1.Short title and table of
contents
(a)This Act may be cited
as the NATO First Act
.
(b)The table of contents for this Act is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title and table of contents.
Sec. 2. Policy on current United States force structure in
Europe and report on future changes in composition and
capabilities.
Sec. 3. Codification of congressional notification requirement
before permanent relocation of any United States military unit stationed
outside the United States.
Sec. 4. Modification and extension of authorities relating to
program to build the capacity of foreign military forces to support the
European Command and other geographic combatant commands.
Sec. 5. Extended deterrence commitment to Europe.
Sec. 6. Availability of funds for long-range missile defense in
Europe.
Sec. 7. Sense of Congress on missile defense and New Start
Treaty with Russian Federation.
Sec. 8. Air Force scholarships for Partnership for Peace
nations to participate in the Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training
Program.
2.Policy on current
United States force structure in Europe and report on future changes in
composition and capabilities
(a)It is the policy of
the United States that the current deployment of units of the United States
Armed Forces at military installations in European member nations of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization is a force-structure arrangement and set of
military capabilities that are adequate to permit the United States—
(1)to satisfy the commitments undertaken by
United States pursuant to article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at
Washington, District of Columbia, on April 4, 1949, and entered into force on
August 24, 1949 (63 Stat. 2241; TIAS 1964);
(2)to address the current security environment
in Europe, including United States participation in theater cooperation
activities; and
(3)to contribute to peace and stability in
Europe.
(b)Report on force
structure changes in composition and capabilities
(1)Not later than one
year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense
shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of
Representatives a report evaluating potential changes in the composition and
capabilities of units of the United States Armed Forces at military
installations in European member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization—
(A)to better achieve
the policy objectives specified in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of subsection
(a); and
(B)to better utilize
such units to respond to other United States national security
responsibilities.
(2)As part of the
report, the Secretary of Defense shall consider—
(A)the stationing of advisory and assist
brigades at military installations in Europe;
(B)the expanded use of Joint Task Forces to
train and build mutual capabilities with partner countries; and
(C)the stationing of units of the United
States Armed Forces to support missile defense and cyber-security
missions.
3.Codification of
congressional notification requirement before permanent relocation of any
United States military unit stationed outside the United States
(a)Codification and
related reportChapter 6 of
title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 162 the
following new section:
162a.Congressional
notification before permanent relocation of military units stationed outside
the United States
(a)The Secretary of Defense shall notify Congress at
least 30 days before the permanent relocation of a unit stationed outside the
United States.
(b)The notification
required by subsection (a) shall include a description of the following:
(1)How relocation of
the unit supports the United States national security strategy.
(2)How relocation of the unit supports the
security commitments undertaken by the United States pursuant to any
international security treaty, including the North Atlantic Treaty, the Treaty
of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, and the
Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States of
America.
(3)How relocation of the unit addresses the
current security environment in the affected geographic combatant command’s
area of responsibility, including United States participation in theater
security cooperation activities and bilateral partnership, exchanges, and
training exercises.
(4)How relocation of the unit impacts the
status of overseas base closure and realignment actions undertaken as part of a
global defense posture realignment strategy and the status of development and
execution of comprehensive master plans for overseas military main operating
bases, forward operating sites, and cooperative security locations of the
global defense posture of the United States.
(c)Subsection (a) does not apply in the case
of—
(1)the relocation of
a unit deployed to a combat zone; or
(2)the relocation of a unit as the result of
closure of an overseas installation at the request of the government of the
host nation in the manner provided in the agreement between the United States
and the host nation regarding the installation.
(d)In
this section:
(1)The term combat
zone has the meaning given that term in section 112(c)(2) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
(2)Geographic
combatant commandThe term geographic combatant
command means a combatant command with a geographic area of
responsibility that does not include North America.
(3)The
term unit has the meaning determined by the Secretary of Defense
for purposes of this
section.
.
(b)The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter
is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 162 the following
new item:
162a. Congressional notification before
permanent relocation of military units stationed outside the United
States.
.
(c)Repeal of
superceded notification requirementSection 1063 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111–84; 123 Stat. 2469; 10
U.S.C. 113 note) is repealed.
4.Modification and
extension of authorities relating to program to build the capacity of foreign
military forces to support the European Command and other geographic combatant
commands
(a)Subsection (a) of section 1206 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (Public Law 109–163;
119 Stat. 3456), as most recently amended by section 1206(a) of the Duncan
Hunter National Defense Authorization for Fiscal Year 2009 (Public Law 110–417;
122 Stat. 4625), is further amended by adding at the end the following:
(3)To build the capacity of a foreign
country’s national military forces in order for that country to support the
theater priorities of the applicable geographic combatant
command.
.
(b)
(1)Annual funding
limitationSubsection (c)(1) of such section, as amended by
section 1206(b) of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2009 (Public Law 110–417; 122 Stat. 4625), is further amended by
striking $350,000,000
and inserting
$500,000,000
.
(2)Availability of
funds for activities across fiscal yearsSubsection (c)(4) of
such section is amended by striking the next fiscal year
and
inserting any of the next 2 fiscal years
.
(c)Implementation
plan; definitionSuch section is further amended—
(1)by redesignating
subsection (g) as subsection (i); and
(2)by inserting after
subsection (f) the following:
(g)Report on
implementation plan
(1)The Secretary of
Defense shall submit to the congressional committees specified in subsection
(e)(3) a report on the plan for the implementation of the program described in
subsection (a)(3) and the allocation of funds under such program for each of
fiscal years 2011 through 2013. Such plan shall be submitted in conjunction
with the budget submitted to Congress by the President pursuant to section
1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, for each of fiscal years 2011 through
2013.
(2)The report required under paragraph (1) shall contain a
description of—
(A)how the plan supports the United States
national security strategy;
(B)how the plan
addresses the current security environment in each geographic combatant
command’s area of responsibility, including United States participation in
theater security cooperation activities and bilateral partnership, exchanges,
and training exercises; and
(C)any comments
resulting from an interagency review of the plan that includes the Department
of State and other relevant Federal departments and agencies.
(h)In this section, the term geographic
combatant command means a combatant command with a geographic area of
responsibility that does not include North
America.
.
(d)Two-Year
extension of authoritySubsection (i) of such section, as
redesignated by subsection (d)(1) of this section and as most recently amended
by section 1206(c) of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2009 (Public Law 110–417; 122 Stat. 4625), is further amended
by—
(1)by striking
September 30, 2011
and inserting September 30,
2013
; and
(2)by striking
fiscal years 2006 through 2011
and inserting fiscal years
2006 through 2013
.
5.Extended deterrence
commitment to Europe
(a)Policy on
extended deterrence commitment to EuropeIt is the policy of the United States
that—
(1)it maintain its commitment to extended
deterrence, specifically the nuclear alliance of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, as an important component of ensuring and linking the national
security interests of the United States and the security of its European
allies;
(2)forward-deployed nuclear forces of the
United States shall remain based in Europe in support of the nuclear policy and
posture of NATO; and
(3)the presence of nuclear weapons of the
United States in Europe—combined with NATO’s unique nuclear sharing
arrangements under which non-nuclear members participate in nuclear planning
and possess specially configured aircraft capable of delivering nuclear
weapons—contributes to the cohesion of NATO and provides reassurance to allies
and partners who feel exposed to regional threats.
(b)Limitation on
reductions in nuclear forces based in EuropeIn light of the policy expressed in
subsection (a), no action may be taken to effect or implement the reduction of
nuclear forces of the United States that are based in Europe unless—
(1)the reduction in such nuclear forces is
requested by the government of the host nation in the manner provided in the
agreement between the United States and the host nation regarding the forces;
or
(2)the President certifies that—
(A)the nuclear policy and nuclear posture of
NATO has changed, reducing the need for such nuclear forces to be based in
Europe;
(B)NATO member states have considered the
reduction in the High Level Group and NATO has decided to support such
reduction;
(C)the remaining
nuclear forces of the United States that are based in Europe after such
reduction provide a commensurate or better level of safety, security,
reliability, and credibility as before such reduction;
(D)such reduction is compensated by other
measures (such as nuclear modernization, conventional forces, and missile
defense) which together provide a commensurate or better deterrence capability
and assurance of NATO member states in a manner consistent with the NATO
Strategic Concept; and
(E)the Russian
Federation has made commensurate reductions to its deployed tactical nuclear
weapons.
(c)Upon any decision to reduce the nuclear
forces of the United States that are based in Europe, the President shall
submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of
Representatives a report containing—
(1)the certification required by subsection
(b)(2);
(2)justification for
such reduction; and
(3)an assessment of how NATO member states, in
light of such reduction, assess the credibility of the deterrence capability of
the United States in support of its commitments undertaken pursuant to article
5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington, District of Columbia, on
April 4, 1949, and entered into force on August 24, 1949 (63 Stat. 2241; TIAS
1964).
(d)Notice and wait
requirementThe President may
not commence a reduction in the nuclear forces of the United States that are
based in Europe for which the certification required by subsection (b)(2) is
made until the expiration of a 180-day period beginning on the date on which
the President submits the report under subsection (c) containing the
certification.
(e)Authorization of
appropriationsThere is
authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator
for Nuclear Security a total of $300,000,000 for fiscal year 2011 for—
(1)developing the
F–35 Lightning II aircraft into a dual-capable aircraft by outfitting it with a
nuclear-capable delivery system; and
(2)supporting the
life extension program for the B61 gravity bomb.
6.Availability of
funds for long-range missile defense in Europe
(a)Congress finds the following:
(1)Missile defense promotes the collective
security of the United States and NATO and improves linkages among member
nations of NATO by defending all members of NATO against the full range of
missile threats.
(2)The Director of National Intelligence,
appearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on February 2,
2010, testified that, The Iranian regime continues to flout UN Security
Council restrictions on its nuclear program … We judge Iran would likely choose
missile delivery as its preferred method of delivering a nuclear weapon. Iran
already has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East and
it continues to expand the scale, reach, and sophistication of its ballistic
missile forces—many of which are inherently capable of carrying a nuclear
payload.
.
(3)The Unclassified
Report on Military Power of Iran, dated April 2010, states that, With
sufficient foreign assistance, Iran could probably develop and test an
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of reaching the United States
by 2015. Iran could also have an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM)
capable of threatening Europe.
.
(4)However, phase 3
of the proposed phased, adaptive approach for missile defense in Europe is
planned to provide coverage of all of Europe by 2018 and phase 4 is planned to
provide additional coverage of the United States by 2020.
(5)According to the February 2010 Ballistic
Missile Defense Review, the United States will continue the development and
assessment of a two-stage ground-based interceptor as part of a hedging
strategy and, as further noted by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
during testimony before the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives on October 1, 2009, We keep the development of the
two-stage [ground-based interceptor] on the books as a hedge in case things
come earlier, in case there’s any kind of technological challenge with the
later models of the SM–3.
.
(b)It
shall be the policy of the United States to—
(1)field long-range
missile defenses in Europe that provide territorial defense of all NATO allies
from intercontinental and intermediate-range ballistic missiles by the time
such threats materialize;
(2)ensure that the standard missile-3 block
IIA interceptors provide full coverage of Europe against medium- and
intermediate-range ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East and that
the standard missile-3 block IIB interceptors provide additional coverage of
the United States against intercontinental ballistic missiles launched from the
Middle East; and
(3)continue the
development and testing of the two-stage ground-based interceptor to maintain
it—
(A)in the event that the long-range ballistic
missile threat materializes sooner than the planned availability of the
standard missile-3 block IIA or block IIB interceptor missiles;
(B)in the event of
technical challenges associated with the standard missile-3 interceptor
missile; and
(C)as a complement to
the missile defense capabilities deployed in Alaska and California for the
defense of the United States.
(c)Of the funds
appropriated pursuant to an authorization of appropriations made available for
fiscal years 2012 and 2013 for the Missile Defense Agency, $300,000,000 shall
be available only for long-range missile defense in Europe as described
subsection (d).
(d)Funds reserved under
subsection (c) may be obligated and expended by the Secretary of
Defense—
(1)to accelerate the
research, development, test, evaluation, procurement, and fielding of a
standard missile-3 block IIA or block IIB interceptor capable of intercepting
intermediate or intercontinental ballistic missiles;
(2)on the research,
development, test, evaluation, procurement, and fielding of a two-stage
ground-based interceptor; and
(3)on an additional
flight test of a two-stage ground-based interceptor.
7.Sense of Congress on
missile defense and New Start Treaty with Russian Federation
(a)Congress finds the following:
(1)The United States and the Russian
Federation signed the Treaty between the United States of America and the
Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms (commonly known as the New START
Treaty
) on April 8, 2010.
(2)The preamble of
the New START Treaty states, Recognizing the existence of the
interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive
arms, that this interrelationship will become more important as strategic
nuclear arms are reduced, and that current strategic defensive arms do not
undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of
the Parties.
.
(3)Officials of the United States have stated
that the New START Treaty does not restrain the program for missile defense of
the United States at bases in California and Alaska, nor does it restrain the
phased, adaptive approach for missile defense in Europe.
(4)However, a
statement from the office of the Russian president states, The Treaty
between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on the
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms signed in Prague on April
8, 2010, can operate and be viable only if the United States of America
refrains from developing its missile defence capabilities quantitatively or
qualitatively.
.
(5)Additionally,
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that Russia would have the right
to withdraw from the treaty if the U.S.’s build-up of its missile
defense strategic potential in numbers and quality begins to considerably
affect the efficiency of Russian strategic nuclear forces.
.
(b)It is the sense of Congress that—
(1)there are no
limitations on any phases of the phased, adaptive approach to missile defense
resulting from ratification of the New START treaty between the United States
and Russia, signed on 8 April 2010;
(2)the United States
should deploy all four phases of the phased, adaptive approach for missile
defense in Europe to protect the United States, deployed forces, and NATO
allies against short, medium, and long-range ballistic missile threats
consistent with the announced time lines of such threats; and
(3)the ground-based
midcourse defense system in Alaska and California should be maintained,
evolved, and expanded because it is the only missile defense capability as of
the date of the enactment of this Act that would protect the United States from
the growing threat of a long-range ballistic missile attack.
8.Air Force scholarships
for Partnership for Peace nations to participate in the Euro-NATO Joint Jet
Pilot Training Program
(a)Chapter 901 of
title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
9325.Euro-NATO
Joint Jet Pilot Training Program: participation scholarships for Partnership
for Peace nations
(a)Establishment of
scholarship programUnder
regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Air
Force shall establish and maintain a scholarship program to allow personnel of
the air forces of countries that are signatories of the Partnership for Peace
Framework Document to receive undergraduate pilot training and necessary
related training through the Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training (ENJJPT)
program.
(b)Transportation,
supplies, and allowanceUnder
such conditions as the Secretary of the Air Force may prescribe, the Secretary
may provide to a person receiving a scholarship under the scholarship
program—
(1)transportation incident to the training
received under the ENJJPT program;
(2)supplies and
equipment to be used during the training;
(3)flight clothing
and other special clothing required for the training;
(4)billeting, food,
and health services; and
(5)a living allowance at a rate to be
prescribed by the Secretary, taking into account the amount of living
allowances authorized for a member of the armed forces under similar
circumstances.
(c)(1)The provision of scholarships under the
scholarship program to personnel of an air force of a foreign country shall not
be construed or interpreted to imply diplomatic recognition of the country as a
member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
(2)Nothing in this section shall be construed
or interpreted to supersede the authority of the ENJJPT Steering Committee
under the ENJJPT Memorandum of Understanding. Countries whose air force
personnel receive scholarships under the scholarship program shall not have
privilege of ENJJPT Steering Committee representation.
(d)For purposes of ENJJPT cost-sharing,
personnel of an air force of a foreign country who receive a scholarship under
the scholarship program shall be counted as United States
pilots.
.
(b)The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter
is amended by adding at the end the following new item:
9325. Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training
Program: participation scholarships for Partnership for Peace
nations.
.