II 110th CONGRESS 1st Session S. 1144 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES April 18, 2007 Ms. Snowe introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations A BILL To provide for an assessment of the achievement by the Government of Iraq of benchmarks for political settlement and national reconciliation in Iraq.

1.

Assessment of achievement by the Government of Iraq of benchmarks for political settlement and national reconciliation in Iraq

(a)

Findings

Congress makes the following findings: (1)Iraq is experiencing a deteriorating and ever-widening problem of sectarian and intra-sectarian violence based upon political distrust and cultural differences between some Sunni and Shia Muslims, concentrated primarily in Baghdad. (2)Iraqis must reach political settlements in order to achieve reconciliation, and the failure of the Iraqis to reach such settlements to support a truly unified government greatly contributes to the increasing violence in Iraq. (3)The responsibility for internal security and halting sectarian violence in Iraq must rest primarily with the Government of Iraq, relying on the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). (4)On January 10, 2007, President George W. Bush announced a new strategy for Iraq, which consists of three basic elements: diplomatic, economic, and military. The central component of the military element is an augmentation of the present level of United States military forces in Iraq with more than 20,000 additional United States military forces to work alongside Iraqi units and be embedded in their formations. Our troops will have a well-defined mission: to help Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods, to help them protect the local population, and to help ensure that the Iraqi forces left behind are capable of providing the security that Baghdad needs. (5)President George W. Bush said on January 10, 2007, that I’ve made it clear to the Prime Minister and Iraq’s other leaders that America’s commitment is not open-ended so as to dispel the contrary impression that exists. (6)The Commander, Multi-National Forces—Iraq, General David Petraeus, stated during his confirmation hearing before the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, on January 23, 2007, that it is very important for Iraqis to understand that they need to reach the political settlements which are essential to resolve the sectarian violence and to defeat insurgents. (7)General Petraeus acknowledged during his confirmation hearing before the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, on January 23, 2007, that political settlement and political settlement alone by the Iraqis is our ultimate way of providing security and success in Iraq. (8)General Petraeus stated on March 8, 2007 that [a] political resolution of various differences, of this legislation, of various senses that people do not have a stake in the success of the new Iraq, and so forth, that is crucial. That is what will determine in the long run the success of this effort. (9)General Petraeus, as principal author of Army Field Manual 3–24 (MCWP 3–33.5), Counterinsurgency, released in December 2006, and therefore possessing the unique understanding and experience regarding the principles and fundamentals of pursuing a counterinsurgency strategy, states that [i]n the end, the host nation has to win on its own. Achieving this requires development of viable local leaders and institutions. U.S. forces and agencies can help, but [Host Nation] elements must accept responsibilities to achieve real victory. (10)United States military operations in Iraq should be conducted alongside a comprehensive diplomatic, political, and economic strategy that includes sustained engagement with Iraq's neighbors and the international community for the purpose of working collectively to bring stability to Iraq. (11)United States strategy in Iraq should be conditioned on the meeting by the Government of Iraq of specific benchmarks, as laid out by the President and in consultation with Congress, and reflected in the commitments of the Government of Iraq to the international community. (12)The meeting of these benchmarks by the Government of Iraq should be viewed as the condition for continued United States military and economic involvement in Iraq. (b)

Sense of Congress

It is the sense of Congress that Congress should not take any action, including the elimination or reduction of funds, that will impair the mission of the United States military forces in the field, undermine their safety or harm their effectiveness in pursuing their assigned missions. (c)

Report on achievement of benchmarks

(1)

Report

Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq, having consulted with relevant United States and Iraqi officials, shall submit to Congress a report setting forth the status of the achievement of the benchmarks specified in paragraph (2), and stating the Commander's assessment whether or not each such benchmark has been met. (2)

Benchmarks

The benchmarks specified in this paragraph are as follows: (A)The assumption by Iraq of control of its military. (B)The enactment of a Militia Law to disarm and demobilize militias and to ensure that Iraqi security forces are accountable only to the central government and loyal to the constitution of Iraq. (C)The completion of the review of the constitution of Iraq and the holding of a referendum on special amendments to the constitution of Iraq to ensure equitable participation in the Government of Iraq without regard to religious sect or ethnicity. (D)The completion of provincial election law and preparation for the conduct of provincial elections that ensures equitable constitution of provincial representative bodies without regard to religious sect or ethnicity. (E)The enactment and implementation of legislation to ensure that the energy resources of Iraq benefit Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, Kurds, and other Iraqi citizens in an equitable manner. (F)The enactment and implementation of legislation that equitably reforms the de-Ba'athification process in Iraq. (3)

Testimony before congress

Not later than 14 days after submittal to Congress of the report required by paragraph (1), the Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq shall appear before each of the appropriate committees of Congress to testify with respect to the following: (A)The success or failure of the Government of Iraq in meeting the benchmarks specified in paragraph (2). (B)The capacity of the Government of Iraq to meet any of such benchmarks that that Government has failed to meet. (4)

Testimony on additional matter

If the Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq testifies that the Government of Iraq has failed to meet any of the benchmarks specified in paragraph (2), the Commander shall also submit in the testimony referred to in paragraph (3) the following: (A)Plans for the phased redeployment of United States forces currently deployed to Iraq in support of the Baghdad Security Plan as outlined by the President. (B)Plans for changing the mission of United States forces in Iraq to— (i)training and equipping Iraqi forces; (ii)assisting deployed Iraqi brigades with intelligence, transportation, air support, and logistics support; (iii)protecting United States and coalition personnel and infrastructure; and (iv)maintaining rapid-reaction teams and special operations teams to undertake strike missions against al Qaeda in Iraq, and for other missions considered vital by the United States commander in Iraq. (5)

Appropriate committees of Congress defined

In this subsection, the term appropriate committees of Congress means— (A)the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and (B)the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.