[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1138 Reported in Senate (RS)]






                                                       Calendar No. 349
110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1138

                          [Report No. 110-151]

To enhance nuclear safeguards and to provide assurances of nuclear fuel 
     supply to countries that forgo certain fuel cycle activities.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             April 18, 2007

    Mr. Lugar (for himself, Mr. Bayh, and Mr. Hagel) introduced the 
 following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on 
                           Foreign Relations

                           September 11, 2007

                Reported by Mr. Biden, without amendment

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
To enhance nuclear safeguards and to provide assurances of nuclear fuel 
     supply to countries that forgo certain fuel cycle activities.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Nuclear Safeguards and Supply Act of 
2007''.

SEC. 2. TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Sec. 1. Short title.
Sec. 2. Table of contents.
Sec. 3. Appropriate congressional committees defined.
          TITLE I--NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS AND NUCLEAR FUEL SUPPLY

Sec. 101. Findings.
Sec. 102. Declaration of policy.
Sec. 103. Safeguards Analytical Laboratory.
Sec. 104. Safeguards technology development program.
                     TITLE II--NUCLEAR FUEL SUPPLY

Sec. 201. Authority for bilateral and multilateral nuclear fuel supply 
                            mechanisms.
Sec. 202. Report on the establishment of an international fuel 
                            authority.
Sec. 203. Sense of the Senate on IAEA fuel supply.

SEC. 3. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.

    In this Act, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
means the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

          TITLE I--NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS AND NUCLEAR FUEL SUPPLY

SEC. 101. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 
        done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and 
        entered into force March 5, 1970 (commonly known as the 
        ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty'' or ``NPT'') and the 
        safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
        (IAEA) are indispensable to international peace and security.
            (2) Congress has long supported efforts aimed at effective 
        and efficient assurances of nuclear fuel supply, the 
        strengthening of IAEA safeguards, and assistance to the 
        developing world for nuclear and non-nuclear energy sources, as 
        embodied in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (22 
        U.S.C. 3201 et seq.).
            (3) The February 22, 2005, Report of the IAEA Experts Group 
        on Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle found 
        that, in addition to increased verification activities in 
        various nations such as Iran, another factor contributing to 
        significant and troubling demands on the IAEA safeguards system 
        was that ``the civilian nuclear industry appears to be poised 
        for worldwide expansion'' and that ``[r]apidly growing global 
        demand for electricity, the uncertainty of supply and price of 
        natural gas, soaring prices for oil, concerns about air 
        pollution and the immense challenge of lowering greenhouse gas 
        emissions, are all forcing a fresh look at nuclear power. As 
        the technical and organizational foundations of nuclear safety 
        improve, there is increasing confidence in the safety of 
        nuclear power plants. In light of existing, new and reawakened 
        interest in many regions of the world, the prospect of new 
        nuclear power stations on a large scale is therefore real. A 
        greater number of States will consider developing their own 
        fuel cycle facilities and nuclear know-how, and will seek 
        assurances of supply in materials, services and technologies.''
            (4) The same report also found, ``Two primary deciding 
        factors dominate all assessments of multilateral nuclear 
        approaches namely `Assurance of non-proliferation' and 
        `Assurance of supply and services.' Both are recognised overall 
        objectives for governments and for the NPT community. In 
        practice, each of these two objectives can seldom be achieved 
        fully on its own. History has shown that it is even more 
        difficult to find an optimum arrangement that will satisfy both 
        objectives at the same time. As a matter of fact, multilateral 
        approaches could be a way to satisfy both objectives.''
            (5) The same report also found, ``The non-proliferation 
        value of a multilateral arrangement is measured by the various 
        proliferation risks associated with a nuclear facility, whether 
        national or multilateral. These risks include the diversion of 
        materials from [a multilateral nuclear approach or MNA] 
        (reduced through the presence of a multinational team), the 
        theft of fissile materials, the diffusion of proscribed or 
        sensitive technologies from MNAs to unauthorised entities, the 
        development of clandestine parallel programmes and the breakout 
        scenario. The latter refers to the case of the host country 
        `breaking out', for example, by expelling multinational staff, 
        withdrawing from the NPT (and thereby terminating its 
        safeguards agreement), and operating the multilateral facility 
        without international control.''
            (6) The 2004 Report of the United Nations Secretary-
        General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 
        found that creating incentives for countries to forego the 
        development of domestic uranium enrichment and reprocessing 
        facilities is essential, and that such suggestions, if 
        implemented swiftly and firmly, offer a real chance to reduce 
        the risk of a nuclear attack, whether by states or non-state 
        actors, and that such proposals ``should be put into effect 
        without delay''.
            (7) On February 11, 2004, President George W. Bush stated, 
        ``The world's leading nuclear exporters should ensure that 
        states have reliable access at reasonable cost to fuel for 
        civilian reactors, so long as those states renounce enrichment 
        and reprocessing. Enrichment and reprocessing are not necessary 
        for nations seeking to harness nuclear energy for peaceful 
        purposes.''
            (8) According to some experts, global energy demand will 
        grow by 50 percent in the next 20 years, predominantly in the 
        developing world.
            (9) Nuclear power may play an increasing role in 
        electricity supply to both the developed and the developing 
        world over the next several decades.
            (10) The Government Accountability Office (GAO) stated in 
        testimony before Congress in September 2006 that a significant 
        factor limiting the effectiveness of the current IAEA 
        safeguards system is that ``more than half, or 111 out of 189, 
        of the NPT signatories have not yet brought the Additional 
        Protocol into force, including the United States''.
            (11) The GAO also testified that an additional ``weakness 
        in implementing strengthened safeguards is that safeguards are 
        significantly limited or not applied in about 60 percent, or 
        112 out of 189, of the NPT signatory countries--either because 
        they have an agreement (known as a small quantities protocol) 
        with IAEA, and are not subject to most safeguards measures, or 
        because they have not concluded a comprehensive safeguards 
        agreement with IAEA''.
            (12) The GAO also testified that ``while IAEA is 
        increasingly relying on the analytical skills of its staff to 
        detect countries' undeclared nuclear activities, the agency is 
        facing a looming human capital crisis. In the next 5 years, 
        IAEA will experience a large turnover of senior safeguards 
        inspectors and high-level management officials. Delays in 
        filling critical safeguards positions limit IAEA's ability to 
        implement strengthened safeguards.''
            (13) Outdated and unnecessary staff restrictions have 
        prevented the IAEA from maintaining and equipping a well-
        trained cadre of professional staff at the IAEA's Safeguards 
        Analytical Laboratory (SAL), located at Seibersdorf, Austria.
            (14) A goal of the Department of State's budget request for 
        fiscal year 2007 for United States voluntary contributions to 
        the IAEA was ``[s]trengthening quality control and sensitivity 
        of analyses by the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL) and 
        the Network of Analytical Laboratories, and reviewing needs for 
        possible refurbishment or replacement of SAL''.
            (15) Considerable investment is needed for SAL to meet 
        future IAEA requirements as its workload is growing, the 
        laboratory's infrastructure is aging, and IAEA requirements 
        have become more demanding, and while initial plans have been 
        made for laboratory enhancement and are currently pending 
        budgetary approval (sometime in 2009), the simple fact is that, 
        as more countries implement IAEA safeguards, many more nuclear 
        samples come to SAL for analysis.
            (16) Any proposals for the creation of bilateral or 
        multilateral assurances of supply mechanisms must take into 
        account, and be achieved in a manner that minimizes, the risk 
        of nuclear proliferation or regional arms races and maximizes 
        adherence to international nonproliferation regimes, including, 
        in particular, the Guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
        (NSG), and the IAEA Additional Protocol.
            (17) Any proposal to create an assurance of supply 
        mechanism in or with a certain country or group of countries 
        should not result in decreased emphasis on existing nuclear 
        safeguards verification efforts and compliance challenges.
            (18) The existing funding, planning, and execution of IAEA 
        safeguards is not sufficient to meet the predicted growth in 
        the future of civilian nuclear power, and therefore any growth 
        in civilian nuclear power must be evaluated against the 
        challenges it poses to verification of the assurances of peace 
        and security provided by the IAEA safeguards system.
            (19) The existing IAEA safeguards system, and the 
        Additional Protocol and the Guidelines of the NSG, represent 
        the current, minimum standards for controlling access to and 
        trade in civilian nuclear technology and should continue to be 
        improved, expanded, and strengthened.

SEC. 102. DECLARATION OF POLICY.

    (a) Continuation of Existing Policy.--It shall remain the policy of 
the United States--
            (1) to create mechanisms to provide adequate supplies of 
        nuclear fuel consistent with the provisions of the Nuclear Non-
        Proliferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 3201 et seq.), in 
        particular title I of such Act (22 U.S.C. 3221 et seq.);
            (2) to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system consistent 
        with the provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 
        1978 (22 U.S.C. 3201 et seq.), in particular title II of such 
        Act (22 U.S.C. 3241 et seq.); and
            (3) to cooperate with other nations, international 
        institutions, and private organizations to assist in the 
        development of non-nuclear energy resources under title V of 
        the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 3261 et 
        seq.).
    (b) Declaration of New Policy.--It shall be the policy of the 
United States to discourage the development of enrichment and 
reprocessing capabilities in additional countries, encourage the 
creation of bilateral and multilateral assurances of nuclear fuel 
supply, and ensure that all supply mechanisms operate in strict 
accordance with the IAEA safeguards system and do not result in any 
additional unmet verification burdens for the system.

SEC. 103. SAFEGUARDS ANALYTICAL LABORATORY.

    (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--In addition to the amount 
requested by the President for United States Voluntary Contributions to 
the IAEA for Fiscal Year 2008, an additional $10,000,000 is authorized 
to be appropriated under this Act for the refurbishment or possible 
replacement of the IAEA Safeguards Analytical Laboratory.
    (b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report on the refurbishment or 
possible replacement of the IAEA Safeguards Analytical Laboratory 
pursuant to subsection (a).

SEC. 104. SAFEGUARDS TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM.

    The Secretary of State is authorized, in cooperation with the 
Secretary of Energy and the Directors of the National Laboratories and 
in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of 
National Intelligence, to pursue a program--
            (1) to strengthen technical safeguards research and 
        development;
            (2) to increase resources, identify near-term technology 
        goals, formulate a technology roadmap, and improve interagency 
        coordination on safeguards technology; and
            (3) to examine proliferation resistance in design and 
        development of all future nuclear energy systems.

                     TITLE II--NUCLEAR FUEL SUPPLY

SEC. 201. AUTHORITY FOR BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR FUEL SUPPLY 
              MECHANISMS.

    (a) In General.--The President is authorized to create, consistent 
with title I of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 
3221 et seq.), and other applicable provisions of law, bilateral and 
multilateral mechanisms to provide a reliable supply of nuclear fuel to 
those countries and groups of countries that adhere to policies 
designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and that 
decide to forgo a national uranium enrichment program and spent nuclear 
fuel reprocessing facilities.
    (b) Purpose of Mechanisms.--The mechanisms authorized under 
subsection (a) shall, to the maximum extent practicable, take into 
account the following:
            (1) The economic rationale for a country or countries 
        pursuing nuclear power, including existing sources of power for 
        such country or countries.
            (2) Whether such country or countries are in compliance 
        with their obligations under applicable safeguards agreements 
        and additional protocols with the IAEA.
            (3) Whether or not the development in such country or 
        countries of the complete nuclear fuel cycle would impose new, 
        costly IAEA safeguards measures that cannot be supported by 
        current IAEA safeguards implementation in such country or 
        countries, such that there is a reasonable assurance that all 
        nuclear materials in such country or countries are for peaceful 
        purposes and that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or 
        activities in such country or countries.
            (4) An evaluation of the proliferation dangers of such 
        country or countries developing nuclear fuel cycle facilities 
        for the production and disposition of source and special 
        nuclear materials.
            (5) Whether or not the country or countries that would be 
        recipients of nuclear fuel or other assistance provided by the 
        United States are or have ever been designated as state 
        sponsors of terrorism pursuant to section 620A of the Foreign 
        Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371), section 40 of the Arms 
        Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780), or section 6(j) of the 
        Export Administration Act (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)).
            (6) If done under a bilateral supply mechanism, whether 
        IAEA safeguards are being applied or will be applied to any 
        facility, site, or location where international nuclear fuel 
        supply activities are to be carried out.
            (7) Whether, in the case of a multilateral supply 
        mechanism, procedures are in place to ensure that when United 
        States funds are used or when United States nuclear materials 
        are to be used, exported, or reexported, all applicable 
        provisions of United States law are followed.
            (8) Whether the recipient country or countries of any fuel 
        provided under this Act are or will become a party, prior to 
        the commencement of any nuclear fuel supply under this Act, 
        to--
                    (A) the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;
                    (B) in the case of a non-nuclear-weapon State Party 
                to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, a 
                comprehensive safeguards agreement that is in force, 
                pursuant to which the IAEA has the right and obligation 
                to ensure that safeguards are applied, in accordance 
                with the terms of the agreement, on all source or 
                special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear 
                activities within the territory of such country, under 
                its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control 
                anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that 
                such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or 
                other nuclear explosive devices;
                    (C) an additional protocol;
                    (D) the Convention on Nuclear Safety, done at 
                Vienna September 20, 1994, and entered into force 
                October 24, 1996;
                    (E) the Convention on Physical Protection of 
                Nuclear Materials, done at Vienna October 26, 1979, and 
                entered into force February 8, 1987; and
                    (F) the Convention on Supplementary Compensation 
                for Nuclear Damage, done at Vienna September 12, 1997.
            (9) The extent to which the recipient country or countries 
        have or will have prior to the commencement of any nuclear fuel 
        supply under this Act effective and enforceable export controls 
        regarding nuclear and dual-use nuclear technology and other 
        sensitive materials comparable to those maintained by the 
        United States.
            (10) The conformity of the safety and regulatory regimes in 
        the recipient country or countries regarding the nuclear power 
        sector with similar United States laws and regulations.
            (11) The history of safety or environmental problems 
        associated with any nuclear site, facility, or location in the 
        recipient country or countries in the past, and the potential 
        for future safety or environmental problems or issues in 
        connection with the civilian nuclear power development plan of 
        the country or countries.
            (12) Whether the recipient country or countries have 
        resident within them any persons or entities involved in the 
        illicit trafficking of nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, or 
        dual-use nuclear technology.
            (13) Whether the recipient country or countries have or 
        will have sufficiently open and transparent civilian power 
        markets such that United States firms may benefit from any such 
        bilateral or multilateral supply mechanisms.
    (c) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this Act shall be construed 
to provide any authority with respect to bilateral cooperation with 
another country or countries or any international organization or 
organizations in atomic energy that is additional to the authority 
provided under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.) 
and all other applicable laws and regulations in effect on the date of 
the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 202. REPORT ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL FUEL 
              AUTHORITY.

    (a) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report detailing the feasibility of 
establishing an International Nuclear Fuel Authority (INFA) as called 
for in section 104 (a)(1) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 
(22 U.S.C. 3223(a)(1)).
    (b) Content.--Without regard to any previous reports submitted 
under section 104 (a)(1) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 
(22 U.S.C. 3223), the report required under subsection (a) shall 
evaluate, with respect to the feasibility of the establishment of the 
International Nuclear Fuel Authority, the following:
            (1) United States laws and regulations that could be 
        affected by the establishment of an INFA.
            (2) What the cost to the United States Government could be 
        of establishing an INFA.
            (3) Potential locations for the INFA.
            (4) The potential for creating a fuel supply bank under the 
        control of the INFA.
            (5) Nuclear materials that should be placed within the 
        control of the INFA, including which nuclear activities should 
        be carried out by the INFA for the production of nuclear fuel 
        or for use as fuel.
            (6) Whether the INFA should provide nuclear fuel services 
        to recipient countries.
            (7) Whether a multilateral supply mechanism, such as the 
        INFA, is, in the judgment of the President, superior to 
        bilateral mechanism for nuclear fuel supply.
            (8) How such an international organization should operate 
        to preserve freedom of markets in nuclear fuel and avoid undue 
        interference in the efficient operation of the international 
        nuclear fuel market.
            (9) The degree and extent to which such a multilateral 
        supply mechanism should be under the control of, or a 
        subordinate organization within, the IAEA, including whether 
        establishing such an INFA would be superior or preferable to 
        allowing the IAEA, pursuant to Article IX of the Statute of the 
        IAEA, to become an international broker of nuclear fuel and 
        nuclear fuel services, including with respect to an examination 
        of the costs to IAEA Member States of effectively carrying out 
        clauses (1) through (4) of paragraph (H) of such Article.
            (10) The likely receptivity of the major countries involved 
        in the supply of nuclear fuel and nuclear services to the 
        creation of a multilateral supply mechanism such as the INFA or 
        one under the IAEA.

SEC. 203. SENSE OF THE SENATE ON IAEA FUEL SUPPLY.

    It is the sense of the Senate that--
            (1) consistent with the long-standing support provided by 
        Congress for the nuclear verification and technical cooperation 
        projects of the IAEA, and with a view toward effective 
        verification of safeguards and a desire to ensure that the 
        expansion of nuclear power remains only for peaceful purposes, 
        the United States should support, either in annual voluntary 
        and off-budget contributions to the IAEA, or in the provision 
        of nuclear fuel to the IAEA, a nuclear fuel bank within the 
        IAEA;
            (2) the Senate commends the President for the September 26, 
        2005, announcement at the 49th Session of the General 
        Conference of the IAEA that the United States will reserve up 
        to 17 metric tons of highly enriched uranium for an IAEA 
        verifiable assured supply arrangement;
            (3) the Senate commends the efforts of the Nuclear Threat 
        Initiative (NTI) to contribute $50,000,000 to the IAEA to help 
        create a low enriched uranium stockpile owned and managed by 
        the IAEA; and
            (4) a combination of public and private efforts, including 
        the provisions of law previously enacted in the Nuclear Non-
        Proliferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 3201 et seq.) and other 
        applicable laws, initiatives supported by the President, 
        efforts provided for by private groups, and the recommendations 
        of many relevant studies, such as those cited in section 101, 
        will be necessary to effectively and flexibly manage the growth 
        of civilian nuclear power in a manner that does not result in 
        undue burdens on the IAEA safeguards system.
                                                       Calendar No. 349

110th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                                S. 1138

                          [Report No. 110-151]

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

To enhance nuclear safeguards and to provide assurances of nuclear fuel 
     supply to countries that forgo certain fuel cycle activities.

_______________________________________________________________________

                           September 11, 2007

                       Reported without amendment