[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6297 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 6297

    To improve the international strategy of the United States for 
monitoring, reducing, and responding to biological risks, and for other 
                               purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           September 29, 2010

 Mr. Sherman introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Foreign Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
    To improve the international strategy of the United States for 
monitoring, reducing, and responding to biological risks, and for other 
                               purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

    (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``International 
Biosecurity Act of 2010''.
    (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as 
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings.
Sec. 3. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 4. International Biosecurity Initiative (IBSI).
Sec. 5. International Biosecurity Task Force.
Sec. 6. Establishment of the Nonproliferation and Counterterrorism 
                            Fellowship Program.
Sec. 7. Technical review and assessment of harmful biological incident 
                            and activity investigation technologies.
Sec. 8. Review and assessment of global legal regime for biosecurity.
Sec. 9. Reporting requirements.
Sec. 10. International disease outbreak information sharing.
Sec. 11. Definitions.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds the following:
            (1) The advance of biological science is vital to 
        increasing the health of humanity, ensuring the well-being of 
        the environment, and spurring economic growth.
            (2) In 2001, letters containing anthrax spores were 
        distributed via the United States postal system, infecting 22 
        people and resulting in five deaths, extensive social 
        disruption, and extensive costs for emergency response and 
        remediation.
            (3) In 2001, while engaging the Taliban in Afghanistan, 
        coalition forces came into possession of a significant body of 
        evidence that al-Qaeda was seeking to develop the capability to 
        conduct biological weapons attacks.
            (4) In a time of international terrorist threats and global 
        health epidemics, United States policy with regard to 
        biological risks is in need of a well coordinated strategy to 
        ensure the effectiveness of efforts to protect the national 
        security and foreign policy interests of the United States.
            (5) Biological risks extend beyond biological weapons 
        developed or used by foreign countries and also include 
        intentional release of harmful biological agents by non-state 
        groups or individuals, harmful outcomes through unintentional 
        release or unforeseen consequences of biological research and 
        experimental biological agents, and natural disease outbreaks.
            (6) A major disease outbreak affecting animals or crops, 
        whether intentionally inflicted or natural, anywhere in the 
        world could threaten food supplies and economic prosperity, 
        potentially exacerbating broader security concerns.
            (7) A major disease outbreak against civilian populations, 
        whether intentionally inflicted or natural, anywhere in the 
        world could cause devastating loss of life and economic harm. 
        Such an outbreak would have adverse implications for United 
        States national security and foreign policy.
            (8) Improving global capacity for monitoring and detecting 
        disease outbreaks improves the ability of the United States to 
        counter both natural and man-made biological risks.
            (9) A well-coordinated strategy for countering harmful 
        biological incidents that integrates United States foreign 
        policies will help ensure the health of Americans as well as 
        security against terrorism and other threats.
            (10) In November 2009, President Obama set forth a 
        ``National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats''.
            (11) The changing geopolitical climate in which a number of 
        countries and non-state actors are seeking or have acquired 
        weapons of mass destruction indicates that the United States 
        will require specialized nonproliferation experts in addition 
        to experts in regional security.
            (12) The United States national security community has 
        focused primarily on technical and international security 
        solutions to international proliferation.
            (13) There are limited opportunities for the next 
        generation of policy makers and nonproliferation specialists to 
        undertake interdisciplinary study in the area of 
        nonproliferation policy.
            (14) Coordinating foreign assistance and other 
        international efforts to improve the ability of partner 
        countries to detect and respond to disease outbreaks benefits 
        partner nations and also improves the United States security by 
        preventing the spread of infectious disease.

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) emerging biological technologies, while providing the 
        promise for unprecedented improvements in health and the 
        environment, may pose a potential for harm, both intentional 
        and accidental or inadvertent;
            (2) the ``National Strategy for Countering Biological 
        Threats'', released by President Obama in November 2009, is a 
        significant step toward enhancing domestic and international 
        biosecurity;
            (3) because biological risks do not heed political borders, 
        United States policy to counter such risks should include 
        cooperation with other countries and improved coordination 
        within the United States Government;
            (4) the United States should work with other countries 
        toward developing international standards and an oversight 
        framework for biological research to prevent and mitigate 
        harmful outcomes;
            (5) the United States strategy for monitoring, reducing, 
        and responding to biological risks should address both natural 
        and man-made risks and should be able to identify and mitigate 
        the impact of both intentional and unintentional or unforeseen 
        harmful biological incidents;
            (6) United States collaboration with and assistance to 
        foreign countries aimed at reducing biological risks should be 
        mutually beneficial and serve to counter natural or man-made 
        biological risks that are mutually determined to be of high 
        importance; and
            (7) because the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
        Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
        (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction 
        (commonly referred to as the ``Biological Weapons Convention'' 
        or ``BWC'') embodies the global norm against the development, 
        production, acquisition, and transfer of biological agents for 
        hostile purposes, United States policy should aim to strengthen 
        the Biological Weapons Convention by increasing its adherence, 
        addressing its transparency and compliance mechanisms, and 
        strengthening its effectiveness to build confidence 
        internationally.

SEC. 4. INTERNATIONAL BIOSECURITY INITIATIVE (IBSI).

    (a) Establishment.--To improve the United States international 
strategy for reducing and responding to biological risks and to aid in 
the implementation of President Obama's 2009 ``National Strategy for 
Countering Biological Threats'', the Secretary of State, in 
coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, shall 
establish an initiative to be known as the ``International Biosecurity 
Initiative''.
    (b) Purpose.--The International Biosecurity Initiative shall--
            (1) pursue efforts, through multilateral and bilateral 
        activities, to support, establish, and implement 
        internationally harmonized standards for assuring critical 
        pathogen and laboratory safety and security and for assessing 
        broad social consequences, including--
                    (A) working in multilateral forums, including 
                forums that engage the private sector, research, and 
                public health communities, to establish, based on 
                international needs and domestic lessons-learned, and 
                regularly update international standards for pathogen 
                and laboratory safety and security;
                    (B) promoting international codes of ethics to 
                ensure safety and security and reinforcing norms during 
                the education and throughout the career of scientists 
                in academia, industry, or government;
                    (C) encouraging the development and implementation 
                of emergency reporting and response in the event of a 
                breach of pathogen or laboratory security; and
                    (D) providing technical and financial assistance, 
                including training, to other countries to facilitate 
                the adoption, sustainable implementation, and 
                enforcement of national measures in accordance with 
                international standards for the safety, transportation, 
                and security of biological agents and laboratories;
            (2) pursue efforts, through bilateral, regional, and 
        multilateral activities, to ensure a strong global legal regime 
        for biosecurity, including--
                    (A) working with other countries to develop and 
                strengthen the national criminal legislation and law 
                enforcement capabilities of such countries for 
                detecting, interdicting, investigating, and prosecuting 
                criminal activities and harmonizing international 
                biosecurity legal efforts;
                    (B) developing, establishing, and promoting common 
                internationally harmonized standards, guidance, and 
                best practices for obtaining, handling, analyzing and 
                sharing microbial forensic evidence;
                    (C) promoting appropriate information sharing, that 
                is in the national security interests of the United 
                States, relating to threats and to best practices, and 
                promoting cooperation for preventing, deterring, 
                detecting, attributing, interdicting, investigating, 
                and prosecuting criminal or terrorist use of biological 
                or toxin agents between the intelligence community, 
                United States Federal law enforcement, and 
                international law enforcement and security officials;
                    (D) promoting international legal and technical 
                cooperation to achieve the goals described in 
                subparagraphs (A) through (C); and
                    (E) providing technical assistance to other 
                countries, including training, to achieve the goals 
                described in subparagraphs (A) through (C);
            (3) pursue strategies to strengthen the Convention on the 
        Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
        Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
        Destruction (commonly referred to as the ``Biological Weapons 
        Convention'' or ``BWC'') and its enforcement by--
                    (A) promoting universal membership in, increased 
                adherence to, effective implementation of, and 
                compliance with the BWC;
                    (B) developing an action plan for increasing 
                international adherence to the BWC;
                    (C) promoting stronger confidence-building and 
                other transparency measures designed to provide mutual 
                reassurance that national biodefense, threat 
                assessment, and other activities comply with the BWC;
                    (D) ensuring that United States participation in 
                BWC meetings is broadly inclusive of representatives of 
                relevant Federal departments and agencies; and
                    (E) supporting efforts to strengthen the United 
                Nations Secretary-General's mechanism for investigating 
                allegations of biological weapons use and to establish 
                a multilateral capability to investigate alleged 
                breaches of BWC obligations;
            (4) engage in cooperative efforts to improve national, 
        regional, and multinational surveillance and response 
        capabilities with respect to outbreaks of infectious diseases, 
        whether naturally occurring or man-made, including--
                    (A) working with countries to ensure full 
                compliance with World Health Organization disease 
                reporting obligations;
                    (B) supporting efforts, in coordination with the 
                Emerging Pandemic Threats program, to improve global 
                capacity for identifying, diagnosing, tracking, and 
                reporting pathogens responsible for possible infectious 
                disease outbreaks of international significance, 
                including--
                            (i) improving international laboratory 
                        capacity for expeditiously collecting, 
                        analyzing, and identifying a broad array of 
                        pathogens including mutated strains which may 
                        cause infectious disease outbreaks or may be 
                        used in a biological weapon; and
                            (ii) improving international capacity for 
                        effectively collecting, analyzing, 
                        transmitting, and reporting validated data and 
                        public health information about such infectious 
                        disease outbreaks;
                    (C) providing assistance to international and 
                regional health organizations to--
                            (i) enhance the surveillance and reporting 
                        capabilities of the World Health Organization 
                        and existing international regional and 
                        international health networks; and
                            (ii) develop new international regional and 
                        international health networks;
                    (D) providing assistance to facilitate 
                standardization in the reporting of public health 
                information between and among developing countries and 
                international health organizations;
                    (E) working with the Secretary of Health and Human 
                Services to establish new country or regional 
                international Field Epidemiology Training Programs in 
                eligible developing countries;
                    (F) establishing and providing assistance for short 
                training courses in--
                            (i) laboratory techniques relating to the 
                        identification, diagnosis, and tracking of 
                        pathogens responsible for possible infectious 
                        disease outbreaks; and
                            (ii) techniques of disease and syndrome 
                        surveillance reporting and rapid analysis of 
                        syndrome information using Geographic 
                        Information System (GIS) tools;
                    (G) promoting efforts to make widely available, 
                especially in developing countries, medical and 
                pharmaceutical measures to counter infectious diseases, 
                including through stockpiling of such measures; and
                    (H) working with other countries and multilateral 
                and regional bodies to provide technical assistance for 
                developing biological and health response capabilities 
                in other countries;
            (5) support the development of international mechanisms 
        that enhance the coordination and implementation of biosecurity 
        policies;
            (6) facilitate the alignment of foreign assistance for 
        biosecurity with the public health needs of recipient 
        countries, including--
                    (A) assisting in the planning, development, 
                enhancement, and training of response capabilities for 
                disease outbreaks in recipient countries and regions; 
                and
                    (B) assisting in the promotion of effective 
                cooperation among public health, law enforcement, and 
                other responder communities in recipient countries and 
                regions;
            (7) engage in multilateral and bilateral discussions of 
        biodefense programs and control of sensitive biotechnologies to 
        ensure that they are limited to prophylactic, protective, and 
        other peaceful purposes;
            (8) develop an assessment of, and appropriate policies to 
        address, the potential security threats and societal and 
        ethical impacts posed by emerging and future biotechnology 
        developments, including synthetic genomics, synthetic biology, 
        human genetic modification, and other biotechnology relevant 
        for the modification of human beings, including through the 
        establishment of international agreement regarding the 
        appropriate uses of advanced biotechnology and proscription of 
        nefarious uses and abhorrent practices; and
            (9) pursue such other activities that the Secretary of 
        State determines will enhance international biosecurity.
    (c) Program Components.--With respect to--
            (1) the short training courses related to laboratory 
        techniques referred to in subsection (b)(4)(F)(i)--
                    (A) such courses shall be for eligible nationals 
                who are laboratory technicians or other public health 
                personnel;
                    (B) the training shall be held outside the United 
                States and may be conducted in facilities of the 
                Centers for Disease Control and Prevention located in 
                foreign countries or in Overseas Medical Research Units 
                of the Department of Defense, as appropriate; and
                    (C) the Secretary of State shall coordinate the 
                training, where appropriate, with existing programs and 
                activities of international health organizations; and
            (2) disease and syndrome surveillance reporting and rapid 
        analysis of syndrome information referred to in subsection 
        (b)(4)(F)(ii)--
                    (A) such courses shall be for eligible nationals 
                who are health care providers or other public health 
                personnel;
                    (B) the training shall be conducted via the 
                Internet or in appropriate facilities located in a 
                foreign country, as determined by the Secretary of 
                State; and
                    (C) the Secretary of State shall coordinate the 
                training, where appropriate, with existing programs and 
                activities of international regional and international 
                health organizations.
    (d) Reporting.--Activities undertaken pursuant to subsection (b) to 
improve or facilitate the reporting of biological incidents, including 
breaches of pathogen or laboratory security, infectious disease 
outbreaks, and public health information, shall be aimed at improving 
and facilitating such reporting only to the United States, the World 
Health Organization, and other responsible countries and international 
entities.
    (e) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this Act shall require the 
Secretary of State to share information about United States defensive 
measures against biological weapons or other threats that could be 
useful to adversaries in developing biological weapons or agents that 
could defeat such defensive measures.
    (f) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated such sums as are necessary to the Secretary of State for 
carrying out this section.

SEC. 5. INTERNATIONAL BIOSECURITY TASK FORCE.

    The Secretary of State shall convene an International Biosecurity 
Task Force of prominent experts, including from the scientific, public 
health, legal, academic, security, research bioethics, and private 
sector communities, to serve as a nongovernmental consultative body for 
the International Biosecurity Initiative established pursuant to 
section 4. The Task Force shall provide advice to the security, 
societal, and ethical implications of emerging and future biotechnology 
developments, including synthetic genomics, synthetic biology, human 
genetic modification, and other biotechnology relevant for the 
modification of human beings, as well as efforts toward the 
establishment of international agreement regarding the appropriate uses 
of advanced biotechnology and proscription of nefarious uses and 
abhorrent practices.

SEC. 6. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NONPROLIFERATION AND COUNTERTERRORISM 
              FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of State shall establish a program 
(to be known as the ``Nonproliferation and Counterterrorism Fellowship 
Program'') to provide eligible students and recent graduates 
educational fellowships for obtaining a deeper understanding of Federal 
efforts to counter terrorist activities and groups and to promote 
nonproliferation.
    (b) Fellowship Program Components.--The Nonproliferation and 
Counterterrorism Fellowship Program authorized by this section shall--
            (1) be awarded to eligible students and recent graduates;
            (2) require such students or recent graduates to complete 
        an educational fellowship at a Federal agency or in Congress, 
        for a period of not less than 3 months, during which fellowship 
        such students and recent graduates shall participate in 
        activities relevant to the goals of the graduate studies of 
        such students and recent graduates;
            (3) ensure that such educational fellowships at Federal 
        agencies or in Congress are designed to contribute to the 
        eligible students' and recent graduates' preparation for a 
        career in a field relating to the goals of the Program 
        authorized by this section; and
            (4) provide financial support to eligible students and 
        recent graduates selected for the program in accordance with 
        subsection (c).
    (c) Financial Support.--The Nonproliferation and Counterterrorism 
Fellowship Program shall provide to each eligible student and recent 
graduate selected for the program for the period during which the 
student or recent graduate is participating in an educational 
fellowship at a Federal agency or in Congress as required by subsection 
(b)(2), a stipend in an amount determined by the Secretary.
    (d) Regulations.--Not later than one year after the date of 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall promulgate 
regulations to carry out this section.
    (e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated $10,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2011 through 2015 to 
the Secretary of State for carrying out the Nonproliferation and 
Counterterrorism Fellowship Program under this section.

SEC. 7. TECHNICAL REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF HARMFUL BIOLOGICAL INCIDENT 
              AND ACTIVITY INVESTIGATION TECHNOLOGIES.

    (a) In General.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
heads of other relevant Federal agencies, the National Academies, or 
any other agency or organization the Secretary determines appropriate, 
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report 
containing a technical review and assessment of the limits and 
capabilities of technologies that could be used for investigating 
biological incidents and allegations of illegal biological weapons 
activities. This report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but 
may include a classified annex.
    (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated such sums as are necessary to the Secretary of State for 
carrying out the review and assessment described in section (a) of this 
section.

SEC. 8. REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF GLOBAL LEGAL REGIME FOR BIOSECURITY.

    (a) In General.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
heads of other relevant Federal agencies, shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a review and assessment of the 
global legal regime for biosecurity, including--
            (1) implementation and enforcement of laws against criminal 
        activities in other countries including extradition treaties 
        and agreements;
            (2) transnational exchange of relevant information between 
        law enforcement authorities;
            (3) attributing responsibility, apprehending, and 
        prosecuting individuals or entities responsible for 
        deliberately releasing pathogens;
            (4) licensing and use approval of medical countermeasures 
        during a disease emergency;
            (5) national and international authority for effectively 
        responding to and recovering from a disease outbreak;
            (6) the establishment and implementation of national and 
        international legal measures for ensuring pathogen and 
        laboratory biosafety and biosecurity; and
            (7) national legal mechanisms to review biodefense research 
        and development activities for compliance with the BWC.
    (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated such sums as are necessary to the Secretary of State for 
carrying out the review and assessment described in section (a) of this 
section.

SEC. 9. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

    Section 140(a) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal 
Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. 12 2656f(a)) is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (3)(B), by striking ``and'' at the end;
            (2) in paragraph (4), by striking the period at the end and 
        inserting ``; and''; and
            (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
            ``(5) detailed assessments of the ability of each foreign 
        country described in paragraphs (1) through (4) to detect and 
        respond to acts of terrorism, including information on--
                    ``(A) surveillance capabilities for detecting 
                infectious disease outbreaks; and
                    ``(B) the ability of the public health and law 
                enforcement communities of each such country to 
                effectively minimize damage to public health, economic 
                infrastructure, and global security during and 
                immediately after a terrorist attack.''.

SEC. 10. INTERNATIONAL DISEASE OUTBREAK INFORMATION SHARING.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of State shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report following any incident in 
which a foreign country fails to share, in a timely manner, 
information, including biological samples and epidemiological data, 
about the outbreak of a previously unknown infectious disease or a new 
strain of an infectious disease or about an outbreak for which the 
country is otherwise required to share information pursuant to 
commitments made by the country. This report shall include a summary 
the activities of the relevant country pertaining to the disease 
outbreak and steps taken by the United States and by relevant 
international organizations, including the World Health Organization, 
to obtain this information.
    (b) Withholding.--The Secretary of State shall withhold 10 percent 
of the foreign assistance given to any country failing to share 
information on infectious disease outbreaks as described in subsection 
(a). This withholding will remain in effect until the information is 
provided. This withholding may be waived at if the President determines 
that to do so is in the national interest.

SEC. 11. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committee on 
        Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the 
        Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
            (2) Appropriate graduate program.--The term ``appropriate 
        graduate program'' means a graduate level degree or certificate 
        program at an institution of higher education that provides for 
        the multidisciplinary study of issues relating to weapons 
        nonproliferation or counterterrorism and includes training in 
        at least several of the following areas--
                    (A) assessment and forecasting of proliferation 
                threats, including non-state actors,
                    (B) technologies underlying weapons of mass 
                destruction,
                    (C) international agreements and regimes to prevent 
                and limit the spread of weapons of mass destruction, 
                including threat reduction assistance,
                    (D) nonproliferation export controls, including 
                governance of dual-use technologies,
                    (E) policy tools and responses to proliferation by 
                both states and non-state actors,
                    (F) the politics and process of nuclear 
                proliferation and renunciation decisionmaking, and
                    (G) regional security issues relevant to 
                proliferation.
            (3) Critical pathogen.--The term ``critical pathogen'' 
        means any biological organism that is used in biological 
        research and is involved in the transmission of infectious 
        diseases whose intentional or unintentional release poses a 
        significant threat to public health.
            (4) Eligible national.--The term ``eligible national'' 
        means any citizen or national of an eligible developing country 
        who--
                    (A) does not have a criminal background;
                    (B) is not on any immigration or other United 
                States watch list; and
                    (C) is not affiliated with any foreign terrorist 
                organization.
            (5) Eligible student.--The term ``eligible student'' means 
        a student who--
                    (A) has obtained from an institution of higher 
                education (as defined in section 102 of the Higher 
                Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1002)) a bachelor's 
                degree or other degree that is acceptable for admission 
                to a graduate or professional degree program;
                    (B) is applying to, or has been admitted for 
                enrollment in, an appropriate graduate program;
                    (C) is a United States citizen; and
                    (D) is otherwise qualified (as determined by the 
                Secretary).
            (6) Foreign assistance.--The term ``foreign assistance'' 
        means assistance authorized under the Foreign Assistance Act of 
        1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.).
            (7) Institution of higher education.--Except as otherwise 
        expressly provided, the term ``institution of higher 
        education'' has the meaning given such term in section 101(a) 
        of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001(a)).
            (8) Technical review and assessment.--The term ``technical 
        review and assessment'' means a policy-neutral study conducted 
        by scientific and technical experts to assess the ability of 
        available technology to verify the purpose of biological 
        research programs and to detect weaponization activities.
            (9) Eligible developing country.--The term ``eligible 
        developing country'' means any developing country that--
                    (A) has agreed to the objective of fully complying 
                with requirements of the World Health Organization on 
                reporting public health information on outbreaks of 
                infectious diseases; and
                    (B) has not been determined by the Secretary, for 
                purposes of section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act 
                (22 U.S.C. 2780), section 620A of the Foreign 
                Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371), or section 
                6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 
                U.S.C. App. 2405), to have repeatedly provided support 
                for acts of international terrorism, unless the 
                Secretary exercises a waiver certifying that it is in 
                the national interest of the United States to provide 
                assistance under the provisions of this Act.
                                 <all>