[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Con. Res. 156 Introduced in House (IH)]
111th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. CON. RES. 156
Condemning the attack on the AMIA Jewish Community Center in Buenos
Aires, Argentina, in July 1994, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
June 17, 2009
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen (for herself, Mr. Sherman, Mr. Burton of Indiana, Mr.
Inglis, Mr. McCaul, Mr. Poe of Texas, Mr. Manzullo, Mr. Mack, Mr.
Bilirakis, Mr. Wilson of South Carolina, Mr. Klein of Florida, Ms.
Berkley, Ms. Harman, Mrs. Maloney, Mr. Rothman of New Jersey, Mr.
Wexler, Mr. McGovern, and Mr. Engel) submitted the following concurrent
resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs
_______________________________________________________________________
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
Condemning the attack on the AMIA Jewish Community Center in Buenos
Aires, Argentina, in July 1994, and for other purposes.
Whereas, on July 18, 1994, 85 people were killed and 300 were wounded when the
Argentine Jewish Mutual Association (AMIA) was bombed in Buenos Aires,
Argentina;
Whereas extensive evidence links the planning of the attacks to the Government
of Iran, and the execution of the attacks to Hezbollah, which is based
in Lebanon, supported by Syria, sponsored by Iran, and designated by the
Department of State as a Foreign Terrorist Organization;
Whereas, on October 25, 2006, the State Prosecutor of Argentina, an office
created by the Government of Argentina, concluded that the AMIA bombing
was ``decided and organized by the highest leaders of the former
government of . . . Iran, whom, at the same time, entrusted its
execution to the Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah'';
Whereas, on October 25, 2006, the State Prosecutor of Argentina concluded that
the AMIA bombing had been approved in advance by Iran's Supreme Leader
Ali Khamene'i, Iran's then-leader Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Iran's
then-Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, and Iran's then-Minister of
Security and Intelligence Ali Fallahijan;
Whereas, on October 25, 2006, the State Prosecutor of Argentina stated that the
Government of Iran uses ``terrorism as a mechanism of its foreign
policy'' in support of ``its final aim [which] is to export its
radicalized vision of Islam and to eliminate the enemies of the
regime'';
Whereas, on October 25, 2006, the State Prosecutor of Argentina identified
Ibrahim Hussein Berro, a Lebanese citizen and member of Hezbollah, as
the suicide bomber who primarily carried out the attack on the AMIA;
Whereas, on November 9, 2006, Argentine Judge Rodolfo Canicoba Corral, pursuant
to the request of the State Prosecutor of Argentina, issued an arrest
warrant for Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a former leader of Iran and
the current chairman of Iran's Assembly of Experts and of Iran's
Expediency Council, for his involvement in the AMIA bombing and urged
the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) to issue an
international arrest warrant for Rafsanjani and detain him;
Whereas, on November 9, 2006, Argentine Judge Rodolfo Canicoba Corral, pursuant
to the request of the State Prosecutor of Argentina, also issued arrest
warrants for Ali Fallahijan, a former Iranian Minister of Security and
Intelligence, Ali Akbar Velayati, a former Iranian Foreign Minister,
Mohsen Rezaei, a former commander of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards
Corps (IRGC), Ahmad Vahidi, a former commander of the elite Al-Quds
Force of the IRGC, Hadi Soleimanpour, a former Iranian ambassador to
Argentina, Mohsen Rabbani, a former cultural attache at the Iranian
Embassy in Buenos Aires, Ahmad Reza Asghari, a former official at the
Iranian Embassy in Buenos Aires, and Imad Moughnieh, a leading
operations chief of Hezbollah;
Whereas, on March 5, 2007, the Executive Committee of INTERPOL unanimously
supported the issuance of Red Notices for Hezbollah operative Imad
Moughnieh and for Iranian officials Ali Fallahijan, Mohsen Rezaei, Ahmad
Vahidi, Mohsen Rabbani, and Ahmad Reza Asgari, thereby allowing arrest
warrants for those individuals to be circulated worldwide with an eye to
their arrest and extradition;
Whereas, on November 7, 2007, the General Assembly of INTERPOL upheld the
Executive Committee's decision to support the issuance of six Red
Notices in connection to the AMIA case;
Whereas, on February 12, 2008, Hezbollah operative Imad Moughnieh reportedly was
killed in Syria;
Whereas in June of 2008, the Government of Saudi Arabia hosted an international
Muslim conference that was reportedly attended by Iranian officials Ali
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, against whom an Argentine arrest warrant has
been issued, and Mohsen Rezaei, against whom both an Argentine arrest
warrant and INTERPOL Red Notice have been issued;
Whereas the Government of Saudi Arabia reportedly made no attempt to detain or
arrest Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani or Mohsen Rezaei during their time
in Saudi Arabia, and the two departed Saudi Arabia without incident;
Whereas, on May 22, 2008, Argentine prosecutor Alberto Nisman filed a request
with Argentine Judge Ariel Lijo for the arrest of Carlos Saul Menem, who
was president of Argentina at the time of the AMIA bombing, and four
other former Argentine high officials in connection with the AMIA case;
Whereas Mr. Nisman claimed in his request for an arrest warrant that Menem and
the other four officials had attempted to cover up the involvement of a
Syrian-Argentine businessman, Alberto Jacinto Kanoore Edul, in the AMIA
bombing;
Whereas Argentine investigators have stated that prior to the AMIA bombing, Mr.
Kanoore Edul was in contact with at least two men who have been
identified as suspects in the AMIA case;
Whereas Mr. Nisman stated in an article published on May 29, 2008, that his
request for arrest warrants against Argentine nationals in the AMIA case
``does absolutely not change the accusations against Hezbollah and Iran
. . . To a certain degree, it reinforces them, because [suspect Alberto
Jacinto] Kanoore Edul has many links with Islamist extremists'';
Whereas, on December 16, 2008, at the AMIA Special Prosecutor's request, the
presiding Argentine judge in a civil suit against the Iranian suspects
and Hezbollah ordered the attachment of six commercial properties in
Argentina allegedly owned by former Iran cultural attache and named
suspect Mohsen Rabbani;
Whereas in December of 2008, the judge also requested that select European
governments freeze up to $1 million in bank accounts allegedly belonging
to former Iranian leader Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and another
Iranian accused of involvement in the attacks;
Whereas between October of 2008 and March of 2009, nearly a dozen Iranian
properties have reportedly been seized in the Buenos Aires area in
connection with a civil suit presented by an unnamed survivor of the
AMIA bombing;
Whereas in May of 2009, former IRGC commander Mohsen Rezaei, against whom both
an Argentine arrest warrant and an INTERPOL Red Notice have been issued,
announced his intention to seek the leadership of Iran;
Whereas in May 2009, Argentina issued an international arrest warrant for Samuel
Salman El Reda, a Colombian citizen of Lebanese descent who Argentine
prosecutor Alberto Nisman believes was the top local connection in the
AMIA attack;
Whereas Mr. Nisman believes El Reda had connections to Hezbollah and the Tri-
Border area, a zone between Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil suspected of
being a haven for Islamic radical groups;
Whereas during the past several years, the Government of Argentina has made
significant advances in the AMIA investigation and other counter-
terrorism efforts;
Whereas the issuance of an Argentine arrest warrant for an attache of the
Iranian Embassy in Argentina in connection with the AMIA case, indicates
that Iran has used its embassies abroad as tools and extensions of
radical Islamist goals and attacks;
Whereas according to news reports published in June of 2008, intelligence
agencies in the United States and Canada have warned of significant
evidence that Hezbollah, with the support of the Government of Iran,
plans to launch a major attack against ``Jewish targets'' outside the
Middle East, and that possible targeted areas include Canada and Latin
America;
Whereas, on January 27, 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said, ``I'm
concerned about the level of . . . subversive activity that the Iranians
are carrying on in a number of places in Latin America . . . They're
opening a lot of offices and a lot of fronts, behind which they
interfere in what is going on in some of these countries.''; and
Whereas, on March 17, 2009, Navy Admiral James Stavridis, Commander, United
States Southern Command, indicated that he shared Secretary Gates's
concern, explaining ``We have seen . . . an increase in a wide level of
activity by the Iranian government in this region . . . That is a
concern principally because of the connections between the government of
Iran, which is a state sponsor of terrorism, and Hezbollah'': Now,
therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring),
That Congress--
(1) reiterates its strongest condemnation of the 1994
attack on the Argentine Jewish Mutual Association (AMIA) Jewish
Community Center in Buenos Aires, Argentina, honors the victims
of this attack, and expresses its sympathy to the relatives of
the victims;
(2) applauds the Government of Argentina for its ongoing
efforts in the AMIA bombing investigation;
(3) urges the Government of Argentina to continue to
dedicate and provide the resources necessary for its judicial
system and intelligence agencies to investigate all areas of
the AMIA case and to prosecute those responsible;
(4) expresses grave concern regarding the Government of
Saudi Arabia's failure, when given the opportunity, to detain
Iranian officials against whom Argentine arrest warrants or
INTERPOL Red Notices are pending in connection with the AMIA
case;
(5) urges all responsible nations to cooperate fully with
the AMIA investigation, including by making information,
witnesses, and suspects available for review and questioning by
the appropriate Argentine authorities, and by detaining and
extraditing to Argentina, if given the opportunity, any persons
against whom Argentine arrest warrants or INTERPOL Red Notices
are pending in connection with the AMIA case, including Iranian
officials and former officials, Hezbollah operatives, and
Islamist militants;
(6) encourages the President to direct United States law
enforcement agencies to provide support and cooperation to the
Government of Argentina, if requested, for the purposes of
deepening and expanding the investigation into the AMIA
bombing; and
(7) urges governments in the Western Hemisphere, who have
not done so already, to draft, adopt, and implement legislation
designating Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, banning
fundraising and recruitment activities, and applying the
harshest penalties on those providing support for activities
involving Hezbollah and other such extremist groups.
<all>