III 110th CONGRESS 1st Session S. RES. 34 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES January 18, 2007 Mr. Kerry (for himself and Mr. Feingold) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations RESOLUTION Calling for the strengthening of the efforts of the United States to defeat the Taliban and terrorist networks in Afghanistan.

Whereas global terrorist networks, including the al Qaeda organization that attacked the United States on September 11, 2001, continue to threaten the security of the United States and are recruiting new members and developing the capability and plans to attack the United States and its allies throughout the world; Whereas a democratic, stable, and prosperous Afghanistan is a vital security interest of the United States; Whereas stability in Afghanistan is being threatened by antigovernment and Taliban forces that seek to disrupt political and economic developments throughout the country; Whereas Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leaders of al Qaeda, are still at large and are reportedly hiding somewhere in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region; Whereas, according to United States military intelligence officials— (1)Taliban attacks on United States, allied, and Afghan forces increased from 1,558 in 2005 to 4,542 in 2006; (2)suicide bomb attacks in Afghanistan increased from 27 in 2005 to 139 in 2006; (3)roadside bomb attacks more than doubled from 783 in 2005 to 1,677 in 2006; and (4)crossborder attacks from Pakistan into Afghanistan have increased by 300 percent since September 2006; Whereas, on September 2, 2006, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reported that in 2006 opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan increased 59 percent over 2005 levels and reached a record high; Whereas the President’s current request for United States economic assistance to Afghanistan for fiscal year 2007 is approximately 33 percent of the amount appropriated for fiscal year 2006; Whereas only 50 percent of the money pledged by the international community for Afghanistan between 2002 and 2005 has actually been delivered; Whereas, on September 12, 2006, the Secretary of State said, [A]n Afghanistan that does not complete its democratic evolution and become a stable, terrorist-fighting state is going to come back to haunt us. . . . [I]t will come back to haunt our successors and their successors. and If we should have learned anything, it is if you allow that kind of vacuum, if you allow a failed state in that strategic a location, you're going to pay for it.; Whereas the bipartisan Iraq Study Group Report concluded, If the Taliban were to control more of Afghanistan, it could provide al Qaeda the political space to conduct terrorist operations. This development would destabilize the region and have national security implications for the United States and other countries around the world.; Whereas the Iraq Study Group Report recommended that the President provide additional political, economic, and military support for Afghanistan, including resources that might become available as combat forces are redeployed from Iraq; Whereas the Iraq Study Group Report specifically recommended that the United States meet the request of General James Jones, then United States North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) commander, for more troops to combat the resurgence of al Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan; Whereas, on October 8, 2006, General David Richards, NATO's top commander in Afghanistan, warned that a majority of Afghans would likely switch their allegiance to resurgent Taliban militants if their lives showed no visible improvements in the next 6 months; Whereas, on January 6, 2007, Army Brigadier General Anthony J. Tata stated that the shortage of troops in Afghanistan could create a strategic high risk, a strategic threat to the United States and an operational threat to the elected government of Hamid Karzai; Whereas, on January 15, 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates stated that there were indications that the Taliban were planning a large spring offensive against United States troops and NATO forces; Whereas, on January 16, 2007, Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, the senior United States commander in Afghanistan, asked to extend the deployment of a United States battalion in Afghanistan that was scheduled to be redeployed to Iraq; Whereas, on January 17, 2007, General David Richards stated that unmet pledges of troops and equipment from NATO countries have left him 10 to 15 percent short of the forces he requires, saying, Clearly, there is a need to fulfill those commitments.; Whereas, on January 17, 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates stated that United States military commanders in Afghanistan have requested additional United States troops for Afghanistan, and stated that he was sympathetic to this request; Whereas the United States currently has approximately 21,000 troops in Afghanistan, approximately 1/7 of the number of United States troops currently deployed to Iraq; Whereas the President of the United States has announced plans to send approximately 21,500 additional United States troops to Iraq; and Whereas if the United States does not strengthen efforts to defeat the Taliban and to create long-term stability in Afghanistan, Afghanistan will become what it was before the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, a haven for those who seek to harm the United States and a source of instability that threatens the security of the United States: Now, therefore, be it

That it is the sense of the Senate that— (1)the United States must strengthen its commitment to establishing long-term stability and peace in Afghanistan; (2)the President should not reduce the total number of United States troops serving in Afghanistan in order to increase the total number of United States troops serving in Iraq; (3)the United States, in partnership with the International Security Assistance Force and the Government of Afghanistan, should immediately increase its efforts to eradicate the Taliban, terrorist organizations, and criminal networks currently operating in Afghanistan, including by increasing United States military personnel as requested by United States military commanders in Afghanistan; (4)the United States, in support of the Government of Afghanistan, should significantly increase the amount of economic assistance available in Afghanistan for reconstruction, social and economic development, counternarcotics efforts, and democracy promotion activities; and (5)the United States should work aggressively to encourage members of the international community to deliver on the financial pledges they have made to support development and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan.