Whereas the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
the United States (referred to in this Resolution as the 9/11
Commission
) conducted a lengthy review of the facts and circumstances
relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, including those
relating to the intelligence community, law enforcement agencies, and the role
of congressional oversight and resource allocation;
Whereas in its final report, the 9/11 Commission found
that congressional oversight of the intelligence activities of the United
States is dysfunctional;
Whereas in its final report, the 9/11 Commission further
found that under the rules of the Senate and the House of Representatives in
effect at the time the report was completed, the committees of Congress charged
with oversight of the intelligence activities lacked the power, influence, and
sustained capability to meet the daunting challenges faced by the intelligence
community of the United States;
Whereas in its final report, the 9/11 Commission further
found that as long as such oversight is governed by such rules of the Senate
and the House of Representatives, the people of the United States will not get
the security they want and need;
Whereas in its final report, the 9/11 Commission further
found that a strong, stable, and capable congressional committee structure is
needed to give the intelligence community of the United States appropriate
oversight, support, and leadership;
Whereas in its final report, the 9/11 Commission further
found that the reforms recommended by the 9/11 Commission in its final report
will not succeed if congressional oversight of the intelligence community in
the United States is not changed;
Whereas the 9/11 Commission recommended structural changes
to Congress to improve the oversight of intelligence activities;
Whereas the 9/11 Commission recommended that the
authorizing authorities and appropriating authorities with respect to
intelligence activities in each house of Congress be combined into a single
committee in each house of Congress;
Whereas Congress has enacted some of the recommendations
made by the 9/11 Commission and is considering implementing additional
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission; and
Whereas the Senate adopted Senate Resolution 445 in the
108th Congress to address some of the intelligence oversight recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission by abolishing term limits for the members of the Select
Committee on Intelligence, clarifying jurisdiction for intelligence-related
nominations, and streamlining procedures for the referral of
intelligence-related legislation, but other aspects of the 9/11 Commission
recommendations regarding intelligence oversight have not been implemented:
Now, therefore, be it
1.The purposes of this resolution are—
(1)to improve
congressional oversight of the intelligence activities of the United
States;
(2)to provide a
strong, stable, and capable congressional committee structure to provide the
intelligence community appropriate oversight, support, and leadership;
(3)to implement a
key recommendation of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States (the 9/11 Commission
) that structural changes be
made to Congress to improve the oversight of intelligence activities;
and
(4)to provide
vigilant legislative oversight over the intelligence activities of the United
States to assure that such activities are in conformity with the Constitution
and laws of the United States.
2.
(a)Authority of
the Select Committee on IntelligenceParagraph (5) of section
3(a) of Senate Resolution 400, 94th Congress, agreed to May 19, 1976, is
amended in that matter preceding subparagraph (A) by striking the comma
following authorizations for appropriations
and inserting
and appropriations,
.
(b)Abolishment of
the Subcommittee on IntelligenceSenate Resolution 445, 108th
Congress, agreed to October 9, 2004, is amended by striking section 402.