[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 1365 Introduced in House (IH)]
110th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. RES. 1365
Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that an
independent commission is the best vehicle for ensuring that
Congressional redistricting conducted by a State is done in a manner
that respects the principles of transparency, effective and diverse
public participation, and accountability.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
July 22, 2008
Mr. Tanner (for himself and Mr. Wamp) submitted the following
resolution; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary
_______________________________________________________________________
RESOLUTION
Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that an
independent commission is the best vehicle for ensuring that
Congressional redistricting conducted by a State is done in a manner
that respects the principles of transparency, effective and diverse
public participation, and accountability.
Whereas the House of Representatives was designed by the framers of the
Constitution as the only institution of the Federal Government whose
members are directly elected by the people, and the House should
represent the true will of the public;
Whereas under article I, section 4 of the Constitution, Congress has the power
to enact laws governing the time, place, and manner of elections for
Members of the House of Representatives;
Whereas article I, section 4 also conveys to Congress the authority to make or
alter regulations with respect to the manner that States must follow in
carrying out congressional redistricting after an apportionment of
Members of the House of Representatives;
Whereas redistricting is conducted in each State by either the State legislature
or a commission, and normally occurs every 10 years following the
regular Census;
Whereas in the early 1960s, when many State legislative and congressional
districts were grossly mal-apportioned, the Supreme Court imposed a
standard of ``one person, one vote'' on nearly all districting,
requiring that equal or nearly equal numbers of people receive equal
numbers of representatives;
Whereas gerrymandering is used both by partisans seeking to gain additional
seats and by incumbents of all parties seeking to shore up their
districts and minimize the risk of electoral defeat, and has several
adverse effects on the democratic process, including a decline in the
number of competitive seats throughout the nation, reducing
accountability and threatening to further the ideological polarization
of our elected officials by enabling the election of partisans who need
not appeal to moderate voters, as well as a reduction in voter interest
and turnout in noncompetitive districts;
Whereas technical advancement has allowed for the precise drawing of
Congressional districts for the purpose of partisan advantage or
incumbent retention;
Whereas it is important to reduce the partisan pressures than are inherent in
the redistricting process when conducted by State legislatures;
Whereas transparency and public participation are crucial components in an
accountable redistricting process;
Whereas numerous good government organizations and advocates have recommended
the use of independent commissions for the redistricting process to draw
fair and competitive Congressional districts, which would decrease
partisanship and increase accountability;
Whereas 12 States presently conduct their redistricting efforts by some form of
independent commission;
Whereas conducting redistricting once each decade, following the census, with a
strict time line for completion and appropriate flexibility to
accommodate the occasional need for technical corrections due to late-
discovered data errors or other rare exogenous events, encourages
stability in the political system and the accountability of
representatives to constituencies established for a 10-year period,
while multiple or mid-cycle redistricting worsens the retributive
aspects of politics and carries the potential for increased partisan
bias;
Whereas almost half of the states already have some provision in law to limit
redistricting to once after each census;
Whereas under the ``one person, one vote'' requirement of the United States
Constitution, any jurisdiction electing district-based representatives
effectively must redistrict after each decennial census;
Whereas the legitimacy of democratic institutions rests largely on transparency
and participation, and mistrust of institutions and government
structures can taint subsequent political outcomes;
Whereas limiting redistricting to once immediately after each decennial census
limits any possibility of partisan opportunism after the post-census
redistricting unless a court finds that the post-census plan is itself
invalid, and ensures the stability of the electoral process and the
democratic process;
Whereas limiting redistricting to once after every decennial census thus makes
sense especially when partisan gain is a threat, and could help
constrain partisan opportunism in cases where political actors
redistrict; and
Whereas the use of an independent commission would vest power in a body composed
of qualified individuals competent to apply the preferred redistricting
standards objectively and would be particularly well-suited to follow
the procedural principles of transparency, effective, and diverse public
participation and accountability: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives
that--
(1) an independent redistricting commission is the best
vehicle for ensuring that Congressional redistricting conducted
by a State is done in a manner that respects the principles of
transparency, effective and diverse public participation, and
accountability, so long as the redistricting is conducted in
accordance with a plan developed by such a commission using
criteria and procedures that will discourage gerrymandering and
promote competition, to the extent that such criteria and
procedures are consistent with the applicable requirements of
the Constitution of the United States and the Voting Rights Act
of 1965 (42 U.S.C. 1973 et seq.); and
(2) a State should not be redistricted until after the next
apportionment of Representatives, unless a court requires the
State to conduct such subsequent redistricting to comply with
the Constitution or to enforce the Voting Rights Act of 1965
(42 U.S.C. 1973 et seq.).
<all>