

110TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. 2243

To strongly encourage the Government of Saudi Arabia to end its support for institutions that fund, train, incite, encourage, or in any other way aid and abet terrorism, to secure full Saudi cooperation in the investigation of terrorist incidents, to denounce Saudi sponsorship of extremist Wahhabi ideology, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER 25, 2007

Mr. SPECTER (for himself and Mr. WYDEN) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

A BILL

To strongly encourage the Government of Saudi Arabia to end its support for institutions that fund, train, incite, encourage, or in any other way aid and abet terrorism, to secure full Saudi cooperation in the investigation of terrorist incidents, to denounce Saudi sponsorship of extremist Wahhabi ideology, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Saudi Arabia Account-
5 ability Act of 2007”.

1 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

2 Congress makes the following findings:

3 (1) United Nations Security Council Resolution
4 1373 (2001) mandates that all states “refrain from
5 providing any form of support, active or passive, to
6 entities or persons involved in terrorist acts”, take
7 “the necessary steps to prevent the commission of
8 terrorist acts”, and “deny safe haven to those who
9 finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts”.

10 (2) In 2004, the Council on Foreign Relations
11 reported that it knew of “not a single Saudi donor
12 of funds to terrorist groups who has been publicly
13 punished”.

14 (3) In his July 2005 testimony to the Com-
15 mittee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of
16 the Senate, Stewart Levey, the Undersecretary for
17 the Office of Terrorism and Financing Intelligence
18 of the Department of the Treasury, reported that
19 “even today, we believe that Saudi donors may still
20 be a significant source of terrorist financing, includ-
21 ing for the insurgency in Iraq”. He added that
22 Saudi financiers and charities “remain a key source
23 for the promotion of ideologies used by terrorists
24 and violent extremists”.

25 (4) According to a July 27, 2007 New York
26 Times article, “Of an estimated 60 to 80 foreign

1 fighters who enter Iraq each month, American mili-
2 tary and intelligence officials say that nearly half are
3 coming from Saudi Arabia and that the Saudis have
4 not done enough to stem the flow.”.

5 (5) According to a July 15, 2007 Los Angeles
6 Times article, “About 45% of all foreign militants
7 targeting U.S. troops and Iraqi civilians and security
8 forces are from Saudi Arabia . . . according to official
9 U.S. military figures made available to The Times
10 by the senior officer. Nearly half of the 135 for-
11 eigners in U.S. detention facilities in Iraq are
12 Saudis, he said. Fighters from Saudi Arabia are
13 thought to have carried out more suicide bombings
14 than those of any other nationality, said the senior
15 U.S. officer, who spoke on condition of anonymity
16 because of the subject’s sensitivity.”.

17 (6) The Center for Religious Freedom, formerly
18 affiliated with Freedom House, in a 2006 report en-
19 titled “Saudi Arabia’s Curriculum of Intolerance”,
20 stated that despite 2005 statements by the Saudi
21 Foreign Minister that their educational curricula
22 have been reformed, this is “simply not the case”.
23 Contrarily, religious textbooks continue to advocate
24 the destruction of any non-Wahhabi Muslim. Saudi
25 Arabia has established Wahhabism, an extreme form

1 of Islam, as the official state doctrine, and about
2 5,000,000 children are instructed each year in Is-
3 lamic studies using Saudi Ministry of Education
4 textbooks.

5 (7) A Fall 2007 United States Commission on
6 International Religious Freedom report stated “Due
7 to insufficient information provided by the Saudi
8 government, the Commission could not verify that a
9 formal mechanism exists within the Saudi govern-
10 ment to review thoroughly and revise educational
11 texts and other materials sent outside of Saudi Ara-
12 bia. It appears that the Saudi government has made
13 little or no progress on efforts to halt the expor-
14 tation of extremist ideology outside the Kingdom.”.

15 (8) A September 2005 Government Account-
16 ability Office report stated that “Saudi Arabia’s
17 multibillion-dollar petroleum industry, although
18 largely owned by the government, has fostered the
19 creation of large private fortunes, enabling many
20 wealthy Saudis to sponsor charities and educational
21 foundations whose operations extend to many coun-
22 tries. United States Government and other expert
23 reports have linked some Saudi donations to the
24 global propagation of religious intolerance, hatred of
25 Western values, and support of terrorist activities”.

1 (9) A June 2004 press release on the website
2 of the Saudi embassy, www.saudiembassy.net, dis-
3 cussed the creation of the Saudi National Commis-
4 sion for Relief and Charity Work Abroad, a non-
5 governmental body designed to “take over all aspects
6 of private overseas aid operations and assume re-
7 sponsibility for the distribution of private charitable
8 donations from Saudi Arabia” in order to “guard
9 against money laundering and the financing of ter-
10 rorism”. As of late 2007, this Commission had not
11 been created.

12 (10) In a February 2006 open Senate Select
13 Committee on Intelligence hearing on the “World
14 Wide Threat”, former Director of National Intel-
15 ligence and current Deputy Secretary of State John
16 Negroponte, stated that “there are private Saudi
17 citizens who still engage in these kinds of donations
18 [in which money is transferred back door to terror-
19 ists]”.

20 (11) A March 2005 report by the Congressional
21 Research Service stated that at least 5 persons listed
22 as beneficiaries of the Saudi Committee for the Sup-
23 port of the Al Quds Intifada were suspected suicide
24 bombers.

1 (12) During November 8, 2005 testimony on
2 Saudi Arabia before the Subcommittee on Ter-
3 rorism, Technology, and Homeland Security of the
4 Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, Steve
5 Emerson, terrorism expert and Executive Director of
6 the Investigative Project on Terrorism, stated that
7 despite repeated declarations by Saudi officials that
8 there has been substantial reform in education,
9 progress against terrorism, and movement toward
10 transparency, a review of other Saudi announce-
11 ments shows that they have either specifically failed
12 to follow through or cannot be proven to have fol-
13 lowed through on their pledges. He also noted that
14 the Saudi government established the Saudi Com-
15 mittee for the Support of the Al Quds Intifada,
16 which was proven to provide aid to Palestinian ter-
17 rorist groups. During an Israeli raid on a Hamas in-
18 stitution, they discovered a spreadsheet from the
19 aforementioned committee giving a detailed account
20 about how they received \$545,000 from the com-
21 mittee to allocate to 102 families of so-called mar-
22 tyrs. The spreadsheet included the names of 8 sui-
23 cide bombers.

24 (13) A January 2007 Congressional Research
25 Service Report on Saudi Arabia's terrorist-financing

1 activities indicated that although the records portion
2 of the Committee for the Support of the Al Quds
3 Intifada was deactivated in March 2005, of the
4 1,300 listed beneficiaries, over 60 matched or closely
5 resembled the names of known Palestinian militants
6 who carried out attacks against Israel between Octo-
7 ber 2000 and March 2002.

8 (14) The final report of the Presidentially-ap-
9 pointed Iraq Study Group stated that “funding for
10 the Sunni insurgency in Iraq comes from private do-
11 nors in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states”.

12 (15) A January 2005 report by the Center for
13 Religious Freedom found that Saudi Arabia was cre-
14 ating and distributing, through its embassy in
15 Washington, D.C., material promoting hatred, intoler-
16 erance, and violence at mosques and Islamic centers
17 in the United States.

18 (16) On December 14, 2005, R. James Wool-
19 sey, former Director of Central Intelligence wrote,
20 “Over the long run, this movement [Wahhabism] is
21 in many ways the most dangerous of the ideological
22 enemies we face.” Mr. Woolsey also explained that
23 “al Qaeda and the Wahhabis share essentially the
24 same underlying totalitarian theocratic ideology. It
25 is this common Salafist ideology that the Wahhabis

1 have been spreading widely — financed by \$3–4 bil-
2 lion/year from the Saudi government and wealthy in-
3 dividuals in the Middle East over the last quarter
4 century — to the madrassas of Pakistan, the text-
5 books of Turkish children in Germany, and the
6 mosques of Europe and the U.S.”.

7 (17) According to a May 2006 report by the
8 Center for Religious Freedom, official Saudi reli-
9 gious textbooks continue to teach hatred of those
10 who do not follow Wahhabi Muslim doctrine and en-
11 courage jihad against such “infidels” and “the
12 Saudi public school religious curriculum continues to
13 propagate an ideology of hate toward the unbeliever
14 ... [A] text instructs students that it is a religious
15 obligation to do ‘battle’ against infidels in order to
16 spread the faith”.

17 (18) In May 2006, the Congressional Research
18 Service reported that “Saudi Arabia has discussed
19 increasing boycott efforts against Israel, despite
20 their WTO [World Trade Organization] obliga-
21 tions”.

22 **SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

23 It is the sense of Congress that—

24 (1) it is imperative that the Government of
25 Saudi Arabia immediately and unconditionally—

1 (A) permanently close all charities, schools,
2 or other organizations or institutions in the
3 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that fund, train, in-
4 cite, encourage, or in any other way aid and
5 abet terrorism anywhere in the world (referred
6 to in this Act as “Saudi-based terror organiza-
7 tions”), including by means of providing sup-
8 port for the families of individuals who have
9 committed acts of terrorism;

10 (B) end funding or other support by the
11 Government of Saudi Arabia for charities,
12 schools, and any other organizations or institu-
13 tions outside the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that
14 train, incite, encourage, or in any other way aid
15 and abet terrorism anywhere in the world (re-
16 ferred to in this Act as “offshore terror organi-
17 zations”), including by means of providing sup-
18 port for the families of individuals who have
19 committed acts of terrorism;

20 (C) block all funding from private Saudi
21 citizens and entities to any Saudi-based terror
22 organization or offshore terrorism organization;
23 and

24 (D) provide complete, unrestricted, and un-
25 obstructed cooperation to the United States, in-

1 including the unsolicited sharing of relevant intel-
2 ligence in a consistent and timely fashion, in
3 the investigation of groups and individuals that
4 are suspected of financing, supporting, plotting,
5 or committing an act of terror against United
6 States citizens anywhere in the world, including
7 within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; and

8 (2) the President, in determining whether to
9 make the certification described in section 4, should
10 judge whether the Government of Saudi Arabia has
11 continued and sufficiently expanded its efforts to
12 combat terrorism since the May 12, 2003 bombing
13 in Riyadh.

14 **SEC. 4. PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATION.**

15 The President shall certify to the appropriate con-
16 gressional committees when the President determines that
17 the Government of Saudi Arabia—

18 (1) is fully cooperating with the United States
19 in investigating and preventing terrorist attacks;

20 (2) has permanently closed all Saudi-based
21 Wahhabist organizations that fund Islamic extre-
22 mism, internally and abroad;

23 (3) has exercised maximum efforts to block all
24 funding from private Saudi citizens, corporations,

1 and entities, to foreign Islamic extremist and ter-
2 rorist movements; and

3 (4) has stopped financing and disseminating
4 materials, and other forms of support, that encour-
5 age the spread of radical Wahhabi ideology.

6 **SEC. 5. STATUS REPORT.**

7 (a) REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT.—Not later than 6
8 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, and
9 every 12 months thereafter until the President makes the
10 certification described in section 4, the Secretary of State
11 shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional
12 committees that describes the progress made by the Gov-
13 ernment of Saudi Arabia toward meeting the conditions
14 described in paragraphs (1) through (4) of section 4.

15 (b) FORM.—The report submitted under subsection
16 (a) shall be in unclassified form and may include a classi-
17 fied annex.

18 **SEC. 6. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-**

19 **FINED.**

20 In this Act, the term “appropriate congressional com-
21 mittees” means the Committee on Foreign Relations of
22 the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
23 House of Representatives.

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