[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 625 Introduced in House (IH)]







110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. RES. 625

              Censuring the President and Vice President.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             August 4, 2007

  Mr. Hinchey (for himself, Ms. Baldwin, Mr. Capuano, Mr. Cohen, Mr. 
Davis of Illinois, Mr. Farr, Mr. Filner, Mr. Grijalva, Mr. Hall of New 
York, Mr. Honda, Ms. Kaptur, Mr. Kucinich, Ms. Lee, Mrs. Maloney of New 
 York, Mr. Moran of Virginia, Mr. Pastor, Ms. Schakowsky, Ms. Watson, 
 Ms. Shea-Porter, and Mr. Rothman) submitted the following resolution; 
          which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION


 
              Censuring the President and Vice President.

    Resolved,

SECTION 1. BASIS FOR CENSURE.

    (a) Iraq's Alleged Nuclear Program.--The House of Representatives 
finds the following:
            (1) In December 2001, the intelligence community assessed 
        that Iraq did not appear to have reconstituted its nuclear 
        weapons program.
            (2) The October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate 
        assessed that Iraq did not have a nuclear weapon or sufficient 
        material to make one, and that without sufficient fissile 
        material acquired from abroad, Iraq probably would not be able 
        to make a weapon until 2007 or 2009.
            (3) On October 6, 2002, the Central Intelligence Agency 
        advised the White House to remove references to Iraq seeking 
        uranium from Africa from a Presidential speech, citing weak 
        evidence.
            (4) In November 2002, the United States Government told the 
        International Atomic Energy Association that ``reporting on 
        Iraqi attempts to procure uranium from Africa are fragmentary 
        at best.''.
            (5) On March 7, 2003, the Director General of the 
        International Atomic Energy Association reported to the United 
        Nations Security Council that inspectors had found ``no 
        evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear 
        weapons program in Iraq.''.
            (6) On March 11, 2003, the Central Intelligence Agency 
        stated that it did not dispute the International Atomic Energy 
        Association conclusions that the documents on Iraq's agreement 
        to buy uranium from Niger were not authentic.
            (7) President George W. Bush and Vice President Richard B. 
        Cheney overstated the nature and urgency of the threat posed by 
        Saddam Hussein by making repeated, unqualified assertions about 
        an Iraqi nuclear program that were not supported by available 
        intelligence, including--
                    (A) on March 22, 2002, President George W. Bush 
                stated that ``[Saddam] is a dangerous man who possesses 
                the world's most dangerous weapons.'';
                    (B) on August 26, 2002, Vice President Richard B. 
                Cheney stated that ``[m]any of us are convinced that 
                Saddam will acquire nuclear weapons fairly soon.'';
                    (C) on September 8, 2002, Vice President Richard B. 
                Cheney stated that ``[w]e do know, with absolute 
                certainty, that he is using his procurement system to 
                acquire the equipment he needs in order to enrich 
                uranium to build a nuclear weapon.'';
                    (D) on September 20, 2002, Vice President Richard 
                B. Cheney stated that ``we now have irrefutable 
                evidence that he has once again set up and 
                reconstituted his program, to take uranium, to enrich 
                it to sufficiently high grade, so that it will function 
                as the base material as a nuclear weapon.'';
                    (E) on October 7, 2002, President George W. Bush 
                stated that ``[f]acing clear evidence of peril, we 
                cannot wait for the final proof--the smoking gun--that 
                could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.'';
                    (F) on December 31, 2002, President George W. Bush 
                stated that ``[w]e don't know whether or not [Saddam] 
                has a nuclear weapon.'';
                    (G) on January 28, 2003, President George W. Bush 
                stated that ``[t]he British government has learned that 
                Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities 
                of uranium from Africa.''; and
                    (H) on March 16, 2003, Vice President Richard B. 
                Cheney stated that ``[w]e believe [Hussein] has, in 
                fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons.''.
    (b) Saddam's Alleged Intent To Use Weapons of Mass Destruction.--
The House of Representatives finds the following:
            (1) The October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate 
        assessed that ``Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line 
        short of conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or CBW 
        against the United States, fearing that exposure of Iraqi 
        involvement would provide Washington a stronger cause for 
        making war'' and that ``Iraq probably would attempt clandestine 
        attacks against the United States Homeland if Baghdad feared an 
        attack that threatened the survival of the regime were imminent 
        or unavoidable, or possibly for revenge.''.
            (2) President George W. Bush and Vice President Richard B. 
        Cheney made misleading statements, that were not supported by 
        the available intelligence, suggesting that Saddam Hussein 
        sought weapons of mass destruction for the purpose of an 
        unprovoked, offensive attack, including--
                    (A) on August 26, 2002, Vice President Richard B. 
                Cheney stated that ``... there is no doubt that Saddam 
                Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is 
                no doubt he is amassing them to use against our 
                friends, against our allies, and against us.'';
                    (B) on August 26, 2002, Vice President Richard B. 
                Cheney stated that ``[t]hese are not weapons for the 
                purpose of defending Iraq; these are offensive weapons 
                for the purpose of inflicting death on a massive scale, 
                developed so that Saddam can hold the threat over the 
                head of anyone he chooses, in his own region or 
                beyond.''; and
                    (C) on October 2, 2002, President George W. Bush 
                stated that ``On its present course, the Iraqi regime 
                is a threat of unique urgency. We know the treacherous 
                history of the regime. It has waged a war against its 
                neighbors, it has sponsored and sheltered terrorists, 
                it has developed weapons of mass death, it has used 
                them against innocent men, women and children. We know 
                the designs of the Iraqi regime.''.
    (c) Saddam's Alleged Links to Al Qaeda and 9/11.--The House of 
Representatives finds the following:
            (1) Before the war, the Central Intelligence Agency 
        assessed that ``Saddam has viewed Islamic extremists operating 
        inside Iraq as a threat, and his regime since its inception has 
        arrested and executed members of both Shia and Sunni groups to 
        disrupt their organizations and limit their influence,'' that 
        ``Saddam Hussain and Usama bin Laden are far from being natural 
        partners,'' and that assessments about Iraqi links to al Qaeda 
        rest on ``a body of fragmented, conflicting reporting from 
        sources of varying reliability.''.
            (2) President George W. Bush and Vice President Richard B. 
        Cheney overstated the threat posed by Saddam Hussein by making 
        unqualified assertions that were not supported by available 
        intelligence linking Saddam Hussein to the September 11, 2001, 
        terrorist attacks and stating that Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda 
        had a relationship and that Saddam Hussein would provide al 
        Qaeda with weapons of mass destruction for purposes of an 
        offensive attack against the United States, including--
                    (A) on September 25, 2002, President George W. Bush 
                stated that ``[Y]ou can't distinguish between al Qa'ida 
                and Saddam when you talk about the war on terror.'';
                    (B) on September 26, 2002, President George W. Bush 
                stated that ``[t]he dangers we face will only worsen 
                from month to month and from year to year. ... Each 
                passing day could be the one on which the Iraqi regime 
                gives anthrax or VX--nerve gas--or some day a nuclear 
                weapon to a terrorist ally.'';
                    (C) on October 14, 2002, President George W. Bush 
                stated that ``[t]his is a man that we know has had 
                connections with al Qa'ida. This is a man who, in my 
                judgment, would like to use al Qa'ida as a forward 
                army.'';
                    (D) on November 7, 2002, President George W. Bush 
                stated that ``[Saddam is] a threat because he is 
                dealing with al Qaida ... [A] true threat facing our 
                country is that an al Qaida-type network trained and 
                armed by Saddam could attack America and not leave one 
                fingerprint.'';
                    (E) on January 31, 2003, President George W. Bush 
                stated that ``Saddam Hussein would like nothing more 
                than to use a terrorist network to attack and to kill 
                and leave no fingerprints behind.'';
                    (F) on March 16, 2003, Vice President Richard B. 
                Cheney stated that ``we also have to address the 
                question of where might these terrorists acquire 
                weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons, 
                biological weapons, nuclear weapons? And Saddam Hussein 
                becomes a prime suspect in that regard because of his 
                past track record and because we know he has, in fact, 
                developed these kinds of capabilities, chemical and 
                biological weapons. We know he's used chemical weapons. 
                And we know he's reconstituted these programs since the 
                Gulf War. We know he's out trying once again to produce 
                nuclear weapons and we know that he has a long-standing 
                relationship with various terrorist groups, including 
                the al-Qaeda organization.'';
                    (G) on March 17, 2003, President George W. Bush 
                stated that ``The danger is clear: using chemical, 
                biological or, one day, nuclear weapons obtained with 
                the help of Iraq, the terrorists could fulfill their 
                stated ambitions and kill thousands or hundreds of 
                thousands of innocent people in our country or any 
                other.'';
                    (H) on May 1, 2003, President George W. Bush stated 
                that ``[t]he liberation of Iraq ... removed an ally of 
                al Qaeda.'';
                    (I) on September 14, 2003, Vice President Richard 
                B. Cheney stated that ``the Iraqi intelligen[ce] 
                service had a relationship with al Qaeda that developed 
                throughout the decade of the 90's. That was clearly 
                official policy.'';
                    (J) on September 14, 2003, Vice President Richard 
                B. Cheney stated that ``[i]f we're successful in Iraq 
                ... we will have struck a major blow right at the heart 
                of the base, if you will, the geographic base of the 
                terrorists who have had us under assault now for many 
                years, but most especially on 9/11.''; and
                    (K) on March 21, 2006, President George W. Bush 
                said at a press conference, ``But we realized on 
                September the 11th, 2001, that killers could destroy 
                innocent life. And I'm never going to forget it. And 
                I'm never going to forget the vow I made to the 
                American people that we will do everything in our power 
                to protect our people. Part of that meant to make sure 
                that we didn't allow people to provide safe haven to an 
                enemy. And that's why I went into Iraq.''.
    (d) Inadequate Planning and Insufficient Troop Levels.--The House 
of Representatives finds the following:
            (1) The intelligence community judged in January 2003 that 
        ``[t]he ouster of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussayn would pose a 
        variety of significant policy challenges for whoever assumes 
        responsibility for governing Iraq'' including ``political 
        transformation, controlling internal strife, solving economic 
        and humanitarian challenges, and dealing with persistent 
        foreign policy and security concerns.''.
            (2) The intelligence community judged in January 2003 that 
        ``a post-Saddam authority would face a deeply divided society 
        with a significant chance that domestic groups would engage in 
        violent conflict with each other unless an occupying force 
        prevented them from doing so.''.
            (3) These judgments were delivered to the White House and 
        Office of the Vice President.
            (4) Then Army Chief of Staff General Shinseki testified on 
        February 25, 2003, that ``something on the order of several 
        hundred thousands soldiers'' would be needed to secure Iraq 
        following a successful completion of the war.
            (5) General Abizaid, then-CENTCOM commander, testified 
        before the Senate Armed Services Committee on November 15, 
        2006, that ``General Shinseki was right that a greater 
        international force contribution, United States force 
        contribution and Iraqi force contribution should have been 
        available immediately after major combat operations.''.
            (6) After President George W. Bush declared the end of 
        major combat operations in Iraq, there were insufficient troops 
        to prevent the outbreak of violence and lawlessness that 
        contributed to the flight of millions of Iraqis and the deaths 
        of tens of thousands of Iraqis.
            (7) The Government Accountability Office provided testimony 
        to the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, 
        House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, on March 
        22, 2007, that due to insufficient troop levels, United States 
        forces were unable to secure conventional weapons stockpiles in 
        Iraq that continue to pose a threat to American servicemembers.
            (8) President George W. Bush failed to ensure that plans 
        were prepared and implemented to address the challenges that 
        the intelligence community predicted would occur after the 
        ouster of Saddam Hussein, and in particular failed to ensure 
        that there were sufficient coalition troops in Iraq after major 
        combat operations ended to maintain security and secure weapons 
        stockpiles.
    (e) Strain on Military and Undermining Homeland Security.--The 
House of Representatives finds the following:
            (1) Retired Major General John Batiste, former commander of 
        the First Infantry Division in Iraq, testified before the House 
        Committee on International Relations on June 27, 2007, that 
        ``[o]ur Army and Marine Corps are at a breaking point at a time 
        in history when we need a strong military the most. The cycle 
        of deployments is staggering. American formations continue to 
        lose a battalion's worth of dead and wounded every month with 
        little to show for it. The current recruiting system falls 
        drastically short of long-term requirements and our all-
        volunteer force can not sustain the current tempo for much 
        longer. The military is spending over $1,000,000,000 a year in 
        incentives in a last ditch effort to keep the force together. 
        Young officers and noncommissioned officers are leaving the 
        service at an alarming rate.''.
            (2) Extended deployments of 15 months, and insufficient 
        time to rest and train between deployments, have undermined the 
        readiness of the Army.
            (3) The Army National Guard reported as early as July 2005 
        that equipment transfers to deploying units ``had largely 
        exhausted its inventory of more than 220 critical items, 
        including some items useful to nondeployed units for training 
        and domestic missions.''.
            (4) The Government Accountability Office found, in 
        September 2006, that ``[a]mong the items for which the Army 
        National Guard had shortages of over 80 percent of the 
        authorized inventory were chemical warfare monitoring and 
        decontamination equipment and night vision goggles''.
            (5) President George W. Bush's policies in Iraq have 
        undermined homeland security by depleting the personnel and 
        equipment needed by the National Guard.
    (f) Insurgency in ``Last Throes''.--The House of Representatives 
finds the following:
            (1) Multi-National Force-Iraq reports indicate that the 
        number of attacks on coalition forces has increased since the 
        beginning of military action.
            (2) The Government Accountability Office, in March 2007, 
        reported that attacks using improvised explosive devices 
        continued to increase between 2005 and July 2006.
            (3) On June 23, 2005, General John Abizaid, in his capacity 
        as head of Central Command, testified before the Senate Armed 
        Services Committee about the state of the insurgency that 
        ``[i]n terms of comparison from 6 months ago, in terms of 
        foreign fighters I believe there are more foreign fighters 
        coming into Iraq than there were 6 months ago. In terms of the 
        overall strength of the insurgency, I'd say it's about the same 
        as it was.''.
            (4) President George W. Bush's Initial Benchmark Assessment 
        report from July 12, 2007, states that ``[a]s a result of 
        increased offensive operations, Coalition and Iraqi Forces have 
        sustained increased attacks in Iraq, particularly in Baghdad, 
        Diyala, and Salah ad Din.''.
            (5) Vice President Richard B. Cheney made misleading 
        statements that the insurgency in Iraq was in its ``last 
        throes,'' including--
                    (A) on May 30, 2005, Vice President Richard B. 
                Cheney said, ``The level of activity that we see today 
                from a military standpoint, I think, will clearly 
                decline. I think they're in the last throes, if you 
                will, of the insurgency.''; and
                    (B) on June 19, 2006, Vice President Richard B. 
                Cheney was asked whether he still supported the comment 
                he made in 2005, regarding the fact that the insurgency 
                in Iraq was in its ``last throes,'' to which he 
                responded ``I do.''

SEC. 2. CENSURE BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

    The House of Representatives censures President George W. Bush and 
Vice President Richard B. Cheney for--
            (1) misleading the American people about the basis for 
        going to war in Iraq;
            (2) failing to plan adequately for the war;
            (3) pursuing policies in Iraq that have strained our 
        military and undermined our homeland security; and
            (4) misleading the American people about the insurgency in 
        Iraq.
                                 <all>