Iraqi civilians and
security forces in clearing those neighborhoods of enemy forces and maintaining
security control to hold those areas once cleared;
Whereas President Bush and General Petraeus, among others,
believed that by increasing the size of the American force in Iraq and
following the counter-insurgency tactics developed in FM 3–24
Counterinsurgency, United States and Coalition forces, working with Iraqi
Security Forces, could bring safety and security to the Iraqi people; provide
the time necessary to train and equip Iraqi Security Forces, of which there are
now more than 613,000; and provide the Iraqi Government with the stable
security environment needed to bring about the reconciliation necessary to
establish that government’s relevance and authority throughout the
country;
Whereas one of the first signs of the success of the
“surge strategy” was the development of the Sunni “Awakening,” in which Sunni
tribal leaders in Anbar Province responded to, and allied themselves with,
United States military and Coalition forces in turning against Al Qaeda in
Iraq;
Whereas some of the most dangerous streets in the world
have become peaceful centers of commerce;
Whereas Anbar Province, where Marines have been stationed
throughout much of the war and which was once one of the most dangerous parts
of Iraq, has been pacified to the point at which on January 23, 2009, General
James Conway, the Commandant of the United States Marine Corps, explained that
the combat portion of the Iraq war is effectively over, stating “The time is
right for Marines in general terms to leave Iraq.”;
Whereas the mayor of Fallujah has declared the city to be
a “city of peace”;
Whereas since implementing the President’s “surge
strategy” in Iraq, civilian deaths have dropped by more than 90 percent since
December 2006, to levels not seen since 2004;
Whereas President Bush’s adoption of the “surge strategy”
has made Iraq a safer place for American troops;
Whereas since July 1, 2008, more American troops in Iraq
have been killed in accidents than by the enemy;
Whereas the surge strategy has delivered a significant
defeat to the terrorist and militia organizations that once controlled vast
areas of Iraq and were responsible for the formerly high levels of violence in
Iraq;
Whereas, on May 25, 2008, Ryan Crocker, the United States
Ambassador to Iraq, stated that Al Qaeda in Iraq “has never been closer to
defeat” and on July 25, 2008, said that the Sunni insurgency, writ large, is
“not much of a challenge any more” to Iraq’s future;
Whereas ethno-sectarian violence has diminished
significantly, falling 98 percent from its highest monthly death toll of 2,086,
recorded for December of 2006;
Whereas the security of the International Zone in Baghdad
(the Green Zone) was transferred to the Iraqi Security Forces on January 1,
2009;
Whereas 13 of Iraq’s 18 provinces are now entirely the
responsibility and under the control of Iraqi Security Forces;
Whereas the self-evident fact that al Qaeda in Iraq has
been defeated as a military force, a fact that has become clear over the past
year, beginning with statements made by Abu-Tariq, a local Al Qaeda leader near
Balad, in a letter captured by American forces in early 2008. In the letter,
Abu-Tariq states that as a result of the Sunni Awakening that followed the
implementation of the “surge strategy”, “The Americans and the apostates
launched their campaigns against us and we found ourselves in a circle not
being able to move, organize or conduct our operations . . . . This created
weakness and psychological defeat. This also created panic, fear and the
unwillingness to fight. The morale of the fighters went down . . . . There was
a total collapse in the security structure of the organization.”;
Whereas 17 of the 18 benchmarks, established by Congress
and signed into law on May 25, 2007, by President Bush as part of H.R. 2206,
the United States Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq
Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007, to provide for an objective analysis
of progress toward reconciliation and self-governance by the Iraqi Government
have been substantially or completely met since the “surge strategy” was
adopted;
Whereas one of the most important benchmarks was recently
met when new provincial elections were held successfully in Iraq on January 31,
2009;
Whereas the final unmet benchmark, increasing Iraqi
Security Force units’ capability of operating independently, requires a
continued United States presence to ensure full attainment in the
future;
Whereas, on February 4, 2009, Ambassador Ryan Crocker
stressed the importance of a continued United States presence in Iraq when he
said “Iraq’s development will be a long-term project, requiring the long-term
strategic commitment of the United States”;
Whereas there have been two legitimate, nationwide
elections in Iraq on January 30, 2005, and on December 15, 2005;
Whereas the Iraqis, on October 15, 2005, by popular vote,
ratified their constitution, which establishes the Rule of Law in Iraq;
and
Whereas the “surge strategy” has ushered in a level of
safety and security in Iraq such that the United States and the Government of
Iraq were able to sign a Status of Forces Agreement on November 17, 2008, and
which took effect on January 1, 2009, that continues the transfer of security
responsibilities within Iraq to Iraqi forces and provides for the withdrawal of
United States forces from Iraq in 36 months by the end of 2011: Now, therefore,
be it
That—
(1)it is the sense of the House of
Representatives that the surge strategy articulated by President Bush as part
of A New Way Forward has succeeded in providing security and stability to the
Iraqi people, addressing the threat posed to the Government of Iraq and the
continued existence of a unified and independent country of Iraq by terrorist
organizations and sectarian militias, and facilitating the opportunity for the
Government of Iraq to make the decisions necessary for national reconciliation
and governance to occur; and
(2)the House of
Representatives—
(A)recognizes the enormous sacrifices made by
the men and women of the United States and Coalition forces from 39 countries
to secure the successes gained in Iraq and thanks these heroes for their
courage, nobility, and sacrifice to defend freedom and defeat our
enemies;
(B)extends its
gratitude to all those within the military and civilian departments and
agencies of the United States Government responsible for directing the
implementation of the “surge strategy,” including General David Petraeus and
Ambassador Ryan Crocker;
(C)recognizes the
importance and significance of victory in the Iraqi theater of the larger,
global struggle against radical, Islamic Jihadist terrorists; and
(D)commits itself to
working with President Obama and his administration to continue the progress
that has been made on the ground in Iraq since the “surge strategy” was
implemented, recognizing that a definable victory has been achieved in Iraq and
that history will judge President Bush’s successor by his ability to maintain
his predecessor’s victory.