[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1977 Introduced in Senate (IS)]







110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1977

  To provide for sustained United States leadership in a cooperative 
   global effort to prevent nuclear terrorism, reduce global nuclear 
 arsenals, stop the spread of nuclear weapons and related material and 
  technology, and support the responsible and peaceful use of nuclear 
                              technology.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             August 2, 2007

 Mr. Obama (for himself and Mr. Hagel) introduced the following bill; 
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
  To provide for sustained United States leadership in a cooperative 
   global effort to prevent nuclear terrorism, reduce global nuclear 
 arsenals, stop the spread of nuclear weapons and related material and 
  technology, and support the responsible and peaceful use of nuclear 
                              technology.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Nuclear Weapons Threat Reduction Act 
of 2007''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Sustained global leadership by the United States will 
        remain essential in a cooperative global effort to prevent 
        nuclear terrorism, reduce global nuclear arsenals, stop the 
        spread of nuclear weapons and related material and technology, 
        and support the responsible and peaceful use of nuclear 
        technology.
            (2) The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 
        United States (commonly referred to as the ``9/11 Commission'') 
        concluded that ``a trained nuclear engineer with an amount of 
        highly enriched uranium or plutonium about the size of a 
        grapefruit or an orange, together with commercially available 
        material, could fashion a nuclear device that would fit in a 
        van like the one Ramzi Yousef parked in the garage of the World 
        Trade Center in 1993. Such a bomb would level Lower 
        Manhattan.''
            (3) The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed 
        16 incidents between 1993 and 2005 that involved trafficking in 
        relatively small quantities of highly enriched uranium and 
        plutonium.
            (4) United States cooperative threat reduction programs 
        have made significant progress in securing, monitoring, and 
        reducing nuclear stockpiles, but there are still significant 
        quantities of weapons-usable nuclear material that remain 
        vulnerable to theft or diversion.
            (5) There are an estimated 60 tons of highly enriched 
        uranium, enough to make over 1,000 nuclear bombs, that are 
        located at facilities associated with civilian industries 
        spread among over 40 countries around the world, and physical 
        security standards governing such materials vary, creating 
        vulnerabilities to theft or diversion.
            (6) Securing nuclear weapons and weapons-usable material at 
        their source is the most direct and reliable way to disrupt 
        efforts by terrorist organizations to acquire such material. 
        Interdiction and other measures based on international 
        cooperation and collaboration must also be sustained.
            (7) The dangers posed by the spread of nuclear weapons-
        related technology and the need to strengthen the global 
        nonproliferation regime are highlighted by--
                    (A) the announcement by the Government of North 
                Korea in 2003 that it was withdrawing from the Treaty 
                on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at 
                Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and 
                entered into force March 5, 1970 (commonly referred to 
                as the ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty''), and the 
                nuclear test explosion carried out by that government 
                in 2006; and
                    (B) the violations by the Government of Iran of its 
                safeguards commitments and the refusal of that 
                government to comply with United Nations Security 
                Council resolutions demanding a suspension of its 
                uranium enrichment program and other sensitive nuclear 
                activities.
            (8) The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty permits countries 
        to acquire a capability to produce fissile material for 
        civilian purposes that brings them to the brink of a capability 
        to produce weapons-usable nuclear material without necessarily 
        violating the agreement, giving them the ability to then leave 
        without penalty unless the United Nations Security Council or 
        other countries take meaningful action.
            (9) The threat of nuclear weapons to the United States and 
        the rest of the world cannot be reduced without stronger 
        international cooperation to achieve universal compliance with 
        tighter nuclear nonproliferation rules and standards as part of 
        a comprehensive and balanced nonproliferation strategy that 
        recognizes legitimate, peaceful nuclear uses.
            (10) To bolster international support for nuclear 
        nonproliferation and reduce the saliency of nuclear weapons, 
        nuclear weapons states should reaffirm their commitment to 
        Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and all 
        states, particularly nuclear weapons states, should actively 
        reaffirm their commitment to Article IV of the Nuclear Non-
        Proliferation Treaty and tangibly support the responsible and 
        peaceful use of nuclear technology.
            (11) The Cold War rivalry that led to the stockpiling of 
        tens of thousands of nuclear weapons ended more than 15 years 
        ago, but the nuclear weapons doctrines of the United States and 
        the Russian Federation have changed very little and large 
        arsenals of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons remain in 
        each country.

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that the United States should have a 
balanced and comprehensive strategy to strengthen global nuclear 
nonproliferation, prevent nuclear terrorism, and uphold all of the 
commitments of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, including by--
            (1) slowing and eventually halting the spread of sensitive 
        nuclear technologies to enrich uranium or separate plutonium;
            (2) establishing multilayered, multilateral nuclear fuel 
        supply assurances, including an international nuclear fuel 
        bank, consistent with United States nonproliferation objectives 
        to dissuade countries from building their own uranium 
        enrichment capability;
            (3) strengthening the inspection and nuclear safety 
        capabilities and authority of the IAEA and reaffirming support 
        for appropriate measures to strengthen the Nuclear Non-
        Proliferation Treaty;
            (4) taking steps to ensure that all countries adopt the 
        Additional Protocol of the IAEA, which grants the IAEA expanded 
        rights of access to information and nuclear-related sites;
            (5) reaffirming the commitment of the United States to 
        fulfill its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
        Treaty, and encouraging other nuclear weapon states to reaffirm 
        their commitments to fulfill obligations under the Treaty, 
        including by taking steps to achieve deeper, verifiable 
        reductions in global nuclear arsenals and their means of 
        delivery;
            (6) initiating talks with the Government of the Russian 
        Federation to reduce the number of nonstrategic nuclear weapons 
        and further reduce the number of strategic nuclear weapons in 
        the respective nuclear stockpiles of the United States and the 
        Russian Federation in a transparent and verifiable fashion and 
        in a manner consistent with the security of the United States;
            (7) taking measures to reduce the risk of an accidental, 
        unauthorized, or mistaken launch of nuclear weapons, including 
        by considering changes in the alert status in United States and 
        Russian forces and rapidly completing the Joint Data Exchange 
        Center, which would improve communications and transparency 
        between the United States and the Russian Federation;
            (8) continuing the United States moratorium on nuclear test 
        explosions, initiating a bipartisan process to achieve 
        ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, working to 
        secure ratification by other key countries, and fully 
        supporting United States commitments to fund the international 
        monitoring system to help detect and deter possible nuclear 
        explosions by other countries;
            (9) pursuing and concluding an agreement to verifiably halt 
        the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons;
            (10) strengthening Nuclear Suppliers Group export control 
        guidelines, national border and transhipment controls, and 
        intelligence and law enforcement efforts to investigate and 
        block the transfer of sensitive nuclear materials and 
        technologies in order to prevent future black-market nuclear 
        networks like the A.Q. Khan network;
            (11) strengthening the Proliferation Security Initiative 
        (PSI) through appropriate measures;
            (12) fully implementing the Lugar-Obama initiative 
        (sections 10, 11, and 12 of the State Department Authorities 
        Act of 2006 (Public Law 109-472; 22 U.S.C. 2349bb-5, 22 U.S.C. 
        2349bb-6, and 22 U.S.C. 2751 note), which strengthens the 
        ability of foreign countries friendly to the United States to 
        detect and interdict weapons of mass destruction and related 
        material;
            (13) achieving increased and sustained financial and other 
        support from Russia, the European Union and its member states, 
        China, Japan, and other countries for stronger, standardized, 
        and worldwide physical security for nuclear weapons and 
        material as well as for other global nuclear nonproliferation 
        efforts;
            (14) accelerating United States programs to secure, 
        consolidate, and reduce global stocks of nuclear weapons and 
        weapons-usable material and ensuring that the highest priority 
        is placed on the security for those stockpiles that pose the 
        greatest risk; and
            (15) taking steps to delegitimize and eventually eliminate 
        the use of highly enriched uranium in civilian commerce.

SEC. 4. ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL BANK.

    (a) Authority.--The President is authorized to make voluntary 
contributions to support the creation of a low enriched uranium reserve 
administered by the IAEA that would help guarantee the availability of 
fuel for commercial nuclear reactors and dissuade countries from 
building their own uranium enrichment capability.
    (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated to the President $50,000,000 for voluntary contributions 
to support the establishment of an international nuclear fuel bank.
    (c) Certification.--Voluntary contributions under subsection (b) 
may be provided only if the Secretary of State certifies to the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that the IAEA has received 
a pledge or pledges in a total amount of not less than $50,000,000 from 
a country or group of countries other than the United States.
    (d) Report.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the 
        President shall submit to Congress a report on efforts by the 
        United States Government to facilitate and support the 
        establishment of a low-enriched uranium reserve administered by 
        the IAEA.
            (2) Content.--The report required under paragraph (1) shall 
        include detailed descriptions of--
                    (A) the international diplomatic efforts to create 
                global support for a fuel bank;
                    (B) financial support for a fuel bank from other 
                countries;
                    (C) any obstacles impeding the establishment of the 
                reserve;
                    (D) efforts by the United States Government to 
                remove or resolve such obstacles; and
                    (E) the structure, mandate, scope, location, 
                duration, decisionmaking authority, rules and 
                guidelines, and physical security measures of a fuel 
                bank.

SEC. 5. STRENGTHENING THE CAPABILITIES OF THE IAEA.

    (a) Finding.--Congress finds that the International Atomic Energy 
Agency plays a critical role in safeguarding the nuclear programs of 
countries around the world and in promulgating security guidance for 
nuclear materials.
    (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated for the President for fiscal years 2008 through 2012, in 
addition to other amounts available for such purposes, for voluntary 
contributions to the IAEA--
            (1) $10,000,000 for each such fiscal year for the 
        Department of Safeguards of the IAEA to improve, strengthen, 
        and expand as necessary, the ability of the IAEA to conduct 
        effective monitoring and inspections to ensure compliance with 
        safeguards and to monitor transfers of dual-use nuclear items 
        and technologies that could be used to subvert those 
        safeguards; and
            (2) $5,000,000 for the Department of Nuclear Safety and 
        Security of the IAEA to strengthen the efforts of the 
        Department to develop guidelines for securing nuclear materials 
        and to assist national authorities with implementation of these 
        guidelines.
    (c) Certification Requirement.--Voluntary contributions under 
subsection (b) may be provided in fiscal years 2010, 2011, and 2012 
only if the Secretary of State certifies to the Committee on Foreign 
Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives that countries other than the United States 
are providing, or have agreed to provide, significant additional funds 
to the International Atomic Energy Agency's Department of Safeguards, 
Department of Nuclear Safety and Security, or both.

SEC. 6. FISSILE MATERIAL CUTOFF TREATY.

    (a) Statement of Policy.--It is in the interest of the United 
States to achieve a comprehensive, verifiable, and effective treaty to 
end the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons worldwide, 
and to actively encourage countries that are producing fissile material 
for nuclear weapons to suspend such activities.
    (b) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the National Academy of Sciences shall submit to Congress 
a comprehensive report on the nature of a verification regime that 
would be necessary for an effectively verifiable fissile material 
cutoff treaty.

SEC. 7. COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR THREAT REDUCTION AND SECURITY PLAN.

    (a) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United 
States to work cooperatively with other countries and the IAEA to 
develop, promulgate, and implement a comprehensive set of standards and 
best practices to fulfill the requirement of United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1540 (2004) to provide ``appropriate effective'' 
physical protection and accounting for all stockpiles of nuclear 
weapons and weapons-usable material.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States should work with other countries and 
        the IAEA to reach a common understanding of the essential 
        elements of an effective physical protection system for nuclear 
        weapons-usable materials stockpiles, including best practices 
        and security measures that will ensure that such systems will 
        be effective in defeating the threats that terrorists and 
        criminals have demonstrated they can pose; and
            (2) the United States should encourage and materially 
        assist other countries to the extent needed to put such 
        effective nuclear security systems in place as rapidly as 
        possible.
    (c) Plan Required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a 
comprehensive nuclear threat reduction and security plan, in classified 
and unclassified forms, for ensuring that all nuclear weapons and 
weapons usable material at vulnerable sites worldwide are secure by 
2012 and for working with other countries to ensure adequate accounting 
and security for such materials on an ongoing basis thereafter.
    (d) Content.--For each element of the accounting and security 
effort, the plan submitted under subsection (c) shall--
            (1) clearly designate agency and departmental 
        responsibility and accountability;
            (2) specify program goals, with metrics for measuring 
        progress, estimated schedules, and specified milestones to be 
        achieved;
            (3) provide estimates of the program budget requirements 
        and resources to meet the goals for each year;
            (4) provide the strategy for diplomacy and related tools 
        and authority to accomplish the program element;
            (5) provide a strategy for expanding the resources, 
        financing, and other support and assistance provided by other 
        countries, particularly Russia, the European Union and its 
        member states, China, and Japan, for the purposes of securing 
        nuclear weapons and weapons-usable material worldwide;
            (6) outline the progress in and impediments to securing 
        agreement from all countries that possess nuclear weapons or 
        weapons-usable material on a set of global nuclear security 
        standards, consistent with their obligation to comply with 
        United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540;
            (7) describe the steps required to overcome impediments 
        that have been identified; and
            (8) describe global efforts to promulgate best practices 
        for securing nuclear materials and outline options to support 
        the establishment of an international voluntary organization to 
        promote best practices for nuclear material security among 
        nuclear facility operators worldwide.
    (e) Annual Report.--Not later than September 30, 2008, and annually 
thereafter, the President shall submit to Congress an integrated annual 
report, in classified and unclassified form, that describes the 
progress made by the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, 
and the Department of State in implementing the comprehensive threat 
reduction plan submitted under subsection (c), including an assessment 
of progress relative to the milestones set forth in the plan.
    (f) Authorization of Appropriations for Global Threat Reduction 
Initiative.--There is authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of 
Energy $20,000,000 for fiscal years 2008 through 2010 for the Global 
Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), in addition to other amounts made 
available for such purposes, to expand the scope of facilities covered 
under the initiative, encourage countries and sites to relinquish 
vulnerable nuclear material, accelerate security upgrades at research 
reactors, and encourage the conversion of civilian reactors from the 
use of highly enriched uranium fuel to low enriched uranium fuel.

SEC. 8. ATTRIBUTION CAPABILITY TO DETER NUCLEAR TERRORISM.

    (a) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United 
States to cooperate with the IAEA, Russia, and other countries that 
possess nuclear weapons-usable material to develop greater technical 
expertise and data necessary to identify the source of any nuclear 
weapons-usable material that might be transferred illegally or that 
might be used in a terrorist attack in order to help dissuade countries 
from participating in nuclear proliferation.
    (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated to the Secretary of Energy $15,000,000 for fiscal year 
2008 and $10,000,000 for fiscal years 2009 through 2012, in addition to 
other amounts available for such purposes, to establish a national 
technical forensics program to develop the best practicable 
technologies and procedures for determining the origin of nuclear 
materials, whether seized while still intact or collected after the 
detonation of a nuclear bomb.

SEC. 9. REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY.

    (a) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United 
States--
            (1) to strongly support the objectives of the Nuclear Non-
        Proliferation Treaty;
            (2) to strongly support all appropriate measures to 
        strengthen the Treaty and to attain its objectives; and
            (3) to pursue a comprehensive and balanced approach to 
        strengthen the global nuclear nonproliferation system in 
        advance of and during the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
        Review Conference to realize a more robust and effective global 
        nuclear nonproliferation system for the 21st century.
    (b) Reports.--
            (1) Report on comprehensive objectives, strategy, and 
        policies.--
                    (A) In general.--Not later than October 31, 2009, 
                the President shall submit to Congress a report, in 
                classified and unclassified forms, that details the 
                comprehensive objectives, strategy, and policies of the 
                United States regarding the 2010 Nuclear Non-
                Proliferation Treaty Review Conference.
                    (B) Content.--The report required under 
                subparagraph (A) shall describe--
                            (i) overall changes or revisions to the 
                        international nuclear nonproliferation 
                        framework, including the Nuclear Non-
                        Proliferation Treaty, that may be needed to 
                        realize a more robust and effective global 
                        nuclear nonproliferation system;
                            (ii) the spread of sensitive nuclear 
                        technologies, in particular uranium enrichment 
                        and nuclear fuel reprocessing;
                            (iii) country-specific nuclear 
                        proliferation concerns;
                            (iv) efforts to uphold Article IV 
                        commitments on peaceful nuclear use, including 
                        the establishment of a nuclear fuel bank;
                            (v) accelerated implementation of 
                        obligations and commitments under the Nuclear 
                        Non-Proliferation Treaty for the purpose of 
                        reducing the world's stockpiles of nuclear 
                        weapons and weapons-grade fissile material;
                            (vi) nuclear and other nonproliferation 
                        initiatives such as the Proliferation Security 
                        Initiative;
                            (vii) the United States assessment of the 
                        objectives and strategies of other states with 
                        regard to the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
                        Treaty Review Conference, including the Nuclear 
                        Weapons States, members of the Nuclear 
                        Suppliers Group, and leading member states 
                        associated with the Non-Aligned Movement; and
                            (viii) the United States diplomatic 
                        strategy leading up to the Conference to build 
                        and strengthen the international consensus 
                        regarding United States objectives.
            (2) Report on outcomes on conference.--
                    (A) In general.--Not later than 60 days after the 
                conclusion of the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
                Review Conference, the President shall submit to 
                Congress a report, in classified and unclassified 
                forms, regarding the outcomes of the Conference.
                    (B) Content.--The report required under 
                subparagraph (A) shall provide an assessment of the 
                overall outcome of the Conference as well as United 
                States consultations and negotiations and outcomes 
                regarding the items listed in paragraph (1)(B).

SEC. 10. COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION AND PEACEFUL USE OF 
              NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY.

    (a) Establishment.--There is hereby established a commission to be 
known as the Commission on United States Objectives and Strategy for 
Nuclear Nonproliferation and Peaceful Use of Nuclear Technology (in 
this section referred to as the ``Commission'').
    (b) Membership.--
            (1) In general.--The Commission shall be comprised of 15 
        members appointed by the President. In selecting individuals 
        for appointment, the President shall consult with--
                    (A) the Majority Leader of the Senate regarding the 
                appointment of 4 of the members of the Commission;
                    (B) the Speaker of the House of Representatives 
                regarding the appointment of 4 of the members of the 
                Commission;
                    (C) the minority leader of the Senate regarding the 
                appointment of 2 of the members of the Commission; and
                    (D) the minority leader of the House of 
                Representatives regarding the appointment of 2 of the 
                members of the Commission.
            (2) Chairman.--The Majority Leader of the Senate, in 
        consultation with the Speaker of the House of Representatives 
        and the respective minority leaders of the Senate and the House 
        of Representatives, shall designate 1 of the Commission members 
        to serve as chairman of the Commission.
            (3) Qualifications.--Members of the Commission shall be 
        appointed from among private United States citizens with 
        knowledge and expertise in the political, security, military, 
        and energy aspects of nuclear proliferation, disarmament, and 
        peaceful use.
            (4) Security clearances.--All Commission members shall hold 
        appropriate security clearances.
            (5) Deadline for appointments.--All appointments to the 
        Commission shall be made not later than 45 days after the date 
        of the enactment of this Act.
            (6) Term.--Members shall be appointed for the life of the 
        Commission. Any vacancies shall be filled in the same manner as 
        the original appointment.
    (c) Duties.--The duties of the Commission shall include--
            (1) assessing and providing recommendations for United 
        States objectives, strategy, and policies regarding the nature, 
        scope, and magnitude of the threat posed by the spread of 
        nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons-related technology, 
        including the threat of nuclear terrorism; and
            (2) reporting on--
                    (A) the status of efforts by nuclear weapons states 
                to reduce global nuclear arsenals;
                    (B) the development by nuclear weapons states of 
                next generation nuclear weapons and nuclear warheads;
                    (C) the need and requirements of peaceful nuclear 
                use, including nuclear energy; and
                    (D) the role and capabilities of existing 
                multilateral and international entities related to 
                nuclear issues.
    (d) Initial Meeting.--The Commission shall convene its first 
meeting not later than 30 days after the date as of which all 
Commission members have been appointed.
    (e) Procedures.--Procedures for the operation of the Commission 
shall be established upon the approval of 10 of the 15 members of the 
Commission.
    (f) Cooperation From Other Federal Agencies.--The Commission shall 
receive the full and timely cooperation of the Secretary of State, the 
Secretary of Defense, the Director of National Intelligence, and the 
heads of other relevant Federal agencies, including analyses, 
briefings, and other information necessary for the fulfillment of the 
Commission's responsibilities.
    (g) Report.--Not later than 270 days after the date if its first 
meeting, the Commission shall submit to Congress the assessment and 
report described under subsection (c).
    (h) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated $5,000,000 for the President to establish the Commission.
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