II 110th CONGRESS 1st Session S. 2130 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES October 3, 2007 Mr. Casey (for himself, Ms. Murkowski, Mr. Durbin, Ms. Collins, and Mr. Kerry) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations A BILL To express the sense of the Senate on the need for a comprehensive diplomatic offensive to help broker national reconciliation efforts in Iraq and lay the foundation for the eventual redeployment of United States combat forces.

1.

Sense of the Senate on need for comprehensive diplomatic offensive to help broker national reconciliation efforts in Iraq

(a)

Findings

The Senate makes the following findings: (1)The men and women of the United States Armed Forces have performed with honor and distinction in executing Operation Iraqi Freedom and deserve the gratitude of the American people. (2)General David H. Petraeus, Commander of the Multinational Force-Iraq, stated on March 8, 2007, “There is no military solution to a problem like that in Iraq.”. (3)President George W. Bush reiterated on July 12, 2007, that the United States troop surge implemented in 2007 seeks to open space for Iraq's political leaders to advance the difficult process of national reconciliation, which is essential to lasting security and stability. (4)Greater involvement and diplomatic engagement by Iraq’s neighbors and key international actors can help facilitate the national political reconciliation so essential to sustainable success in Iraq. (5)The United States troop surge carried out in 2007 has not, as of yet, been matched by a comparable diplomatic surge designed to ensure that Iraqi national leaders carry through on the process of national reconciliation. (6)The final report of the Iraq Study Group, released in December 2006, declared, “The United States must build a new international consensus for stability in Iraq and the region. In order to foster such consensus, the United States should embark on a robust diplomatic effort to establish an international support structure intended to stabilize Iraq and ease tensions in other countries in the region. This support structure should include every country that has an interest in averting a chaotic Iraq, including all of Iraq’s neighbors.”. (7)On August 10, 2007, the United Nations Security Council voted unanimously to expand the mandate of its mission in Iraq to assist the national government with political reconciliation, bring together Iraq’s neighbors to discuss border security and energy access, and facilitate much needed humanitarian assistance. (8)The United States Ambassador to Iraq, the Honorable Ryan C. Crocker, asserted on September 11, 2007, in testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, “With respect, again, to [Iraq’s] neighbors and others, that is exactly our intent to have a more intensive, positive, more regulated engagement between Iraq and its neighbors. . . . The United Nations is now positioned to play a more active and involved role.”. (9)General Petraeus said on September 11, 2007, in response to a question on the need for greater civilian activity in Iraq, “I agree with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who has said repeatedly that certain elements of our government are at war, DoD, State, AID, but not all of the others. . . . We can use help in those areas. Some of the areas are quite thin, agriculture, health, and some others.”. (10)The United States troop surge carried out in 2007 has not, as of yet, been matched by a comparable civilian surge designed to help the Government of Iraq strengthen its capabilities in providing essential government services. (b)

Sense of the Senate

It is the sense of the Senate that— (1)the United States Government should take the lead in organizing a comprehensive diplomatic offensive, consisting of bilateral, regional, and international initiatives, to assist the Government of Iraq in achieving national reconciliation and successfully meeting key security, political, and economic benchmarks; (2)it is in the interest of the United States and the people of Iraq that Iraq is not seen as a uniquely American problem, but rather as of enduring importance to the security and prosperity of its neighbors, the entire Middle East region, and the broader international community; (3)the greater involvement in a constructive fashion of Iraq’s neighbors, whether through a regional conference or another mechanism, can help stabilize Iraq and end the outside flows of weapons, explosive materials, foreign fighters, and funding that contribute to the current sectarian warfare in Iraq; (4)the President and the Secretary of State should invest their personal time and energy in these diplomatic efforts to ensure that they receive the highest priority within the United States Government and are viewed as a serious effort in the region and elsewhere; (5)the President, in order to demonstrate that a regional diplomacy strategy enjoys attention at the highest levels of the United States Government, should appoint a seasoned, high-level Presidential envoy to the Middle East region to supplement the efforts of Ambassador Crocker and focus on the establishment of a regional framework to help stabilize Iraq; (6)the United States Government should build upon tentative progress achieved by the International Compact for Iraq and the Iraq Neighbors Conference to serve as the basis for a more intensive and sustained effort to construct an effective regional mechanism; (7)the President should direct the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use the voice and vote of the United States at the United Nations to seek the appointment of an international mediator in Iraq, under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council, to engage political, religious, ethnic, and tribal leaders in Iraq to foster national reconciliation efforts; (8)the United States Government should begin planning for a wide-ranging dialogue on the mandate governing international support for Iraq when the current United Nations mandate authorizing the United States-led coalition expires at the end of 2007; (9)the United States Government should more directly press Iraq’s neighbors to open fully operating embassies in Baghdad and establish inclusive diplomatic relations with the Government of Iraq to help ensure the Government is viewed as legitimate throughout the region; (10)the United States Government should strongly urge the governments of those countries that have previously pledged debt forgiveness and economic assistance to the Government of Iraq to fully carry through on their commitments on an expedited basis; (11)a key objective of any diplomatic offensive should be to ameliorate the suffering and deprivation of Iraqi refugees, both those displaced internally and those who have fled to neighboring countries, through coordinated humanitarian assistance and the development of a regional framework to establish long-term solutions to the future of displaced Iraqi citizens; (12)the United States Government should reallocate diplomats and Department of State funds as required to ensure that any comprehensive diplomatic offensive to stabilize Iraq on an urgent basis has the needed resources to succeed; and (13)the United States Government should reallocate civilian expertise to help governmental entities in Iraq strengthen their ability to provide essential government services to the people of Iraq.