[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Con. Res. 217 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. CON. RES. 217

Expressing the sense of Congress that the President, in negotiating any 
  new bilateral strategic arms agreement with the Russian Federation, 
 shall ensure the continued deterrence capability of the United States 
 strategic arsenal and flexibility in the allocation of its components 
    in the event that third countries may pursue the deployment of 
 significant and technologically advanced nuclear strategic forces not 
        covered by such a United States-Russian arms agreement.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            December 3, 2009

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen (for herself, Mr. McKeon, Mr. Boehner, Mr. Pence, Mrs. 
McMorris Rodgers, Mr. Price of Georgia, Mr. McCotter, Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. 
   Wilson of South Carolina, Mr. Turner, Mr. Franks of Arizona, Mr. 
 Gallegly, Mr. Bishop of Utah, Mr. Burton of Indiana, Mr. Boozman, Mr. 
Bilirakis, Mr. Inglis, Mr. Lamborn, Mr. Miller of Florida, Mr. Fleming, 
Ms. Granger, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. Kline of Minnesota, Mr. Aderholt, Mrs. 
 Myrick, Mrs. Bachmann, Mr. Wittman, Mr. Broun of Georgia, Mr. Putnam, 
Mr. Mack, Mr. Bonner, Mr. Barrett of South Carolina, Mr. Sessions, Mr. 
Linder, Mr. Smith of New Jersey, Mr. Coble, Mr. Neugebauer, Mr. Tiahrt, 
  Mr. Coffman of Colorado, Mr. Souder, Mr. Garrett of New Jersey, Mr. 
Cao, Mr. McCaul, Mr. Fortenberry, Mrs. Capito, Mr. Issa, Mr. Gingrey of 
 Georgia, Mr. Sam Johnson of Texas, Mr. Graves, Ms. Foxx, Mr. Tiberi, 
Mr. Akin, Mr. Campbell, Mr. Rogers of Michigan, Mr. Conaway, Mr. Roe of 
   Tennessee, Mr. Alexander, and Mr. Posey) submitted the following 
 concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign 
                                Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION


 
Expressing the sense of Congress that the President, in negotiating any 
  new bilateral strategic arms agreement with the Russian Federation, 
 shall ensure the continued deterrence capability of the United States 
 strategic arsenal and flexibility in the allocation of its components 
    in the event that third countries may pursue the deployment of 
 significant and technologically advanced nuclear strategic forces not 
        covered by such a United States-Russian arms agreement.

Whereas United States strategic nuclear forces have been successful in providing 
        a security framework for the United States based on the concept of 
        deterrence, such continued successful deterrence of strategic attacks on 
        the United States will require the United States to maintain a strategic 
        force capable of deterring attacks, not just by the Russian Federation, 
        but by other countries with the capability to deploy significant nuclear 
        arsenals;
Whereas the importance of maintaining strong nuclear capabilities is emphasized 
        in the September 2008 report, ``National Security and Nuclear Weapons in 
        the 21st Century'', issued by the Department of State and the Department 
        of Defense, which states, ``Nuclear forces continue to represent the 
        ultimate deterrent capability that supports U.S. national security . . . 
        [and the] nuclear force must be of sufficient size and possess a wide 
        range of capabilities to provide credible threat option to deter 
        existing and future WMD-armed adversaries'';
Whereas the United States and the Soviet Union, and, subsequently, the Russian 
        Federation, have already reduced the total numbers of deployed strategic 
        nuclear weapons by more than three-quarters;
Whereas, on July 31, 1991, the United States and the former Soviet Union, 
        succeeded by the Russian Federation, signed the Strategic Arms Reduction 
        Treaty (START I), which committed both countries to reduce and limit 
        long range nuclear arsenals and which is set to expire on December 5, 
        2009;
Whereas in 2002, the United States and the Russian Federation signed the 
        Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, known as the ``Moscow Treaty'', 
        which set out to reduce deployed strategic nuclear weapons to between 
        1,700 and 2,200 warheads on each side by 2012 using the verification 
        regime of START I to monitor reductions;
Whereas, although the United States and Russia have significantly reduced their 
        nuclear missile arsenals, other countries are seeking to enhance and 
        enlarge their nuclear weapons capabilities and deployments, including 
        the People's Republic of China;
Whereas the People's Republic of China is the only declared nuclear weapons 
        country under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) that is 
        expanding its nuclear arsenal;
Whereas, according to the United States National Air and Space Intelligence 
        Center's April 2009 report, ``Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat'', 
        ``China has the most active and diverse ballistic missile development 
        program in the world'' and ``China's ICBM force will grow 
        considerably.'';
Whereas, in a March 2006 statement to the United States-China Economic and 
        Security Review Commission, then Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
        International Security Affairs Peter W. Rodman said, ``China is pursuing 
        a patient, long-term, comprehensive modernization program . . . . newer 
        versions [of ICBMs] such as the DF-31 and DF-31A . . . and the JL-2 
        submarine-launched ballistic missile . . . will reach . . . virtually 
        the entire continental United States'';
Whereas the 2009 Department of Defense annual report to Congress on the military 
        power of the People's Republic of China states that ``China is both 
        qualitatively and quantitatively improving its strategic missile 
        forces'', and that ``By 2010, China's nuclear forces will include DF-31s 
        and DF-31As; enhanced CSS-4s; CSS-3s; CSS-5s; and JIN-class SSBNs, each 
        carrying 12 JL-2 SLBMs. The addition of nuclear-capable forces with 
        greater mobility and survivability . . . will . . . enhance [China's] 
        strategic strike capabilities'';
Whereas, on July 6, 2009, President Barack Obama and Russian Federation 
        President Dmitry Medvedev signed a preliminary agreement to replace 
        START I, which is set to expire on December 5, 2009, in spite of the 
        fact that the Nuclear Posture Review, which is now being conducted by 
        the United States Department of Defense and which will establish United 
        States nuclear deterrence policy and examine United States strategic 
        force requirements, will not be ready for submission to the Congress 
        until December 2009;
Whereas the Nuclear Posture Review is intended to provide a basis for the 
        negotiations to the follow-on agreement to START I, and it would 
        therefore be premature and potentially damaging to the national security 
        interests of the United States to hold negotiations on any nuclear arms 
        control agreement until the Department of Defense completes that Review 
        and the President and Congress have had adequate time to carefully 
        review its assessments; and
Whereas it is estimated that the People's Republic of China now has 40 or more 
        strategic nuclear warheads on missiles capable of reaching the United 
        States in all or in part and the National Air and Space Intelligence 
        Center April 2009 report states ``. . . the number of warheads on 
        Chinese ICBMs capable of threatening the United States is expected to 
        grow to well over 100 in the next 15 years'': Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), 
That Congress--
            (1) calls on the President to not enter into or extend any 
        arms control agreement with the Russian Federation that may in 
        future jeopardize the ability of the United States to ensure a 
        credible strategic deterrent with regard to the People's 
        Republic of China or other countries that are deemed capable of 
        deploying a strategic nuclear arsenal and may decide to do so;
            (2) calls on the President to provide Congress with a 
        detailed report on any plans, negotiations, or steps taken for 
        the purpose of entering into any bilateral arms control 
        agreement with the Russian Federation;
            (3) calls on the President to report to Congress on the 
        capabilities and intentions of the People's Republic of China 
        with regard to the future deployment of a major strategic 
        nuclear arsenal;
            (4) urges the President to refrain from negotiating or 
        entering into any follow-on agreement to START I until the 
        Nuclear Posture Review is completed and the President, 
        Congress, and all relevant United States Government departments 
        and agencies have had an opportunity to carefully review the 
        determinations provided in the Nuclear Posture Review; and
            (5) calls on the President to refuse to enter into any 
        strategic nuclear arms agreement with the Russian Federation or 
        any other country that would require or imply an agreement by 
        the United States to the limitation or suspension of its 
        efforts to create missile defense systems for itself and its 
        allies.
                                 <all>