[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 625 Introduced in House (IH)]
110th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. RES. 625
Censuring the President and Vice President.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
August 4, 2007
Mr. Hinchey (for himself, Ms. Baldwin, Mr. Capuano, Mr. Cohen, Mr.
Davis of Illinois, Mr. Farr, Mr. Filner, Mr. Grijalva, Mr. Hall of New
York, Mr. Honda, Ms. Kaptur, Mr. Kucinich, Ms. Lee, Mrs. Maloney of New
York, Mr. Moran of Virginia, Mr. Pastor, Ms. Schakowsky, Ms. Watson,
Ms. Shea-Porter, and Mr. Rothman) submitted the following resolution;
which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary
_______________________________________________________________________
RESOLUTION
Censuring the President and Vice President.
Resolved,
SECTION 1. BASIS FOR CENSURE.
(a) Iraq's Alleged Nuclear Program.--The House of Representatives
finds the following:
(1) In December 2001, the intelligence community assessed
that Iraq did not appear to have reconstituted its nuclear
weapons program.
(2) The October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate
assessed that Iraq did not have a nuclear weapon or sufficient
material to make one, and that without sufficient fissile
material acquired from abroad, Iraq probably would not be able
to make a weapon until 2007 or 2009.
(3) On October 6, 2002, the Central Intelligence Agency
advised the White House to remove references to Iraq seeking
uranium from Africa from a Presidential speech, citing weak
evidence.
(4) In November 2002, the United States Government told the
International Atomic Energy Association that ``reporting on
Iraqi attempts to procure uranium from Africa are fragmentary
at best.''.
(5) On March 7, 2003, the Director General of the
International Atomic Energy Association reported to the United
Nations Security Council that inspectors had found ``no
evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear
weapons program in Iraq.''.
(6) On March 11, 2003, the Central Intelligence Agency
stated that it did not dispute the International Atomic Energy
Association conclusions that the documents on Iraq's agreement
to buy uranium from Niger were not authentic.
(7) President George W. Bush and Vice President Richard B.
Cheney overstated the nature and urgency of the threat posed by
Saddam Hussein by making repeated, unqualified assertions about
an Iraqi nuclear program that were not supported by available
intelligence, including--
(A) on March 22, 2002, President George W. Bush
stated that ``[Saddam] is a dangerous man who possesses
the world's most dangerous weapons.'';
(B) on August 26, 2002, Vice President Richard B.
Cheney stated that ``[m]any of us are convinced that
Saddam will acquire nuclear weapons fairly soon.'';
(C) on September 8, 2002, Vice President Richard B.
Cheney stated that ``[w]e do know, with absolute
certainty, that he is using his procurement system to
acquire the equipment he needs in order to enrich
uranium to build a nuclear weapon.'';
(D) on September 20, 2002, Vice President Richard
B. Cheney stated that ``we now have irrefutable
evidence that he has once again set up and
reconstituted his program, to take uranium, to enrich
it to sufficiently high grade, so that it will function
as the base material as a nuclear weapon.'';
(E) on October 7, 2002, President George W. Bush
stated that ``[f]acing clear evidence of peril, we
cannot wait for the final proof--the smoking gun--that
could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.'';
(F) on December 31, 2002, President George W. Bush
stated that ``[w]e don't know whether or not [Saddam]
has a nuclear weapon.'';
(G) on January 28, 2003, President George W. Bush
stated that ``[t]he British government has learned that
Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities
of uranium from Africa.''; and
(H) on March 16, 2003, Vice President Richard B.
Cheney stated that ``[w]e believe [Hussein] has, in
fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons.''.
(b) Saddam's Alleged Intent To Use Weapons of Mass Destruction.--
The House of Representatives finds the following:
(1) The October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate
assessed that ``Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line
short of conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or CBW
against the United States, fearing that exposure of Iraqi
involvement would provide Washington a stronger cause for
making war'' and that ``Iraq probably would attempt clandestine
attacks against the United States Homeland if Baghdad feared an
attack that threatened the survival of the regime were imminent
or unavoidable, or possibly for revenge.''.
(2) President George W. Bush and Vice President Richard B.
Cheney made misleading statements, that were not supported by
the available intelligence, suggesting that Saddam Hussein
sought weapons of mass destruction for the purpose of an
unprovoked, offensive attack, including--
(A) on August 26, 2002, Vice President Richard B.
Cheney stated that ``... there is no doubt that Saddam
Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is
no doubt he is amassing them to use against our
friends, against our allies, and against us.'';
(B) on August 26, 2002, Vice President Richard B.
Cheney stated that ``[t]hese are not weapons for the
purpose of defending Iraq; these are offensive weapons
for the purpose of inflicting death on a massive scale,
developed so that Saddam can hold the threat over the
head of anyone he chooses, in his own region or
beyond.''; and
(C) on October 2, 2002, President George W. Bush
stated that ``On its present course, the Iraqi regime
is a threat of unique urgency. We know the treacherous
history of the regime. It has waged a war against its
neighbors, it has sponsored and sheltered terrorists,
it has developed weapons of mass death, it has used
them against innocent men, women and children. We know
the designs of the Iraqi regime.''.
(c) Saddam's Alleged Links to Al Qaeda and 9/11.--The House of
Representatives finds the following:
(1) Before the war, the Central Intelligence Agency
assessed that ``Saddam has viewed Islamic extremists operating
inside Iraq as a threat, and his regime since its inception has
arrested and executed members of both Shia and Sunni groups to
disrupt their organizations and limit their influence,'' that
``Saddam Hussain and Usama bin Laden are far from being natural
partners,'' and that assessments about Iraqi links to al Qaeda
rest on ``a body of fragmented, conflicting reporting from
sources of varying reliability.''.
(2) President George W. Bush and Vice President Richard B.
Cheney overstated the threat posed by Saddam Hussein by making
unqualified assertions that were not supported by available
intelligence linking Saddam Hussein to the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks and stating that Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda
had a relationship and that Saddam Hussein would provide al
Qaeda with weapons of mass destruction for purposes of an
offensive attack against the United States, including--
(A) on September 25, 2002, President George W. Bush
stated that ``[Y]ou can't distinguish between al Qa'ida
and Saddam when you talk about the war on terror.'';
(B) on September 26, 2002, President George W. Bush
stated that ``[t]he dangers we face will only worsen
from month to month and from year to year. ... Each
passing day could be the one on which the Iraqi regime
gives anthrax or VX--nerve gas--or some day a nuclear
weapon to a terrorist ally.'';
(C) on October 14, 2002, President George W. Bush
stated that ``[t]his is a man that we know has had
connections with al Qa'ida. This is a man who, in my
judgment, would like to use al Qa'ida as a forward
army.'';
(D) on November 7, 2002, President George W. Bush
stated that ``[Saddam is] a threat because he is
dealing with al Qaida ... [A] true threat facing our
country is that an al Qaida-type network trained and
armed by Saddam could attack America and not leave one
fingerprint.'';
(E) on January 31, 2003, President George W. Bush
stated that ``Saddam Hussein would like nothing more
than to use a terrorist network to attack and to kill
and leave no fingerprints behind.'';
(F) on March 16, 2003, Vice President Richard B.
Cheney stated that ``we also have to address the
question of where might these terrorists acquire
weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons,
biological weapons, nuclear weapons? And Saddam Hussein
becomes a prime suspect in that regard because of his
past track record and because we know he has, in fact,
developed these kinds of capabilities, chemical and
biological weapons. We know he's used chemical weapons.
And we know he's reconstituted these programs since the
Gulf War. We know he's out trying once again to produce
nuclear weapons and we know that he has a long-standing
relationship with various terrorist groups, including
the al-Qaeda organization.'';
(G) on March 17, 2003, President George W. Bush
stated that ``The danger is clear: using chemical,
biological or, one day, nuclear weapons obtained with
the help of Iraq, the terrorists could fulfill their
stated ambitions and kill thousands or hundreds of
thousands of innocent people in our country or any
other.'';
(H) on May 1, 2003, President George W. Bush stated
that ``[t]he liberation of Iraq ... removed an ally of
al Qaeda.'';
(I) on September 14, 2003, Vice President Richard
B. Cheney stated that ``the Iraqi intelligen[ce]
service had a relationship with al Qaeda that developed
throughout the decade of the 90's. That was clearly
official policy.'';
(J) on September 14, 2003, Vice President Richard
B. Cheney stated that ``[i]f we're successful in Iraq
... we will have struck a major blow right at the heart
of the base, if you will, the geographic base of the
terrorists who have had us under assault now for many
years, but most especially on 9/11.''; and
(K) on March 21, 2006, President George W. Bush
said at a press conference, ``But we realized on
September the 11th, 2001, that killers could destroy
innocent life. And I'm never going to forget it. And
I'm never going to forget the vow I made to the
American people that we will do everything in our power
to protect our people. Part of that meant to make sure
that we didn't allow people to provide safe haven to an
enemy. And that's why I went into Iraq.''.
(d) Inadequate Planning and Insufficient Troop Levels.--The House
of Representatives finds the following:
(1) The intelligence community judged in January 2003 that
``[t]he ouster of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussayn would pose a
variety of significant policy challenges for whoever assumes
responsibility for governing Iraq'' including ``political
transformation, controlling internal strife, solving economic
and humanitarian challenges, and dealing with persistent
foreign policy and security concerns.''.
(2) The intelligence community judged in January 2003 that
``a post-Saddam authority would face a deeply divided society
with a significant chance that domestic groups would engage in
violent conflict with each other unless an occupying force
prevented them from doing so.''.
(3) These judgments were delivered to the White House and
Office of the Vice President.
(4) Then Army Chief of Staff General Shinseki testified on
February 25, 2003, that ``something on the order of several
hundred thousands soldiers'' would be needed to secure Iraq
following a successful completion of the war.
(5) General Abizaid, then-CENTCOM commander, testified
before the Senate Armed Services Committee on November 15,
2006, that ``General Shinseki was right that a greater
international force contribution, United States force
contribution and Iraqi force contribution should have been
available immediately after major combat operations.''.
(6) After President George W. Bush declared the end of
major combat operations in Iraq, there were insufficient troops
to prevent the outbreak of violence and lawlessness that
contributed to the flight of millions of Iraqis and the deaths
of tens of thousands of Iraqis.
(7) The Government Accountability Office provided testimony
to the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs,
House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, on March
22, 2007, that due to insufficient troop levels, United States
forces were unable to secure conventional weapons stockpiles in
Iraq that continue to pose a threat to American servicemembers.
(8) President George W. Bush failed to ensure that plans
were prepared and implemented to address the challenges that
the intelligence community predicted would occur after the
ouster of Saddam Hussein, and in particular failed to ensure
that there were sufficient coalition troops in Iraq after major
combat operations ended to maintain security and secure weapons
stockpiles.
(e) Strain on Military and Undermining Homeland Security.--The
House of Representatives finds the following:
(1) Retired Major General John Batiste, former commander of
the First Infantry Division in Iraq, testified before the House
Committee on International Relations on June 27, 2007, that
``[o]ur Army and Marine Corps are at a breaking point at a time
in history when we need a strong military the most. The cycle
of deployments is staggering. American formations continue to
lose a battalion's worth of dead and wounded every month with
little to show for it. The current recruiting system falls
drastically short of long-term requirements and our all-
volunteer force can not sustain the current tempo for much
longer. The military is spending over $1,000,000,000 a year in
incentives in a last ditch effort to keep the force together.
Young officers and noncommissioned officers are leaving the
service at an alarming rate.''.
(2) Extended deployments of 15 months, and insufficient
time to rest and train between deployments, have undermined the
readiness of the Army.
(3) The Army National Guard reported as early as July 2005
that equipment transfers to deploying units ``had largely
exhausted its inventory of more than 220 critical items,
including some items useful to nondeployed units for training
and domestic missions.''.
(4) The Government Accountability Office found, in
September 2006, that ``[a]mong the items for which the Army
National Guard had shortages of over 80 percent of the
authorized inventory were chemical warfare monitoring and
decontamination equipment and night vision goggles''.
(5) President George W. Bush's policies in Iraq have
undermined homeland security by depleting the personnel and
equipment needed by the National Guard.
(f) Insurgency in ``Last Throes''.--The House of Representatives
finds the following:
(1) Multi-National Force-Iraq reports indicate that the
number of attacks on coalition forces has increased since the
beginning of military action.
(2) The Government Accountability Office, in March 2007,
reported that attacks using improvised explosive devices
continued to increase between 2005 and July 2006.
(3) On June 23, 2005, General John Abizaid, in his capacity
as head of Central Command, testified before the Senate Armed
Services Committee about the state of the insurgency that
``[i]n terms of comparison from 6 months ago, in terms of
foreign fighters I believe there are more foreign fighters
coming into Iraq than there were 6 months ago. In terms of the
overall strength of the insurgency, I'd say it's about the same
as it was.''.
(4) President George W. Bush's Initial Benchmark Assessment
report from July 12, 2007, states that ``[a]s a result of
increased offensive operations, Coalition and Iraqi Forces have
sustained increased attacks in Iraq, particularly in Baghdad,
Diyala, and Salah ad Din.''.
(5) Vice President Richard B. Cheney made misleading
statements that the insurgency in Iraq was in its ``last
throes,'' including--
(A) on May 30, 2005, Vice President Richard B.
Cheney said, ``The level of activity that we see today
from a military standpoint, I think, will clearly
decline. I think they're in the last throes, if you
will, of the insurgency.''; and
(B) on June 19, 2006, Vice President Richard B.
Cheney was asked whether he still supported the comment
he made in 2005, regarding the fact that the insurgency
in Iraq was in its ``last throes,'' to which he
responded ``I do.''
SEC. 2. CENSURE BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
The House of Representatives censures President George W. Bush and
Vice President Richard B. Cheney for--
(1) misleading the American people about the basis for
going to war in Iraq;
(2) failing to plan adequately for the war;
(3) pursuing policies in Iraq that have strained our
military and undermined our homeland security; and
(4) misleading the American people about the insurgency in
Iraq.
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