[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2130 Introduced in Senate (IS)]







110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 2130

  To express the sense of the Senate on the need for a comprehensive 
diplomatic offensive to help broker national reconciliation efforts in 
  Iraq and lay the foundation for the eventual redeployment of United 
                         States combat forces.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            October 3, 2007

Mr. Casey (for himself, Ms. Murkowski, Mr. Durbin, Ms. Collins, and Mr. 
Kerry) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 
                 to the Committee on Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
  To express the sense of the Senate on the need for a comprehensive 
diplomatic offensive to help broker national reconciliation efforts in 
  Iraq and lay the foundation for the eventual redeployment of United 
                         States combat forces.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SENSE OF THE SENATE ON NEED FOR COMPREHENSIVE DIPLOMATIC 
              OFFENSIVE TO HELP BROKER NATIONAL RECONCILIATION EFFORTS 
              IN IRAQ.

    (a) Findings.--The Senate makes the following findings:
            (1) The men and women of the United States Armed Forces 
        have performed with honor and distinction in executing 
        Operation Iraqi Freedom and deserve the gratitude of the 
        American people.
            (2) General David H. Petraeus, Commander of the 
        Multinational Force-Iraq, stated on March 8, 2007, ``There is 
        no military solution to a problem like that in Iraq.''.
            (3) President George W. Bush reiterated on July 12, 2007, 
        that the United States troop surge implemented in 2007 ``seeks 
        to open space for Iraq's political leaders to advance the 
        difficult process of national reconciliation, which is 
        essential to lasting security and stability''.
            (4) Greater involvement and diplomatic engagement by Iraq's 
        neighbors and key international actors can help facilitate the 
        national political reconciliation so essential to sustainable 
        success in Iraq.
            (5) The United States troop surge carried out in 2007 has 
        not, as of yet, been matched by a comparable diplomatic surge 
        designed to ensure that Iraqi national leaders carry through on 
        the process of national reconciliation.
            (6) The final report of the Iraq Study Group, released in 
        December 2006, declared, ``The United States must build a new 
        international consensus for stability in Iraq and the region. 
        In order to foster such consensus, the United States should 
        embark on a robust diplomatic effort to establish an 
        international support structure intended to stabilize Iraq and 
        ease tensions in other countries in the region. This support 
        structure should include every country that has an interest in 
        averting a chaotic Iraq, including all of Iraq's neighbors.''.
            (7) On August 10, 2007, the United Nations Security Council 
        voted unanimously to expand the mandate of its mission in Iraq 
        to assist the national government with political 
        reconciliation, bring together Iraq's neighbors to discuss 
        border security and energy access, and facilitate much needed 
        humanitarian assistance.
            (8) The United States Ambassador to Iraq, the Honorable 
        Ryan C. Crocker, asserted on September 11, 2007, in testimony 
        before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, ``With 
        respect, again, to [Iraq's] neighbors and others, that is 
        exactly our intent to have a more intensive, positive, more 
        regulated engagement between Iraq and its neighbors. . . . The 
        United Nations is now positioned to play a more active and 
        involved role.''.
            (9) General Petraeus said on September 11, 2007, in 
        response to a question on the need for greater civilian 
        activity in Iraq, ``I agree with the chairman of the Joint 
        Chiefs of Staff who has said repeatedly that certain elements 
        of our government are at war, DoD, State, AID, but not all of 
        the others. . . . We can use help in those areas. Some of the 
        areas are quite thin, agriculture, health, and some others.''.
            (10) The United States troop surge carried out in 2007 has 
        not, as of yet, been matched by a comparable civilian surge 
        designed to help the Government of Iraq strengthen its 
        capabilities in providing essential government services.
    (b) Sense of the Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate that--
            (1) the United States Government should take the lead in 
        organizing a comprehensive diplomatic offensive, consisting of 
        bilateral, regional, and international initiatives, to assist 
        the Government of Iraq in achieving national reconciliation and 
        successfully meeting key security, political, and economic 
        benchmarks;
            (2) it is in the interest of the United States and the 
        people of Iraq that Iraq is not seen as a uniquely ``American'' 
        problem, but rather as of enduring importance to the security 
        and prosperity of its neighbors, the entire Middle East region, 
        and the broader international community;
            (3) the greater involvement in a constructive fashion of 
        Iraq's neighbors, whether through a regional conference or 
        another mechanism, can help stabilize Iraq and end the outside 
        flows of weapons, explosive materials, foreign fighters, and 
        funding that contribute to the current sectarian warfare in 
        Iraq;
            (4) the President and the Secretary of State should invest 
        their personal time and energy in these diplomatic efforts to 
        ensure that they receive the highest priority within the United 
        States Government and are viewed as a serious effort in the 
        region and elsewhere;
            (5) the President, in order to demonstrate that a regional 
        diplomacy strategy enjoys attention at the highest levels of 
        the United States Government, should appoint a seasoned, high-
        level Presidential envoy to the Middle East region to 
        supplement the efforts of Ambassador Crocker and focus on the 
        establishment of a regional framework to help stabilize Iraq;
            (6) the United States Government should build upon 
        tentative progress achieved by the International Compact for 
        Iraq and the Iraq Neighbors Conference to serve as the basis 
        for a more intensive and sustained effort to construct an 
        effective regional mechanism;
            (7) the President should direct the United States Permanent 
        Representative to the United Nations to use the voice and vote 
        of the United States at the United Nations to seek the 
        appointment of an international mediator in Iraq, under the 
        auspices of the United Nations Security Council, to engage 
        political, religious, ethnic, and tribal leaders in Iraq to 
        foster national reconciliation efforts;
            (8) the United States Government should begin planning for 
        a wide-ranging dialogue on the mandate governing international 
        support for Iraq when the current United Nations mandate 
        authorizing the United States-led coalition expires at the end 
        of 2007;
            (9) the United States Government should more directly press 
        Iraq's neighbors to open fully operating embassies in Baghdad 
        and establish inclusive diplomatic relations with the 
        Government of Iraq to help ensure the Government is viewed as 
        legitimate throughout the region;
            (10) the United States Government should strongly urge the 
        governments of those countries that have previously pledged 
        debt forgiveness and economic assistance to the Government of 
        Iraq to fully carry through on their commitments on an 
        expedited basis;
            (11) a key objective of any diplomatic offensive should be 
        to ameliorate the suffering and deprivation of Iraqi refugees, 
        both those displaced internally and those who have fled to 
        neighboring countries, through coordinated humanitarian 
        assistance and the development of a regional framework to 
        establish long-term solutions to the future of displaced Iraqi 
        citizens;
            (12) the United States Government should reallocate 
        diplomats and Department of State funds as required to ensure 
        that any comprehensive diplomatic offensive to stabilize Iraq 
        on an urgent basis has the needed resources to succeed; and
            (13) the United States Government should reallocate 
        civilian expertise to help governmental entities in Iraq 
        strengthen their ability to provide essential government 
        services to the people of Iraq.
                                 <all>