AN ACT

To amend the Federal Power Act to protect the bulk-power system and electric infrastructure critical to the defense of the United States against cybersecurity and other threats and vulnerabilities.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3
4 This Act may be cited as the “Grid Reliability and
5 Infrastructure Defense Act” or the “GRID Act”.

4 This Act may be cited as the “Grid Reliability and
SEC. 2. AMENDMENT TO THE FEDERAL POWER ACT.

(a) Critical Electric Infrastructure Security.—Part II of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 824 et seq.) is amended by adding after section 215 the following new section:

"SEC. 215A. CRITICAL ELECTRIC INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY.

(a) Definitions.—For purposes of this section:

"(1) Bulk-power system; electric reliability organization; regional entity.—The terms ‘bulk-power system’, ‘Electric Reliability Organization’, and ‘regional entity’ have the meanings given such terms in paragraphs (1), (2), and (7) of section 215(a), respectively.

"(2) Defense critical electric infrastructure.—The term ‘defense critical electric infrastructure’ means any infrastructure located in the United States (including the territories) used for the generation, transmission, or distribution of electric energy that—

"(A) is not part of the bulk-power system;

and

"(B) serves a facility designated by the President pursuant to subsection (d)(1), but is not owned or operated by the owner or operator of such facility."
"(3) Defense critical electric infrastructure vulnerability.—The term ‘defense critical electric infrastructure vulnerability’ means a weakness in defense critical electric infrastructure that, in the event of a malicious act using electronic communication or an electromagnetic pulse, would pose a substantial risk of disruption of those electronic devices or communications networks, including hardware, software, and data, that are essential to the reliability of defense critical electric infrastructure.

"(4) Electromagnetic pulse.—The term ‘electromagnetic pulse’ means 1 or more pulses of electromagnetic energy emitted by a device capable of disabling, disrupting, or destroying electronic equipment by means of such a pulse.

"(5) Geomagnetic storm.—The term ‘geomagnetic storm’ means a temporary disturbance of the Earth’s magnetic field resulting from solar activity.

"(6) Grid security threat.—The term ‘grid security threat’ means a substantial likelihood of—

"(A)(i) a malicious act using electronic communication or an electromagnetic pulse; or

"(A)(ii) a geomagnetic storm event, that could disrupt
the operation of those electronic devices or communications networks, including hardware, software, and data, that are essential to the reliability of the bulk-power system or of defense critical electric infrastructure; and

(ii) disruption of the operation of such devices or networks, with significant adverse effects on the reliability of the bulk-power system or of defense critical electric infrastructure, as a result of such act or event; or

(B)(i) a direct physical attack on the bulk-power system or on defense critical electric infrastructure; and

(ii) significant adverse effects on the reliability of the bulk-power system or of defense critical electric infrastructure as a result of such physical attack.

(7) Grid security vulnerability.—The term ‘grid security vulnerability’ means a weakness that, in the event of a malicious act using electronic communication or an electromagnetic pulse, would pose a substantial risk of disruption to the operation of those electronic devices or communications networks, including hardware, software, and data, that
are essential to the reliability of the bulk-power system.

**(8)** LARGE TRANSFORMER.—The term ‘large transformer’ means an electric transformer that is part of the bulk-power system.

**(9)** PROTECTED INFORMATION.—The term ‘protected information’ means information, other than classified national security information, designated as protected information by the Commission under subsection (c)(2)—

**(A)** that was developed or submitted in connection with the implementation of this section;

**(B)** that specifically discusses grid security threats, grid security vulnerabilities, defense critical electric infrastructure vulnerabilities, or plans, procedures, or measures to address such threats or vulnerabilities; and

**(C)** the unauthorized disclosure of which could be used in a malicious manner to impair the reliability of the bulk-power system or of defense critical electric infrastructure.

**(10)** SECRETARY.—The term ‘Secretary’ means the Secretary of Energy.
(11) Security.—The definition of ‘security’ in section 3(16) shall not apply to the provisions in this section.

(b) Emergency Response Measures.—

(1) Authority to Address Grid Security Threats.—Whenever the President issues and provides to the Commission (either directly or through the Secretary) a written directive or determination identifying an imminent grid security threat, the Commission may, with or without notice, hearing, or report, issue such orders for emergency measures as are necessary in its judgment to protect the reliability of the bulk-power system or of defense critical electric infrastructure against such threat. As soon as practicable but not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this section, the Commission shall, after notice and opportunity for comment, establish rules of procedure that ensure that such authority can be exercised expeditiously.

(2) Notification of Congress.—Whenever the President issues and provides to the Commission (either directly or through the Secretary) a written directive or determination under paragraph (1), the President (or the Secretary, as the case may be) shall promptly notify congressional committees of
relevant jurisdiction, including the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate, of the contents of, and justification for, such directive or determination.

``(3) CONSULTATION.—Before issuing an order for emergency measures under paragraph (1), the Commission shall, to the extent practicable in light of the nature of the grid security threat and the urgency of the need for such emergency measures, consult with appropriate governmental authorities in Canada and Mexico, entities described in paragraph (4), the Secretary, and other appropriate Federal agencies regarding implementation of such emergency measures.

``(4) APPLICATION.—An order for emergency measures under this subsection may apply to—

``(A) the Electric Reliability Organization;

``(B) a regional entity; or

``(C) any owner, user, or operator of the bulk-power system or of defense critical electric infrastructure within the United States.

``(5) DISCONTINUANCE.—The Commission shall issue an order discontinuing any emergency meas-
ures ordered under this subsection, effective not
later than 30 days after the earliest of the following:

        (A) The date upon which the President
issues and provides to the Commission (either
directly or through the Secretary) a written di-
rective or determination that the grid security
threat identified under paragraph (1) no longer
exists.

        (B) The date upon which the Commission
issues a written determination that the emer-
gency measures are no longer needed to address
the grid security threat identified under para-
graph (1), including by means of Commission
approval of a reliability standard under section
215 that the Commission determines adequately
addresses such threat.

        (C) The date that is 1 year after the
issuance of an order under paragraph (1):

        (6) COST RECOVERY.—If the Commission de-
determines that owners, operators, or users of the
bulk-power system or of defense critical electric in-
frastucture have incurred substantial costs to com-
ply with an order under this subsection and that
such costs were prudently incurred and cannot rea-
sonably be recovered through regulated rates or
market prices for the electric energy or services sold
by such owners, operators, or users, the Commission
shall, after notice and an opportunity for comment,
establish a mechanism that permits such owners, op-
erators, or users to recover such costs.

"(c) MEASURES TO ADDRESS GRID SECURITY
VULNERABILITIES.—

"(1) COMMISSION AUTHORITY.—If the Commiss-
ion, in consultation with appropriate Federal agen-
cies, identifies a grid security vulnerability that the
Commission determines has not adequately been ad-
dressed through a reliability standard developed and
approved under section 215, the Commission shall,
after notice and opportunity for comment and after
consultation with the Secretary, other appropriate
Federal agencies, and appropriate governmental au-
thorities in Canada and Mexico, promulgate a rule
or issue an order requiring implementation, by any
owner, operator, or user of the bulk-power system in
the United States, of measures to protect the bulk-
power system against such vulnerability. Before pro-
mulgating a rule or issuing an order under this
paragraph, the Commission shall, to the extent prac-
ticable in light of the urgency of the need for action
to address the grid security vulnerability, request
and consider recommendations from the Electric Reliability Organization regarding such rule or order. The Commission may establish an appropriate deadline for the submission of such recommendations.

(2) Certain existing cybersecurity vulnerabilities.—Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this section, the Commission shall, after notice and opportunity for comment and after consultation with the Secretary, other appropriate Federal agencies, and appropriate governmental authorities in Canada and Mexico, promulgate a rule or issue an order requiring the implementation, by any owner, user, or operator of the bulk-power system in the United States, of such measures as are necessary to protect the bulk-power system against the vulnerabilities identified in the June 21, 2007, communication to certain Electricity Sector Owners and Operators from the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, acting in its capacity as the Electricity Sector Information and Analysis Center.

(3) Rescission.—The Commission shall approve a reliability standard developed under section 215 that addresses a grid security vulnerability that is the subject of a rule or order under paragraph (1).
or (2), unless the Commission determines that such
reliability standard does not adequately protect
against such vulnerability or otherwise does not sat-
ify the requirements of section 215. Upon such ap-
proval, the Commission shall rescind the rule pro-
mulgated or order issued under paragraph (1) or (2)
addressing such vulnerability, effective upon the ef-
flective date of the newly approved reliability stand-
ard.

"(4) GEOMAGNETIC STORMS.—Not later than 1
year after the date of enactment of this section, the
Commission shall, after notice and an opportunity
for comment and after consultation with the Sec-
retary and other appropriate Federal agencies, issue
an order directing the Electric Reliability Organiza-
tion to submit to the Commission for approval under
section 215, not later than 1 year after the issuance
of such order, reliability standards adequate to pro-
tect the bulk-power system from any reasonably
foreseeable geomagnetic storm event. The Commis-
sion’s order shall specify the nature and magnitude
of the reasonably foreseeable events against which
such standards must protect. Such standards shall
appropriately balance the risks to the bulk-power
system associated with such events, including any
regional variation in such risks, and the costs of mitigating such risks.

(ii) LARGE TRANSFORMER AVAILABILITY.—

Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this section, the Commission shall, after notice and an opportunity for comment and after consultation with the Secretary and other appropriate Federal agencies, issue an order directing the Electric Reliability Organization to submit to the Commission for approval under section 215, not later than 1 year after the issuance of such order, reliability standards addressing availability of large transformers. Such standards shall require entities that own or operate large transformers to ensure, individually or jointly, adequate availability of large transformers to promptly restore the reliable operation of the bulk-power system in the event that any such transformer is destroyed or disabled as a result of a reasonably foreseeable physical or other attack or geomagnetic storm event. The Commission’s order shall specify the nature and magnitude of the reasonably foreseeable attacks or events that shall provide the basis for such standards. Such standards shall—
“(A) provide entities subject to the standards with the option of meeting such standards individually or jointly; and

“(B) appropriately balance the risks associated with a reasonably foreseeable attack or event, including any regional variation in such risks, and the costs of ensuring adequate availability of spare transformers.

“(d) CRITICAL DEFENSE FACILITIES.—

“(1) DESIGNATION.—Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this section, the President shall designate, in a written directive or determination provided to the Commission, facilities located in the United States (including the territories) that are—

“(A) critical to the defense of the United States; and

“(B) vulnerable to a disruption of the supply of electric energy provided to such facility by an external provider.

The number of facilities designated by such directive or determination shall not exceed 100. The President may periodically revise the list of designated facilities through a subsequent written directive or determination provided to the Commission; provided
that the total number of designated facilities at any
time shall not exceed 100.

(2) Commission authority.—If the Commis-
sion identifies a defense critical electric infrastruc-
ture vulnerability that the Commission, in consulta-
tion with owners and operators of any facility or fa-
cilities designated by the President pursuant to
paragraph (1), determines has not adequately been
addressed through measures undertaken by owners
or operators of defense critical electric infrastruc-
ture, the Commission shall, after notice and an op-
portunity for comment and after consultation with
the Secretary and other appropriate Federal agen-
cies, promulgate a rule or issue an order requiring
implementation, by any owner or operator of defense
critical electric infrastructure, of measures to protect
the defense critical electric infrastructure against
such vulnerability. The Commission shall exempt
from any such rule or order any specific defense
critical electric infrastructure that the Commission
determines already has been adequately protected
against the identified vulnerability. The Commission
shall make any such determination in consultation
with the owner or operator of the facility designated
by the President pursuant to paragraph (1) that relies upon such defense critical electric infrastructure.

**(3)** Cost recovery.—An owner or operator of defense critical electric infrastructure shall be required to take measures under paragraph (2) only to the extent that the owners or operators of a facility or facilities designated by the President pursuant to paragraph (1) that rely upon such infrastructure agree to bear the full incremental costs of compliance with a rule promulgated or order issued under paragraph (2).

**(e)** Protection of Information.—

**(1)** Prohibition of public disclosure of protected information.—Protected information—

**(A)** shall be exempt from disclosure under section 552(b)(3) of title 5, United States Code; and

**(B)** shall not be made available pursuant to any State, local, or tribal law requiring disclosure of information or records.

**(2)** Information sharing.—

**(A)** In general.—Consistent with the Controlled Unclassified Information framework established by the President, the Commission
shall promulgate such regulations and issue such orders as necessary to designate protected information and to prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of such protected information.

"(B) Sharing of protected information.—The regulations promulgated and orders issued pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall provide standards for and facilitate the appropriate sharing of protected information with, between, and by Federal, State, local, and tribal authorities; the Electric Reliability Organization; regional entities; and owners, operators, and users of the bulk-power system in the United States and of defense critical electric infrastructure. In promulgating such regulations and issuing such orders, the Commission shall take account of the role of State commissions in reviewing the prudence and cost of investments within their respective jurisdictions. The Commission shall consult with appropriate Canadian and Mexican authorities to develop protocols for the sharing of protected information with, between, and by appropriate Canadian and Mexican authorities and owners, operators, and
users of the bulk-power system outside the United States.

**(3)** Submission of information to Congress.—Nothing in this section shall permit or authorize the withholding of information from Congress, any committee or subcommittee thereof, or the Comptroller General.

**(4)** Disclosure of non-protected information.—In implementing this section, the Commission shall protect from disclosure only the minimum amount of information necessary to protect the reliability of the bulk-power system and of defense critical electric infrastructure. The Commission shall segregate protected information within documents and electronic communications, wherever feasible, to facilitate disclosure of information that is not designated as protected information.

**(5)** Duration of designation.—Information may not be designated as protected information for longer than 5 years, unless specifically redesignated by the Commission.

**(6)** Removal of designation.—The Commission may remove the designation of protected information, in whole or in part, from a document or electronic communication if the unauthorized disclo-
sure of such information could no longer be used to impair the reliability of the bulk-power system or of defense critical electric infrastructure.

"(7) JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DESIGNATIONS.—
Notwithstanding subsection (f) of this section or section 313, a person or entity may seek judicial review of a determination by the Commission concerning the designation of protected information under this subsection exclusively in the district court of the United States in the district in which the complainant resides, or has his principal place of business, or in the District of Columbia. In such a case the court shall determine the matter de novo, and may examine the contents of documents or electronic communications designated as protected information in camera to determine whether such documents or any part thereof were improperly designated as protected information. The burden is on the Commission to sustain its designation.

"(f) JUDICIAL REVIEW.—The Commission shall act expeditiously to resolve all applications for rehearing of orders issued pursuant to this section that are filed under section 313(a). Any party seeking judicial review pursuant to section 313 of an order issued under this section may
obtain such review only in the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

(g) Provision of Assistance to Industry in
Meeting Grid Security Protection Needs.—

(1) Expertise and Resources.—The Sec-
retary shall establish a program, in consultation with
other appropriate Federal agencies, to develop tech-
nical expertise in the protection of systems for the
generation, transmission, and distribution of electric
energy against geomagnetic storms or malicious acts
using electronic communications or electromagnetic
pulse that would pose a substantial risk of disrup-
tion to the operation of those electronic devices or
communications networks, including hardware, soft-
ware, and data, that are essential to the reliability
of such systems. Such program shall include the
identification and development of appropriate tech-
nical and electronic resources, including hardware,
software, and system equipment.

(2) Sharing Expertise.—As appropriate,
the Secretary shall offer to share technical expertise
developed under the program under paragraph (1),
through consultation and assistance, with owners,
operators, or users of systems for the generation,
transmission, or distribution of electric energy lo-
eated in the United States and with State commissions. In offering such support, the Secretary shall assign higher priority to systems serving facilities designated by the President pursuant to subsection (d)(1) and other critical-infrastructure facilities, which the Secretary shall identify in consultation with the Commission and other appropriate Federal agencies.

"(3) SECURITY CLEARANCES AND COMMUNICATION.—The Secretary shall facilitate and, to the extent practicable, expedite the acquisition of adequate security clearances by key personnel of any entity subject to the requirements of this section to enable optimum communication with Federal agencies regarding grid security threats, grid security vulnerabilities, and defense critical electric infrastructure vulnerabilities. The Secretary, the Commission, and other appropriate Federal agencies shall, to the extent practicable and consistent with their obligations to protect classified and protected information, share timely actionable information regarding grid security threats, grid security vulnerabilities, and defense critical electric infrastructure vulnerabilities with appropriate key personnel of owners, operators, and users of the bulk-
power system and of defense critical electric infra-
structure.

"(h) CERTAIN FEDERAL ENTITIES.—For the 11-year
period commencing on the date of enactment of this sec-
tion, the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Bonneville
Power Administration shall be exempt from any require-
ment under subsection (b) or (e) (except for any require-
ment addressing a malicious act using electronic commu-
nication)."

(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—

(1) JURISDICTION.—Section 201(b)(2) of the
Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 824(b)(2)) is amend-
ed by inserting "215A," after "215," each place it
appears.

(2) PUBLIC UTILITY.—Section 201(e) of the
Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 824(e)) is amended
by inserting "215A," after "215,".

SEC. 3. BUDGETARY COMPLIANCE.

The budgetary effects of this Act, for the purpose of
complying with the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010,
shall be determined by reference to the latest statement
titled "Budgetary Effects of PAYGO Legislation" for this
Act, submitted for printing in the Congressional Record
by the Chairman of the House Budget Committee, pro-
provided that such statement has been submitted prior to the vote on passage.

SECTION 1. CRITICAL ELECTRIC INFRASTRUCTURE.

Part II of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 824 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“SEC. 224. CRITICAL ELECTRIC INFRASTRUCTURE.

“(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

“(1) CRITICAL ELECTRIC INFRASTRUCTURE.—The term ‘critical electric infrastructure’ means systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, used for the generation, transmission, or distribution of electric energy affecting interstate commerce that, as determined by the Commission or the Secretary (as appropriate), are so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of the systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on national security, national economic security, or national public health or safety.

“(2) CRITICAL ELECTRIC INFRASTRUCTURE INFORMATION.—The term ‘critical electric infrastructure information’ means critical infrastructure information relating to critical electric infrastructure.

“(3) CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE INFORMATION.—The term ‘critical infrastructure information’ has the meaning given the term in section 212 of the

“(4) CYBER SECURITY THREAT.—The term ‘cyber security threat’ means the imminent danger of an act that disrupts, attempts to disrupt, or poses a significant risk of disrupting the operation of programmable electronic devices or communications networks (including hardware, software, and data) essential to the reliable operation of critical electric infrastructure.

“(5) CYBER SECURITY VULNERABILITY.—The term ‘cyber security vulnerability’ means a weakness or flaw in the design or operation of any programmable electronic device or communication network that exposes critical electric infrastructure to a cyber security threat.

“(6) SECRETARY.—The term ‘Secretary’ means the Secretary of Energy.

“(b) AUTHORITY OF COMMISSION.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—The Commission shall issue such rules or orders as are necessary to protect critical electric infrastructure from cyber security vulnerabilities.

“(2) EXPEDITED PROCEDURES.—The Commission may issue a rule or order without prior notice
or hearing if the Commission determines the rule or order must be issued immediately to protect critical electric infrastructure from a cyber security vulnerability.

“(3) Consultation.—Before issuing a rule or order under paragraph (2), to the extent practicable, taking into account the nature of the threat and urgency of need for action, the Commission shall consult with the entities described in subsection (e)(1) and with officials at other Federal agencies, as appropriate, regarding implementation of actions that will effectively address the identified cyber security vulnerabilities.

“(4) Termination of Rules or Orders.—A rule or order issued to address a cyber security vulnerability under this subsection shall expire on the effective date of a standard developed and approved pursuant to section 215 to address the cyber security vulnerability.

“(c) Emergency Authority of Secretary.—

“(1) In General.—If the Secretary determines that immediate action is necessary to protect critical electric infrastructure from a cyber security threat, the Secretary may require, by order, with or without notice, persons subject to the jurisdiction of the Com-
mission under this section to take such actions as the Secretary determines will best avert or mitigate the cyber security threat.

“(2) COORDINATION WITH CANADA AND MEXICO.—In exercising the authority granted under this subsection, the Secretary is encouraged to consult and coordinate with the appropriate officials in Canada and Mexico responsible for the protection of cyber security of the interconnected North American electricity grid.

“(3) CONSULTATION.—Before exercising the authority granted under this subsection, to the extent practicable, taking into account the nature of the threat and urgency of need for action, the Secretary shall consult with the entities described in subsection (e)(1) and with officials at other Federal agencies, as appropriate, regarding implementation of actions that will effectively address the identified cyber security threat.

“(4) COST RECOVERY.—The Commission shall establish a mechanism that permits public utilities to recover prudently incurred costs required to implement immediate actions ordered by the Secretary under this subsection.
“(d) Duration of Expedited or Emergency Rules or Orders.—Any rule or order issued by the Commission without prior notice or hearing under subsection (b)(2) or any order issued by the Secretary under subsection (c) shall remain effective for not more than 90 days unless, during the 90 day-period, the Commission—

“(1) gives interested persons an opportunity to submit written data, views, or arguments (with or without opportunity for oral presentation); and

“(2) affirms, amends, or repeals the rule or order.

“(e) Jurisdiction.—

“(1) In general.—Notwithstanding section 201, this section shall apply to any entity that owns, controls, or operates critical electric infrastructure.

“(2) Covered entities.—

“(A) In general.—An entity described in paragraph (1) shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission for purposes of—

“(i) carrying out this section; and

“(ii) applying the enforcement authorities of this Act with respect to this section.

“(B) Jurisdiction.—This subsection shall not make an electric utility or any other entity
subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission for any other purpose.

“(3) ALASKA AND HAWAII EXCLUDED.—Except as provided in subsection (f), nothing in this section shall apply in the State of Alaska or Hawaii.

“(f) DEFENSE FACILITIES.—Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this section, the Secretary of Defense shall prepare, in consultation with the Secretary, the States of Alaska and Hawaii, the Territory of Guam, and the electric utilities that serve national defense facilities in those States and Territory, a comprehensive plan that identifies the emergency measures or actions that will be taken to protect the reliability of the electric power supply of the national defense facilities located in those States and Territory in the event of an imminent cybersecurity threat.

“(g) PROTECTION OF CRITICAL ELECTRIC INFRASTRUCTURE INFORMATION.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—Section 214 of the Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 133) shall apply to critical electric infrastructure information submitted to the Commission or the Secretary under this section to the same extent as that section applies to critical infrastructure information voluntarily submitted to the Department of Homeland Security under that Act (6 U.S.C. 131 et seq.).
“(2) Rules prohibiting disclosure.—Notwithstanding section 552 of title 5, United States Code, the Secretary and the Commission shall prescribe regulations prohibiting disclosure of information obtained or developed in ensuring cyber security under this section if the Secretary or Commission, as appropriate, decides disclosing the information would be detrimental to the security of critical electric infrastructure.

“(3) Procedures for sharing information.—

“(A) In general.—The Secretary and the Commission shall establish procedures on the release of critical infrastructure information to entities subject to this section, to the extent necessary to enable the entities to implement rules or orders of the Commission or the Secretary.

“(B) Requirements.—The procedures shall—

“(i) limit the redissemination of information described in subparagraph (A) to ensure that the information is not used for an unauthorized purpose;

“(ii) ensure the security and confidentiality of the information;
“(iii) protect the constitutional and statutory rights of any individuals who are subjects of the information; and

“(iv) provide data integrity through the timely removal and destruction of obsolete or erroneous names and information.”.
AN ACT

To amend the Federal Power Act to protect the bulk-power system and electric infrastructure critical to the defense of the United States against cybersecurity and other threats and vulnerabilities.

AUGUST 8, 2010

Reported with an amendment

SEPTEMBER 27, 2010

Reported with an amendment