[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 68 Introduced in House (IH)]







110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. RES. 68

  Recognizing the dangers posed by nuclear weapons and calling on the 
    President to engage in nonproliferation strategies designed to 
  eliminate these weapons of mass destruction from United States and 
                          worldwide arsenals.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 16, 2007

  Ms. Woolsey (for herself, Mr. Farr, Mr. Kucinich, Mr. Grijalva, Ms. 
 Schakowsky, and Mr. Stark) submitted the following resolution; which 
 was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to 
   the Committee on Armed Services, for a period to be subsequently 
   determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such 
 provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION


 
  Recognizing the dangers posed by nuclear weapons and calling on the 
    President to engage in nonproliferation strategies designed to 
  eliminate these weapons of mass destruction from United States and 
                          worldwide arsenals.

Whereas nuclear weapons are inherently indiscriminate and represent a 
        disproportionate use of force;
Whereas, since the end of the Cold War, the United States has squandered a 
        superb opportunity to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in foreign 
        and military affairs and failed to verifiably eliminate existing stocks 
        of nuclear weapons as well as prevent new nuclear dangers from arising, 
        and consequently the threat of nuclear disaster remains unacceptably 
        high;
Whereas United States foreign policy is eroding the network of security treaties 
        that have helped to stem the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological 
        weapons, thus decreasing security for Americans and non-Americans alike;
Whereas the United States has a vital security interest in promoting the 
        nonproliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons, since the only 
        genuine and permanent security from the threat of the use of nuclear 
        weapons is their elimination under strict and effective international 
        control;
Whereas the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (21 UST 
        483) entered into force and became part of United States law on March 5, 
        1970;
Whereas more countries (a total of 188) have ratified the NPT than any other 
        arms limitation and disarmament agreement, a testament to the 
        significance of the NPT;
Whereas the United States has undertaken, in accordance with Article VI of the 
        NPT, to ``pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures 
        relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to 
        nuclear disarmament'';
Whereas the long-term viability of the nonproliferation goal is at risk if the 
        United States fails to implement its Article VI obligations;
Whereas the United States agreed, in connection with the indefinite extension of 
        the NPT in 1995, to the ``determined pursuit'' of ``systematic and 
        progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the 
        ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons'', including a pledge to 
        complete negotiations on a ``universal and internationally and 
        effectively verifiable Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty no later 
        than 1996'';
Whereas, on July 8, 1996, the International Court of Justice, in response to a 
        request for an advisory opinion from the United Nations General 
        Assembly, concluded that--

    (1) ``the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be 
considered contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed 
conflict'';

    (2) ``there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to 
conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects 
under strict and effective international control''; and

    (3) ``[t]he legal import of [the NPT Article VI] obligation ... is an 
obligation to achieve a precise result--nuclear disarmament in all its 
aspects--by adopting a particular course of conduct, namely, the pursuit of 
negotiations on the matter in good faith'';

Whereas, from April 24 to May 19, 2000, the United States and all NPT parties 
        participating in the 2000 NPT Review Conference unanimously agreed to 13 
        steps for the systematic implementation of Article VI, including--

    (1) an unequivocal undertaking to eliminate their nuclear arsenals;

    (2) prompt ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty;

    (3) full implementation of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II 
(START II) (ratified on January 26, 1996) and conclusion of negotiations on 
the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty III (START III) as soon as possible, 
while preserving and strengthening the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (23 
UST 3435; entered into force on October 3, 1972);

    (4) taking concrete measures to reduce the operational status of 
nuclear weapons;

    (5) taking irreversible measures toward total nuclear disarmament;

    (6) increasing transparency regarding nuclear weapons capabilities; and

    (7) diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies;

Whereas the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), signed on May 24, 
        2002, (ratified on March 6, 2003), by President George W. Bush, fails to 
        incorporate key elements of the START II and START III agreements 
        regarding the destruction of delivery vehicles and the dismantlement of 
        warheads, and it fails to provide new verification procedures necessary 
        to effect transparent, meaningful, and permanent reductions crucial to 
        the de-nuclearization process;
Whereas the SORT called for a decrease in the number of deployed strategic 
        nuclear warheads, but projected storage of thousands of strategic 
        warheads, including many capable of quick redeployment;
Whereas rather than affirming the United States obligations under the NPT, the 
        January 9, 2002, Department of Defense Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) 
        called for a New Strategic Triad consisting of nuclear and conventional 
        offensive strike systems integrated with active and passive defenses and 
        a revitalized defense infrastructure with new capabilities;
Whereas the NPR--

    (1) projected indefinite retention of a large, modern, and diverse 
nuclear force totalling many thousands of weapons;

    (2) maintains and expands the role of nuclear weapons in United States 
national security policy, including the use of nuclear weapons in 
``immediate, potential, or unexpected contingencies'';

    (3) reiterated Administration plans not to support ratification of the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty;

    (4) pledged to increase readiness to resume nuclear testing and proceed 
with development of a Ballistic Missile Defense; and

    (5) called for the development of new nuclear weapons capabilities for 
a wide range of missions, including nuclear earth-penetrating weapons to 
strike hardened and deeply buried targets, and low-yield nuclear warheads;

Whereas rather than affirming the United States obligations under the NPT, the 
        September 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States set forth 
        an aggressive policy of preventive self-defense in which ``America will 
        act against ... emerging threats before they are fully formed'';
Whereas rather than affirming the United States obligations under the NPT, the 
        December 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction 
        (WMD) stated that ``The United States ... reserves the right to respond 
        with overwhelming force--including through resort to all of our 
        options--to the use of WMD against the United States, our forces abroad, 
        and friends and allies'', with both ``conventional and nuclear 
        response'' capabilities;
Whereas the current annual funding for the United States nuclear weapons 
        activities account stands at $6 billion, representing a 45 percent 
        increase over the Cold War average of approximately $4 billion per year;
Whereas the above-detailed policies and programs of the United States are--

    (1) antithetical to United States obligations under the NPT;

    (2) contrary to fundamental requirements of international law, because 
the United Nations Charter does not permit preventive war;

    (3) counterproductive, because United States reliance on nuclear 
weapons encourages other countries to acquire them, ultimately increasing 
the likelihood that a nuclear weapon will be used against the United 
States;

    (4) dangerous, because the assertion of the United States of a right to 
engage in preventive war encourages other countries to assert the same 
right; and

    (5) immoral, because they place a threat of mass destruction, and the 
assertion of a right to initiate war, at the core of United States foreign 
policy;

Whereas nonproliferation strategies based on internationally accepted standards 
        of behavior, ranging from treaties to enforcement mechanisms such as on-
        site inspections, technical surveillance, intelligence sharing, and the 
        destruction of all such weapons of mass destruction, are designed to 
        prevent the proliferation and development of all forms of WMD, so that 
        hostile countries and entities either are unable to procure WMD or are 
        required not to use WMD; and
Whereas nonproliferation strategies emphasizing reciprocity and cooperation that 
        are consistent with international law have been used successfully for 
        the last 50 years, while counterproliferation strategies based primarily 
        on the unilateral use of force, outside the framework of international 
        organizations and agreements, are likely to lead to the disintegration 
        of existing arms control and nonproliferation mechanisms and a renewed, 
        more complex arms race: Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved,  That the House of Representatives--
            (1) requests the President to inform Congress and the 
        Secretary General of the United Nations regarding the efforts 
        and measures the United States has taken with respect to--
                    (A) implementation and observance of Article VI of 
                the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
                (NPT) (21 UST 483);
                    (B) implementation and observance of United Nations 
                General Assembly Resolution 52/38O and subsequent 
                resolutions related to the July 1996 advisory opinion 
                of the International Court of Justice, which called 
                upon all countries to fulfill their nuclear disarmament 
                obligation by commencing multilateral negotiations 
                leading to the early conclusion of a nuclear weapons 
                convention;
                    (C) implementation and observance of United Nations 
                General Assembly Resolution 55/33C and subsequent 
                resolutions welcoming the outcome of the 2000 NPT 
                Review Conference, and affirming that ``a nuclear 
                weapon free world will ultimately require the 
                underpinning of a universal and multilaterally 
                negotiated legally binding instrument''; and
                    (D) nuclear disarmament;
            (2) calls on the President to implement and observe all NPT 
        obligations and commitments and to revise national policies on 
        nuclear weapons accordingly; and
            (3) urges the President, in the interests of protecting and 
        advancing human, national, and global security, to--
                    (A) declare unconditionally that the United States 
                will not use nuclear weapons first, and that pending 
                their elimination, nuclear weapons serve only to deter 
                a nuclear attack by a hostile country or other entity;
                    (B) initiate and conclude multilateral negotiations 
                on sweeping, verifiable, and irreversible steps that 
                countries with nuclear capability shall take to reduce 
                and eventually eliminate strategic and tactical nuclear 
                weapons and their delivery systems;
                    (C) begin verifiable and irreversible reductions in 
                the United States strategic and tactical nuclear 
                weapons and their delivery systems;
                    (D) cooperate with the Russian Federation to remove 
                from deployment nuclear weapons that presently are 
                operational and ready to be launched on short notice;
                    (E) reaffirm the moratorium on nuclear testing and 
                work for ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban 
                Treaty at the earliest possible date;
                    (F) terminate all efforts aimed at enhancing the 
                military capabilities of the United States nuclear 
                arsenal, including research and development for both 
                low-yield nuclear weapons and the ``robust nuclear 
                earth penetrator'' (commonly referred to as ``bunker-
                busters'');
                    (G) terminate all plans for upgrades to existing 
                weapons research and production facilities, and 
                construction of new facilities, including those for 
                plutonium pit manufacturing and tritium production;
                    (H) terminate the declared United States policy of 
                preventive warfare as a response to threats from 
                weapons of mass destruction (WMD);
                    (I) obtain the approval of the Senate or the entire 
                Congress as a condition for withdrawal from and 
                termination of both existing and future security 
                treaties;
                    (J) terminate development of ballistic missile 
                defenses and initiate multilateral negotiations to 
                eliminate ballistic missiles; and
                    (K) support initiatives and multilateral 
                negotiations to ban weapons in outer space.
                                 <all>