[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1144 Introduced in Senate (IS)]







110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1144

 To provide for an assessment of the achievement by the Government of 
Iraq of benchmarks for political settlement and national reconciliation 
                                in Iraq.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             April 18, 2007

   Ms. Snowe introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
             referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
 To provide for an assessment of the achievement by the Government of 
Iraq of benchmarks for political settlement and national reconciliation 
                                in Iraq.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. ASSESSMENT OF ACHIEVEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ OF 
              BENCHMARKS FOR POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND NATIONAL 
              RECONCILIATION IN IRAQ.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Iraq is experiencing a deteriorating and ever-widening 
        problem of sectarian and intra-sectarian violence based upon 
        political distrust and cultural differences between some Sunni 
        and Shia Muslims, concentrated primarily in Baghdad.
            (2) Iraqis must reach political settlements in order to 
        achieve reconciliation, and the failure of the Iraqis to reach 
        such settlements to support a truly unified government greatly 
        contributes to the increasing violence in Iraq.
            (3) The responsibility for internal security and halting 
        sectarian violence in Iraq must rest primarily with the 
        Government of Iraq, relying on the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).
            (4) On January 10, 2007, President George W. Bush announced 
        a new strategy for Iraq, which consists of three basic 
        elements: diplomatic, economic, and military. The central 
        component of the military element is an augmentation of the 
        present level of United States military forces in Iraq with 
        more than 20,000 additional United States military forces to 
        ``work alongside Iraqi units and be embedded in their 
        formations. Our troops will have a well-defined mission: to 
        help Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods, to help them 
        protect the local population, and to help ensure that the Iraqi 
        forces left behind are capable of providing the security that 
        Baghdad needs''.
            (5) President George W. Bush said on January 10, 2007, that 
        ``I've made it clear to the Prime Minister and Iraq's other 
        leaders that America's commitment is not open-ended'' so as to 
        dispel the contrary impression that exists.
            (6) The Commander, Multi-National Forces--Iraq, General 
        David Petraeus, stated during his confirmation hearing before 
        the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, on January 23, 
        2007, that it is ``very important'' for Iraqis to understand 
        that they need to reach the political settlements which are 
        essential to resolve the sectarian violence and to defeat 
        insurgents.
            (7) General Petraeus acknowledged during his confirmation 
        hearing before the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, 
        on January 23, 2007, that political settlement and political 
        settlement alone by the Iraqis is our ultimate way of providing 
        security and success in Iraq.
            (8) General Petraeus stated on March 8, 2007 that ``[a] 
        political resolution of various differences, of this 
        legislation, of various senses that people do not have a stake 
        in the success of the new Iraq, and so forth, that is crucial. 
        That is what will determine in the long run the success of this 
        effort''.
            (9) General Petraeus, as principal author of Army Field 
        Manual 3-24 (MCWP 3-33.5), Counterinsurgency, released in 
        December 2006, and therefore possessing the unique 
        understanding and experience regarding the principles and 
        fundamentals of pursuing a counterinsurgency strategy, states 
        that ``[i]n the end, the host nation has to win on its own. 
        Achieving this requires development of viable local leaders and 
        institutions. U.S. forces and agencies can help, but [Host 
        Nation] elements must accept responsibilities to achieve real 
        victory''.
            (10) United States military operations in Iraq should be 
        conducted alongside a comprehensive diplomatic, political, and 
        economic strategy that includes sustained engagement with 
        Iraq's neighbors and the international community for the 
        purpose of working collectively to bring stability to Iraq.
            (11) United States strategy in Iraq should be conditioned 
        on the meeting by the Government of Iraq of specific 
        benchmarks, as laid out by the President and in consultation 
        with Congress, and reflected in the commitments of the 
        Government of Iraq to the international community.
            (12) The meeting of these benchmarks by the Government of 
        Iraq should be viewed as the condition for continued United 
        States military and economic involvement in Iraq.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that Congress 
should not take any action, including the elimination or reduction of 
funds, that will impair the mission of the United States military 
forces in the field, undermine their safety or harm their effectiveness 
in pursuing their assigned missions.
    (c) Report on Achievement of Benchmarks.--
            (1) Report.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act, the Commander, Multi-National Forces-
        Iraq, having consulted with relevant United States and Iraqi 
        officials, shall submit to Congress a report setting forth the 
        status of the achievement of the benchmarks specified in 
        paragraph (2), and stating the Commander's assessment whether 
        or not each such benchmark has been met.
            (2) Benchmarks.--The benchmarks specified in this paragraph 
        are as follows:
                    (A) The assumption by Iraq of control of its 
                military.
                    (B) The enactment of a Militia Law to disarm and 
                demobilize militias and to ensure that Iraqi security 
                forces are accountable only to the central government 
                and loyal to the constitution of Iraq.
                    (C) The completion of the review of the 
                constitution of Iraq and the holding of a referendum on 
                special amendments to the constitution of Iraq to 
                ensure equitable participation in the Government of 
                Iraq without regard to religious sect or ethnicity.
                    (D) The completion of provincial election law and 
                preparation for the conduct of provincial elections 
                that ensures equitable constitution of provincial 
                representative bodies without regard to religious sect 
                or ethnicity.
                    (E) The enactment and implementation of legislation 
                to ensure that the energy resources of Iraq benefit 
                Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, Kurds, and other Iraqi 
                citizens in an equitable manner.
                    (F) The enactment and implementation of legislation 
                that equitably reforms the de-Ba'athification process 
                in Iraq.
            (3) Testimony before congress.--Not later than 14 days 
        after submittal to Congress of the report required by paragraph 
        (1), the Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq shall appear 
        before each of the appropriate committees of Congress to 
        testify with respect to the following:
                    (A) The success or failure of the Government of 
                Iraq in meeting the benchmarks specified in paragraph 
                (2).
                    (B) The capacity of the Government of Iraq to meet 
                any of such benchmarks that that Government has failed 
                to meet.
            (4) Testimony on additional matter.--If the Commander, 
        Multi-National Forces-Iraq testifies that the Government of 
        Iraq has failed to meet any of the benchmarks specified in 
        paragraph (2), the Commander shall also submit in the testimony 
        referred to in paragraph (3) the following:
                    (A) Plans for the phased redeployment of United 
                States forces currently deployed to Iraq in support of 
                the Baghdad Security Plan as outlined by the President.
                    (B) Plans for changing the mission of United States 
                forces in Iraq to--
                            (i) training and equipping Iraqi forces;
                            (ii) assisting deployed Iraqi brigades with 
                        intelligence, transportation, air support, and 
                        logistics support;
                            (iii) protecting United States and 
                        coalition personnel and infrastructure; and
                            (iv) maintaining rapid-reaction teams and 
                        special operations teams to undertake strike 
                        missions against al Qaeda in Iraq, and for 
                        other missions considered vital by the United 
                        States commander in Iraq.
            (5) Appropriate committees of congress defined.--In this 
        subsection, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' 
        means--
                    (A) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; 
                and
                    (B) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
                Representatives.
                                 <all>