1.Short title; table of
contents
(a)This Act may be cited as the International Biosecurity Act of
2010
.
(b)The table of contents for this Act is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings.
Sec. 3. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 4. International Biosecurity Initiative
(IBSI).
Sec. 5. International Biosecurity Task Force.
Sec. 6. Establishment of the Nonproliferation and
Counterterrorism Fellowship Program.
Sec. 7. Technical review and assessment of harmful biological
incident and activity investigation technologies.
Sec. 8. Review and assessment of global legal regime for
biosecurity.
Sec. 9. Reporting requirements.
Sec. 10. International disease outbreak information
sharing.
Sec. 11. Definitions.
2.Congress finds the following:
(1)The advance of
biological science is vital to increasing the health of humanity, ensuring the
well-being of the environment, and spurring economic growth.
(2)In 2001, letters
containing anthrax spores were distributed via the United States postal system,
infecting 22 people and resulting in five deaths, extensive social disruption,
and extensive costs for emergency response and remediation.
(3)In 2001, while
engaging the Taliban in Afghanistan, coalition forces came into possession of a
significant body of evidence that al-Qaeda was seeking to develop the
capability to conduct biological weapons attacks.
(4)In a time of
international terrorist threats and global health epidemics, United States
policy with regard to biological risks is in need of a well coordinated
strategy to ensure the effectiveness of efforts to protect the national
security and foreign policy interests of the United States.
(5)Biological risks
extend beyond biological weapons developed or used by foreign countries and
also include intentional release of harmful biological agents by non-state
groups or individuals, harmful outcomes through unintentional release or
unforeseen consequences of biological research and experimental biological
agents, and natural disease outbreaks.
(6)A
major disease outbreak affecting animals or crops, whether intentionally
inflicted or natural, anywhere in the world could threaten food supplies and
economic prosperity, potentially exacerbating broader security concerns.
(7)A
major disease outbreak against civilian populations, whether intentionally
inflicted or natural, anywhere in the world could cause devastating loss of
life and economic harm. Such an outbreak would have adverse implications for
United States national security and foreign policy.
(8)Improving global
capacity for monitoring and detecting disease outbreaks improves the ability of
the United States to counter both natural and man-made biological risks.
(9)A
well-coordinated strategy for countering harmful biological incidents that
integrates United States foreign policies will help ensure the health of
Americans as well as security against terrorism and other threats.
(10)In November 2009,
President Obama set forth a National Strategy for Countering Biological
Threats
.
(11)The changing geopolitical climate in which
a number of countries and non-state actors are seeking or have acquired weapons
of mass destruction indicates that the United States will require specialized
nonproliferation experts in addition to experts in regional security.
(12)The United States
national security community has focused primarily on technical and
international security solutions to international proliferation.
(13)There are limited
opportunities for the next generation of policy makers and nonproliferation
specialists to undertake interdisciplinary study in the area of
nonproliferation policy.
(14)Coordinating
foreign assistance and other international efforts to improve the ability of
partner countries to detect and respond to disease outbreaks benefits partner
nations and also improves the United States security by preventing the spread
of infectious disease.
3.It is the sense of
Congress that—
(1)emerging
biological technologies, while providing the promise for unprecedented
improvements in health and the environment, may pose a potential for harm, both
intentional and accidental or inadvertent;
(2)the
National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats
, released by
President Obama in November 2009, is a significant step toward enhancing
domestic and international biosecurity;
(3)because biological
risks do not heed political borders, United States policy to counter such risks
should include cooperation with other countries and improved coordination
within the United States Government;
(4)the United States
should work with other countries toward developing international standards and
an oversight framework for biological research to prevent and mitigate harmful
outcomes;
(5)the United States
strategy for monitoring, reducing, and responding to biological risks should
address both natural and man-made risks and should be able to identify and
mitigate the impact of both intentional and unintentional or unforeseen harmful
biological incidents;
(6)United States
collaboration with and assistance to foreign countries aimed at reducing
biological risks should be mutually beneficial and serve to counter natural or
man-made biological risks that are mutually determined to be of high
importance; and
(7)because the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction
(commonly referred to as the Biological Weapons Convention
or
BWC
) embodies the global norm against the development,
production, acquisition, and transfer of biological agents for hostile
purposes, United States policy should aim to strengthen the Biological Weapons
Convention by increasing its adherence, addressing its transparency and
compliance mechanisms, and strengthening its effectiveness to build confidence
internationally.
4.International
Biosecurity Initiative (IBSI)
(a)To
improve the United States international strategy for reducing and responding to
biological risks and to aid in the implementation of President Obama’s 2009
National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats
, the
Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal
agencies, shall establish an initiative to be known as the International
Biosecurity Initiative
.
(b)The
International Biosecurity Initiative shall—
(1)pursue efforts,
through multilateral and bilateral activities, to support, establish, and
implement internationally harmonized standards for assuring critical pathogen
and laboratory safety and security and for assessing broad social consequences,
including—
(A)working in
multilateral forums, including forums that engage the private sector, research,
and public health communities, to establish, based on international needs and
domestic lessons-learned, and regularly update international standards for
pathogen and laboratory safety and security;
(B)promoting
international codes of ethics to ensure safety and security and reinforcing
norms during the education and throughout the career of scientists in academia,
industry, or government;
(C)encouraging the
development and implementation of emergency reporting and response in the event
of a breach of pathogen or laboratory security; and
(D)providing
technical and financial assistance, including training, to other countries to
facilitate the adoption, sustainable implementation, and enforcement of
national measures in accordance with international standards for the safety,
transportation, and security of biological agents and laboratories;
(2)pursue efforts,
through bilateral, regional, and multilateral activities, to ensure a strong
global legal regime for biosecurity, including—
(A)working with other
countries to develop and strengthen the national criminal legislation and law
enforcement capabilities of such countries for detecting, interdicting,
investigating, and prosecuting criminal activities and harmonizing
international biosecurity legal efforts;
(B)developing, establishing, and promoting
common internationally harmonized standards, guidance, and best practices for
obtaining, handling, analyzing and sharing microbial forensic evidence;
(C)promoting appropriate information sharing,
that is in the national security interests of the United States, relating to
threats and to best practices, and promoting cooperation for preventing,
deterring, detecting, attributing, interdicting, investigating, and prosecuting
criminal or terrorist use of biological or toxin agents between the
intelligence community, United States Federal law enforcement, and
international law enforcement and security officials;
(D)promoting
international legal and technical cooperation to achieve the goals described in
subparagraphs (A) through (C); and
(E)providing
technical assistance to other countries, including training, to achieve the
goals described in subparagraphs (A) through (C);
(3)pursue strategies
to strengthen the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production
and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction (commonly referred to as the Biological Weapons
Convention
or BWC
) and its enforcement by—
(A)promoting universal membership in,
increased adherence to, effective implementation of, and compliance with the
BWC;
(B)developing an
action plan for increasing international adherence to the BWC;
(C)promoting stronger
confidence-building and other transparency measures designed to provide mutual
reassurance that national biodefense, threat assessment, and other activities
comply with the BWC;
(D)ensuring that
United States participation in BWC meetings is broadly inclusive of
representatives of relevant Federal departments and agencies; and
(E)supporting efforts
to strengthen the United Nations Secretary-General’s mechanism for
investigating allegations of biological weapons use and to establish a
multilateral capability to investigate alleged breaches of BWC
obligations;
(4)engage in
cooperative efforts to improve national, regional, and multinational
surveillance and response capabilities with respect to outbreaks of infectious
diseases, whether naturally occurring or man-made, including—
(A)working with
countries to ensure full compliance with World Health Organization disease
reporting obligations;
(B)supporting efforts, in coordination with
the Emerging Pandemic Threats program, to improve global capacity for
identifying, diagnosing, tracking, and reporting pathogens responsible for
possible infectious disease outbreaks of international significance,
including—
(i)improving
international laboratory capacity for expeditiously collecting, analyzing, and
identifying a broad array of pathogens including mutated strains which may
cause infectious disease outbreaks or may be used in a biological weapon;
and
(ii)improving
international capacity for effectively collecting, analyzing, transmitting, and
reporting validated data and public health information about such infectious
disease outbreaks;
(C)providing
assistance to international and regional health organizations to—
(i)enhance the
surveillance and reporting capabilities of the World Health Organization and
existing international regional and international health networks; and
(ii)develop new
international regional and international health networks;
(D)providing
assistance to facilitate standardization in the reporting of public health
information between and among developing countries and international health
organizations;
(E)working with the
Secretary of Health and Human Services to establish new country or regional
international Field Epidemiology Training Programs in eligible developing
countries;
(F)establishing and
providing assistance for short training courses in—
(i)laboratory
techniques relating to the identification, diagnosis, and tracking of pathogens
responsible for possible infectious disease outbreaks; and
(ii)techniques of
disease and syndrome surveillance reporting and rapid analysis of syndrome
information using Geographic Information System (GIS) tools;
(G)promoting efforts to make widely available,
especially in developing countries, medical and pharmaceutical measures to
counter infectious diseases, including through stockpiling of such measures;
and
(H)working with other
countries and multilateral and regional bodies to provide technical assistance
for developing biological and health response capabilities in other
countries;
(5)support the
development of international mechanisms that enhance the coordination and
implementation of biosecurity policies;
(6)facilitate the
alignment of foreign assistance for biosecurity with the public health needs of
recipient countries, including—
(A)assisting in the
planning, development, enhancement, and training of response capabilities for
disease outbreaks in recipient countries and regions; and
(B)assisting in the
promotion of effective cooperation among public health, law enforcement, and
other responder communities in recipient countries and regions;
(7)engage in
multilateral and bilateral discussions of biodefense programs and control of
sensitive biotechnologies to ensure that they are limited to prophylactic,
protective, and other peaceful purposes;
(8)develop an assessment of, and appropriate
policies to address, the potential security threats and societal and ethical
impacts posed by emerging and future biotechnology developments, including
synthetic genomics, synthetic biology, human genetic modification, and other
biotechnology relevant for the modification of human beings, including through
the establishment of international agreement regarding the appropriate uses of
advanced biotechnology and proscription of nefarious uses and abhorrent
practices; and
(9)pursue such other
activities that the Secretary of State determines will enhance international
biosecurity.
(c)With respect
to—
(1)the short training
courses related to laboratory techniques referred to in subsection
(b)(4)(F)(i)—
(A)such courses shall
be for eligible nationals who are laboratory technicians or other public health
personnel;
(B)the training shall
be held outside the United States and may be conducted in facilities of the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention located in foreign countries or in
Overseas Medical Research Units of the Department of Defense, as appropriate;
and
(C)the Secretary of
State shall coordinate the training, where appropriate, with existing programs
and activities of international health organizations; and
(2)disease and syndrome surveillance reporting
and rapid analysis of syndrome information referred to in subsection
(b)(4)(F)(ii)—
(A)such courses shall
be for eligible nationals who are health care providers or other public health
personnel;
(B)the training shall
be conducted via the Internet or in appropriate facilities located in a foreign
country, as determined by the Secretary of State; and
(C)the Secretary of
State shall coordinate the training, where appropriate, with existing programs
and activities of international regional and international health
organizations.
(d)Activities
undertaken pursuant to subsection (b) to improve or facilitate the reporting of
biological incidents, including breaches of pathogen or laboratory security,
infectious disease outbreaks, and public health information, shall be aimed at
improving and facilitating such reporting only to the United States, the World
Health Organization, and other responsible countries and international
entities.
(e)Nothing in this Act shall require the Secretary of
State to share information about United States defensive measures against
biological weapons or other threats that could be useful to adversaries in
developing biological weapons or agents that could defeat such defensive
measures.
(f)Authorization of
appropriationsThere are authorized to be appropriated such sums
as are necessary to the Secretary of State for carrying out this
section.
5.International
Biosecurity Task ForceThe
Secretary of State shall convene an International Biosecurity Task Force of
prominent experts, including from the scientific, public health, legal,
academic, security, research bioethics, and private sector communities, to
serve as a nongovernmental consultative body for the International Biosecurity
Initiative established pursuant to section 4. The Task Force shall provide
advice to the security, societal, and ethical implications of emerging and
future biotechnology developments, including synthetic genomics, synthetic
biology, human genetic modification, and other biotechnology relevant for the
modification of human beings, as well as efforts toward the establishment of
international agreement regarding the appropriate uses of advanced
biotechnology and proscription of nefarious uses and abhorrent
practices.
6.Establishment of
the Nonproliferation and Counterterrorism Fellowship Program
(a)The Secretary of State shall establish a program (to be
known as the Nonproliferation and Counterterrorism Fellowship
Program
) to provide eligible students and recent graduates educational
fellowships for obtaining a deeper understanding of Federal efforts to counter
terrorist activities and groups and to promote nonproliferation.
(b)Fellowship
program componentsThe Nonproliferation and Counterterrorism
Fellowship Program authorized by this section shall—
(1)be awarded to
eligible students and recent graduates;
(2)require such
students or recent graduates to complete an educational fellowship at a Federal
agency or in Congress, for a period of not less than 3 months, during which
fellowship such students and recent graduates shall participate in activities
relevant to the goals of the graduate studies of such students and recent
graduates;
(3)ensure that such
educational fellowships at Federal agencies or in Congress are designed to
contribute to the eligible students’ and recent graduates’ preparation for a
career in a field relating to the goals of the Program authorized by this
section; and
(4)provide financial
support to eligible students and recent graduates selected for the program in
accordance with subsection (c).
(c)The Nonproliferation and Counterterrorism Fellowship
Program shall provide to each eligible student and recent graduate selected for
the program for the period during which the student or recent graduate is
participating in an educational fellowship at a Federal agency or in Congress
as required by subsection (b)(2), a stipend in an amount determined by the
Secretary.
(d)Not
later than one year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
State shall promulgate regulations to carry out this section.
(e)Authorization of
appropriationsThere are authorized to be appropriated
$10,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2011 through 2015 to the Secretary of
State for carrying out the Nonproliferation and Counterterrorism Fellowship
Program under this section.
7.Technical review
and assessment of harmful biological incident and activity investigation
technologies
(a)Not later than one year after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other
relevant Federal agencies, the National Academies, or any other agency or
organization the Secretary determines appropriate, shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report containing a technical review and
assessment of the limits and capabilities of technologies that could be used
for investigating biological incidents and allegations of illegal biological
weapons activities. This report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but
may include a classified annex.
(b)Authorization of
appropriationsThere are authorized to be appropriated such sums
as are necessary to the Secretary of State for carrying out the review and
assessment described in section (a) of this section.
8.Review and
assessment of global legal regime for biosecurity
(a)Not later than one year after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other
relevant Federal agencies, shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a review and assessment of the global legal regime for biosecurity,
including—
(1)implementation and
enforcement of laws against criminal activities in other countries including
extradition treaties and agreements;
(2)transnational
exchange of relevant information between law enforcement authorities;
(3)attributing
responsibility, apprehending, and prosecuting individuals or entities
responsible for deliberately releasing pathogens;
(4)licensing and use
approval of medical countermeasures during a disease emergency;
(5)national and
international authority for effectively responding to and recovering from a
disease outbreak;
(6)the establishment
and implementation of national and international legal measures for ensuring
pathogen and laboratory biosafety and biosecurity; and
(7)national legal
mechanisms to review biodefense research and development activities for
compliance with the BWC.
(b)Authorization of
appropriationsThere are authorized to be appropriated such sums
as are necessary to the Secretary of State for carrying out the review and
assessment described in section (a) of this section.
9.Section 140(a) of
the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C.
12 2656f(a)) is amended—
(1)in paragraph
(3)(B), by striking and
at the end;
(2)in paragraph (4),
by striking the period at the end and inserting ; and
;
and
(3)by adding at the
end the following new paragraph:
(5)detailed
assessments of the ability of each foreign country described in paragraphs (1)
through (4) to detect and respond to acts of terrorism, including information
on—
(A)surveillance
capabilities for detecting infectious disease outbreaks; and
(B)the ability of the
public health and law enforcement communities of each such country to
effectively minimize damage to public health, economic infrastructure, and
global security during and immediately after a terrorist
attack.
.
10.International
disease outbreak information sharing
(a)The Secretary of
State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report
following any incident in which a foreign country fails to share, in a timely
manner, information, including biological samples and epidemiological data,
about the outbreak of a previously unknown infectious disease or a new strain
of an infectious disease or about an outbreak for which the country is
otherwise required to share information pursuant to commitments made by the
country. This report shall include a summary the activities of the relevant
country pertaining to the disease outbreak and steps taken by the United States
and by relevant international organizations, including the World Health
Organization, to obtain this information.
(b)The
Secretary of State shall withhold 10 percent of the foreign assistance given to
any country failing to share information on infectious disease outbreaks as
described in subsection (a). This withholding will remain in effect until the
information is provided. This withholding may be waived at if the President
determines that to do so is in the national interest.
11.In this Act:
(1)Appropriate
congressional committeesThe term appropriate
congressional committees
means the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate.
(2)Appropriate
graduate programThe term appropriate graduate
program
means a graduate level degree or certificate program at an
institution of higher education that provides for the multidisciplinary study
of issues relating to weapons nonproliferation or counterterrorism and includes
training in at least several of the following areas—
(A)assessment and
forecasting of proliferation threats, including non-state actors,
(B)technologies
underlying weapons of mass destruction,
(C)international
agreements and regimes to prevent and limit the spread of weapons of mass
destruction, including threat reduction assistance,
(D)nonproliferation
export controls, including governance of dual-use technologies,
(E)policy tools and
responses to proliferation by both states and non-state actors,
(F)the politics and
process of nuclear proliferation and renunciation decisionmaking, and
(G)regional security
issues relevant to proliferation.
(3)The term critical pathogen
means any
biological organism that is used in biological research and is involved in the
transmission of infectious diseases whose intentional or unintentional release
poses a significant threat to public health.
(4)The term eligible national
means any
citizen or national of an eligible developing country who—
(A)does not have a
criminal background;
(B)is not on any
immigration or other United States watch list; and
(C)is not affiliated
with any foreign terrorist organization.
(5)The term eligible student
means a student
who—
(A)has obtained from
an institution of higher education (as defined in section 102 of the Higher
Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1002)) a bachelor’s degree or other degree
that is acceptable for admission to a graduate or professional degree
program;
(B)is applying to, or
has been admitted for enrollment in, an appropriate graduate program;
(C)is a United States
citizen; and
(D)is otherwise
qualified (as determined by the Secretary).
(6)The term foreign assistance
means
assistance authorized under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151
et seq.).
(7)Institution of
higher educationExcept as otherwise expressly provided, the term
institution of higher education
has the meaning given such term
in section 101(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C.
1001(a)).
(8)Technical review
and assessmentThe term technical review and
assessment
means a policy-neutral study conducted by scientific and
technical experts to assess the ability of available technology to verify the
purpose of biological research programs and to detect weaponization
activities.
(9)Eligible
developing countryThe term eligible developing
country
means any developing country that—
(A)has agreed to the
objective of fully complying with requirements of the World Health Organization
on reporting public health information on outbreaks of infectious diseases;
and
(B)has not been
determined by the Secretary, for purposes of section 40 of the Arms Export
Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780), section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371), or section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979
(50 U.S.C. App. 2405), to have repeatedly provided support for acts of
international terrorism, unless the Secretary exercises a waiver certifying
that it is in the national interest of the United States to provide assistance
under the provisions of this Act.