[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Con. Res. 7 Introduced in Senate (IS)]







110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
S. CON. RES. 7

               Expressing the sense of Congress on Iraq.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            January 31, 2007

   Mr. Warner (for himself, Mr. Nelson of Nebraska, Ms. Collins, Mr. 
 Levin, and Ms. Snowe) submitted the following concurrent resolution; 
        which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION


 
               Expressing the sense of Congress on Iraq.

Whereas we respect the Constitutional authorities given a President in article 
        II, section 2, which states that ``The President shall be commander in 
        chief of the Army and Navy of the United States''; it is not the intent 
        of this resolution to question or contravene such authority, but to 
        accept the offer to Congress made by the President on January 10, 2007, 
        that, ``if members have improvements that can be made, we will make 
        them. If circumstances change, we will adjust'';
Whereas the United States strategy and operations in Iraq can only be sustained 
        and achieved with support from the American people and with a level of 
        bipartisanship;
Whereas over 137,000 American military personnel are currently serving in Iraq, 
        like thousands of others since March 2003, with the bravery and 
        professionalism consistent with the finest traditions of the United 
        States Armed Forces, and are deserving of the support of all Americans, 
        which they have strongly;
Whereas many American service personnel have lost their lives, and many more 
        have been wounded, in Iraq, and the American people will always honor 
        their sacrifices and honor their families;
Whereas the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, including their Reserve and National 
        Guard organizations, together with components of the other branches of 
        the military, are under enormous strain from multiple, extended 
        deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan;
Whereas these deployments, and those that will follow, will have lasting impacts 
        on the future recruiting, retention and readiness of our Nation's all 
        volunteer force;
Whereas in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, the 
        Congress stated that ``calendar year 2006 should be a period of 
        significant transition to full sovereignty, with Iraqi security forces 
        taking the lead for the security of a free and sovereign Iraq'';
Whereas United Nations Security Council Resolution 1723, approved November 28, 
        2006, ``determin[ed] that the situation in Iraq continues to constitute 
        a threat to international peace and security'';
Whereas Iraq is experiencing a deteriorating and ever-widening problem of 
        sectarian and intra-sectarian violence based upon political distrust and 
        cultural differences between some Sunni and Shia Muslims;
Whereas Iraqis must reach political settlements in order to achieve 
        reconciliation, and the failure of the Iraqis to reach such settlements 
        to support a truly unified government greatly contributes to the 
        increasing violence in Iraq;
Whereas the responsibility for Iraq's internal security and halting sectarian 
        violence must rest primarily with the Government of Iraq and Iraqi 
        Security Forces;
Whereas U.S. Central Command Commander General John Abizaid testified to 
        Congress on November 15, 2006, ``I met with every divisional commander, 
        General Casey, the Corps Commander, [and] General Dempsey. We all talked 
        together. And I said, in your professional opinion, if we were to bring 
        in more American troops now, does it add considerably to our ability to 
        achieve success in Iraq? And they all said no. And the reason is, 
        because we want the Iraqis to do more. It's easy for the Iraqis to rely 
        upon us to do this work. I believe that more American forces prevent the 
        Iraqis from doing more, from taking more responsibility for their own 
        future'';
Whereas Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki stated on November 27, 2006, that 
        ``The crisis is political, and the ones who can stop the cycle of 
        aggravation and bloodletting of innocents are the politicians'';
Whereas there is growing evidence that Iraqi public sentiment opposes the 
        continued U.S. troop presence in Iraq, much less increasing the troop 
        level;
Whereas, in the fall of 2006, leaders in the Administration and Congress, as 
        well as recognized experts in the private sector, began to express 
        concern that the situation in Iraq was deteriorating and required a 
        change in strategy; and, as a consequence, the Administration began an 
        intensive, comprehensive review by all components of the Executive 
        Branch to devise a new strategy;
Whereas, in December 2006, the bipartisan Iraq Study Group issued a valuable 
        report, suggesting a comprehensive strategy that includes ``new and 
        enhanced diplomatic and political efforts in Iraq and the region, and a 
        change in the primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq that will enable 
        the United States to begin to move its combat forces out of Iraq 
        responsibly'';
Whereas, on January 10, 2007, following consultations with the Iraqi Prime 
        Minister, the President announced a new strategy (hereinafter referred 
        to as the ``plan''), which consists of three basic elements: diplomatic, 
        economic, and military; the central component of the military element is 
        an augmentation of the present level of the U.S. military forces through 
        additional deployments of approximately 21,500 U.S. military troops to 
        Iraq;
Whereas, on January 10, 2007, the President said that the ``Iraqi government 
        will appoint a military commander and two deputy commanders for their 
        capital'' and that U.S. forces will ``be embedded in their formations''; 
        and in subsequent testimony before the Armed Services Committee on 
        January 25, 2007, by the retired former Vice Chief of the Army it was 
        learned that there will also be a comparable U.S. command in Baghdad, 
        and that this dual chain of command may be problematic because ``the 
        Iraqis are going to be able to move their forces around at times where 
        we will disagree with that movement'', and called for clarification;
Whereas this proposed level of troop augmentation far exceeds the expectations 
        of many of us as to the reinforcements that would be necessary to 
        implement the various options for a new strategy, and led many members 
        of Congress to express outright opposition to augmenting our troops by 
        21,500;
Whereas the Government of Iraq has promised repeatedly to assume a greater share 
        of security responsibilities, disband militias, consider Constitutional 
        amendments and enact laws to reconcile sectarian differences, and 
        improve the quality of essential services for the Iraqi people; yet, 
        despite those promises, little has been achieved;
Whereas the President said on January 10, 2007, that ``I've made it clear to the 
        Prime Minister and Iraq's other leaders that America's commitment is not 
        open-ended'' so as to dispel the contrary impression that exists; and
Whereas the recommendations in this resolution should not be interpreted as 
        precipitating any immediate reduction in, or withdrawal of, the present 
        level of forces: Now, therefore, be it--
    Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), 
That it is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the Senate disagrees with the ``plan'' to augment our 
        forces by 21,500, and urges the President instead to consider 
        all options and alternatives for achieving the strategic goals 
        set forth below;
            (2) the Senate believes the United States should continue 
        vigorous operations in Anbar province, specifically for the 
        purpose of combating an insurgency, including elements 
        associated with the Al Qaeda movement, and denying terrorists a 
        safe haven;
            (3) the Senate believes a failed state in Iraq would 
        present a threat to regional and world peace, and the long-term 
        security interests of the United States are best served by an 
        Iraq that can sustain, govern, and defend itself, and serve as 
        an ally in the war against extremists;
            (4) the Congress should not take any action that will 
        endanger United States military forces in the field, including 
        the elimination or reduction of funds for troops in the field, 
        as such an action with respect to funding would undermine their 
        safety or harm their effectiveness in pursuing their assigned 
        missions;
            (5) the primary objective of the overall U.S. strategy in 
        Iraq should be to encourage Iraqi leaders to make political 
        compromises that will foster reconciliation and strengthen the 
        unity government, ultimately leading to improvements in the 
        security situation;
            (6) the military part of this strategy should focus on 
        maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq, denying 
        international terrorists a safe haven, conducting 
        counterterrorism operations, promoting regional stability, 
        supporting Iraqi efforts to bring greater security to Baghdad, 
        and training and equipping Iraqi forces to take full 
        responsibility for their own security;
            (7) United States military operations should, as much as 
        possible, be confined to these goals, and should charge the 
        Iraqi military with the primary mission of combating sectarian 
        violence;
            (8) the military Rules of Engagement for this plan should 
        reflect this delineation of responsibilities, and the Secretary 
        of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should 
        clarify the command and control arrangements in Baghdad;
            (9) the United States Government should transfer to the 
        Iraqi military, in an expeditious manner, such equipment as is 
        necessary;
            (10) the United States Government should engage selected 
        nations in the Middle East to develop a regional, 
        internationally sponsored peace-and-reconciliation process for 
        Iraq;
            (11) the Administration should provide regular updates to 
        the Congress, produced by the Commander of United States 
        Central Command and his subordinate commanders, about the 
        progress or lack of progress the Iraqis are making toward this 
        end; and
            (12) our overall military, diplomatic, and economic 
        strategy should not be regarded as an ``open-ended'' or 
        unconditional commitment, but rather as a new strategy that 
        hereafter should be conditioned upon the Iraqi government's 
        meeting benchmarks that must be delineated in writing and 
        agreed to by the Iraqi Prime Minister. Such benchmarks should 
        include, but not be limited to, the deployment of that number 
        of additional Iraqi security forces as specified in the plan in 
        Baghdad, ensuring equitable distribution of the resources of 
        the Government of Iraq without regard to the sect or ethnicity 
        of recipients, enacting and implementing legislation to ensure 
        that the oil resources of Iraq benefit Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, 
        Kurds, and other Iraqi citizens in an equitable manner, and the 
        authority of Iraqi commanders to make tactical and operational 
        decisions without political intervention.
                                 <all>