1.Short title; definitions;
table of contents
(a)This Act may be cited as the Western Hemisphere Counterterrorism and Nonproliferation
Act of 2009
.
(b)In
this Act:
(1)Appropriate
congressional committeesThe term appropriate congressional
committees means—
(A)the Committee on
Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of
Representatives; and
(B)the Committee on
Foreign Relations and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs of the Senate.
(2)Nonhumanitarian
assistanceThe term nonhumanitarian assistance
means—
(A)any assistance under the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 (including programs under title IV of chapter 2 of part I of such
Act, relating to the Overseas Private Investment Corporation), other
than—
(i)disaster relief assistance, including any
assistance under chapter 9 of part I of such Act;
(ii)assistance which
involves the provision of food (including monetization of food) or medicine;
and
(iii)assistance for
refugees;
(B)sales, or financing on any terms, under the
Arms Export Control Act; and
(C)financing under the Export-Import Bank Act
of 1945.
(3)State sponsor of
terrorismThe term
state sponsor of terrorism means a country the government of which
has been determined by the Secretary of State, for purposes of section 6(j) of
the Export Administration Act of 1979, section 620A of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961, section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, or other provision of
law, is a government that has repeatedly provided support for acts of
international terrorism.
(c)The table of contents for this Act is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; definitions; table of
contents.
Title I—Counterterrorism in the Western Hemisphere
Sec. 101. Findings.
Sec. 102. Statement of policy regarding regional efforts to
counter terrorism in the Western Hemisphere.
Sec. 103. Amendments to annual country reports on
terrorism.
Sec. 104. Amendments to annual determination
procedures.
Sec. 105. Amendment to international narcotics control strategy
report.
Sec. 106. United States efforts in the Western
Hemisphere.
Sec. 107. International Law Enforcement Academy in San
Salvador, El Salvador.
Sec. 108. Actions regarding the Organization of American
States.
Sec. 109. Amendment to Department of State Rewards
Program.
Title II—Nonproliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons in the Western Hemisphere
Sec. 201. Findings.
Sec. 202. Statement of policy regarding the proliferation of
weapons-related nuclear, chemical, and biological materials, technology, and
facilities.
Sec. 203. Statement of policy regarding the small quantities
protocol.
Sec. 204. Securing adherence to agreements regarding nuclear
nonproliferation by countries in the Western Hemisphere.
Sec. 205. Halting the proliferation of nuclear fuel
fabrication.
Sec. 206. Cooperation with the Proliferation Security
Initiative.
Sec. 207. Establishment of the Western Hemisphere
Nonproliferation Partnership Initiative.
Sec. 208. Prohibited transactions.
Sec. 209. Restrictions on nuclear cooperation with countries
assisting the nuclear program of Venezuela or Cuba.
Title III—Western Hemisphere Regional Coordination
Centers
Sec. 301. Establishment of the Western Hemisphere Regional
Coordination Centers.
Sec. 302. Regional Security Initiative.
Sec. 303. Authorization of appropriations.
Title IV—Prohibitions
on engagement with certain Western Hemisphere countries
Sec. 401. Prohibitions on engagement with certain Western
Hemisphere countries.
Title V—Report
Sec. 501. Report.
<enum>I</enum><header>Counterterrorism
in the Western Hemisphere</header>
<section display-inline="no-display-inline" id="H0BC484F2F6884DDAABC4F361CCA3AE6E" section-type="subsequent-section"><enum>101.</enum><header>Findings</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">Congress finds the following:</text>
<paragraph id="H46A4CAB66F5E4D3B84FF7C1B16F76570"><enum>(1)</enum><text>In 2004, a
Lebanese individual, having entered the United States illegally from Mexico,
was charged with supporting Hezbollah financially and was described by the
United States Attorney as a <quote>fighter, recruiter and
fundraiser</quote>.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H1A398B9A3182439C8E44D898BB3EB9A"><enum>(2)</enum><text>In
December 2006, the Department of the Treasury designated nine individuals and
two entities as part of a network that is <quote>a major financial artery to
Hezbollah in Lebanon</quote> and announced an effort to target Hezbollah
fundraising in the tri-border area of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H79B29FDEA7B34304A38BCA6636DACC70"><enum>(3)</enum><text>In 2007, the
Chavez regime established routine civilian airline flights between Venezuela
and designated State Sponsors of Terrorism, Iran, and Syria.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HB42B9AB305FC4EFB9352A3F5CBB624F8"><enum>(4)</enum><text>In October 2007,
Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff said, in response to a question
about relations between Iran and Venezuela, <quote>I think [there is] an
emerging threat and challenge to the West, which is the export of ideology that
we see among Islamist extremists in the Middle East from Iran, and the marriage
of that with others who, perhaps for their own reasons, have strong
anti-American views or who simply exploit anti-Americanism as a way of
promoting their own ideological or power agendas.</quote>.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H14AE6EDB6A3A4D109C524FF3AE8B219D"><enum>(5)</enum><text>In November 2007,
Interpol’s General Assembly agreed to issue red capture notices for the arrest
of a Hezbollah leader and five former senior Iranian officials charged by
Argentina in the 1994 Argentine Mutual Jewish Association (AMIA) terrorist
attack, in which 85 innocent people were killed and 300 more were
wounded.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HD37FCBE8890C4BEC8BC6E90031B8411C"><enum>(6)</enum><text>A
2007 Drug Enforcement Administration report linked nearly half of foreign
terrorist organizations around the world today to narcotics trade, underscoring
the fact that the fight against terrorism must also include a corresponding
fight against illicit drugs.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H3860462BB083448988905B8990B97EF8"><enum>(7)</enum><text>In February 2008,
Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell reported to Congress in his
presentation of the Intelligence Community’s Annual Threat Assessment that the
governments of Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Bolivia, <quote>to varying degrees, have
engaged in sharply anti-U.S. rhetoric, aligned with Venezuela and Cuba—and
increasingly Iran—on international issues, and advocated measures that directly
clash with U.S. initiatives</quote>.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HC247F77679384D9285DD935773B4FD4"><enum>(8)</enum><text>In
February 2008, a United States Federal law-enforcement official shared,
<quote>We’ve known for some time that Islamic extremists groups were gaining
momentum and exploiting the region … Iran is no exception—now with Cuba and
Venezuela, the door is open.</quote>.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H7334B48E97DC488AA3A2D0B36584EDF"><enum>(9)</enum><text>Venezuela has
concluded nearly 200 bilateral agreements with Iran on military cooperation,
the sharing of intelligence, expanding financial cooperation, and initiating
cultural exchanges, among others.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H1EB5603CBC224A17BA8E7E9B1C28D26E"><enum>(10)</enum><text>According to
United States intelligence officials, Iran possesses the potential to use its
close relationship with Venezuela to facilitate the smuggling of people, drugs,
and weapons into the Western Hemisphere through terrorist proxy groups.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HA2EC27B5970E45FEA5CDAB9EBB7FEB6"><enum>(11)</enum><text>In March 2008, the
Colombian army led a raid against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
and seized computers containing documents that suggest evidence of $300,000,000
in payments to the extremist organization from the Venezuelan Government,
high-level contacts by the FARC with officials from Ecuador and Venezuela, and
efforts by the FARC to obtain 50 kilograms of uranium.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H7575D16C341644B28343412127EBEA39"><enum>(12)</enum><text>The
Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism of the Organization of American
States commits all State parties to establish domestic regulatory institutions
that eradicate the financing of terrorist offenses, cooperate with fellow
signatories to control borders, provide mutual legal assistance in
counterterrorism efforts and prosecution of terrorist offenses, and conform to
all other stipulations of the convention designed to prevent, punish, and
eliminate terrorist offenses.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H6CCE505F7E404816A88C1191B197FE82"><enum>(13)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">In June 2008, the Department of the
Treasury designated two Venezuela-based supporters of Hizballah, Ghazi Nasr al
Din and Fawzi Kan’an, along with two travel agencies owned and controlled by
Kan’an, explaining it is <quote>extremely troubling to see the Government of
Venezuela employing and providing safe harbor to Hizballah facilitators and
fundraisers.</quote>.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HB55CBB7B6C9A4D149159BC42D5B14C"><enum>(14)</enum><text>In
May 2008, for the third year in a row, the Department of State determined,
pursuant to section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act, that Venezuela was not
cooperating fully with United States antiterrorism efforts.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H418DD240F16A4743BE6263003D77CFB6"><enum>(15)</enum><text>In April 2008,
for the fouth year in a row, the Department of State’s Annual Country Report on
Terrorism stated that the Government of Cuba provided safe haven to members of
[several Latin American terrorist groups] and maintained close relationships
with other state sponsors of terrorism such as Iran.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H08E9538F6F584857A0671C0060E0A25D"><enum>(16)</enum><text>In April 2008,
for the fifth year in a row, the Department of State’s Annual Country Report on
Terrorism also noted that Venezuelan citizenship, identity, and travel
documents remain easy to obtain, making Venezuela a potentially attractive
way-station for terrorists.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HFD6C243D6DC1461289D2FB5008687F"><enum>(17)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">August to December 2008 marked a resurgence
in deadly attacks by the Shining Path, a Department of State-designated foreign
terrorist organization, in Peru. Peruvian security officials say that while the
group’s numbers have dwindled, its arsenal is stronger than in the past, as
profits from the drug trade allow it to buy more powerful weapons.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HBD9E0A19FDF449538E1D3887AAC22E9"><enum>(18)</enum><text>In October 2008,
reports surfaced that the Chavez government, with help from Cuban military
advisors and FARC guerrillas, was allegedly operating a secret paramilitary
training camp in a closed-off tourist campground in Venezuela.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HEB055DDD923640E8BF2358A6606CFC8B"><enum>(19)</enum><text>In October 2008,
the Department of the Treasury designated Banco Internacional de Desarollo,
C.A., a financial institution located in Venezuela, to be owned or controlled
by or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly,
the Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI). EDBI was designated for its role
in helping Iran violate United Nations sanctions and handle its illicit
transactions.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HC141B36153AE4E23B00010B3978EB615"><enum>(20)</enum><text>In December 2008,
media sources reported that Iran is using its close ties with Venezuela to
dodge United Nations sanctions by using aircraft from Venezuelan airline
Conviasa to transport computers and engine components to Syria for use in
missiles.</text>
</paragraph></section><section id="H800BD404B55C465081036421B4F8ECF9"><enum>102.</enum><header>Statement of
policy regarding regional efforts to counter terrorism in the Western
Hemisphere</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">To enhance the
security of the Western Hemisphere and bolster regional capacity to counter
terrorism, it shall be the policy of the United States to promote the signing,
ratification, and implementation by all countries in the Western Hemisphere of
the following:</text>
<paragraph id="H511C3D8350FC4BE596F45646CBE25CC1"><enum>(1)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">OAS AG/RES. 1840 (XXXII–O/02)
Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H819AC35FDEA54F7E80C254AEAAB2DAA5"><enum>(2)</enum><text>Financial Action
Task Force (FATF) 40 Recommendations on Money Laundering (ML) and 9 Special
Recommendations (SR) on Terrorist Financing (TF).</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H35F801E0FB35471AB67BBEF48F4BCE7E"><enum>(3)</enum><text>The 1963 ICAO
Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board
Aircraft.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H4A0CC097E16F4B5296BF24B6AD99B51"><enum>(4)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The 1970 ICAO Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H090E7F15EA2F4C2A906D585873ADB254"><enum>(5)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The 1971 ICAO Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H2EA11DF61AEE446B855400B66DA2C573"><enum>(6)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The 1973 United Nations Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Person,
including Diplomatic Agents.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H809F1242126B4DA4A596BDB1A6F929E8"><enum>(7)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The 1979 United Nations International
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H4265283DD1AA4197BBF730F67900FFFB"><enum>(8)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The 1988 ICAO Protocol for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation,
Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of Civil Aviation.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H164258DB4DBC429B8B20D9482D52F737"><enum>(9)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The 1988 IMO Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H0784BC3443FC45119ECED1C287D56BEE"><enum>(10)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The 1988 IMO Protocol for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the
Continental Shelf.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H0965782A15204FF4A49CF8CBD334EB35"><enum>(11)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The 1991 ICAO Convention on the Marking of
Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H4B534D4B3E7A44BCB24C07D3E8CE5B2"><enum>(12)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The 1997 United Nations International
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H8331DDC98B9F41B18E65EFD0DDA178ED"><enum>(13)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The 1999 United Nations International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H1BD551F247394F87A5B7B0418B00BFCF"><enum>(14)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The 2001 United Nations S/Res/1373 Creation
of Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC).</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H9F99DC694A944AAA95AAB964B4CF5564"><enum>(15)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The 2005 United Nations S/Res/1624
Prohibition of incitement to commit terrorist act or acts.</text>
</paragraph></section><section id="H1F3B662AA1434A71000500D0882CA487"><enum>103.</enum><header>Amendments to
annual country reports on terrorism</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">Section 140(b) of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. 2656f(b)) is
amended—</text>
<paragraph id="H4E3AC016277147C3A5E63BA8CA7FF3"><enum>(1)</enum><text>in
paragraph (4)(D), by striking <quote>and</quote> at the end;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HA5EBAF3BB4EA482AB5A32F70801994D1"><enum>(2)</enum><text>in paragraph (5),
by striking the period at the end and inserting <quote>; and</quote>;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H686285CAB6274EF1AA63455CFBC8495E"><enum>(3)</enum><text>by redesignating
the second paragraph (3) and the second paragraph (4) as paragraphs (6) and
(7), respectively;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HF0C6F9FBF6664620BA1B8511915700F3"><enum>(4)</enum><text>in paragraph (6),
as so redesignated, by striking <quote>and</quote> at the end;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H937BFAC8DF664DBBAEEF966EA2EE3C80"><enum>(5)</enum><text>in paragraph (7),
as so redesignated, by striking the period at the end; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HB1409DADA2AE4E38A5864837113EA2F7"><enum>(6)</enum><text>by adding after
such paragraph (7) the following new paragraphs:</text>
<quoted-block display-inline="no-display-inline" id="HA59BABF77F00424E9571338F70B82651" style="OLC">
<paragraph id="HF99D6D9A3EEC4A16964C4964A430DD2"><enum>(8)</enum><text>a comprehensive
assessment of all United States assistance available to combat terrorism in
each country that is a subject of such report; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H469D4567DE784D7A83006888C744B6F"><enum>(9)</enum><text>with respect to
countries in the Western Hemisphere that are the subjects of such report, the
level in each such country of threat posed by radical Islamist
terrorism.</text>
</paragraph><after-quoted-block>.</after-quoted-block></quoted-block>
</paragraph></section><section id="H9DFBE4A48ED947A5AFD7A1AD6FB9FF6"><enum>104.</enum><header>Amendments to
annual determination procedures</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">Section 706 of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107–228; 22 U.S.C. 2291j–1) is
amended—</text>
<paragraph id="H10BDEA2B90844321A360D68E8FDE7073"><enum>(1)</enum><text>in paragraph
(2)—</text>
<subparagraph id="H096FFC79FBAD40BF82D0218166A2F604"><enum>(A)</enum><text>in subparagraph
(A)(ii); by striking <quote>and</quote> at the end;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H1C2AA8726D4E4F0B907EA9BDA230E49F"><enum>(B)</enum><text>by redesignating
subparagraph (B) as subparagraph (C);</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H61B21FCFB7C9420388031BB88BB103B"><enum>(C)</enum><text>by inserting after
subparagraph (A) the following new subparagraph:</text>
<quoted-block display-inline="no-display-inline" id="H0298F7D863FD4D758B49291D2F5691F6" style="OLC">
<subparagraph commented="no" id="H0C5F8D6D636641608B8E22E7BE77ED5"><enum>(B)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">designate each country, if any, identified
in such report in which a link has been determined to exist between illicit
drug trafficking and a designated foreign terrorist organization and that has
failed demonstrably, during the previous 12 months, to make substantial
efforts—</text>
<clause commented="no" id="H53A2BA4A8CD1412D8170F03D2D6D8FBA"><enum>(i)</enum><text>to adhere to its
obligations under international counterterrorism agreements; and</text>
</clause><clause commented="no" id="HAD31903000EE48DB830988C70001455E"><enum>(ii)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">to implement effective counterterrorism
measures, including action on such issues as the rule of law, denying safe
haven to terrorists, financing and money laundering, and law enforcement;
and</text>
</clause></subparagraph><after-quoted-block>;
and</after-quoted-block></quoted-block>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H02E8F64A54854FBFBE55A433153D873"><enum>(D)</enum><text>in subparagraph
(C), as so redesignated, by inserting before the period at the end the
following: <quote>under subparagraph (A) or (B)</quote>;</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="H2AA765D638A34D1FB1EA77C5421EA551"><enum>(2)</enum><text>in paragraph
(3)—</text>
<subparagraph id="H1F69B040BE9440F0A8D500CBE3A276EC"><enum>(A)</enum><text>in subparagraph
(A), by striking <quote>or</quote> at the end;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="HDA32B1635D7244D4BD1C31C5E5CEB578"><enum>(B)</enum><text>in subparagraph
(B)(2), by striking the period at the end and inserting <quote>; or</quote>;
and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H53B36B26DBCC44699DA53200283E279F"><enum>(C)</enum><text>by adding at the
end the following new subparagraph:</text>
<quoted-block display-inline="no-display-inline" id="H959C45DDEF934683924DEA3E1BEDDF00" style="OLC">
<subparagraph id="H9839E352D7CC419490C818CD71F7F54"><enum>(C)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">subsequent to the designation being made
under paragraph (2)(B), the country has made substantial efforts—</text>
<clause id="H75FE41527CD94A1F90656E1BE7F456B"><enum>(i)</enum><text>to
adhere to its obligations under international counterterrorism agreements;
and</text>
</clause><clause id="H0EA914A761A446A99276EA00EA22A29B"><enum>(ii)</enum><text>to implement
effective counterterrorism measures, including action on such issues as the
rule of law, denying safe haven to terrorists, financing and money laundering,
and law
enforcement.</text>
</clause></subparagraph><after-quoted-block>;</after-quoted-block></quoted-block>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="HE4592DC9E74B4506965793446DBC5159"><enum>(3)</enum><text>by redesignating
paragraph (8) as paragraph (9); and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H87532FB7A5F54562946F55CC71E604CD"><enum>(4)</enum><text>by inserting after
paragraph (7) the following new paragraph:</text>
<quoted-block display-inline="no-display-inline" id="H238B38EE9326420DB8ECB61691D97873" style="OLC">
<paragraph id="H131EFD7813034E27BF9C99F4EDBDF646"><enum>(8)</enum><header>Bilateral
agreements</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">If a country
designated under subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (2) does not receive a
determination under subparagraphs (B) or (C) of paragraph (3), the Secretary of
State shall negotiate with such country a bilateral agreement describing
actions to be taken by the United States and such country to satisfy such
determinations during the one year period following such a designation. Such a
bilateral agreement should include a needs assessment, a bilateral action plan,
the provision of United States training and assistance, the use of
International Law Enforcement Academy facilities in the region, and an exchange
of model laws and best
practices.</text>
</paragraph><after-quoted-block>.</after-quoted-block></quoted-block>
</paragraph></section><section id="HE21C5E39CF364084A635734400BABE00"><enum>105.</enum><header>Amendment to
international narcotics control strategy report</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">Section 489(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2291h(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following new
paragraph:</text>
<quoted-block display-inline="no-display-inline" id="H08C014566EB24389A2FE56CEF9178F2C" style="traditional">
<paragraph id="H54039CE8D7924F9B9B59E5C9C35C1DC"><enum>(9)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">A separate section that contains
information relating to any links between illicit narcotics trafficking or
money laundering and terrorists, terrorist acts, or designated foreign
terrorist organizations (as such term is used in section 219 of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189)), and any actions taken by the United
States Government or foreign government to address such
links.</text>
</paragraph><after-quoted-block>.</after-quoted-block></quoted-block>
</section><section commented="no" id="H2C9783129ED1418BB95939B000B9DDE9"><enum>106.</enum><header>United States
efforts in the Western Hemisphere</header>
<subsection commented="no" id="H857584621D444EA7B3CBB0BE067B132C"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Determination</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">For any country in the Western Hemisphere
that the President has determined—</text>
<paragraph commented="no" id="H5A94C113EE034E95B0C65869755C88D2"><enum>(1)</enum><text>is engaged in
military cooperation with a state sponsor of terrorism,</text>
</paragraph><paragraph commented="no" id="HCFDDE509275241288D188C488EE3F2AF"><enum>(2)</enum><text>is engaged in
nonmarket-based trade with a state sponsor of terrorism,</text>
</paragraph><paragraph commented="no" id="H321DF7E9D8C444E000FBCBCD19057E30"><enum>(3)</enum><text>is carrying out
policies that threaten United States national security interests, or</text>
</paragraph><paragraph commented="no" id="HE7ACE01E56E6422282335F15F0724FC0"><enum>(4)</enum><text>is not fully
cooperating with United States counterterrorism or nonproliferation
efforts,</text>
</paragraph><continuation-text commented="no" continuation-text-level="subsection">the President is authorized to
impose any of the sanctions described in subsection (b).</continuation-text></subsection><subsection commented="no" id="HB294DCB520304697B5A061F2F4F749EF"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Sanctions</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">For any country in the Western Hemisphere
with respect to which the President has made a determination in accordance with
subsection (a), the President is authorized to—</text>
<paragraph commented="no" id="H8E6147A88E134DBA826E746E34962153"><enum>(1)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">suspend United States nonhumanitarian
foreign assistance to the government of that country; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph commented="no" id="HC362A629B6814434BE832253F733862B"><enum>(2)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">prohibit the sale, provision, or transfer
of articles, including the issuance of any specific license or grant of any
other specific permission or authority to export any goods or technology
under—</text>
<subparagraph commented="no" id="HF20DB0B74DED43C79BE0D847E55E6173"><enum>(A)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">the Export Administration Act of
1979;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph commented="no" id="HB21F624E135B4BD6B6DCE61868D685A8"><enum>(B)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">the Arms Export Control Act;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph commented="no" id="H181E6F6F57A64DB6AA7532F0A40072D0"><enum>(C)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; or</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph commented="no" id="H62CF1D9134524FC8B99B09CD52553F8E"><enum>(D)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">any other statute that requires the prior
review and approval of the United States Government as a condition for the
export or re-export of goods or services.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph></subsection></section><section id="HD1688EF25B49433997F8744F33FA621"><enum>107.</enum><header>International
Law Enforcement Academy in San Salvador, El Salvador</header>
<subsection id="H8F5EBAEBB7BC42268B66332C9594AA05"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Sense of
Congress</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">It is the sense of
Congress that the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in San Salvador,
El Salvador, should continue to serve as a critical component of United States
regional counterterrorism efforts.</text>
</subsection><subsection id="HDA9705612B4D421B8D21E41D600091EE"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Negotiation</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The Secretary of State shall negotiate with
the appropriate agency entities to ensure that counterterrorism, including
radical Islamist extremism within the Western Hemisphere, nonproliferation, and
border security courses are instituted as part of the core curriculum at the
International Law Enforcement Academy in San Salvador.</text>
</subsection><subsection id="HFA17CA38C8244587BD529CBE40645CBD"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Authorization of
appropriations</header><text>There are authorized to be appropriated such sums
as may be necessary to—</text>
<paragraph id="H8B446F38CB6F4DB18F7CFFCA1C9414D"><enum>(1)</enum><text>complete all
physical aspects of the ILEA facility in San Salvador; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H58B73BBF1B9B431EAFB5AFE80071025F"><enum>(2)</enum><text>implement the ILEA
Global Network.</text>
</paragraph></subsection></section><section id="H41F5CE4CFDC84D5DA4F3BD94C07E9277"><enum>108.</enum><header>Actions
regarding the Organization of American States</header>
<subsection id="H0283F1DF61B44742B500B007EDE43A3"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Declaration
regarding terrorism</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The
Secretary of State shall direct the United States Representative to the
Organization of American States (OAS) to use the voice, vote, and influence of
the United States at the OAS to move for a declaration at the first meeting of
Member States of the OAS convened after the date of the enactment of this Act
calling on countries to systematically deny the use of their territories by
terrorists or terrorist organizations.</text>
</subsection><subsection commented="no" id="H714E42A184904785A169B0629191A5A0"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Reduction in
United States contribution</header>
<paragraph commented="no" id="H99B42536047542DF98AC2BCA1BE784D8"><enum>(1)</enum><header>In
general</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The Secretary of
State shall reduce by 50 percent the amount of the United States assessed
contribution to the OAS for fiscal year 2009 and each subsequent fiscal
year.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H2F22D09FDB124E71B058FBE563705936"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Use of
funds</header>
<subparagraph id="H050E504E08124B229995E7BCAC5A616"><enum>(A)</enum><header>In
general</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">Of the amount reduced
pursuant to paragraph (1), not less than ten percent of such amount shall be
added to United States voluntary contributions to each of the organizations
specified in subparagraph (B) and the remaining amount shall be used to
establish and maintain the Western Hemisphere Regional Coordination Centers
under section 301.</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph commented="no" id="H9AB3A3DA96E84784994CFC09B0B76FFB"><enum>(B)</enum><header>Organizations
specified</header><text>The organizations referred to in subparagraph (A) are
the following:</text>
<clause commented="no" id="HF44DA5D0FD564FAF8EC44864C4339331"><enum>(i)</enum><text>The OAS
Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE).</text>
</clause><clause commented="no" id="H9A49AD52914B446B95D39FD56497284C"><enum>(ii)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The OAS Inter-American Drug Abuse Control
Commission (CICAD).</text>
</clause></subparagraph></paragraph></subsection></section><section id="H7CA870515C4143D29500960005C96149"><enum>109.</enum><header>Amendment to
Department of State Rewards Program</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">Section 36(b) of the State Department Basic
Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2708(b)) is amended—</text>
<paragraph id="H7B3CE3D676F047D9B4F8A9DC48837638"><enum>(1)</enum><text>in paragraph (6),
by striking <quote>or</quote> at the end;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H15D31EAE5DCA4DDABAA6D603861F6BF"><enum>(2)</enum><text>in
paragraph (7)(B), by striking the period at the end and inserting <quote>;
or</quote>; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H4FEC3673A1894BBFB85F728D7529756C"><enum>(3)</enum><text>by adding at the
end the following new paragraph:</text>
<quoted-block display-inline="no-display-inline" id="HF5DF17EB3DDC407C842EBBD9E838095E" style="OLC">
<paragraph id="H2F5DB6822CFE4FC097DC29C4175F70C7"><enum>(8)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">the arrest or conviction in any country of
any individual wanted on terrorism charges pursuant to red notices duly issued
by Interpol, if such reward would help advance United States interests or the
interests of United States allies in the global struggle against international
terrorism.</text>
</paragraph><after-quoted-block>.</after-quoted-block></quoted-block>
</paragraph></section><enum>II</enum><header>Nonproliferation
of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons in the Western Hemisphere</header>
<section id="H6034703ECEBB45C6BF7EE440AD6195C" section-type="subsequent-section"><enum>201.</enum><header>Findings</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">Congress finds the following:</text>
<paragraph id="H40641172534E4DF7A458678310EB5000"><enum>(1)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">Venezuela and Iran have established
extensive political, military, and economic cooperation.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H0EAD514CEE424B7BAB9FD1AE21B2C9F5"><enum>(2)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">Venezuela, under the government of Hugo
Chavez, has publicly supported Iran’s development of a capacity to enrich
uranium, which many observers believe is part of a nuclear weapons
program.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HC08A89BD23B9473198AB7E180095C3D9"><enum>(3)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">In May 2005, Chavez stated that he was
seeking assistance from Iran to establish a nuclear program in
Venezuela.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HB1246DEE454C443E957448842966177F"><enum>(4)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">On February 4, 2006, Venezuela was one of
only three countries to vote against a resolution by the Board of Governors of
the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, to report Iran to the United
Nations Security Council for violating its obligations under the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HE3AA180BF58F4D7C85768E4867C296DD"><enum>(5)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">On February 15, 2006, the Speaker of the
Iranian parliament, Gholam Ali Haddad-Adel, stated that his government was
prepared to discuss providing technical assistance to a Venezuelan nuclear
program.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H2D7620FA29E84B6AB96FBDC4C7D2E1A5"><enum>(6)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">On a visit to Iran in February 2008, Abel
El Zabayar, a member of Venezuela’s National Assembly and Mining Commission,
stated that Iran will <quote>practically give away</quote> its civilian nuclear
technology and that <quote>if relations with Iran lead to sharing nuclear
technology with us, we would then give it away to our brothers in Latin America
once we are successful.</quote>.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H4E3CB8FE8174449EB1E5158BEF8B85D1"><enum>(7)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">El Zabayar stated that Venezuela had taken
steps toward establishing a civilian nuclear program and that cooperation in
this area was being discussed with the Governments of Iran and Belarus.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H9AF88FA233B7492DAC6F143FE14806F"><enum>(8)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">Venezuela reportedly has large deposits of
uranium ore in the Guiana Shield region.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H332271E4693F4738A7C731119BB32423"><enum>(9)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">In 1985 the Brazilian government announced
that it had terminated a clandestine nuclear weapons program run by the
military since 1975.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HF12A003FD93947C1BD7F668B71D6F9DA"><enum>(10)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">In August 2005 a former high-ranking
Brazilian nuclear official stated that the military had continued to develop
elements of a nuclear weapons program into the 1990s.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H537BC5A96690484DA973D18476ED8463"><enum>(11)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">On November 20, 2007, Brazilian General
Jose Benedito de Barros Moreira publicly called for Brazil to develop the
technological capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H977B4860891E45CD90814361F9D6DCE0"><enum>(12)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The centrifuges at Brazil’s Resende uranium
enrichment plant can be reconfigured to produce highly enriched uranium in
quantities sufficient to produce several nuclear weapons annually.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HC0EF6E6B0D6042FBAA861B7CC8537833"><enum>(13)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">Brazil has denied inspectors from the IAEA
full access to its uranium enrichment centrifuges at Resende on the grounds
that it is protecting commercial secrets.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H6C73E8AC30554157846F1F2F60FB6D18"><enum>(14)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The standoff with the IAEA was resolved
only by the IAEA agreeing to limit its verification methods to indirect
inspections without direct inspection of the centrifuges, which many
nonproliferation experts fear could be used as a precedent by Iran and other
countries to prevent IAEA inspectors from examining their suspect nuclear
facilities.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H6854831579124C0998942686791F9E3B"><enum>(15)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">A prototype nuclear reactor is being
developed at the Armar Research Center for use in Brazil’s nuclear-powered
submarine program.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H4EC31929D0B1413498C03C46376E1DE6"><enum>(16)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">On February 24, 2008, the Governments of
Argentina and Brazil agreed to begin negotiations regarding the joint
development of a nuclear reactor and construction of a uranium enrichment
plant.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HDCD5ABE69C90433EBCF123DCD9D6FD59"><enum>(17)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">Until 1990 the Argentine Government
conducted a clandestine nuclear weapons program.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H12DEF535A8CD471889BCD1679EBCBD6B"><enum>(18)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">In December 1985 Argentina and Iran signed
a nuclear cooperation agreement in which Argentina agreed to supply Iran with
highly enriched uranium.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H612C6453B18A47D9A20169D29E0737E9"><enum>(19)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">In 1987 and 1988 Argentina signed three
agreements with Iran for converting a nuclear reactor to use enriched uranium,
for building pilot plants for uranium-dioxide conversion and fuel
fabrication.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HBFF2B609650543E381C800C7411B2200"><enum>(20)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">Assistance by Argentina to the Iranian
nuclear program was reduced, but not terminated, following pressure by the
United States.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HB2670E71A5924AE5AA97CB7F639DD459"><enum>(21)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">Several countries in Latin America,
including Brazil and Argentina, have not signed and implemented an Additional
Protocol which provides IAEA inspectors with enhanced access to nuclear
facilities.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H79847136B72F4887A4D11FDA5884C2C9"><enum>(22)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">Some Western Hemisphere countries have not
ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, also referred
to as The Chemical Weapons Convention.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H5AF3734CA7F9425084F67DE867B4EAED"><enum>(23)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">Several countries in Latin America have not
signed and ratified The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their
Destruction, also referred to as The Biological Convention.</text>
</paragraph></section><section display-inline="no-display-inline" id="H24BC573DF7274ACD98DE634CCA78FD07" section-type="subsequent-section"><enum>202.</enum><header>Statement of policy
regarding the proliferation of weapons-related nuclear, chemical, and
biological materials, technology, and facilities</header>
<subsection id="H108DE02353EB4737A9C8233902F051DA"><enum>(a)</enum><header>In
general</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">To enhance the
prevention of the proliferation of weapons-related nuclear, chemical, and
biological materials, technology, and facilities, it shall be the policy of the
United States to—</text>
<paragraph id="H5D286D66203D4789B58FB3BF1F6C4904"><enum>(1)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">promote the negotiation and implementation
by all countries of—</text>
<subparagraph id="H1544F7A0DBF54B9C9C3FA527B0074B82"><enum>(A)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">a comprehensive safeguards agreement with
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="HC4462F8CB1B041B7B90743187714901C"><enum>(B)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">an Additional Protocol to the safeguards
agreement;</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="H519A362C50634743958BC83B897DC319"><enum>(2)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">secure guarantees by all countries of
unrestricted access by IAEA personnel to all nuclear-related materials and
facilities in territories under the control of the host country;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HEECBF466163548C5B6EA156FD003E7E"><enum>(3)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">promote the implementation by all countries
of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H14AA3E9C52534D2C9D5DEC3CE155741"><enum>(4)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">promote the accession to and ratification
and implementation of—</text>
<subparagraph id="HC4AE41992CD9424387B2FD6A06E7935"><enum>(A)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their
Destruction (also referred to as the Chemical Weapons Convention);</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H2A28E8C87E9743EA90718CF7575F8000"><enum>(B)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">the 1980 IAEA Convention on the Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="HCEA7516F235A4D3ABEC483B5B4A667BF"><enum>(C)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">the 2005 United Nations International
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H4B3B1988C6544CF28E33B6E37ED7E007"><enum>(D)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons
and on their Destruction (also referred to as the Biological Weapons
Convention).</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="HC522B41F91EA44CBB1F3CEED3194576"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Additional
Protocol defined</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">In this
section, the term <term>Additional Protocol</term> means the Protocol
Additional to an agreement between a country and the International Atomic
Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards.</text>
</subsection></section><section id="HFE3A84750A624F1092266E7268458F6D"><enum>203.</enum><header>Statement of
policy regarding the small quantities protocol</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">Because a Small Quantities Protocol (SQP)
sets aside many of the operative provisions of a general safeguards agreement,
the ability of the IAEA to verify that nuclear materials and facilities in a
country with an SQP are not being diverted for illicit purposes is
significantly impaired. For this reason, it shall be the policy of the United
States to—</text>
<paragraph id="H5919E4C851FF40C7ACE24B201D4D8A3"><enum>(1)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">oppose the negotiation by the IAEA of an
SQP for any country that did not have an SQP as of January 1, 2008; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H4C31FFEBE49A4FB19DE062AB5FABED79"><enum>(2)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">encourage every country with an SQP to
withdraw formally from or renegotiate that agreement for the purpose of
increasing transparency and eliminating any exemption or provision that could
restrict the ability of the IAEA to verify that a country’s nuclear materials
and facilities are not being diverted to impermissible uses.</text>
</paragraph></section><section id="HC92A3F7D93B045EE997C243D836B00B4"><enum>204.</enum><header>Securing
adherence to agreements regarding nuclear nonproliferation by countries in the
Western Hemisphere</header>
<subsection id="H795C2FFD2FB04E368D43CC3C93B1641E"><enum>(a)</enum><header>In
general</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The President shall
use all available political, economic, and diplomatic tools to ensure that each
country in the Western Hemisphere—</text>
<paragraph id="HCF68028D868145AC8FFA3C6D8FA500F7"><enum>(1)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">has signed and implemented a comprehensive
safeguards agreement with the IAEA;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H1D96C1943CE14B54B9708444EC91608"><enum>(2)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">has signed and implemented an Additional
Protocol to its safeguards agreement;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H9569ED63994D4DCF963FE835E7A508B4"><enum>(3)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">guarantees unrestricted access for IAEA
personnel to all nuclear-related facilities;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HF3FCADE2AC60431B9B3177432379A44E"><enum>(4)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">has implemented the provisions of United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1540;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H3E31AD93CDDA40AF87EB229E233710C5"><enum>(5)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">has acceded to, ratified, and fully
implemented the conventions referred to in section 202(a)(4);</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HDD94441E71964021A749B993FDC2CAE8"><enum>(6)</enum><text>does not negotiate
with the IAEA an SQP if that country did not have an SQP as of January 1, 2008;
and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H3CDAF2CBCE424B1BA4A997DD336B35AE"><enum>(7)</enum><text>withdraws formally
from or renegotiates an SQP agreement if a country has such an
agreement.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="HE85BEB9CF21D494A808372B9F47ECDAC"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Sanctions</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">For any Western Hemisphere country that has
not satisfied all of the requirements specified in subsection (a), the
President is authorized to—</text>
<paragraph id="H7FCF45C814C74464BD085526CB4E68EF"><enum>(1)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">suspend United States nonhumanitarian
foreign assistance to the government of that country; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H4AC36EB2ED58411DB71F26E8FF3743E1"><enum>(2)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">prohibit the sale, provision, or transfer
of articles, including the issuance of any specific license or grant of any
other specific permission or authority to export any goods or technology
under—</text>
<subparagraph id="H5CA68A3A593A4885A0684BF072A6BC9"><enum>(A)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">the Export Administration Act of
1979;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H475348802B514F85ABF3D9F3B35EE082"><enum>(B)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">the Arms Export Control Act;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H472A3AED398E4BB99E83B100511D773C"><enum>(C)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; or</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="HE4F358C8955D43B0ACAF86EE2309228F"><enum>(D)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">any other statute that requires the prior
review and approval of the United States Government as a condition for the
export or re-export of goods or services.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph></subsection></section><section id="HCDF6615E74A34005943F95CB399C4CAD"><enum>205.</enum><header>Halting the
proliferation of nuclear fuel fabrication</header>
<subsection id="H5AB9EE7C754E4BC900B5C2FCC94B70C7"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Statement of
policy</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">It shall be the policy
of the United States to oppose the development or acquisition by any country of
a capacity to fabricate nuclear fuel if such country did not have such capacity
as of January 1, 2008.</text>
</subsection><subsection id="H525280DF6A7549E991CD6BA5323E238"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Prevention of
capacity To fabricate nuclear fuel</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The President shall use all available
political, economic, and diplomatic tools, and shall use the voice, vote, and
influence of the United States in all international organizations and
associations of which it is a member, including the IAEA and the Nuclear
Suppliers Group, to prevent the development or acquisition by any country of a
capacity to fabricate nuclear fuel if such country did not have such capacity
as of January 1, 2008.</text>
</subsection><subsection id="H207BA13C0B4A41628E249FA4ADD2F45"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Nuclear technical
cooperation with the IAEA</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The
President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA
to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to block
the allocation of funds for any IAEA development, environmental, or nuclear
science assistance or activity to a country the government of which—</text>
<paragraph id="H92BC0D12D5E742928EABD000CD57332B"><enum>(1)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">the Secretary of State has determined, for
purposes of section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, section 620A
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, section 40 of the Arms Export Control
Act, or other provision of law, is a government that has repeatedly provided
support for acts of international terrorism;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H49477E82E30C496F97E4B243031F4E74"><enum>(2)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">is actively cooperating with a government
as described in paragraph (1);</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H43D1BBF93DC545D6AC9E51781EB95FA6"><enum>(3)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">is under investigation for a breach of or
noncompliance with its IAEA obligations or the purposes and principles of the
Charter of the United Nations; or</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H3A8E84BBF17D417693E818174C64EA91"><enum>(4)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">is in violation of its IAEA obligations or
the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.</text>
</paragraph></subsection></section><section id="HA74DD3F3AC4E4650A2C282DAC6337BE0"><enum>206.</enum><header>Cooperation
with the Proliferation Security Initiative</header>
<subsection id="H037831B4D83B476590FB2CEA578E2934"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Findings</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">Congress finds the following:</text>
<paragraph id="H272D96961A044CDB0068D8CDB708FD0"><enum>(1)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">From its inception on May 31, 2003, the
Proliferation Security Initiative, also referred to as the PSI, has repeatedly
demonstrated its effectiveness in preventing the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H5D0E3FD9212D4A5B00C8EDB76B6E9A0"><enum>(2)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">In his February 11, 2004, address at the
National Defense University regarding additional measures to enhance global
efforts against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction President Bush
proposed that <quote>the work of the Proliferation Security Initiative be
expanded to address more than shipments and transfers. Building on the tools
we've developed to fight terrorists, we can take direct action against
proliferation networks. We need greater cooperation not just among intelligence
and military services, but in law enforcement, as well. PSI participants and
other willing nations should use the Interpol and all other means to bring to
justice those who traffic in deadly weapons, to shut down their labs, to seize
their materials, to freeze their assets. We must act on every lead. We will
find the middlemen, the suppliers and the buyers.</quote>.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HB00751D4E12C40C6989CEDC9E612D6C8"><enum>(3)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The number of countries participating in
PSI has steadily increased, thereby greatly enhancing its effectiveness.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H31D53ED460FE46E596AD5CEB93C078F1"><enum>(4)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">Many countries in the Western Hemisphere
formally or informally cooperate with the PSI.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HFE31DC43045C418597064E1B87CDF837"><enum>(5)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">Expanded law enforcement cooperation
throughout the Western Hemisphere, including by means of greater coordination
of policies, improved communications, and enhanced capabilities would
significantly promote the objectives of the PSI.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="H03BBC705FDDB4CD186FA2ED002FE364D"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Sense of
Congress concerning strengthening cooperation regarding
nonproliferation</header><text>It is the sense of Congress that—</text>
<paragraph id="HEBB98210BE554A138B4815FCE9BF4D7D"><enum>(1)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">it is in the national security interest of
the United States to establish comprehensive cooperation to prevent the
proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological materials in the Western
Hemisphere; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H7EED837E697248B39C27434EE9E1BC3E"><enum>(2)</enum><text>the Secretary of
State should seek to secure the formal or informal cooperation by Western
Hemisphere countries for the purpose of securing the goals of the Proliferation
Security Initiative announced by the President on May 31, 2003.</text>
</paragraph></subsection></section><section id="HFF41885C459D4A439546191860EE02A3"><enum>207.</enum><header>Establishment
of the Western Hemisphere Nonproliferation Partnership Initiative</header>
<subsection id="H4E1EA9FE93AA46469FCB7D9F2C2FE672"><enum>(a)</enum><header>In
general</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The Secretary of
State is authorized, in consultation with relevant United States Government
agencies, to negotiate with the leaders of the governments of countries in the
Western Hemisphere on a bilateral or multilateral basis, as appropriate,
international agreements under which such governments work in partnership to
establish an initiative to be known as the <quote>Western Hemisphere
Nonproliferation Partnership Initiative</quote> (NPI).</text>
</subsection><subsection id="H7928C14BF280403EB767BEF39EC8F998"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Purpose</header>
<paragraph id="HE937CFED260A4880B66DDB3B40A23444"><enum>(1)</enum><header>In
general</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The NPI shall—</text>
<subparagraph id="HC21E3D8BBAE044C3B4865F5DA3268FB0"><enum>(A)</enum><text>encourage the
establishment of contacts and cooperative relationships, including the sharing
of intelligence, between the responsible individuals and agencies of each
participant country with their counterparts in the United States Government and
in other participating countries; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H4F869BB1F66C42E78067B8EE8FED6574"><enum>(B)</enum><text>encourage
bilateral and multilateral support, cooperation, and coordination of national
programs and efforts to promote effective and in-depth cooperation to counter
the illicit acquisition or trade of weapons-related nuclear, chemical, or
biological materials, technology, or facilities.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="H08ED3270BE9140539FFCDB642D44846E"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Cooperative
programs</header><text>The cooperative programs referred to under paragraph
(1)(B) shall include the following:</text>
<subparagraph id="H79CD88F646C5440E867ECB47C562BB3"><enum>(A)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">Training for government officials and
agents from participating countries regarding the development and operation of
NPI programs.</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="HB80F2FAEBD1C4EDBAB9B063EE44E377B"><enum>(B)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">Assistance in developing a comprehensive
legal and regulatory framework in each country, as appropriate, to enable the
establishment and effective implementation of export controls and the capacity
to track nuclear, chemical, and biological materials, equipment, technology,
and facilities.</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H3DAD1D0B070D4A8BB4673B462498CCF4"><enum>(C)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">Provision of equipment, development of
infrastructure, and the acquisition of other resources required by
participating countries to effectively carry out the tasks referred to in
subparagraphs (A) and (B).</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph></subsection></section><section display-inline="no-display-inline" id="H6EFAA7B05B8445709295FE97743DD975" section-type="subsequent-section"><enum>208.</enum><header>Prohibited
transactions</header>
<subsection id="HF1694E2542A344B7BA773163AD04A4F2"><enum>(a)</enum><header>In
general</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">No defense article or
defense service may be sold or licensed for export under this Act in a fiscal
year to a foreign country that the President determines and certifies to
Congress, not later than May 15 of the calendar year in which such fiscal year
begins, is carrying out policies aimed at undermining United States national
security interests or is not cooperating fully with United States
nonproliferation efforts.</text>
</subsection><subsection id="H5FBA2C5E0AA34DFF9CEA4B8DCE4EAC2"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Waiver</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The President may waive the prohibition
under subsection (a) with respect to a specific transaction if the President
determines that such transaction is important to the national security
interests of the United States.</text>
</subsection></section><section display-inline="no-display-inline" id="H113CA87EC6D4493BA00026D706B1002B" section-type="subsequent-section"><enum>209.</enum><header>Restrictions on
nuclear cooperation with countries assisting the nuclear program of Venezuela
or Cuba</header>
<subsection id="H0DD1E716F238469E9B55D8C4432FCC9D"><enum>(a)</enum><header>In
general</header><text>Notwithstanding any other provision of law or any
international agreement, no agreement for cooperation between the United States
and the government of any country that is assisting the nuclear program of
Venezuela or Cuba or transferring advanced conventional weapons or missiles to
Venezuela or Cuba may be submitted to the President or to Congress pursuant to
section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153), no such
agreement may enter into force with such country, no license may be issued for
export directly or indirectly to such country of any nuclear material,
facilities, components, or other goods, services, or technology that would be
subject to such agreement, and no approval may be given for the transfer or
retransfer directly or indirectly to such country of any nuclear material,
facilities, components, or other goods, services, or technology that would be
subject to such agreement, until the President determines and reports to the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate that the government of the country that is
assisting the nuclear program of Venezuela or Cuba or transferring advanced
conventional weapons or missiles to Venezuela or Cuba—</text>
<paragraph display-inline="no-display-inline" id="HC26E203326E14B09A8C67BD153EBBC75"><enum>(1)</enum><text>has suspended all
nuclear assistance to Venezuela or Cuba and all transfers of advanced
conventional weapons and missiles to Venezuela or Cuba; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph commented="no" id="HDD234743BD844E2886D5F6F4BE5D24C2"><enum>(2)</enum><text>is committed to
maintaining such suspension until Venezuela or Cuba has implemented measures
that would permit the President to make the determination described in
paragraph (1).</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="HC813A71FA1154A13BB24570064779E00"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Rules of
construction</header><text>The restrictions described in subsection (a)—</text>
<paragraph id="HE105BE22C2C94FD8BDB306D3B400D500"><enum>(1)</enum><text>shall apply in
addition to all other applicable procedures, requirements, and restrictions
required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and any other law; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H999B0D0FBF4848F692EAF700D026CA35"><enum>(2)</enum><text>shall not be
construed as affecting the validity of agreements for cooperation that are in
effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="HDA61D3978FF143E382AE6019A59B205C"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Definitions</header><text>In
this section:</text>
<paragraph id="H6BE362321EA2484992FAC3005BBF7B72"><enum>(1)</enum><header>Agreement for
cooperation</header><text>The term <term>agreement for cooperation</term> has
the meaning given that term in section 11 b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
(42 U.S.C. 2014 b.).</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H527D02919BA340039D3B314F4DA19273"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Assisting the
nuclear program of Venezuela or Cuba</header><text>The term <term>assisting the
nuclear program of Venezuela or Cuba</term> means the intentional transfer to
Venezuela or Cuba by a government, or by a person subject to the jurisdiction
of a government with the knowledge and acquiescence of such government, of
goods, services, or technology listed on the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines
for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology (published by the
International Atomic Energy Agency as Information Circular INFCIRC/254/Rev.
3/Part 1, and subsequent revisions) or Guidelines for Transfers of
Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Material, and Related Technology (published
by the International Atomic Energy Agency as Information Circular
INFCIR/254/Rev. 3/Part 2, and subsequent revisions).</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H4618F0C2F7194F5D9297F9F6DC70E399"><enum>(3)</enum><header>Country that is
assisting the nuclear program of Venezuela or Cuba or transferring advanced
conventional weapons or missiles to Venezuela or Cuba</header><text>The term
<term>country that is assisting the nuclear program of Venezuela or Cuba or
transferring advanced conventional weapons or missiles to Venezuela or
Cuba</term> means—</text>
<subparagraph id="HADD008DC84D041A6BD9750CB493066B1"><enum>(A)</enum><text>Russia; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="HC0821F3EACFA4A73AE29995D7723F170"><enum>(B)</enum><text>any other country
determined by the President to be assisting the nuclear program of Venezuela or
Cuba or transferring advanced conventional weapons or missiles to Venezuela or
Cuba.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="H92B6E71A9257431C872C15B2BE798FE3"><enum>(4)</enum><header>Transferring
advanced conventional weapons or missiles to Venezuela or
Cuba</header><text>The term <term>transferring advanced conventional weapons or
missiles to Venezuela or Cuba</term> means the intentional transfer to
Venezuela or Cuba by a government, or by a person subject to the jurisdiction
of a government with the knowledge and acquiescence of such government, of
goods, services, or technology listed on—</text>
<subparagraph id="H6F23B2741AD047CD9CF905BCF0EB19C3"><enum>(A)</enum><text>the Wassenaar
Arrangement list of Dual Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions list of July
12, 1996, and subsequent revisions; or</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H69EED809AA994441B3A225A5004204F0"><enum>(B)</enum><text>the Missile
Technology Control Regime Equipment and Technology Annex of June 11, 1996, and
subsequent revisions.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph></subsection></section><enum>III</enum><header>Western
Hemisphere Regional Coordination Centers</header>
<section id="H876056682BE24000965ED6D72897E883"><enum>301.</enum><header>Establishment
of the Western Hemisphere Regional Coordination Centers</header>
<subsection id="H00C35C3BC98D42E0A3FED62B5B04A8AA"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Sense of
Congress</header><text>It is the sense of Congress that—</text>
<paragraph id="H2A46574B3DA94C82B8B431007C8EA7BA"><enum>(1)</enum><text>the United States
Government should carry out a comprehensive and integrated approach to United
States counterterrorism and nonproliferation efforts, both domestically and
abroad; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H9B3CD9B15FA04166B400F39E8C544D7"><enum>(2)</enum><text>the Secretary of
State should seek to engage leaders of the governments of countries in the
Western Hemisphere to develop a comprehensive multilateral strategy to counter
current and emerging threats and prevent the proliferation of nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="HB24A712BC0AD44988404300009BA597B"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Purpose</header><text>Western
Hemisphere Regional Coordination Centers shall serve as joint operational
facilities dedicated to coordinating efforts, capacity, and intelligence among
participating countries to counter current and emerging threats and prevent the
proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons throughout the
Western Hemisphere.</text>
</subsection><subsection id="H197089E8CD384FBE999EC5F5B6B3549F"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Establishment</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The Secretary of State shall negotiate with
the leaders of the governments of countries in the Western Hemisphere on a
bilateral or multilateral basis, as appropriate, international agreements under
which such governments work in partnership to establish centers to be known as
the <quote>Western Hemisphere Regional Coordination Centers</quote>
(RCC).</text>
</subsection><subsection id="H05CE63AE55714ED7AF46A26633D9708C"><enum>(d)</enum><header>Cooperation with
governments in the Western Hemisphere</header>
<paragraph id="HD9C73AE3F2AC4F07A6B06533EA22EEDB"><enum>(1)</enum><header>In
general</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The Secretary of
State shall negotiate with—</text>
<subparagraph id="H591EEA11ECC34A3FA641678ECA34B240"><enum>(A)</enum><text>the governments of
countries in Central and South America agreements for the establishment of one
RCC in a country in Central America and one RCC in a country in South America;
and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H65E6F4C9B4354C9099CF22CD2DC943AF"><enum>(B)</enum><text>the Government of
Brazil, the Government of Argentina, and the Government of Paraguay an
agreement for the establishment of a RCC specifically in the tri-border
area.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="HB6BDD5E577A24230815217CB119D05EE"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Coordination</header><text>The
Secretary of State shall negotiate with the leaders of the governments of
countries in the Western Hemisphere on a bilateral or multilateral basis, as
appropriate, agreements under which a method is established for staffing
parallel representatives, from each participating country or region, for each
United States agency represented at the relevant RCC.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="H4A3275B00CCD4CE28BDB0F551018F28"><enum>(e)</enum><header>Participation of
United States Government agencies</header>
<paragraph id="H5A850D5C5E144FA185E4058151869584"><enum>(1)</enum><header>In
general</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The Secretary of
State, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the
Secretary of Defense, shall determine which departments and agencies of the
United States Government, including the Department of Defense, the Department
of Energy, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of the Treasury,
the Department of Justice, the Drug Enforcement Agency, and the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, are necessary to ensure the establishment and operation of
the RCCs. The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Director of National
Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense, shall negotiate agreements with the
heads of such agencies to ensure their full participation and cooperation in
such establishment and operation.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H7B31CA8DBDC1400F9FEE79B9F247C7FE"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Assignment of
regional attaches and advisors</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The Secretary of State shall transfer to
appropriate RCCs regional attaches and advisors serving at United States
diplomatic and consular missions in the Western Hemisphere.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection commented="no" id="H914700D402C7428B8D623BE1F4600044"><enum>(f)</enum><header>Structure</header>
<paragraph id="H6E6C75FF07BC48EA9B1808664279FD6C"><enum>(1)</enum><header>Management of
the RCCs</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The Secretary of
State, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the
Secretary of Defense, shall be responsible for the management of the RCCs,
including development of the budget, priorities, and programs of the
RCCs.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HC9403D9E20FD44ECB16C814E00A303F4"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Staffing and
duties</header><text>Each RCC shall have one United States Director, at least
one but not more than two United States Deputy Directors, and one host country
General Director. The United States Director and United States Deputy Directors
may be employees of any of the United States national security agencies and
shall be chosen by the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Director of
National Intelligence and Secretary of Defense. The Director and Deputy
Directors of each RCC shall keep the Chief of Mission of the United States
Embassies in the host country of such RCC fully informed of activities and
operations of such RCC.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H4F32B60CE89748C6A537906686EB17B0"><enum>(3)</enum><header>RCC Policy
Board</header>
<subparagraph id="H16EA776D481348E1B8B8F95DF3EB04DE"><enum>(A)</enum><header>Establishment</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">There is established the RCC Policy
Board.</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H145A4BA6C0384F39A5E87F3046BB288B"><enum>(B)</enum><header>Composition</header><text>The
RCC Policy Board shall be comprised of senior representatives from the
departments and agencies determined by the Secretary of State, in consultation
with the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense, to be
necessary to ensure the establishment and operation of the RCCs in accordance
with subsection (e).</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H1429674A86C341388F21FD83B713DFB4"><enum>(C)</enum><header>Duties</header><text>The
Policy Board shall monitor and provide guidance and oversight for the RCCs to
ensure that their operations are consistent with United States foreign policy
and law enforcement goals.</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H234916A96E63459FABAF3956F9959FFC"><enum>(D)</enum><header>Meetings</header><text>The
Policy Board shall meet bi-monthly and shall be co-chaired by officers from the
Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism of the Department of State and
the National Counterterrorism Center of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph></subsection></section><section id="HA67029FA1F264A38B916D5F07A5CDD8"><enum>302.</enum><header>Regional
Security Initiative</header>
<subsection id="HBE4431E2A2574E989D56ACF99AB0000"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Sense of
Congress</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">It is the sense of
Congress that the Latin America Regional Strategic Initiative (RSI) should
serve as a critical component of United States regional counterterrorism and
nonproliferation efforts.</text>
</subsection><subsection commented="no" id="H17341B6A9C6F46039278782B89691574"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Participation
with the RCCs</header><text>The Latin America RSI shall conduct at least one
inter-agency meeting at one of the three RCCs each fiscal year. The Director, a
Deputy Director, or both, of each RCC shall participate in all RSI meetings
organized by the Department of State.</text>
</subsection><subsection id="HF644235CAA8042519D5C89A60056154B"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Report</header><text>Not
later than 45 days after the conclusion of each RSI meeting, the Secretary of
State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report, which
shall include a classified annex if necessary, that describes—</text>
<paragraph id="H474B398179034F0CBEA1D55511A8BBAC"><enum>(1)</enum><text>the defined
objectives of the RSI;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H2FB2196700874A6ABA85B72003266F5E"><enum>(2)</enum><text>the extent to
which such objectives have been achieved;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H3305C8A6BD5544538200CB3542CF1836"><enum>(3)</enum><text>the steps taken by
the United States to accomplish such objectives;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HA6D5EE7E317A4B69B117F6B8666B2CEB"><enum>(4)</enum><text>the extent of
cooperation by other countries in the Western Hemisphere toward achieving such
objectives; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HB5109BF1805D4798ABBC65D3F9FE8B9E"><enum>(5)</enum><text>the steps the
United States will take in the subsequent months to accomplish such
objectives.</text>
</paragraph></subsection></section><section id="HBA6E7DE062C341939E5971B01874B89"><enum>303.</enum><header>Authorization of
appropriations</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">There is
authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary for fiscal year
2009 and each subsequent fiscal year to carry out this title.</text>
</section><enum>IV</enum><header>Prohibitions on
engagement with certain Western Hemisphere countries</header>
<section id="H75BA4F3736D74081965DBED6FC632309"><enum>401.</enum><header>Prohibitions on
engagement with certain Western Hemisphere countries</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">Nothing in this Act shall be construed as
weakening or removing any prohibitions on United States engagement with or
assistance to any country in the Western Hemisphere that the Secretary of State
has designated as a state sponsor of terrorism for a minimum of three
consecutive years.</text>
</section><enum>V</enum><header>Report</header>
<section id="H918B69D48985452BA63DDAC343F9DD79"><enum>501.</enum><header>Report</header>
<subsection id="H96C6640C9A4B45DE8D51FEA4E612EAFD"><enum>(a)</enum><header>In
general</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">Not later than one
year after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the
Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
report on the activities carried out to achieve the objectives described in
titles II and III that describe—</text>
<paragraph id="HE3F63FF5478E4E468286479EC4AE8DB1"><enum>(1)</enum><text>the extent to
which each such objective has been achieved;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H37FBA15DCF7B44F59C6E00A0B8B5755D"><enum>(2)</enum><text>the steps taken by
the United States and countries in the Western Hemisphere in the preceding
calendar year to accomplish such objectives;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HB8E1A61EF1C8406283397C5477D0EEA7"><enum>(3)</enum><text>the extent of
cooperation by other countries in the Western Hemisphere toward achieving such
objectives; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H063E2282416843178BA62FAB009D9054"><enum>(4)</enum><text>the steps the
United States will take in the current calendar year to accomplish such
objectives.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="H531859DC702C40EA00C36DDBF39B447"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Preparation and
form of report</header><text>The report required under subsection (a) shall
rely on public information to the extent possible, and shall include a
classified annex, if necessary.</text>
</subsection></section>