110 HRES 910 IH: Calling for the full implementation of the U.S. House of Representatives 2007-12-19 text/xml EN Pursuant to Title 17 Section 105 of the United States Code, this file is not subject to copyright protection and is in the public domain.

IV 110th CONGRESS 1st Session H. RES. 910 IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES December 19, 2007 Mr. Payne submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs RESOLUTION Calling for the full implementation of the Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

Whereas on January 9, 2005, the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), after two and half years of negotiations, signed the Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement at a ceremony in Nairobi, Kenya; Whereas the signing of this agreement effectively ended the 21-year old civil war and triggered a six-year Interim Period; Whereas at the end of the Interim Period, southerners are to hold a referendum to decide their political future; Whereas in September 2005, after weeks of contentious negotiations, the SPLM and the National Congress Party (NCP), formerly known as the National Islamic Front (NIF), agreed on a cabinet; Whereas on July 30, 2005, First Vice President and Chairman of the SPLM, Dr. John Garang, was killed in a plane crash in southern Sudan; Whereas the death of Dr. Garang triggered violence between government security forces and southerners in Khartoum and Juba; Whereas the Bush Administration played a key role in the North-South peace process, while pressing for a resolution of the Darfur crisis in Western Sudan; Whereas through the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD)-sponsored talks, the Bush Administration engaged the parties at the highest levels; Whereas United States financial support for the peace process and technical assistance during the talks were considered by the parties and the mediators as critical; Whereas American interventions at critical times during the negotiations helped break a number of stalemates; Whereas the Bush Administration’s sustained pressure on the Government of Sudan helped secure the Comprehensive Peace Agreement; Whereas, however, the Administration has not been forceful in ensuring implementation of the CPA, despite repeated warnings by SPLM officials; Whereas implementation of the CPA by the Government of National Unity has been selective and at times deliberately slow; Whereas the Bush Administration took the lead in setting up the mechanism to resolve the Abyei problem and a former United States Ambassador to Sudan chaired the Abyei Border Commission (ABC); Whereas the Abyei protocols in the CPA was written by the United States; Whereas the ABC was mandated to define and demarcate the area known as the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms transferred in 1905 to Kordofan in North Sudan; Whereas in July 2005, the ABC submitted its final report to the Presidency; Whereas, according to the CPA, upon presentation of the final report, the Presidency shall take necessary action to put the special administration status of Abyei Area into immediate effect.; Whereas after the signing of the peace agreement, the Abyei area was suppose to be administered by an Executive Council; Whereas members of the Executive Council were suppose to be elected by the residents of Abyei and the Chief Administrator appointed by the Presidency; Whereas at the end of the Interim Period, the residents of Abyei are to choose between retaining a special administrative status in the north or be part of South Sudan; Whereas the Bashir Government has not put in place an administration in Abyei and continues to reject the recommendation of the ABC; Whereas, according to a September 2007 report by the United Nations Secretary General, the lack of administration in Abyei has hampered CPA activities and left gaps in policing, public sanitation, and health services.; Whereas the CPA in many ways continues to face serious challenges despite the number of commissions created and decrees issued by the Presidency to address issues related to the agreement; Whereas in October 2007, the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) suspended the participation of its Ministers, State Ministers, and Presidential Advisors from the Government of National Unity to protest and demand full implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement; Whereas the SPLM has been complaining and urging the Sudanese government to implement key provisions of the CPA and to consult the First Vice President on key issues; Whereas President Omer Bashir has been taking important decisions with little or no consultation with the First Vice President since the signing of the peace agreement in 2005; Whereas on Darfur, President Bashir has been waging war and deliberately sidelining the SPLM on key decisions; Whereas, according to the CPA, the President shall take decisions with the consent of the First Vice President on declaration and termination of state of emergency, declaration of war, appointments that the president is required to make according to the peace agreement, summoning, adjourning, or proroguing the National Assembly, and.; Whereas in December 2007, President Bashir agreed to some of the GOSS demands, although the issue of Abyei remains unresolved in large part due to the intransigence of the Bashir Government; and Whereas if the Abyei issue is not resolved soon, the prospects for war are real: Now, therefore, be it

That the House of Representatives— (1)calls for the full implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement; (2)strongly condemns the obstructionist behavior of the Bashir government; (3)urges President Bush to continue applying pressure on the Government of Sudan to ensure full implementation of the CPA and an end to the genocide in Darfur; (4)strongly condemns any attempt to open up the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in order to appease the Bashir Government; (5)demands full and immediate implementation of the Abyei Border Commission decisions; (6)calls on the Bush Administration to impose additional punitive measures if the Bashir government refuses to implement the United States-led Abyei Commission decisions; and (7)strongly urges President Bush to maintain all sanctions, keep Sudan on the terrorism list, and reject calls to upgrade diplomatic relations with the Bashir government until the CPA is fully implemented and the outcome of the referendum respected by the Bashir government, and a lasting and just peace is secured in Darfur, Sudan.