Findings

Congress finds the following: (1)Throughout its history, the FBI has been an integral part of anticrime investigatory efforts in the United States. (2)Since September 11, 2001, the FBI has lost substantial capacity and willingness to fight violent crime. (3)The FBI has reduced the goal of combating crime to number 8 of its top 10 priorities. (4)To meet its primary goal of combating terrorism, the FBI has reprogrammed nearly 1,000 agents from crime to counterterrorism cases since September 11, 2001. (5)While this reprogramming of agents to counterterrorism is necessary and proper, it has had the unintended consequence of precluding the FBI from adequately and satisfactorily discharging its traditional anticrime efforts. (6)The FBI’s shift to counterterrorism has reduced the Bureau’s involvement in traditional crime investigations, including— (A)fewer agents to the successful High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) task forces; (B)fewer violent crime cases, as the Bureau has reduced the number of agents committed to Federal-State-local task forces like Safe Streets and Violent Crime Task Forces; and (C)fewer agents handling bank robbery and white collar crimes, which involve technical areas of investigative expertise that State and locals often lack. (7)In testimony before the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, FBI Director Bob Mueller stated that the shortfall of agents has required difficult choices in determining how to most effectively use the available agents. (8)This reprogramming has occurred at the same time that Federal assistance for State and local law enforcement has been decimated, including the elimination of the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services hiring program and substantial cuts to the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program under part E of title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 3750 et seq.). (9)Local police officials have decried this approach, and the results are becoming apparent, with the largest crime increase in 15 years according the 2005 Uniform Crime Reports. (10)The preliminary Uniform Crime Reports for 2006, reported in December, have shown further increases in violent crime across the Nation. (11)The FBI’s traditional anticrime investigations complement and assist investigations by State and local law enforcement around the country. (12)Through task forces and other more informal assistance, the FBI over the years has brought an invaluable expertise and resources to help state and local law enforcement in combating traditional criminal enterprises. (13)Even when factoring in assistance local law enforcement has received from the Department of Homeland Security, the International Association of Chiefs of Police has stated, “combined, the proposed FY 2006 funding level for DoJ/DHS law enforcement assistance programs is $2.158 B. This is a reduction of $1.467 B or 40 percent from the combined FY 2005 level of $3.625 B. It represents a decrease in $2.55 B or 54 percent from FY 2004.”. (14)The FBI has the ability and the mandate to focus both on countering terrorist plots and fighting traditional crime. (15)There does not need to be a trade-off between crime and terrorism, but this can only happen if the FBI is given the manpower to be able to do both.