1.This Act may be cited as the
Iraq War De-Escalation Act of
2007
.
2.
(a)Congress makes the following
findings:
(1)Congress and the Nation honor the courage,
sacrifices, and efforts of the members of the Armed Forces of the United States
and their families.
(2)In his speech to the Nation on January 10,
2007, President George W. Bush said that I've made it clear to the Prime
Minister and Iraq's other leaders that America's commitment is not open-ended.
If the Iraqi government does not follow through on its promises, it will lose
the support of the American people. . . The Prime Minister understands
this
.
(3)In that speech, President George W. Bush
also told the Nation that America will hold the Iraqi government to the
benchmarks it has announced. . . [T]o take responsibility for security in all
of Iraq's provinces by November. To give every Iraqi citizen a stake in the
country's economy, Iraq will pass legislation to share oil revenues among all
Iraqis. To show that it is committed to delivering a better life, the Iraqi
government will spend $10,000,000,000 of its own money on reconstruction and
infrastructure projects that will create new jobs. To empower local leaders,
Iraqis plan to hold provincial elections later this year. And to allow more
Iraqis to re-enter their nation's political life, the government will reform
de-Baathification laws, and establish a fair process for considering amendments
to Iraq's constitution
.
(4)In that speech, President George W. Bush
also told the Nation that only Iraqis can end the sectarian violence and
secure their people
.
(5)On December 18, 2006, former Secretary of
State Colin Powell stated: [s]o we have tried this surge of troops over
the summer. I am not persuaded that another surge of troops in Baghdad for the
purpose of suppressing this communitarian violence, this civil war, will
work
.
(6)On November 15, 2006, General John Abizaid,
Commander of the United States Central Command, stated before the Committee on
Armed Services of the Senate that I met with every divisional commander,
General Casey, the corps commander, General Dempsey. We all talked together.
And I said, in your professional opinion, if we were to bring in more American
troops now, does it add considerably to our ability to achieve success in Iraq?
And they all said no. And the reason is, because we want the Iraqis to do more.
It's easy for the Iraqis to rely upon us to do this work. I believe that more
American forces prevent the Iraqis from doing more, from taking more
responsibility for their own future
.
(7)In testimony before the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate on January 11, 2007, Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice stated that unless the Government of Iraq has met certain
benchmarks and reestablishes the confidence of the Iraqi people over the next
several months, this plan is not going to work
.
(8)In a statement on January 11, 2007,
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated [a]nd we will probably have a
better view a couple of months from now in terms of whether we are making
headway in terms of getting better control of Baghdad, with the Iraqis in the
lead and with the Iraqis beginning to make better progress on the
reconciliation process
.
(9)The bipartisan Iraq Study Group headed by
former Secretary of State James Baker and former Representative Lee Hamilton
reached a bipartisan consensus on 79 separate recommendations for a new
approach in Iraq. Among those recommendations were calling for a new diplomatic
offensive in the region and conditioning American economic assistance to Iraq
on specific benchmarks, with the expectation that by the first quarter
of 2008, subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on the
ground, all combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of
Iraq
.
(10)In reaction to the speech of President
George W. Bush of January 10, 2007, former Secretary of State Baker and former
Representative Hamilton wrote that [t]he President did not suggest the
possibility of a transition that could enable U.S. combat forces to begin to
leave Iraq. The President did not state that political, military, or economic
support for Iraq would be conditional on the Iraq government's ability to meet
benchmarks. Within the region, the President did not announce an international
support group for Iraq including all of Iraq's neighbors. . .
.
(b)The purposes of this Act are as
follows:
(1)To formulate and provide for the
implementation of an effective United States policy towards Iraq and the Middle
East region that employs military, political, diplomatic, and economic assets
to promote and protect the national security interests of the United
States.
(2)To provide for the implementation of a
responsible, phased redeployment of the Armed Forces of the United States from
Iraq in a substantial and gradual manner that places the highest priority on
protecting the lives of members of the Armed Forces and civilian personnel of
the United States and on promoting the national security interests of the
United States in the Middle East region.
(3)To urge the political parties and leaders
of Iraq to reach the political solution necessary to promote stability in Iraq
and enhance the safety of innocent Iraqi civilians.
(4)To condition future economic assistance to
the Government of Iraq on significant progress toward the achievement of
political and economic measures to be taken by the Government of Iraq.
(5)To provide for the initiation of a wider
and sustained diplomatic strategy aimed at promoting a political settlement in
Iraq, thereby ending the civil war in Iraq, preventing a humanitarian
catastrophe in Iraq, and preventing a wider regional conflict.
(6)To provide, through sections 4 through 7,
for the implementation of key recommendations of the Iraq Study Group, a
bipartisan panel of experts co-chaired by former Secretary of State James Baker
and former Representative Lee Hamilton.
3.Appropriate force levels for United States
military forces in IraqNotwithstanding any other provision of law,
the levels of the Armed Forces of the United States in Iraq after the date of
the enactment of this Act shall not exceed the levels of such forces in Iraq as
of January 10, 2007, without specific authority in statute enacted by Congress
after the date of the enactment of this Act.
4.Redeployment of United States military
forces from Iraq
(a)
(1)Deadline for commencement of
redeploymentExcept as
otherwise provided in this section, the phased redeployment of the Armed Forces
of the United States from Iraq shall commence not later than May 1,
2007.
(2)Scope and manner of
redeploymentThe redeployment
of the Armed Forces under this section shall be substantial, shall occur in a
gradual manner, and shall be executed at a pace to achieve the goal of the
complete redeployment of all United States combat brigades from Iraq by March
31, 2008, consistent with the expectation of the Iraq Study Group, if all the
matters set forth in subsection (b)(1)(B) are not met by such date, subject to
the exceptions for retention of forces for force protection, counter-terrorism
operations, training of Iraqi forces, and other purposes as contemplated by
subsection (g).
(3)Formulation of plan with military
commandersThe redeployment
of the Armed Forces under this section should be conducted pursuant to a plan
formulated by United States military commanders that is developed, if
practicable, in consultation with the Government of Iraq.
(4)Protection of united states forces and
civilian personnelIn
carrying out the redeployment of the Armed Forces under this section, the
highest priority shall be afforded to the safety of members of the Armed Forces
and civilian personnel of the United States in Iraq.
(b)Suspension of redeployment
(1)The President may suspend, on a temporary
basis as provided in paragraph (2), the redeployment of the Armed Forces under
this section if the President certifies to the President pro tempore of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives that—
(A)doing so is in the national security
interests of the United States; and
(B)the Government of Iraq—
(i)has lifted all restrictions concerning
non-interference in operations of the Armed Forces of the United States in Iraq
and does so on a continuing basis;
(ii)is making significant progress in reducing
sectarian violence in Iraq and in reducing the size and operational
effectiveness of sectarian militias in Iraq;
(iii)is making significant progress towards
removing militia elements from the Iraqi Army, National Police, Facilities
Protection Services, and other security forces of the Government of
Iraq;
(iv)has enacted legislation or established
other binding mechanisms to ensure the sharing of all Iraqi oil revenues among
all segments of Iraqi society in an equitable manner;
(v)is making significant progress towards
making available not less than $10,000,000,000 for reconstruction, job
creation, and economic development in Iraq, with safeguards to prevent
corruption, by January 10, 2008;
(vi)has deployed at least 18 Iraqi Army and
National Police brigades to Baghdad and is effectively ensuring that such units
are performing their security and police functions in all Baghdad
neighborhoods, regardless of their sectarian composition;
(vii)has enacted legislation or established
other binding mechanisms to revise its de-Baathification laws to encourage the
employment in the Government of Iraq of qualified Iraqi professionals,
irrespective of ethnic or political affiliation, including ex-Baathists who
were not leading figures of the Saddam Hussein regime;
(viii)has established a fair process for
considering amendments to the constitution of Iraq that promote lasting
national reconciliation in Iraq;
(ix)is making significant progress towards
assuming full responsibility for security in all the provinces of Iraq by
November 30, 2007;
(x)is making significant progress towards
holding free and fair provincial elections in Iraq at the earliest date
practicable, but not later than December 31, 2007;
(xi)is making substantial progress towards
increasing the size and effectiveness of Ministry of Defense forces as
described on page 11 of Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review
published by the National Security Council in January 2007;
(xii)is making significant progress in reforming
and strengthening the civilian ministries and other government institutions
that support the Iraqi Army and National Police; and
(xiii)is making significant progress towards
reforming its civilian ministries to ensure that they are not administered on a
sectarian basis and that government services are delivered in an even-handed
and non-sectarian manner.
(2)A suspension of the redeployment of the
Armed Forces under this subsection, including any renewal of the suspension
under paragraph (3), shall be for a period not to exceed 90 days.
(3)A suspension of the redeployment of the
Armed Forces under this subsection may be renewed. Any such renewal shall
include a certification to the officers referred to in paragraph (1) on the
matters set forth in clauses (i) through (xiii) of subparagraph (B) of that
paragraph.
(c)Disapproval of suspension
(1)If Congress enacts a joint resolution
disapproving the suspension of the redeployment of the Armed Forces under
subsection (b), or any renewal of the suspension, the suspension shall be
discontinued, and the redeployment of the Armed Forces from Iraq under this
section shall resume.
(2)Procedures for consideration of joint
resolutions
(A)For purposes of this subsection, the term
joint resolution means only a joint resolution introduced not
later than 10 days after the date on which a certification of the President
under subsection (b) is received by Congress, the matter after the resolving
clause of which is as follows: “That Congress disapproves the certification of
the President submitted to Congress under section 4(b) of the Iraq War
De-Escalation Act of 2007, on _______.”, the blank space being filled in with
the appropriate date.
(B)A joint resolution described in paragraph
(1) shall be considered in a House of Congress in accordance with the
procedures applicable to joint resolutions under paragraphs (3) through (8) of
section 8066(c) of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1985 (as
enacted by section 101(h) of Public Law 98–473; 98 Stat. 1936).
(d)
(1)Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter, the President shall
submit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives a report describing and assessing—
(A)the progress made by the Government of Iraq
on each of the matters set forth in subsection (b)(1)(B); and
(B)the progress of the redeployment required
by subsection (a).
(2)Each report under this subsection shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(e)Sense of congress on location of
redeploymentIt is the sense
of Congress that, in redeploying the Armed Forces from Iraq under this section,
appropriate units of the Armed Forces should be redeployed—
(1)to the United States;
(2)to Afghanistan, in order to enhance United
States military operations in that country;
(3)elsewhere in the region, to serve as an
over-the-horizon force to prevent the conflict in Iraq from becoming a wider
war, to reassure allies of the United States of the commitment of the United
States to remain engaged in the region, and to position troops to strike
directly at al-Qaeda; and
(4)elsewhere, to meet urgent United States
security needs.
(f)Political solution in IraqThe United States should use the
redeployment of the Armed Forces under this section, and the possible
suspension of such redeployment if the benchmarks set forth in subsection (b)
are met, as a tool to press the Iraqi leaders to promote national
reconciliation among ethnic and religious groups in Iraq in order to establish
stability in Iraq.
(g)Retention of certain forces in
Iraq
(1)Notwithstanding the requirement for the
redeployment of the Armed Forces under subsection (a) and subject to the
provisions of this subsection, personnel of the Armed Forces of the United
States may be in Iraq after the completion of the redeployment of the Armed
Forces under this section for the following purposes:
(A)To protect United States personnel and
facilities in Iraq.
(B)To conduct targeted counter-terrorism
operations.
(C)To provide training for Iraqi security
forces.
(D)To conduct the routine functions of the
Office of Defense Attache.
(2)Personnel of the Armed Forces may not be
retained in Iraq under this subsection unless the President certifies to the
President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives that—
(A)the retention of the Armed Forces in Iraq
is necessary for one or more of the purposes set forth in paragraph (1);
and
(B)the utilization of Armed Forces positioned
outside Iraq could not result in the effective achievement of such purpose or
purposes.
(3)If Congress enacts a joint resolution
disapproving the retention of personnel of the Armed Forces in Iraq under this
subsection, or any renewal of the retention, the retention of such personnel in
Iraq shall be discontinued, and such personnel shall be redeployed from
Iraq.
(4)Procedures for consideration of joint
resolutions
(A)For purposes of paragraph (3), the term
joint resolution means only a joint resolution introduced not
later than 10 days after the date on which a certification of the President
under paragraph (2) is received by Congress, the matter after the resolving
clause of which is as follows: “That Congress disapproves the certification of
the President submitted to Congress under section 4(g)(2) of the Iraq War
De-Escalation Act of 2007, on _______.”, the blank space being filled in with
the appropriate date.
(B)A joint resolution described in
subparagraph (A) shall be considered in a House of Congress in accordance with
the procedures applicable to joint resolutions under paragraphs (3) through (8)
of section 8066(c) of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1985 (as
enacted by section 101(h) of Public Law 98–473; 98 Stat. 1936).
(h)Congress hereby reaffirms section 1519 of
the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public
Law 109–364; 120 Stat. 2444), and related provisions of law, that prohibit the
establishment of military installations or bases for the purpose of providing
for the permanent stationing of United States Armed Forces in Iraq.
5.Intensification of training of Iraqi
security forcesIt shall be
the policy of the United States to immediately formulate and implement a plan
that—
(1)with the Government of Iraq—
(A)removes militia elements from the Iraqi
Army, National Police, and other security forces of the Government of Iraq;
and
(B)puts such forces in charge of maintaining
security in Iraq;
(2)focuses and intensifies United States
efforts on training such forces; and
(3)presses the Government of Iraq to reform
the civilian ministries and other government institutions that support the
Iraqi Army, National Police, local police, and judicial system.
6.Availability of economic assistance for
Iraq
(a)Except as provided in subsection (b), after
May 1, 2007, economic assistance may be furnished to the Government of Iraq
only if the President submits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives a certification that the Government
of Iraq—
(1)is making measurable progress toward
providing not less than $10,000,000,000 of Iraqi funds for reconstruction, job
creation, and economic development in Iraq, with safeguards to prevent
corruption, by January 10, 2008;
(2)is making progress toward meeting the
conditions set forth in the International Compact for Iraq and in the stand-by
agreement with the International Monetary Fund; and
(3)is making progress toward reducing
sectarian violence and promoting national reconciliation.
(b)The limitation in subsection (a) shall not
apply to assistance for Iraq as follows:
(1)Humanitarian assistance.
(2)Assistance to address urgent security and
employment needs.
(c)Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter, the Special Inspector
General for Iraq Reconstruction shall submit to Congress a report describing
the progress of the Government of Iraq on each matter set forth in subsection
(a).
7.Regional diplomatic initiatives on
Iraq
(a)Policy of the United StatesIt shall be the policy of the United States
to undertake comprehensive regional and international initiatives, involving
key nations, that will assist the Government of Iraq in achieving the purposes
of this Act, including promoting a political settlement among the Iraqi people,
ending the civil war in Iraq, preventing a humanitarian catastrophe in Iraq,
and preventing a regional conflict.
(b)The President should, not later than 60
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, appoint a special envoy for
Iraq to carry out the policy set forth in subsection (a).
(c)Strategy on preventing wider regional
war
(1)Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the President pro
tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives a report
setting forth a strategy for preventing the conflict in Iraq from becoming a
wider regional war.
(2)The report under paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.