Findings

Congress makes the following findings: (1)The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established in 1957 with the objectives of seeking to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world and to ensure . . . that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose.. (2)The United States, via assessed contributions, is the largest financial contributor to the regular budget of the IAEA. (3)In 1959, the IAEA established what is now called the Technical Cooperation Program, financed primarily through voluntary contributions by member states to the Technical Cooperation Fund, to provide nuclear technical cooperation (TC) for peaceful purposes to countries worldwide. (4)The United States is the largest financial contributor to the IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Fund. (5)A March 2009 report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that neither [the Department of State] nor IAEA seeks to systematically limit TC assistance to countries the United States has designated as state sponsors of terrorism—Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria—even though under U.S. law these countries are subject to sanctions.. (6)The GAO report also found that Together, [Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria] received more than $55 million in TC assistance from 1997 through 2007.. These four countries received over $4,400,000 in TC assistance in 2008. (7)The GAO report also found that proliferation concerns about the [Technical Cooperation Program] have persisted because of the assistance it has provided to certain countries and because nuclear equipment, technology, and expertise can be dual-use—capable of serving peaceful purposes . . . but also useful in contributing to nuclear weapons development.. (8)The GAO report also found that [The State Department] reported in 2007 that three TC projects in [Iran] were directly related to the Iranian nuclear power plant at Bushehr.. (9)The GAO report also found that The proliferation concerns associated with the [Technical Cooperation Program] are difficult for the United States to fully identify, assess, and resolve . . . [because] there is no formal mechanism for obtaining TC project information during the proposal development phase . . . [l]imited [Department of] State documentation on how proliferation concerns of TC proposals were resolved . . . [and s]hortcomings in U.S. policies and IAEA procedures [including monitoring proliferation risks] related to TC program fellowships.. (10)The GAO report noted that IAEA officials told us that the [Technical Cooperation Program] does not attempt to exclude countries on the basis of their status as U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism or other political considerations and that, according to the Deputy Director General for the Technical Cooperation Program, there are no good countries and there are no bad countries with respect to provision of technical cooperation by the IAEA. (11)The GAO report also found that given the limited information available on TC projects and the dual-use nature of some nuclear technologies and expertise, we do not believe [the State Department] can assert with complete confidence that TC assistance has not advanced [weapons of mass destruction] programs in U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism. (12)The GAO report also found that we do not share [the State Department’s confidence in IAEA’s internal safeguards to prevent TC projects from contributing to weapons development . . . ]. (13)The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) prohibited any of the funds authorized to be appropriated for International Organizations and Programs from being made available for the United States proportionate share for programs for Libya, Iran, Cuba, or the Palestine Liberation Organization, inter alia. (14)The Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1998 (Public Law 105–118) prohibited any of the funds made available by such Act for the IAEA from being made available for programs and projects of the IAEA in Cuba. (15)The Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (Public Law 105–277) required the United States to withhold a proportionate share of funding to the IAEA for projects in Cuba regarding the Juragua Nuclear Power Plant and the Pedro Pi Nuclear Research Center. (16)The GAO report asked Congress to consider directing [the State Department] to withhold a share of future annual contributions to the [Technical Cooperation Fund] that is proportionate to the amount of funding provided from the fund for U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism and other countries of concern, noting that such a withholding is a matter of fundamental principle and intended to foster a more consistent U.S. policy toward such nations.. (17)The IAEA has repeatedly reported that the Government of Iran continues its work on heavy water-related projects and its enrichment of uranium, in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), and 1835 (2008). (18)United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006) decided that technical cooperation provided to Iran by the IAEA or under its auspices shall only be for food, agricultural, medical, safety or other humanitarian purposes [inter alia] . . . but that no such technical cooperation shall be provided that relates to . . . proliferation sensitive nuclear activities . . . . (19)According to multiple news reports, the IAEA Director General reported to the IAEA Board of Governors in June of 2009 that the Government of Iran now has approximately 7,000 centrifuges for enriching uranium, is running almost 5,000 of them, and has increased its stockpile of low-enriched uranium to over 1,300 kilograms, considered sufficient for further enrichment into enough high-enriched uranium for an atomic bomb. (20)The IAEA Director General has repeatedly reported to the IAEA Board of Governors, including in his report of February 19, 2009, that there remain a number of outstanding issues which give rise to concerns . . . [regarding] the existence of possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. (21)The IAEA Director General has repeatedly reported to the IAEA Board of Governors, including in his report of February 19, 2009, that Iran has not implemented the Additional Protocol, which is a prerequisite for [the IAEA] to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Nor has [Iran] agreed to [the IAEA’s] request that Iran provide, as a transparency measure, access to additional locations related, inter alia, to the manufacturing of centrifuges, research and development on uranium enrichment, and uranium mining and milling, as also required by the Security Council.. (22)The IAEA Director General has repeatedly reported to the IAEA Board of Governors, including in his report of February 19, 2009, that as a result of the continued lack of cooperation by Iran in connection with . . . issues which give rise to concerns about possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear programme, [the IAEA] has made no substantive progress on these issues.. (23)Iran has refused to comply with resolutions adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors on September 12, 2003, November 26, 2003, March 15, 2004, June 18, 2004, November 29, 2004, August 11, 2005, September 24, 2005, February 4, 2006, and July 31, 2006, regarding Iran’s many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement and continues to block IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities, in violation of its NPT Safeguards Agreement. (24)According to multiple news reports, Iran recently denied access to its enrichment site at Natanz to IAEA inspectors, and has also denied a request by the IAEA to place one or more additional surveillance cameras at the enrichment site at Natanz. (25)In April of 2008, United States Government officials publicly revealed that Syria was building at the Dair Alzour site, with North Korea’s assistance, a secret nuclear reactor that was based on a North Korean model capable of producing plutonium for nuclear weapons and that was weeks away from becoming operational before an Israeli air strike reportedly destroyed the reactor in September 2007. (26)On April 28, 2008, General Michael Hayden, the former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, stated that the Syrian reactor at Dair Alzour could have produced enough plutonium for 1 or 2 bombs within a year of becoming operational. (27)The IAEA Director General reported to the IAEA Board of Governors, on November 19, 2008, that the Syrian facility at Dair Alzour bore features that resembled those of an undeclared nuclear reactor, adding that Syria has not yet provided the requested documentation in support of its declarations concerning the nature or function of the destroyed building, nor agreed to a visit to the three other locations which the IAEA has requested to visit.. (28)The IAEA Director General publicly stated to the IAEA Board of Governors, on June 15, 2009, that the limited information and access provided by Syria to date have not enabled the Agency to determine the nature of the destroyed facility at Dair Alzour site, that uranium particles have been found in samples taken from a second site, the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor facility in Damascus, and that the particles found at both sites are of a type not included in Syria’s declared inventory of nuclear material..