[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Con. Res. 156 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. CON. RES. 156

  Condemning the attack on the AMIA Jewish Community Center in Buenos 
        Aires, Argentina, in July 1994, and for other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             June 17, 2009

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen (for herself, Mr. Sherman, Mr. Burton of Indiana, Mr. 
   Inglis, Mr. McCaul, Mr. Poe of Texas, Mr. Manzullo, Mr. Mack, Mr. 
  Bilirakis, Mr. Wilson of South Carolina, Mr. Klein of Florida, Ms. 
   Berkley, Ms. Harman, Mrs. Maloney, Mr. Rothman of New Jersey, Mr. 
Wexler, Mr. McGovern, and Mr. Engel) submitted the following concurrent 
   resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION


 
  Condemning the attack on the AMIA Jewish Community Center in Buenos 
        Aires, Argentina, in July 1994, and for other purposes.

Whereas, on July 18, 1994, 85 people were killed and 300 were wounded when the 
        Argentine Jewish Mutual Association (AMIA) was bombed in Buenos Aires, 
        Argentina;
Whereas extensive evidence links the planning of the attacks to the Government 
        of Iran, and the execution of the attacks to Hezbollah, which is based 
        in Lebanon, supported by Syria, sponsored by Iran, and designated by the 
        Department of State as a Foreign Terrorist Organization;
Whereas, on October 25, 2006, the State Prosecutor of Argentina, an office 
        created by the Government of Argentina, concluded that the AMIA bombing 
        was ``decided and organized by the highest leaders of the former 
        government of . . . Iran, whom, at the same time, entrusted its 
        execution to the Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah'';
Whereas, on October 25, 2006, the State Prosecutor of Argentina concluded that 
        the AMIA bombing had been approved in advance by Iran's Supreme Leader 
        Ali Khamene'i, Iran's then-leader Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Iran's 
        then-Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, and Iran's then-Minister of 
        Security and Intelligence Ali Fallahijan;
Whereas, on October 25, 2006, the State Prosecutor of Argentina stated that the 
        Government of Iran uses ``terrorism as a mechanism of its foreign 
        policy'' in support of ``its final aim [which] is to export its 
        radicalized vision of Islam and to eliminate the enemies of the 
        regime'';
Whereas, on October 25, 2006, the State Prosecutor of Argentina identified 
        Ibrahim Hussein Berro, a Lebanese citizen and member of Hezbollah, as 
        the suicide bomber who primarily carried out the attack on the AMIA;
Whereas, on November 9, 2006, Argentine Judge Rodolfo Canicoba Corral, pursuant 
        to the request of the State Prosecutor of Argentina, issued an arrest 
        warrant for Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a former leader of Iran and 
        the current chairman of Iran's Assembly of Experts and of Iran's 
        Expediency Council, for his involvement in the AMIA bombing and urged 
        the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) to issue an 
        international arrest warrant for Rafsanjani and detain him;
Whereas, on November 9, 2006, Argentine Judge Rodolfo Canicoba Corral, pursuant 
        to the request of the State Prosecutor of Argentina, also issued arrest 
        warrants for Ali Fallahijan, a former Iranian Minister of Security and 
        Intelligence, Ali Akbar Velayati, a former Iranian Foreign Minister, 
        Mohsen Rezaei, a former commander of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards 
        Corps (IRGC), Ahmad Vahidi, a former commander of the elite Al-Quds 
        Force of the IRGC, Hadi Soleimanpour, a former Iranian ambassador to 
        Argentina, Mohsen Rabbani, a former cultural attache at the Iranian 
        Embassy in Buenos Aires, Ahmad Reza Asghari, a former official at the 
        Iranian Embassy in Buenos Aires, and Imad Moughnieh, a leading 
        operations chief of Hezbollah;
Whereas, on March 5, 2007, the Executive Committee of INTERPOL unanimously 
        supported the issuance of Red Notices for Hezbollah operative Imad 
        Moughnieh and for Iranian officials Ali Fallahijan, Mohsen Rezaei, Ahmad 
        Vahidi, Mohsen Rabbani, and Ahmad Reza Asgari, thereby allowing arrest 
        warrants for those individuals to be circulated worldwide with an eye to 
        their arrest and extradition;
Whereas, on November 7, 2007, the General Assembly of INTERPOL upheld the 
        Executive Committee's decision to support the issuance of six Red 
        Notices in connection to the AMIA case;
Whereas, on February 12, 2008, Hezbollah operative Imad Moughnieh reportedly was 
        killed in Syria;
Whereas in June of 2008, the Government of Saudi Arabia hosted an international 
        Muslim conference that was reportedly attended by Iranian officials Ali 
        Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, against whom an Argentine arrest warrant has 
        been issued, and Mohsen Rezaei, against whom both an Argentine arrest 
        warrant and INTERPOL Red Notice have been issued;
Whereas the Government of Saudi Arabia reportedly made no attempt to detain or 
        arrest Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani or Mohsen Rezaei during their time 
        in Saudi Arabia, and the two departed Saudi Arabia without incident;
Whereas, on May 22, 2008, Argentine prosecutor Alberto Nisman filed a request 
        with Argentine Judge Ariel Lijo for the arrest of Carlos Saul Menem, who 
        was president of Argentina at the time of the AMIA bombing, and four 
        other former Argentine high officials in connection with the AMIA case;
Whereas Mr. Nisman claimed in his request for an arrest warrant that Menem and 
        the other four officials had attempted to cover up the involvement of a 
        Syrian-Argentine businessman, Alberto Jacinto Kanoore Edul, in the AMIA 
        bombing;
Whereas Argentine investigators have stated that prior to the AMIA bombing, Mr. 
        Kanoore Edul was in contact with at least two men who have been 
        identified as suspects in the AMIA case;
Whereas Mr. Nisman stated in an article published on May 29, 2008, that his 
        request for arrest warrants against Argentine nationals in the AMIA case 
        ``does absolutely not change the accusations against Hezbollah and Iran 
        . . . To a certain degree, it reinforces them, because [suspect Alberto 
        Jacinto] Kanoore Edul has many links with Islamist extremists'';
Whereas, on December 16, 2008, at the AMIA Special Prosecutor's request, the 
        presiding Argentine judge in a civil suit against the Iranian suspects 
        and Hezbollah ordered the attachment of six commercial properties in 
        Argentina allegedly owned by former Iran cultural attache and named 
        suspect Mohsen Rabbani;
Whereas in December of 2008, the judge also requested that select European 
        governments freeze up to $1 million in bank accounts allegedly belonging 
        to former Iranian leader Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and another 
        Iranian accused of involvement in the attacks;
Whereas between October of 2008 and March of 2009, nearly a dozen Iranian 
        properties have reportedly been seized in the Buenos Aires area in 
        connection with a civil suit presented by an unnamed survivor of the 
        AMIA bombing;
Whereas in May of 2009, former IRGC commander Mohsen Rezaei, against whom both 
        an Argentine arrest warrant and an INTERPOL Red Notice have been issued, 
        announced his intention to seek the leadership of Iran;
Whereas in May 2009, Argentina issued an international arrest warrant for Samuel 
        Salman El Reda, a Colombian citizen of Lebanese descent who Argentine 
        prosecutor Alberto Nisman believes was the top local connection in the 
        AMIA attack;
Whereas Mr. Nisman believes El Reda had connections to Hezbollah and the Tri-
        Border area, a zone between Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil suspected of 
        being a haven for Islamic radical groups;
Whereas during the past several years, the Government of Argentina has made 
        significant advances in the AMIA investigation and other counter-
        terrorism efforts;
Whereas the issuance of an Argentine arrest warrant for an attache of the 
        Iranian Embassy in Argentina in connection with the AMIA case, indicates 
        that Iran has used its embassies abroad as tools and extensions of 
        radical Islamist goals and attacks;
Whereas according to news reports published in June of 2008, intelligence 
        agencies in the United States and Canada have warned of significant 
        evidence that Hezbollah, with the support of the Government of Iran, 
        plans to launch a major attack against ``Jewish targets'' outside the 
        Middle East, and that possible targeted areas include Canada and Latin 
        America;
Whereas, on January 27, 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said, ``I'm 
        concerned about the level of . . . subversive activity that the Iranians 
        are carrying on in a number of places in Latin America . . . They're 
        opening a lot of offices and a lot of fronts, behind which they 
        interfere in what is going on in some of these countries.''; and
Whereas, on March 17, 2009, Navy Admiral James Stavridis, Commander, United 
        States Southern Command, indicated that he shared Secretary Gates's 
        concern, explaining ``We have seen . . . an increase in a wide level of 
        activity by the Iranian government in this region . . . That is a 
        concern principally because of the connections between the government of 
        Iran, which is a state sponsor of terrorism, and Hezbollah'': Now, 
        therefore, be it
    Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), 
That Congress--
            (1) reiterates its strongest condemnation of the 1994 
        attack on the Argentine Jewish Mutual Association (AMIA) Jewish 
        Community Center in Buenos Aires, Argentina, honors the victims 
        of this attack, and expresses its sympathy to the relatives of 
        the victims;
            (2) applauds the Government of Argentina for its ongoing 
        efforts in the AMIA bombing investigation;
            (3) urges the Government of Argentina to continue to 
        dedicate and provide the resources necessary for its judicial 
        system and intelligence agencies to investigate all areas of 
        the AMIA case and to prosecute those responsible;
            (4) expresses grave concern regarding the Government of 
        Saudi Arabia's failure, when given the opportunity, to detain 
        Iranian officials against whom Argentine arrest warrants or 
        INTERPOL Red Notices are pending in connection with the AMIA 
        case;
            (5) urges all responsible nations to cooperate fully with 
        the AMIA investigation, including by making information, 
        witnesses, and suspects available for review and questioning by 
        the appropriate Argentine authorities, and by detaining and 
        extraditing to Argentina, if given the opportunity, any persons 
        against whom Argentine arrest warrants or INTERPOL Red Notices 
        are pending in connection with the AMIA case, including Iranian 
        officials and former officials, Hezbollah operatives, and 
        Islamist militants;
            (6) encourages the President to direct United States law 
        enforcement agencies to provide support and cooperation to the 
        Government of Argentina, if requested, for the purposes of 
        deepening and expanding the investigation into the AMIA 
        bombing; and
            (7) urges governments in the Western Hemisphere, who have 
        not done so already, to draft, adopt, and implement legislation 
        designating Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, banning 
        fundraising and recruitment activities, and applying the 
        harshest penalties on those providing support for activities 
        involving Hezbollah and other such extremist groups.
                                 <all>