[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 626 Introduced in House (IH)]







110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. RES. 626

           Censuring the President and the Attorney General.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             August 4, 2007

  Mr. Hinchey (for himself, Ms. Baldwin, Mr. Capuano, Mr. Cohen, Mr. 
Davis of Illinois, Mr. Farr, Mr. Filner, Mr. Grijalva, Mr. Hall of New 
York, Mr. Honda, Ms. Kaptur, Mr. Kucinich, Ms. Lee, Mrs. Maloney of New 
 York, Mr. Moran of Virginia, Mr. Pastor, Ms. Schakowsky, Ms. Watson, 
 Ms. Shea-Porter, and Mr. Rothman) submitted the following resolution; 
          which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION


 
           Censuring the President and the Attorney General.

    Resolved,

SECTION 1. BASIS FOR CENSURE.

    (a) National Security Agency Wiretapping.--The House of 
Representatives finds the following:
            (1) Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
        Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), and in so doing provided 
        the executive branch with clear authority to wiretap suspected 
        terrorists inside the United States.
            (2) Section 201 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
        Act of 1978 states that it and the criminal wiretap law are the 
        ``exclusive means by which electronic surveillance'' may be 
        conducted by the United States Government, and section 109 of 
        that Act makes it a crime to wiretap individuals without 
        complying with this statutory authority.
            (3) The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 both 
        permits the Government to initiate wiretapping immediately in 
        emergencies as long as the Government obtains approval from the 
        court established under section 103 of the Foreign Intelligence 
        Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803) within 72 hours of 
        initiating the wiretap, and authorizes wiretaps without a court 
        order otherwise required by the Foreign Intelligence 
        Surveillance Act of 1978 for the first 15 days following a 
        declaration of war by Congress.
            (4) The Authorization for Use of Military Force that became 
        law on September 18, 2001 (Public Law 107-40; 50 U.S.C. 1541 
        note), did not grant the President the power to authorize 
        wiretaps of Americans within the United States without 
        obtaining the court orders required by the Foreign Intelligence 
        Surveillance Act of 1978.
            (5) The President's inherent constitutional authority does 
        not give him the power to violate the explicit statutory 
        prohibition on warrantless wiretaps in the Foreign Intelligence 
        Surveillance Act of 1978.
            (6) George W. Bush, President of the United States, 
        authorized the National Security Agency to wiretap Americans 
        within the United States without obtaining the court orders 
        required by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
        for more than 5 years.
            (7) Alberto R. Gonzales, as Attorney General of the United 
        States and as Counsel to the President, reviewed and defended 
        the legality of the President's authorization of wiretaps by 
        the National Security Agency of Americans within the United 
        States without the court orders required by the Foreign 
        Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.
            (8) President George W. Bush repeatedly misled the public 
        prior to the public disclosure of the National Security Agency 
        warrantless surveillance program by indicating his 
        Administration was relying on court orders to wiretap suspected 
        terrorists inside the United States.
            (9) Alberto R. Gonzales misled Congress in January 2005 
        during the hearing on his nomination to be Attorney General of 
        the United States by indicating that a question about whether 
        the President has the authority to authorize warrantless 
        wiretaps in violation of statutory prohibitions presented a 
        ``hypothetical situation,'' even though he was fully aware that 
        a warrantless wiretapping program had been ongoing for several 
        years.
            (10) In statements about the supposed need for the National 
        Security Agency warrantless surveillance program after the 
        public disclosure of the program, President George W. Bush 
        falsely implied that the program was necessary because the 
        executive branch did not otherwise have authority to wiretap 
        suspected terrorists inside the United States.
            (11) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales, despite his 
        admitted awareness that congressional critics of the program 
        support wiretapping terrorists in accordance with the Foreign 
        Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, attempted to create the 
        opposite impression by making public statements such as 
        ``[s]ome people will argue that nothing could justify the 
        Government being able to intercept conversations like the ones 
        the Program targets''.
            (12) President George W. Bush inaccurately stated in his 
        January 31, 2006, State of the Union address that ``[p]revious 
        Presidents have used the same constitutional authority I have, 
        and federal courts have approved the use of that authority.'', 
        even though the Administration has failed to identify a single 
        instance since the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
        1978 became law in which another President has authorized 
        wiretaps inside the United States without complying with the 
        Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, and no Federal 
        court has evaluated whether the President has the inherent 
        authority to authorize wiretaps inside the United States 
        without complying with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
        Act of 1978.
            (13) At a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on February 6, 
        2006, Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales defended the 
        President's misleading statements in the January 31, 2006, 
        State of the Union address.
            (14) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales has misled 
        Congress and the American people repeatedly by stating that 
        there was no serious disagreement among Government officials 
        ``about'' or ``relate[d] to'' the National Security Agency 
        program confirmed by the President.
            (15) According to testimony from former Deputy Attorney 
        General James Comey, Alberto R. Gonzales, while serving as 
        Counsel to the President, participated in a visit to then-
        Attorney General John Ashcroft in the intensive care unit of 
        the hospital in an attempt to convince Mr. Ashcroft to overturn 
        the decision by Mr. Comey, then serving as Acting Attorney 
        General due to Mr. Ashcroft's illness, not to certify the 
        legality of a classified intelligence program, in what Mr. 
        Comey described as ``an effort to take advantage of a very sick 
        man''.
    (b) Detainee and Torture Policy.--The House of Representatives 
finds the following:
            (1) The United States is a party to the Convention Against 
        Torture, the Geneva Conventions, and the International Covenant 
        on Civil and Political Rights.
            (2) Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions requires 
        that detainees in armed conflicts other than those between 
        nations ``shall in all circumstances be treated humanely,'' and 
        the Third Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of 
        War provides additional protections for detainees who qualify 
        as ``prisoners of war''.
            (3) United States law criminalizes any ``act specifically 
        intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or 
        suffering'' under sections 2340 and 2340A of title 18, United 
        States Code, and the War Crimes Act (18 U.S.C. 2441) and 
        recognizes the gravity of such offenses by further providing 
        for civil liability under the Torture Victim Protection Act and 
        the Alien Tort Claims Act.
            (4) In a draft memorandum dated January 25, 2002, Alberto 
        R. Gonzales, in his capacity as Counsel to the President, 
        argued that the protections of the Third Geneva Convention 
        should not be afforded to Taliban and al Qaeda detainees, and 
        described provisions of the Convention as ``quaint'' and 
        ``obsolete''.
            (5) The January 25, 2002, memorandum by then-Counsel to the 
        President Alberto R. Gonzales cited ``reduc[ing] the threat of 
        domestic criminal prosecution'' as a ``positive'' consequence 
        of disavowing the Geneva Conventions' applicability, asserting 
        that such a disavowal ``would provide a solid defense to any 
        future prosecution'' in the event a prosecutor brought charges 
        under the domestic War Crimes Act.
            (6) Secretary of State Colin Powell responded in a January 
        26, 2002, memorandum that such an attempt to evade the Geneva 
        Conventions would ``reverse over a century of U.S. policy and 
        practice in supporting the Geneva Conventions and undermine the 
        protections of the rule of law for our troops''.
            (7) Despite the warnings of the Secretary of State and in 
        contravention of the language of the Third Geneva Convention, 
        President George W. Bush announced on February 7, 2002, that--
                    (A) he did not consider the Convention to apply to 
                al Qaeda fighters; and
                    (B) Taliban detainees would not be entitled to 
                ``prisoner of war'' status under the Convention, 
                despite the fact that Article 5 of the Convention and 
                United States Army regulations expressly require such 
                determinations to be made by a ``competent tribunal''.
            (8) The Supreme Court, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, confirmed 
        that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applies to 
        Taliban forces and al Qaeda forces, and characterized a central 
        legal premise by which the President sought to avoid the 
        obligations of international law as ``erroneous''.
            (9) Alberto R. Gonzales, acting as Counsel to the 
        President, solicited and accepted the August 1, 2002, Office of 
        Legal Counsel memorandum entitled ``Standards of Conduct for 
        Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec.  2340-2340A'', which 
        took the untenable position that ``mere infliction of pain'' is 
        not ``torture'' unless ``the victim ... experiences intense 
        pain or suffering of the kind that is equivalent to the pain 
        that would be associated with serious physical injury so severe 
        that death, organ failure, or permanent damage resulting in a 
        loss of significant body function will likely result.''.
            (10) According to the ``Review of Department of Defense 
        Detention Operations and Detainee Interrogation Techniques'' 
        (the ``Church Report''), issued on March 7, 2005, then-
        Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld on December 2, 2002, 
        authorized the use on Guantanamo Bay detainees of harsh 
        interrogation techniques not listed in the Army Field Manual, 
        including stress positions, hooding, the use of military dogs 
        to exploit phobias, prolonged isolation, sensory deprivation, 
        and forcing Muslim men to shave their beards.
            (11) According to the ``Article 15-6 Investigation of 
        CJSOTF-AP [Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Arabian 
        Peninsula] and 5th SF [Special Forces] Group Detention 
        Operation (Formica Report)'' and Department of Defense 
        documents released under the Freedom of Information Act, 
        Guantanamo Bay detainees were chained to the floor, subjected 
        to loud music, fed only bread and water, and kept for some 
        period of time in cells measuring 4 feet by 4 feet by 20 
        inches.
            (12) The March 2004 investigative report of Major General 
        Antonio Taguba documented ``sadistic, blatant and wanton 
        criminal abuses'' against detainees at the Abu Ghraib detention 
        facility, including sexual and physical abuse, the threat of 
        torture, the forcing of detainees to perform degrading acts 
        designed to assault their religious identity, and the use of 
        dogs to frighten detainees.
            (13) According to Department of Defense documents released 
        under the Freedom of Information Act, the United States Armed 
        Forces held certain Iraqis as ``ghost detainees,'' who were 
        ``not accounted for'' and were hidden from the observation of 
        the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
            (14) Military autopsy reports and death certificates 
        released pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act revealed 
        that at least 39 deaths, and probably more, have occurred among 
        detainees in United States custody overseas, approximately half 
        of which were homicides and 7 of which appear to have been 
        caused by ``strangulation,'' ``asphyxiation'' or fatal ``blunt 
        force injuries''.
            (15) On September 6, 2006, President George W. Bush stated 
        that he had authorized the incommunicado detention of certain 
        suspected terrorist leaders and operatives at secret sites 
        outside the United States under a ``separate program'' operated 
        by the Central Intelligence Agency.
            (16) President George W. Bush has authorized the indefinite 
        detention, without charge or trial, of more than 700 
        individuals at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base on the ground that 
        they are ``enemy combatants'' and therefore may be held until 
        the cessation of hostilities under the laws of war.
            (17) Department of Justice lawyers, representing President 
        George W. Bush and the Department of Defense in a Federal 
        lawsuit brought on behalf of Guantanamo detainees, took the 
        unprecedented position that the term ``enemy combatant'' could 
        in theory justify the indefinite detention of a ``little old 
        lady in Switzerland who writes checks to what she thinks is [a] 
        charity that helps orphans in Afghanistan but is really a front 
        to finance al-Qaeda activities'' and ``a person who teaches 
        English to the son of an al Qaeda member''.
            (18) After the Supreme Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Rasul 
        v. Bush rejected the claim that an alleged ``enemy combatant'' 
        could be detained indefinitely without any meaningful 
        opportunity to challenge the designation, the Deputy Secretary 
        of Defense issued an order on July 7, 2004, creating 
        ``Combatant Status Review Tribunals'' (CSRTs) for the stated 
        purpose of ``review[ing] the detainee's status as an enemy 
        combatant''.
            (19) Such Order--
                    (A) did not allow detainees to be represented by 
                counsel in Combatant Status Review Tribunal 
                proceedings, but instead specified that a ``military 
                officer'' would be assigned to ``assist[ ]'' each 
                detainee and required such military officers to inform 
                the detainees that ``I am neither a lawyer nor your 
                advocate,'' and that ``[n]one of the information you 
                provide me shall be held in confidence'';
                    (B) allowed the detainee to be excluded from 
                attendance during review proceedings involving 
                ``testimony or other matters that would compromise 
                national security if held in the presence of the 
                detainee'';
                    (C) allowed the decision-maker to rely on hearsay 
                evidence and specified that ``[t]he Tribunal is not 
                bound by the rules of evidence such as would apply in a 
                court of law''; and
                    (D) specified that ``there shall be a rebuttable 
                presumption in favor of the Government's evidence''.
            (20) The Government has relied on the above procedures to 
        deprive individuals of their liberty for an indefinite period 
        of time without a meaningful opportunity to confront and rebut 
        the evidence on which that detention is predicated.
            (21) President George W. Bush and the Department of Defense 
        designated at least 2 United States citizens as ``enemy 
        combatants,'' claimed the right to detain them indefinitely on 
        United States soil without charge and without access to 
        counsel, and argued that allowing meaningful judicial review of 
        their detention would be ``constitutionally intolerable''.
            (22) The Supreme Court established in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 
        that meaningful review by a neutral decisionmaker of the 
        detention of United States citizens is constitutionally 
        required, that ``the risk of an erroneous deprivation of a 
        citizen's liberty ... is very real,'' and that the Constitution 
        mandates that a United States citizen be given a fair 
        opportunity to rebut the Government's ``enemy combatant'' 
        designation.
            (23) The administration, having consistently claimed that 
        according United States citizens designated as ``enemy 
        combatants'' the due process protections accorded to criminal 
        defendants in civilian courts would jeopardize national 
        security interests of the utmost importance, elected to pursue 
        criminal charges against alleged ``enemy combatant'' Jose 
        Padilla in a civilian court after holding him in military 
        custody for 3 years.
            (24) The administration, having contended that alleged 
        ``enemy combatant'' and United States citizen Yaser Esam Hamdi 
        was so dangerous that merely allowing him to meet with counsel 
        ``jeopardizes compelling national security interests'' because 
        he might ``pass concealed messages through unwitting 
        intermediaries,'' released Mr. Hamdi from custody after 3 years 
        and allowed him to return to Saudi Arabia.
            (25) President George W. Bush issued ``Military Order of 
        November 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain 
        Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism,'' which authorized 
        the creation of military tribunals to try suspected al Qaeda 
        members and other international terrorist suspects for 
        violations of the law of war.
            (26) Alberto R. Gonzales, as Counsel to the President, in a 
        November 30, 2001, newspaper editorial, defended these military 
        tribunals and misleadingly represented that they would have 
        adequate procedural safeguards, by stating: ``Everyone tried 
        before a military commission will know the charges against him, 
        be represented by qualified counsel and be allowed to present a 
        defense.''.
            (27) The military tribunals' procedural rules as outlined 
        in Military Commission Order No. 1, issued on March 21, 2002, 
        and as subsequently amended--
                    (A) permitted the accused and his civilian counsel 
                to be excluded from any part of the proceeding that the 
                presiding officer decided to close, and never learn 
                what was presented during that portion of the 
                proceeding;
                    (B) permitted the introduction of any evidence that 
                the presiding officer determined would have probative 
                value to a reasonable person, thereby permitting the 
                admission of hearsay and evidence obtained through 
                undue coercion; and
                    (C) restricted appellate review of the commissions 
                to a panel appointed by the Secretary of Defense, 
                followed by review by the Secretary of Defense and a 
                final decision by the President, with no provision for 
                direct appeal to the Federal courts for review by 
                civilian judges.
            (28) Nearly 5 years after the military order was signed, 
        the Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld struck down the 
        military commissions as unlawful, finding that--
                    (A) the military commissions as constituted were 
                not expressly authorized by any congressional act, 
                including the Authorization for Use of Military Force, 
                the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), and the 
                Detainee Treatment Act;
                    (B) the military commission procedures violated the 
                UCMJ, which mandates that rules governing military 
                commissions be as similar to those governing courts-
                martial ``as practicable,'' and which affords the 
                accused the right to be present;
                    (C) the military commission procedures violated 
                Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which is 
                part of the ``law of war'' under UCMJ Article 21 and 
                requires trial in ``a regularly constituted court 
                affording all the judicial guarantees which are 
                recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples''.
            (29) President George W. Bush sought to prevent the 
        Guantanamo detainees from obtaining judicial review of their 
        indefinite confinement by claiming that the writ of habeas 
        corpus was categorically unavailable to non-citizens held at 
        Guantanamo Bay.
            (30) The Supreme Court in Rasul v. Bush squarely rejected 
        this claim, holding that the legal precedent on which the 
        President relied ``plainly does not preclude the exercise of 
        [statutory habeas] jurisdiction'' over the detainees' claims, 
        and that the general presumption against extraterritorial 
        application of a statute, cited by the President, ``certainly 
        has no application'' with respect to detainees at Guantanamo 
        Bay where the United States exercises ``complete jurisdiction 
        and control''.
    (c) United States Attorney Firings and Executive Privilege.--The 
House of Representatives finds the following:
            (1) At least 9 United States Attorneys were told in 2006 
        that they must step down under the authority of President 
        George W. Bush, who had the final decision-making power in 
        terminating the employment of United States Attorneys.
            (2) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales and subordinates 
        under his supervision repeatedly misled Congress and attempted 
        to block legitimate congressional oversight efforts concerning 
        the firing of at least nine United States Attorneys.
            (3) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales repeatedly 
        obscured the true scope of the firings, originally declining to 
        cite a specific number of individuals fired in his testimony on 
        January 18, 2007, acknowledging only seven in his USA Today op-
        ed published on March 6, 2007, acknowledging eight firings in 
        his testimony on April 19, 2007, tacitly conceding there had 
        been nine individuals fired in his testimony on May 10, 2007, 
        and testifying on July 24, 2007, that ``there may have been 
        others'' but he did not know the exact number.
            (4) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales initially 
        characterized the firings as ``an overblown personnel matter,'' 
        claiming that the United States Attorneys had lost his 
        confidence and were fired for ``performance reasons'' when many 
        of those same individuals had received only the highest 
        performance reviews prior to their dismissal.
            (5) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales testified before 
        the Senate on January 18, 2007, that he would ``never, ever 
        make a change in a United States attorney for political 
        reasons,'' but in later testimony on April 19, 2007, and July 
        24, 2007, admitted that he does not know who selected each 
        individual United States Attorney for firing or why they were 
        included on the list of United States Attorneys to be fired.
            (6) Prior to their selection for firing, both former New 
        Mexico United States Attorney David Iglesias and former 
        Washington United States Attorney John McKay received 
        inappropriate phone calls from Members of Congress or their 
        staffs regarding ongoing, politically sensitive investigations 
        and the White House received complaints about the manner in 
        which they were conducting those investigations.
            (7) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales testified before 
        the Senate on January 18, 2007, that he would not fire a United 
        States Attorney ``if it would in any way jeopardize an ongoing 
        serious investigation,'' but later testified, as did his 
        subordinates, that concerns about whether ongoing 
        investigations would be jeopardized were not explored prior to 
        the firings and were specifically ignored when some fired 
        United States Attorneys asked for a delay in their departure 
        dates to allow them to wrap up ongoing investigations.
            (8) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales publicly stated on 
        March 13, 2007, that he was ``not involved in seeing any memos, 
        was not involved in any discussions about what was going on'' 
        regarding the process leading up to the firing of the United 
        States Attorneys, but later testimony from his subordinates and 
        documents released by the Department of Justice indicate that 
        the Attorney General was, in fact, regularly briefed on the 
        process and did receive at least one memo in November 2005 
        regarding the planned firings.
            (9) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales publicly stated on 
        May 15, 2007, that Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty's 
        participation in the firing of the United States Attorneys was 
        of central importance to the validity of the process and to the 
        Attorney General's decision to fire the specific individuals, 
        but he had previously testified on April 19, 2007, that he did 
        not discuss the process with Mr. McNulty prior to firing the 
        United States Attorneys, and that ``looking back ... I would 
        have had the deputy attorney general more involved, directly 
        involved''.
            (10) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales testified on May 
        10, 2007, that, after the start of the congressional 
        investigation into the firings, he had refrained from 
        discussing the firings with anyone involved because he did not 
        want to interfere with the ongoing investigations, but former 
        White House Liaison for the Department of Justice, Monica 
        Goodling, testified on May 23, 2007, that the Attorney General 
        spoke with her in late March of 2007 and ``laid out ... his 
        general recollection ... of some of the process regarding the 
        replacement of the United States Attorneys.''
            (11) Former White House Liaison for the Department of 
        Justice, Monica Goodling, also testified on May 23, 2007, that 
        she did not respond to what Attorney General Alberto R. 
        Gonzales said about his recollection because ``I did not know 
        if it was appropriate for us to both be discussing our 
        recollections of what had happened, and I just thought maybe we 
        shouldn't have that conversation.''
            (12) President George W. Bush has consistently stonewalled 
        congressional attempts at oversight by refusing to turn over 
        White House documents relating to the firing of at least 9 
        United States Attorneys and refusing to allow current or former 
        White House officials to testify before Congress on this 
        matter, based on an excessively broad and legally insufficient 
        assertion of executive privilege.
            (13) President George W. Bush has asserted executive 
        privilege in refusing even to turn over correspondence between 
        non-Executive Branch officials and White House officials 
        concerning the firings of at least 9 United States Attorneys, 
        even though such communications could not reasonably be 
        classified as falling within the privilege.
            (14) President George W. Bush has directed at least two 
        staff members, former and current, to ignore congressional 
        subpoenas altogether, ordering former Counsel to the President 
        Harriet Miers and current Deputy Chief of Staff and Senior 
        Adviser to the President Karl Rove not to appear at 
        Congressional oversight hearings based on the assertion that 
        immediate presidential advisors are ``immune from compelled 
        Congressional testimony about matters that arose during [their] 
        tenure,'' rather than simply instructing them to refrain from 
        answering questions that might be covered by a proper assertion 
        of executive privilege.
            (15) President George W. Bush has refused to work to find a 
        compromise with Congress or otherwise accommodate legitimate 
        congressional oversight efforts, disregarding the proper 
        relationship between the executive and legislative branches and 
        demonstrating a belief that he and his Administration are above 
        oversight and the rule of law.
    (d) Misleading Statements on the USA Patriot Act.--The House of 
Representatives finds the following:
            (1) President George W. Bush made misleading claims during 
        the course of the Administration's 2005 campaign to reauthorize 
        the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, by suggesting that Federal 
        officials did not have access to the same tools to investigate 
        terrorism as they did to investigate other crimes.
            (2) In 2005 the Federal Bureau of Investigation transmitted 
        to Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales multiple reports of 
        violations of law in connection with provisions of the USA 
        PATRIOT Act and related authorities, including unauthorized 
        surveillance and improper collection of communications data 
        that were serious enough to require notification of the 
        President's Intelligence Oversight Board.
            (3) Despite these reports, Attorney General Alberto R. 
        Gonzales told Congress and the American people in the course of 
        the Administration's 2005 campaign to reauthorize the USA 
        PATRIOT Act of 2001 that ``[t]he track record established over 
        the past three years has demonstrated the effectiveness of the 
        safeguards of civil liberties put in place when the Act was 
        passed,'' that ``[t]here has not been one verified case of 
        civil liberties abuse,'' and that ``no one has provided me with 
        evidence that the Patriot Act is being abused or misused''.
            (4) The United States Department of Justice sent a 10-page 
        letter to Congress dated November 23, 2005--
                    (A) stating that a November 6, 2005, Washington 
                Post story detailing the Federal Bureau of 
                Investigation's use of National Security Letters was a 
                ``materially misleading portrayal'' full of 
                ``distortions and factual errors'';
                    (B) defending its use of National Security Letters 
                by pointing to the Department's ``robust mechanisms for 
                checking misuse,'' ``significant internal oversight and 
                checks,'' and reports to Congress regarding the number 
                of National Security Letters issued; and
                    (C) stating that the November 6, 2005, Washington 
                Post story was inaccurate in stating that ``The FBI now 
                issues more than 30,000 National Security Letters a 
                year, ... a hundredfold increase over historic 
                norms.''.
            (5) On March 9, 2007, the Inspector General for the United 
        States Department of Justice issued a report on the Federal 
        Bureau of Investigation's use of National Security Letters from 
        2003 through 2005--
                    (A) that the Inspector General said found 
                ``widespread and serious misuse of the FBI's national 
                security letter authorities'' that ``in many instances 
                ... violated NSL statutes, Attorney General Guidelines, 
                or the FBI's own internal policies,'' and found that 
                ``the FBI did not provide adequate guidance, adequate 
                controls, or adequate training on the use of these 
                sensitive authorities''; and
                    (B) that indicated the Federal Bureau of 
                Investigation issued approximately 39,000 National 
                Security Letter requests in 2003, 56,000 National 
                Security Letter requests in 2004, and 47,000 National 
                Security Letter requests in 2005.
            (6) The United States Department of Justice sent a letter 
        on March 9, 2007, to Congress, admitting that it had 
        ``determined that certain statements in our November 23, 2005 
        letter need clarification'' in light of the Inspector General's 
        findings and that ``the reports [The Department of Justice] 
        provided Congress in response to statutory reporting 
        requirements did not accurately reflect the FBI's use of 
        NSLs''.
    (e) Signing Statements.--The House of Representatives finds the 
following:
            (1) President George W. Bush has lodged more than 800 
        challenges to duly enacted provisions of law by issuing signing 
        statements that indicate that the President does not believe he 
        must comply with such provisions of law.
            (2) Such signing statements effectively assign to the 
        executive branch alone the decision whether to fully comply 
        with the laws that Congress has passed.
            (3) On December 30, 2005, President George W. Bush signed 
        the Department of Defense Emergency Supplemental Appropriations 
        to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic 
        Influenza Act, 2006, title X of which prohibits the Government 
        from subjecting any individual ``in the custody or under the 
        physical control of the United States Government, regardless of 
        nationality or physical location'' to ``cruel, inhuman, or 
        degrading treatment or punishment''.
            (4) President George W. Bush issued a signing statement to 
        such Act that suggested he believed he did not have to comply 
        with the prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman and 
        degrading treatment, stating: ``The executive branch shall 
        construe Title X in Division A of the Act, relating to 
        detainees, in a manner consistent with the constitutional 
        authority of the President to supervise the unitary executive 
        branch and as Commander in Chief and consistent with the 
        constitutional limitations on the judicial power, which will 
        assist in achieving the shared objective of the Congress and 
        the President, evidenced in Title X, of protecting the American 
        people from further terrorist attacks.''.
            (5) On March 9, 2006, President George W. Bush signed the 
        USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, which 
        requires that the executive branch furnish reports to Congress 
        on certain surveillance activities.
            (6) President George W. Bush issued a signing statement to 
        such Act that suggested he believed he did not have to comply 
        fully with these reporting requirements, stating: ``The 
        executive branch shall construe the provisions of H.R. 3199 
        that call for furnishing information to entities outside the 
        executive branch, such as sections 106A and 119, in a manner 
        consistent with the President's constitutional authority to 
        supervise the unitary executive branch and to withhold 
        information the disclosure of which could impair foreign 
        relations, national security, the deliberative processes of the 
        Executive, or the performance of the Executive's constitutional 
        duties.''.
            (7) On December 20, 2006, President George W. Bush signed 
        the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act, which protects 
        certain classes of sealed domestic mail from being opened 
        except in specifically defined circumstances.
            (8) President George W. Bush issued a signing statement to 
        such Act that suggested he believed he did not have to comply 
        with this provision, stating: ``The executive branch shall 
        construe subsection 404(c) of title 39, as enacted by 
        subsection 1010(e) of the Act, which provides for opening of an 
        item of a class of mail otherwise sealed against inspection, in 
        a manner consistent, to the maximum extent permissible, with 
        the need to conduct searches in exigent circumstances, such as 
        to protect human life and safety against hazardous materials, 
        and the need for physical searches specifically authorized by 
        law for foreign intelligence collection.''
            (9) The American Bar Association Task Force on Presidential 
        Signing Statements and the Separation of Powers Doctrine 
        concluded that President George W. Bush's misuse of signing 
        statements ``weaken[s] our cherished system of checks and 
        balances and separation of powers''.

SEC. 2. CENSURE BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

    The House of Representatives censures George W. Bush, President of 
the United States, and Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General of the 
United States, and condemns their lengthy record of--
            (1) undermining the rule of law and the separation of 
        powers;
            (2) disregarding statutes, treaties ratified by the United 
        States, and the Constitution; and
            (3) repeatedly misleading the American people.
                                 <all>