[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1545 Introduced in Senate (IS)]







110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1545

       To implement the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                              June 5, 2007

 Mr. Salazar (for himself, Mr. Alexander, Mr. Pryor, Mr. Bennett, Mr. 
Casey, Mr. Gregg, Mrs. Lincoln, Mr. Sununu, and Ms. Collins) introduced 
the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee 
                          on Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
       To implement the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Iraq Study Group Recommendations 
Implementation Act of 2007''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) On March 15, 2006, the Iraq Study Group was created at 
        the request of a bipartisan group of members of Congress.
            (2) The United States Institute of Peace was designated as 
        the facilitating organization for the Iraq Study Group with the 
        support of the Center for the Study of the Presidency, the 
        Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the James 
        A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University.
            (3) The Iraq Study Group was composed of a bipartisan group 
        of senior individuals who have had distinguished careers in 
        public service. The Group was co-chaired by former Secretary of 
        State James A. Baker, III and former chairman of the House 
        Foreign Affairs Committee Lee H. Hamilton, and the other 
        members were former Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger; 
        Vernon E. Jordan, Jr, the Senior Managing Director of Lazard, 
        Freres and Company; former Attorney General Edwin Meese III; 
        former Supreme Court Associate Justice Sandra Day O'Connor; 
        former White House Chief of Staff Leon E. Panetta; former 
        Secretary of Defense William J. Perry; United States Senator 
        Charles S. Robb; and United States Senator Alan K. Simpson.
            (4) On June 15, 2006, President George W. Bush signed into 
        law the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, 
        the Global War on Terror, and Hurricane Recovery, 2006 (Public 
        Law 109-234), which provided $1,000,000 to the United States 
        Institute of Peace for activities in support of the Iraq Study 
        Group.
            (5) The Iraq Study Group consulted nearly 200 leading 
        officials and experts, including the senior members of the 
        Government of Iraq, the United States Government, and key 
        coalition partners and received advice from more than 50 
        distinguished scholars and experts from a variety of fields who 
        conducted working groups in the areas of economy and 
        reconstruction, military and security, political development, 
        and the strategic environment in Iraq and the Middle East.
            (6) While the Iraq Study Group recommended shifting the 
        primary mission of United States military forces in Iraq from 
        combat to training, and while the Iraq Study Group described 
        actions and conditions that could allow for a redeployment of 
        troops not necessary for force protection out of Iraq by the 
        first quarter of 2008, the Iraq Study Group did not set a fixed 
        timetable for withdrawal and said it could support a short-term 
        redeployment of United States combat forces, complemented by 
        comprehensive political, economic, and diplomatic efforts, to 
        stabilize Baghdad or to speed up the mission of training and 
        equipping Iraqis if the United States commander in Iraq 
        determines that such steps would be effective.
            (7) The report of the Iraq Study Group includes a letter 
        from the co-chairs of the Iraq Study Group, James A. Baker, III 
        and Lee H. Hamilton, which states, ``Our political leaders must 
        build a bipartisan approach to bring a responsible conclusion 
        to what is now a lengthy and costly war. Our country deserves a 
        debate that prizes substance over rhetoric, and a policy that 
        is adequately funded and sustainable. The President and 
        Congress must work together. Our leaders must be candid and 
        forthright with the American people in order to win their 
        support.''
            (8) The Republicans and Democrats who comprised the Iraq 
        Study Group reached compromise and consensus and unanimously 
        concluded that their recommendations offer a new way forward 
        for the United States in Iraq and the region, and are 
        comprehensive and need to be implemented in a coordinated 
        fashion.

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF IRAQ STUDY GROUP 
              RECOMMENDATIONS.

    It is the sense of Congress that the President and Congress should 
agree that the way forward in Iraq is to implement the comprehensive 
set of recommendations of the Iraq Study Group, particularly those 
specifically described in this Act, and the President should formulate 
a comprehensive plan to do so.

SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS IN IRAQ.

    It is the sense of Congress that, consistent with the 
recommendations of the Iraq Study Group, the United States Government 
should--
            (1) establish a ``New Diplomatic Offensive'' to deal with 
        the problems of Iraq and of the region;
            (2) support the unity and territorial integrity of Iraq;
            (3) encourage other countries in the region to stop the 
        destabilizing interventions and actions of Iraq's neighbors;
            (4) secure the borders of Iraq, including through the use 
        of joint patrols with neighboring countries;
            (5) prevent the expansion of the instability and conflict 
        beyond the borders of Iraq;
            (6) promote economic assistance, commerce, trade, political 
        support, and, if possible, military assistance for the 
        Government of Iraq from non-neighboring Muslim nations;
            (7) energize the governments of other countries to support 
        national political reconciliation in Iraq;
            (8) encourage the governments of other countries to 
        validate the legitimate sovereignty of Iraq by resuming 
        diplomatic relations, where appropriate, and reestablishing 
        embassies in Baghdad;
            (9) assist the Government of Iraq in establishing active 
        working embassies in key capitals in the region;
            (10) help the Government of Iraq reach a mutually 
        acceptable agreement on the future of Kirkuk;
            (11) assist the Government of Iraq in achieving certain 
        security, political, and economic milestones, including better 
        performance on issues such as national reconciliation, 
        equitable distribution of oil revenues, and the dismantling of 
        militias;
            (12) encourage the holding of a meeting or conference in 
        Baghdad, supported by the United States and the Government of 
        Iraq, of the Organization of the Islamic Conference or the Arab 
        League, both to assist the Government of Iraq in promoting 
        national reconciliation in Iraq and to reestablish their 
        diplomatic presence in Iraq;
            (13) seek the creation of the Iraq International Support 
        Group to assist Iraq in ways the Government of Iraq would 
        desire, attempting to strengthen Iraq's sovereignty;
            (14) engage directly with the Governments of Iran and Syria 
        in order to obtain their commitment to constructive policies 
        toward Iraq and other regional issues;
            (15) provide additional political, economic, and military 
        support for Afghanistan including resources that might become 
        available as United States combat forces are redeployed from 
        Iraq;
            (16) remain in contact with the Iraqi leadership, conveying 
        the clear message that there must be action by the Government 
        of Iraq to make substantial progress toward the achievement of 
        the milestones described in section 11, and conveying in as 
        much detail as possible the substance of these exchanges in 
        order to keep the American people, the Iraqi people, and the 
        people of countries in the region well informed of progress in 
        these areas;
            (17) make clear the willingness of the United States 
        Government to continue training, assistance, and support for 
        Iraq's security forces, and to continue political, military, 
        and economic support for the Government of Iraq until Iraq 
        becomes more capable of governing, defending, and sustaining 
        itself;
            (18) make clear that, should the Government of Iraq not 
        make substantial progress toward the achievement of the 
        milestones described in section 11, the United States shall 
        reduce its political, military, or economic support for the 
        Government of Iraq;
            (19) make clear that the United States Government does not 
        seek to establish permanent military bases in Iraq;
            (20) restate that the United States Government does not 
        seek to control the oil resources of Iraq;
            (21) make active efforts to engage all parties in Iraq, 
        with the exception of al Qaeda;
            (22) encourage dialogue between sectarian communities and 
        press religious leaders inside and outside of Iraq to speak out 
        on behalf of peace and reconciliation;
            (23) support the presence of neutral international experts 
        as advisors to the Government of Iraq on the processes of 
        disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of militias and 
        other armed groups not under the control of the Government of 
        Iraq; and
            (24) ensure that reconstruction efforts in Iraq consist of 
        great involvement by and with international partners that 
        actively participate in the design and construction of 
        projects.

SEC. 5. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON SECURITY AND MILITARY FORCES.

    It shall be the policy of the United States to formulate and 
implement with the Government of Iraq a plan, consistent with the 
recommendations of the Iraq Study Group, that--
            (1) gives the highest priority to the training, equipping, 
        advising, and support for security and military forces in Iraq 
        and to supporting counterterrorism operations in Iraq; and
            (2) supports the providing of more and better equipment for 
        the Iraqi Army by encouraging the Government of Iraq to 
        accelerate its requests under the Foreign Military Sales 
        program and, as United States combat brigades redeploy from 
        Iraq, provides for the transfer of certain United States 
        military equipment to Iraqi forces.

SEC. 6. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON STRENGTHENING THE UNITED STATES 
              MILITARY.

    It shall be the policy of the United States to formulate and 
implement a plan, consistent with the recommendations of the Iraq Study 
Group, that--
            (1) directs the Secretary of Defense to build healthy 
        relations between the civilian and military sectors, by 
        creating an environment where senior military leaders feel free 
        to offer independent advice to the civilian leadership of the 
        United States Government;
            (2) emphasizes training and education programs for the 
        forces that have returned to the United States in order to 
        restore the United States Armed Forces to a high level of 
        readiness for global contingencies;
            (3) provides sufficient funds to restore military equipment 
        to full functionality over the next 5 years; and
            (4) assesses the full future budgetary impact of the war in 
        Iraq and its potential impact on--
                    (A) the future readiness of United States military 
                forces;
                    (B) the ability of the United States Armed Forces 
                to recruit and retain high-quality personnel;
                    (C) needed investments in military procurement and 
                in research and development; and
                    (D) the budgets of other Federal agencies involved 
                in the stability and reconstruction effort in Iraq.

SEC. 7. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON POLICE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN IRAQ.

    It shall be the policy of the United States to formulate and 
implement with the Government of Iraq a plan, consistent with the 
recommendations of the Iraq Study Group, that--
            (1) transfers the Iraqi National Police to the Ministry of 
        Defense, where the police commando units will become part of 
        the new Iraqi Army;
            (2) transfers the Iraqi Border Police to the Ministry of 
        Defense, which would have total responsibility for border 
        control and external security;
            (3) establishes greater responsibility for the Iraqi Police 
        Service to conduct criminal investigations and expands its 
        cooperation with other elements in the judicial system in Iraq 
        in order to better control crime and protect Iraqi civilians;
            (4) establishes a process of organizational transformation, 
        including efforts to expand the capability and reach of the 
        current major crime unit, to exert more authority over local 
        police forces, and to give sole authority to the Ministry of 
        the Interior to pay police salaries and disburse financial 
        support to local police;
            (5) proceeds with efforts to identify, register, and 
        control the Facilities Protection Service;
            (6) directs the Department of Defense to continue its 
        mission to train Iraqi National Police and the Iraqi Border 
        Police, which shall be placed within the Iraqi Ministry of 
        Defense;
            (7) directs the Department of Justice to proceed with the 
        mission of training the police forces remaining under the 
        Ministry of the Interior;
            (8) provides for funds from the Government of Iraq to 
        expand and upgrade communications equipment and motor vehicles 
        for the Iraqi Police Service;
            (9) directs the Attorney General to lead the work of 
        organizational transformation in the Ministry of the Interior 
        and creates a strategic plan and standard administrative 
        procedures, codes of conduct, and operational measures for 
        Iraqis; and
            (10) directs the Attorney General to establish courts, 
        train judges, prosecutors, and investigators, and create 
        strongly supported and funded institutions and practices in 
        Iraq to fight corruption.

SEC. 8. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON OIL SECTOR IN IRAQ.

    It shall be the policy of the United States to formulate and 
implement with the Government of Iraq a plan, consistent with the 
recommendations of the Iraq Study Group, that--
            (1) provides technical assistance in drafting legislation 
        to implement the February 27, 2007, agreement by Iraq's Council 
        of Ministers on principles for the equitable sharing of oil 
        resources and revenues;
            (2) encourages the Government of Iraq to accelerate 
        contracting for the comprehensive oil well work-overs in the 
        southern fields needed to increase oil production, while 
        ensuring that the United States no longer funds such 
        infrastructure projects;
            (3) supports the Iraqi military and private security forces 
        in their efforts to protect oil infrastructure and contractors;
            (4) implements metering at both ends of the oil supply line 
        to immediately improve accountability in the oil sector;
            (5) in conjunction with the International Monetary Fund, 
        encourages the Government of Iraq to reduce subsidies in the 
        energy sector;
            (6) encourages investment in Iraq's oil sector by the 
        international community and by international energy companies;
            (7) assists Iraqi leaders to reorganize the national oil 
        industry as a commercial enterprise, in order to enhance 
        efficiency, transparency, and accountability;
            (8) encourages the Government of Iraq to post all oil 
        contracts, volumes, and prices on the Internet so that Iraqis 
        and outside observers can track exports and export revenues;
            (9) supports the efforts of the World Bank to ensure that 
        best practices are used in contracting; and
            (10) provides technical assistance to the Ministry of Oil 
        for enhancing maintenance, improving the payments process, 
        managing cash flows, improving contracting and auditing, and 
        updating professional training programs for management and 
        technical personnel.

SEC. 9. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON IMPROVING ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN IRAQ.

    It shall be the policy of the United States to formulate and 
implement a plan, consistent with the recommendations of the Iraq Study 
Group, that--
            (1) provides for the United States to take the lead in 
        funding assistance requests from the United Nations High 
        Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian agencies;
            (2) creates a new Senior Advisor for Economic 
        Reconstruction in Iraq reporting to the President, with the 
        authority to bring interagency unity of effort to the policy, 
        budget, and implementation of economic reconstruction programs 
        in Iraq and the authority to serve as the principal point of 
        contact with United States partners in the overall 
        reconstruction effort;
            (3) gives the chief of mission in Iraq the authority to 
        spend significant funds through a program structured along the 
        lines of the Commander's Emergency Response Program, with the 
        authority to rescind funding from programs and projects--
                    (A) in which the Government of Iraq is not 
                demonstrating effective partnership; or
                    (B) that do not demonstrate substantial progress 
                toward achievement of the milestones described in 
                section 11;
            (4) authorizes and implements a more flexible security 
        assistance program for Iraq, breaking down the barriers to 
        effective interagency cooperation; and
            (5) grants authority to merge United States assistance with 
        assistance from international donors and Iraqi participants for 
        the purpose of carrying out joint assistance projects.

SEC. 10. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON BUDGET PREPARATION, PRESENTATION, AND 
              REVIEW.

    It shall be the policy of the United States to formulate and 
implement a plan, consistent with the recommendations of the Iraq Study 
Group, that--
            (1) directs the President to include the costs for the war 
        in Iraq in the annual budget request;
            (2) directs the Secretary of State, the Secretary of 
        Defense, and the Director of National Intelligence to provide 
        United States military and civilian personnel in Iraq the 
        highest possible priority in obtaining professional language 
        proficiency and cultural training;
            (3) directs the United States Government to provide for 
        long-term training for Federal agencies that participate in 
        complex stability operations like those in Iraq and 
        Afghanistan;
            (4) creates training for United States Government personnel 
        to carry out civilian tasks associated with complex stability 
        operations; and
            (5) directs the Director of National Intelligence and the 
        Secretary of Defense to devote greater analytic resources to 
        understanding the threats and sources of violence in Iraq and 
        institute immediate changes in the collection of data and 
        violence and the sources of violence to provide a more accurate 
        picture of events on the ground in Iraq.

SEC. 11. CONDITIONS FOR CONTINUED UNITED STATES SUPPORT IN IRAQ.

    (a) In General.--It shall be the policy of the United States to 
condition continued United States political, military and economic 
support for Iraq upon the demonstration by the Government of Iraq of 
sufficient political will and the making of substantial progress toward 
achieving the milestones described in subsection (b), and to base the 
decision to transfer command and control over Iraqi security forces 
units from the United States to Iraq in part upon such factors.
    (b) Milestones.--The milestones referred to in subsection (a) are 
the following:
            (1) Promptly establishing a fair process for considering 
        amendments to the constitution of Iraq that promote lasting 
        national reconciliation in Iraq.
            (2) Enacting legislation or establishing other mechanisms 
        to revise the de-Baathification laws in Iraq to encourage the 
        employment in the Government of Iraq of qualified 
        professionals, irrespective of ethnic or political affiliation, 
        including ex-Baathists who were not leading figures of the 
        Saddam Hussein regime.
            (3) Enacting legislation or establishing other binding 
        mechanisms to ensure the sharing of all Iraqi oil revenues 
        among all segments of Iraqi society in an equitable manner.
            (4) Holding free and fair provincial elections in Iraq at 
        the earliest date practicable.
            (5) Enacting legislation or establishing other mechanisms 
        to ensure the rights of women and the rights of all minority 
        communities in Iraq are protected.

SEC. 12. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON REDEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES FORCES FROM 
              IRAQ.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) with the implementation of the policies specified in 
        sections 5 through 11 and the engagement in the increased 
        diplomatic efforts specified in section 4, and as additional 
        Iraqi brigades are being deployed, and subject to unexpected 
        developments in the security situation on the ground, all 
        United States combat brigades not necessary for force 
        protection could be redeployed from Iraq by the first quarter 
        of 2008, except for those that are essential for--
                    (A) protecting United States and coalition 
                personnel and infrastructure;
                    (B) training, equipping, and advising Iraqi forces;
                    (C) conducting targeted counterterrorism 
                operations;
                    (D) search and rescue; and
                    (E) rapid reaction and special operations; and
            (2) the redeployment should be implemented as part of a 
        comprehensive diplomatic, political, and economic strategy that 
        includes sustained engagement with Iraq's neighbors and the 
        international community for the purpose of working collectively 
        to bring stability to Iraq.

SEC. 13. REPORT ON POLICY IMPLEMENTATION.

    Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
and every 90 days thereafter, the President shall submit to Congress a 
report on the actions that have been taken to implement the policies 
specified in sections 4 through 11.
                                 <all>