

111TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 1288

To halt Saudi support for institutions that fund, train, incite, encourage, or in any other way aid and abet terrorism, to secure full Saudi cooperation in the investigation of terrorist incidents, to halt the issuance of visas to citizens of Saudi Arabia until the President certifies that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia does not discriminate in the issuance of visas on the basis of religious affiliation or heritage, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 3, 2009

Mr. WEINER (for himself, Mr. CROWLEY, Ms. BERKLEY, Mr. NADLER of New York, and Mrs. TAUSCHER) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To halt Saudi support for institutions that fund, train, incite, encourage, or in any other way aid and abet terrorism, to secure full Saudi cooperation in the investigation of terrorist incidents, to halt the issuance of visas to citizens of Saudi Arabia until the President certifies that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia does not discriminate in the issuance of visas on the basis of religious affiliation or heritage, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

1 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

2 This Act may be cited as the “Saudi Arabia Account-
3 ability Act of 2009”.

4 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

5 Congress makes the following findings:

6 (1) United Nations Security Council Resolution
7 1373 (2001) mandates that all states “refrain from
8 providing any form of support, active or passive, to
9 entities or persons involved in terrorist acts”, take
10 “the necessary steps to prevent the commission of
11 terrorist acts”, and “deny safe haven to those who
12 finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts”.

13 (2) The Council on Foreign Relations concluded
14 in an October 2002 report on terrorist financing
15 that “[f]or years, individuals and charities based in
16 Saudi Arabia have been the most important source
17 of funds for al-Qaeda, and for years, Saudi officials
18 have turned a blind eye to this problem”.

19 (3) In a June 2004 report entitled “Update on
20 the Global Campaign Against Terrorist Financing”,
21 the Council on Foreign Relations reported that
22 “[w]e find it regrettable and unacceptable that since
23 September 11, 2001, we know of not a single Saudi
24 donor of funds to terrorist groups who has been
25 publicly punished”.

1 (4) According to the final report of the Na-
2 tional Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
3 United States, when asked where terrorist leaders
4 would likely locate their bases, military officers and
5 government officials repeatedly listed Saudi Arabia
6 as a prime location.

7 (5) A report released on January 28, 2005 by
8 Freedom House’s Center for Religious Freedom
9 found that Saudi Arabia is the state most respon-
10 sible for the propagation of material promoting ha-
11 tred, intolerance, and violence within United States
12 mosques and Islamic centers, and that these publica-
13 tions are often official publications of a Saudi min-
14 istry or distributed by the Embassy of Saudi Arabia
15 in Washington, DC.

16 (6) During a July 2003 hearing on terrorism
17 before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology
18 and Homeland Security of the Committee on the Ju-
19 diciary of the Senate, David Aufhauser, General
20 Counsel of the Treasury Department, stated that
21 Saudi Arabia is, in many cases, the “epicenter” of
22 financing for terrorism.

23 (7) The New York Times, citing United States
24 and Israeli sources, reported on September 17,
25 2003, that at least 50 percent of the current oper-

1 ating budget of Hamas comes from “people in Saudi
2 Arabia”.

3 (8) The Middle East Media Research Institute
4 concluded in a July 3, 2003, report on Saudi sup-
5 port for Palestinian terrorists that “for decades, the
6 royal family of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has
7 been the main financial supporter of Palestinian
8 groups fighting Israel”. The report notes specifically
9 that Saudi-sponsored organizations have funneled
10 over \$4,000,000,000 to finance the Palestinian
11 intifada that began in September 2000.

12 (9) A joint committee of the Select Committee
13 on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Se-
14 lect Committee on Intelligence of the House of Rep-
15 resentatives issued a report on July 24, 2003, that
16 quotes various United States Government personnel
17 who complained that the Saudis refused to cooperate
18 in the investigation of Osama bin Laden and his net-
19 work both before and after the September 11, 2001,
20 terrorist attacks.

21 (10) After the 1996 bombing of the Khobar
22 Towers housing complex at Dahrhan, Saudi Arabia,
23 which killed 19 United States Air Force personnel
24 and wounded approximately 400 people, the Govern-
25 ment of Saudi Arabia refused to allow United States

1 officials to question individuals held in detention by
2 the Saudis in connection with the attack.

3 (11) As recounted by counterterrorism officials
4 in a September 2003 issue of Time Magazine, Saudi
5 Arabia denied United States officials access to sev-
6 eral suspects in the custody of the Government of
7 Saudi Arabia, including a Saudi Arabian citizen in
8 detention for months who had knowledge of exten-
9 sive plans to inject poison gas in the New York City
10 subway system.

11 (12) The United States Commission on Inter-
12 national Religious Freedom has reported that Saudi
13 Arabian Government-funded textbooks used both in
14 Saudi Arabia and also in North American Islamic
15 schools and mosques have been found to encourage
16 incitement to violence against non-Muslims.

17 (13) There are indications that, since the May
18 12, 2003, suicide bombings in Riyadh, the Govern-
19 ment of Saudi Arabia is making a more serious ef-
20 fort to combat terrorism.

21 (14) An official website of the Saudi Arabian
22 Government's Supreme Commission for Tourism in-
23 cluded the following text:

24 "Visas will not be issued for the following
25 groups of people:

1 “An Israeli passport holder or a passport
2 that has an Israeli arrival/departure stamp.

3 “Those who don’t abide by the Saudi tra-
4 ditions concerning appearance and behaviors.
5 Those under the influence of alcohol will not be
6 permitted into the Kingdom.

7 “There are certain regulations for pilgrims
8 and you should contact the consulate for more
9 information.

10 “Jewish People.”.

11 **SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

12 It is the sense of Congress that—

13 (1) it is imperative that the Government of
14 Saudi Arabia immediately and unconditionally—

15 (A) provide complete, unrestricted, and un-
16 obstructed cooperation to the United States, in-
17 cluding the unsolicited sharing of relevant intel-
18 ligence in a consistent and timely fashion, in
19 the investigation of groups and individuals that
20 are suspected of financing, supporting, plotting,
21 or committing an act of terror against United
22 States citizens anywhere in the world, including
23 within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia;

24 (B) permanently close all charities, schools,
25 or other organizations or institutions in the

1 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that fund, train, in-
2 cite, encourage, or in any other way aid and
3 abet terrorism anywhere in the world (hereafter
4 in this Act referred to as “Saudi-based terror
5 organizations”), including by means of pro-
6 viding support for the families of individuals
7 who have committed acts of terrorism;

8 (C) end funding or other support by the
9 Government of Saudi Arabia for charities,
10 schools, and any other organizations or institu-
11 tions outside the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that
12 train, incite, encourage, or in any other way aid
13 and abet terrorism anywhere in the world (here-
14 after in this Act referred to as “offshore terror
15 organizations”), including by means of pro-
16 viding support for the families of individuals
17 who have committed acts of terrorism; and

18 (D) block all funding from private Saudi
19 citizens and entities to any Saudi-based terror
20 organization or offshore terrorism organization;
21 and

22 (2) the President, in deciding whether to make
23 the certification under section 4, should judge
24 whether the Government of Saudi Arabia has contin-
25 ued and sufficiently expanded the efforts to combat

1 terrorism that it redoubled after the May 12, 2003,
2 bombing in Riyadh.

3 **SEC. 4. SANCTIONS.**

4 (a) RESTRICTIONS ON EXPORTS AND DIPLOMATIC
5 TRAVEL.—Unless the President makes the certification
6 described in subsection (c), the President shall take the
7 following actions:

8 (1) Prohibit the export to the Kingdom of
9 Saudi Arabia, and prohibit the issuance of a license
10 for the export to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, of—

11 (A) any defense articles or defense services
12 on the United States Munitions List under sec-
13 tion 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22
14 U.S.C. 2778) for which special export controls
15 are warranted under such Act (22 U.S.C. 2751
16 et seq.); and

17 (B) any item identified on the Commerce
18 Control List maintained under part 774 of title
19 15, Code of Federal Regulations.

20 (2) Restrict travel of Saudi diplomats assigned
21 to Washington, District of Columbia, New York,
22 New York, the Saudi Consulate General in Houston,
23 or the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles to a 25-mile
24 radius of Washington, District of Columbia, New
25 York, New York, the Saudi Consulate General in

1 Houston, or the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, re-
2 spectively.

3 (b) WAIVER.—The President may waive the applica-
4 tion of subsection (a) if the President—

5 (1) determines that it is in the national security
6 interest of the United States to do so; and

7 (2) submits to the appropriate congressional
8 committees a report that contains the reasons for
9 such determination.

10 (c) CERTIFICATION.—The President shall transmit to
11 the appropriate congressional committees a certification of
12 any determination made by the President after the date
13 of the enactment of this Act that the Government of Saudi
14 Arabia—

15 (1) is fully cooperating with the United States
16 in investigating and preventing terrorist attacks;

17 (2) has permanently closed all Saudi-based ter-
18 ror organizations;

19 (3) has ended any funding or other support by
20 the Government of Saudi Arabia for any offshore
21 terror organization; and

22 (4) has exercised maximum efforts to block all
23 funding from private Saudi citizens and entities to
24 offshore terrorist organizations.

1 **SEC. 5. REPORT.**

2 (a) REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT.—Not later than six
3 months after the date of the enactment of this Act and
4 annually thereafter until the President makes the certifi-
5 cation described in section 4(c), the Secretary of State
6 shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees
7 a report on the progress made by the Government of Saudi
8 Arabia toward meeting the conditions described in para-
9 graphs (1) through (4) of such section.

10 (b) FORM.—The report submitted under subsection
11 (a) shall be in unclassified form but may include a classi-
12 fied annex.

13 **SEC. 6. CESSATION OF VISA ISSUANCE.**

14 Beginning on the day after the date of the enactment
15 of this Act, no visa shall be issued by the Government of
16 the United States to a citizen of Saudi Arabia until the
17 President certifies that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia does
18 not discriminate in the issuance of visas on the basis of
19 religious affiliation or heritage.

20 **SEC. 7. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-**
21 **FINED.**

22 In this Act, the term “appropriate congressional com-
23 mittees” means the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
24 House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign
25 Relations of the Senate.

