[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 1345 Referred to Committee House (RTH)]

  2d Session
H. RES. 1345

  Impeaching George W. Bush, President of the United States, of high 
                        crimes and misdemeanors.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             July 15, 2008

            Mr. Kucinich submitted the following resolution

                             July 15, 2008

   By motion of the House, referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION


 
  Impeaching George W. Bush, President of the United States, of high 
                        crimes and misdemeanors.

    Resolved, That President George W. Bush be impeached for high 
crimes and misdemeanors, and that the following Article of Impeachment 
be exhibited to the United States Senate:
    An Article of Impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives 
of the United States of America in the name of itself and the people of 
the United States of America, in maintenance and support of its 
impeachment against President George W. Bush for high crimes and 
misdemeanors.

Article One--Deceiving Congress With Fabricated Threats of Iraq WMDs To 
Fraudulently Obtain Support for an Authorization of the Use of Military 
                           Force Against Iraq

    In his conduct while President of the United States, George W. 
Bush, in violation of his constitutional oath to faithfully execute the 
Office of President of the United States, and to the best of his 
ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United 
States, and in violation of his constitutional duty under article II, 
section 3 of the Constitution ``to take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed,'' deceived Congress with fabricated threats of 
Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction to fraudulently obtain support for an 
authorization for the use of force against Iraq and used that 
fraudulently obtained authorization, then acting in his capacity under 
article II, section 2 of the Constitution as Commander in Chief, to 
commit U.S. troops to combat in Iraq.
    To gain congressional support for the passage of the Joint 
Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against 
Iraq, the President made the following material representations to the 
Congress in S.J. Res. 45:
            1. That Iraq was ``continuing to possess and develop a 
        significant chemical and biological weapons capability. . . .''
            2. That Iraq was ``actively seeking a nuclear weapons 
        capability. . . .''
            3. That Iraq was ``continuing to threaten the national 
        security interests of the United States and international peace 
        and security.''
            4. That Iraq has demonstrated a ``willingness to attack, 
        the United States. . . .''
            5. That ``members of al Qaeda, an organization bearing 
        responsibility for attacks on the United States, its citizens 
        and interests, including the attacks that occurred on September 
        11, 2001, are known to be in Iraq. . . .''
            6. The ``attacks on the United States of September 11, 
        2001, underscored the gravity of the threat that Iraq will 
        transfer weapons of mass destruction to international terrorist 
        organizations. . . .''
            7. That Iraq ``will either employ those weapons to launch a 
        surprise attack against the United States or its Armed Forces 
        or provide them to international terrorists who would do so. . 
        . .''
            8. That an ``extreme magnitude of harm that would result to 
        the United States and its citizens from such an attack. . . .''
            9. That the aforementioned threats ``justify action by the 
        United States to defend itself. . . .''
            10. The enactment clause of section 2 of S.J. Res. 45, the 
        Authorization of the Use of the United States Armed Forces 
        authorizes the President to ``defend the national security 
        interests of the United States against the threat posed by 
        Iraq. . . .''
    Each consequential representation made by the President to the 
Congress in S.J. Res. 45 in subsequent iterations and the final version 
was unsupported by evidence which was in the control of the White 
House.
    To wit:
            1. Iraq was not ``continuing to possess and develop a 
        significant chemical and biological weapons capability. . . .''
                    ``A substantial amount of Iraq's chemical warfare 
                agents, precursors, munitions and production equipment 
                were destroyed between 1991 and 1998 as a result of 
                Operation Desert Storm and United Nations Special 
                Commission (UNSCOM) actions. There is no reliable 
                information on whether Iraq is producing and 
                stockpiling chemical weapons or whether Iraq has or 
                will establish its chemical warfare agent production 
                facilities.''
                    The source of this information is the Defense 
                Intelligence Agency, a report called, ``Iraq--Key WMD 
                Facilities--An Operational Support Study,'' September 
                2002.
                    ``Statements by the President and Vice President 
                prior to the October 2002 National Intelligence 
                Estimate regarding Iraq's chemical weapons production 
                capability and activities did not reflect the 
                intelligence community's uncertainties as to whether 
                such production was ongoing.''
                    The source of this information is the Senate Select 
                Committee on Intelligence, a report entitled ``Report 
                on Whether Public Statements Regarding Iraq By U.S. 
                Government Officials Were Substantiated By Intelligence 
                Information.'' June 5, 2008.
                    ``In April and early May 2003, military forces 
                found mobile trailers in Iraq. Although intelligence 
                experts disputed the purpose of the trailers, 
                administration officials repeatedly asserted that they 
                were mobile biological weapons laboratories. In total, 
                President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary 
                Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell, and National Security 
                Advisor Rice made 34 misleading statements about the 
                trailers in 27 separate public appearances. Shortly 
                after the mobile trailers were found, the Central 
                Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency 
                issued an unclassified white paper evaluating the 
                trailers. The white paper was released without 
                coordination with other members of the intelligence 
                community, however. It was later disclosed that 
                engineers from the Defense Intelligence Agency who 
                examined the trailers concluded that they were most 
                likely used to produce hydrogen for artillery weather 
                balloons. A former senior intelligence official 
                reported that `only one of 15 intelligence analysts 
                assembled from three agencies to discuss the issue in 
                June endorsed the white paper conclusion.'''
                    The source of this information is the House 
                Committee on Government Reform, minority staff, ``Iraq 
                on the Record: Bush Administration's Public Statements 
                about Chemical and Biological Weapons.'' March 16, 
                2004.
                    Former chief of CIA covert operations in Europe, 
                Tyler Drumheller, has said that the CIA had credible 
                sources discounting weapons of mass destruction claims, 
                including the primary source of biological weapons 
                claims, an informant who the Germans code-named 
                ``Curveball'' whom the Germans had informed the Bush 
                administration was a likely fabricator of information 
                including that concerning the Niger yellowcake forgery. 
                Two other former CIA officers confirmed Drumheller's 
                account to Sidney Blumenthal who reported the story at 
                Salon.com on September 6, 2007, which in fact is the 
                media source of this information.
                    ``In practical terms, with the destruction of the 
                al Hakam facility, Iraq abandoned its ambition to 
                obtain advanced biological weapons quickly. The Iraq 
                Survey Group (ISG) found no direct evidence that Iraq, 
                after 1996, had plans for a new biological weapons 
                program or was conducting biological weapons-specific 
                work for military purposes. Indeed, from the mid-1990s, 
                despite evidence of continuing interest in nuclear and 
                chemical weapons, there appears to be a complete 
                absence of discussion or even interest in biological 
                weapons at the Presidential level. In spite of 
                exhaustive investigation, the Iraq Survey Group found 
                no evidence that Iraq possessed, or was developing, 
                biological weapon agent production systems mounted on 
                road vehicles or railway wagons. The Iraq Survey Group 
                harbors severe doubts about the source's credibility in 
                regards to the breakout program.'' That's a direct 
                quote from the ``Comprehensive Report of the Special 
                Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence on 
                Iraq's WMD,'' commonly known as the Duelfer report by 
                Charles Duelfer.
                    ``While a small number of old, abandoned chemical 
                munitions have been discovered, the Iraq Survey Group 
                judges that Iraq unilaterally destroyed its undeclared 
                chemical weapons stockpile in 1991. There are no 
                credible indications that Baghdad resumed production of 
                chemical munitions thereafter, a policy the Iraq Survey 
                Group attributes to Baghdad's desire to see sanctions 
                lifted, or rendered ineffectual, or its fear of force 
                against it should WMD be discovered.''
                    The source of this information, the ``Comprehensive 
                Report of the Special Advisor to the Director of 
                Central Intelligence on Iraq's WMD,'' Charles Duelfer.
            2. Iraq was not ``actively seeking a nuclear weapons 
        capability.''
                    The key finding of the Iraq Survey Group's report 
                to the Director of Central Intelligence found that 
                ``Iraq's ability to reconstitute a nuclear weapons 
                program progressively decayed after that date. Saddam 
                Husayn (sic) ended the nuclear program in 1991 
                following the Gulf War. Iraq Survey Group found no 
                evidence to suggest concerted efforts to restart the 
                program.''
                    The source of this information, the ``Comprehensive 
                Report of the Special Advisor to the Director of 
                Central Intelligence on Iraq's WMD,'' Charles Duelfer.
                    Claims that Iraq was purchasing uranium from Niger 
                were not supported by the State Department's Bureau of 
                Intelligence and Research in the National Intelligence 
                Estimate of October 2002.
                    The CIA had warned the British Government not to 
                claim Iraq was purchasing uranium from Niger prior to 
                the British statement that was later cited by President 
                Bush, this according to George Tenet of the Central 
                Intelligence Agency on July 11, 2003.
                    Mohamed ElBaradei, the Director General of the 
                International Atomic Energy Agency, in a ``Statement to 
                the United Nations Security Council on The Status of 
                Nuclear Inspections in Iraq: An Update'' on March 7, 
                2003, said as follows:
                    ``One, there is no indication of resumed nuclear 
                activities in those buildings that were identified 
                through the use of satellite imagery as being 
                reconstructed or newly erected since 1998, nor any 
                indication of nuclear-related prohibited activities at 
                any inspected sites. Second, there is no indication 
                that Iraq has attempted to import uranium since 1990. 
                Three, there is no indication that Iraq has attempted 
                to import aluminum tubes for use in centrifuge 
                enrichment. Moreover, even had Iraq pursued such a 
                plan, it would have been--it would have encountered 
                practical difficulties in manufacturing centrifuges out 
                of the aluminum tubes in question. Fourthly, although 
                we are still reviewing issues related to magnets and 
                magnet production, there is no indication to date that 
                Iraq imported magnets for use in a centrifuge 
                enrichment program. As I stated above, the IAEA 
                (International Atomic Energy Agency) will naturally 
                continue to further scrutinize and investigate all of 
                the above issues.''
            3. Iraq was not ``continuing to threaten the national 
        security interests of the United States.''
                    ``Let me be clear: analysts differed on several 
                important aspects of [Iraq's biological, chemical, and 
                nuclear] programs and those debates were spelled out in 
                the Estimate. They never said there was an `imminent' 
                threat.''
                    George Tenet, who was Director of the CIA, said 
                this in Prepared Remarks for Delivery at Georgetown 
                University on February 5, 2004.
                    ``We have been able to keep weapons from going into 
                Iraq. We have been able to keep the sanctions in place 
                to the extent that items that might support weapons of 
                mass destruction have had some controls on them. It's 
                been quite a success for 10 years.'' The source of this 
                statement, Colin Powell, Secretary of State, in an 
                interview with Face the Nation, February 11, 2001.
                    On July 23, 2002, a communication from the Private 
                Secretary to Prime Minister Tony Blair, ``Memo to 
                British Ambassador David Manning'' reads as follows: 
                ``British Secret Intelligence Service Chief Sir Richard 
                Billing Dearlove reported on his recent talks in 
                Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. 
                Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted 
                to remove Saddam through military action, justified by 
                the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the 
                intelligence and facts were being fixed around the 
                policy. The NSC had no patience with the U.N. route and 
                no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi 
                regime's record. There was little discussion in 
                Washington of the aftermath after military action. The 
                Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin 
                Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up 
                his mind to take military action, even if the timing 
                was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam 
                Hussein was not threatening his neighbors, and his WMD 
                capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or 
                Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to 
                Saddam to allow back in the U.N. weapons inspectors. 
                This would also help with the legal justification for 
                the use of force.''
            4. Iraq did not have the ``willingness to attack, the 
        United States.''
                    ``The fact of the matter is that both baskets, the 
                U.N. basket and what we and other allies have been 
                doing in the region, have succeeded in containing 
                Saddam Hussein and his ambitions. His forces are about 
                one-third their original size. They really don't 
                possess the capability to attack their neighbors the 
                way they did 10 years ago.'' The source of this quote, 
                Colin Powell, Secretary of State, in a transcript of 
                remarks made to German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer 
                in February 2001.
                    The October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate 
                concluded that ``Baghdad for now appears to be drawing 
                a line short of conducting terrorist attacks with 
                conventional or chemical or biological weapons against 
                the United States, fearing that exposure of Iraqi 
                involvement would provide Washington a stronger case 
                for making war.''
            5. Iraq had no connection with the attacks of 9/11 or with 
        al Qaeda's role in 9/11.
                    ``The report of the Senate Select Committee on 
                Intelligence documents significant instances in which 
                the administration went beyond what the intelligence 
                community knew or believed in making public claims, 
                most notably on the false assertion that Iraq and al 
                Qaeda had an operational partnership and joint 
                involvement in carrying out the attacks of September 
                11.'' This is a quote from Senator John D. Rockefeller, 
                IV, the chairman of the Senate Select Committee on 
                Intelligence entitled ``Additional Views of Chairman 
                John D. Rockefeller, IV'' on page 90.
                    Continuing from Senator Rockefeller:
                    ``The President and his advisors undertook a 
                relentless public campaign in the aftermath of the 
                attacks to use the war against al Qaeda as a 
                justification for overthrowing Saddam Hussein. 
                Representing to the American people that the two had an 
                operational partnership and posed a single, 
                indistinguishable threat was fundamentally misleading 
                and led the Nation to war on false premises.'' Senator 
                Rockefeller.
                    Richard Clarke, a National Security Advisor, in a 
                memo of September 18, 2001, titled ``Survey of 
                Intelligence Information on Any Iraq Involvement in the 
                September 11 Attacks'' found no ``compelling case'' 
                that Iraq had either planned or perpetrated the 
                attacks, and that there was no confirmed reporting on 
                Saddam cooperating with bin Laden on unconventional 
                weapons.
                    On September 17, 2003, President Bush said: ``No, 
                we've got no evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved 
                with September 11. What the Vice President said was is 
                that he (Saddam) has been involved with al Qaeda.''
                    On June 16, 2004, a staff report from the 9/11 
                Commission stated: ``There have been reports that 
                contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda also occurred after 
                bin Laden had returned to Afghanistan in 1996, but they 
                do not appear to have resulted in a collaborative 
                relationship. Two senior bin Laden associates have 
                adamantly denied that any ties existed between al Qaeda 
                and Iraq. We have no credible evidence that Iraq and al 
                Qaeda cooperated on attacks against the United 
                States.''
                    ``Intelligence provided by former Undersecretary of 
                Defense Douglas J. Feith to buttress the White House 
                case for invading Iraq included `reporting of dubious 
                quality or reliability' that supported the political 
                views of senior administration officials rather than 
                the conclusions of the intelligence community, this 
                according to a report by the Pentagon Inspector 
                General.
                    ``Feith's office `was predisposed to finding a 
                significant relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda,' 
                according to portions of the report released by Senator 
                Carl Levin. The Inspector General described Feith's 
                activities as `an alternative intelligence assessment 
                process.''' The source of this information is a report 
                in the Washington Post dated February 9, 2007, page A-
                1, an article by Walter Pincus and Jeffrey Smith 
                entitled ``Official's Key Report on Iraq is Faulted, 
                `Dubious' Intelligence Fueled Push for War.''
            6. Iraq possessed no weapons of mass destruction to 
        transfer to anyone.
                    Iraq possessed no weapons of mass destruction to 
                transfer. Furthermore, available intelligence 
                information found that the Iraq regime would probably 
                only transfer weapons of mass destruction to terrorist 
                organizations if under threat of attack by the United 
                States.
                    According to information in the October 2002 
                National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq that was 
                available to the administration at the time that they 
                were seeking congressional support for the 
                authorization of use of force against Iraq, the Iraq 
                regime would probably only transfer weapons to a 
                terrorist organization if ``sufficiently desperate'' 
                because it feared that ``an attack that threatened the 
                survival of the regime were imminent or unavoidable.''
                    ``The Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) probably has 
                been directed to conduct clandestine attacks against 
                the United States and Allied interests in the Middle 
                East in the event the United States takes action 
                against Iraq. The IIS probably would be the primary 
                means by which Iraq would attempt to conduct any 
                chemical and biological weapon attacks on the U.S. 
                homeland, although we have no specific intelligence 
                information that Saddam's regime has directed attacks 
                against U.S. territory.''
            7. Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction and therefore 
        had no capability of launching a surprise attack against the 
        United States or its Armed Forces and no capability to provide 
        them to international terrorists who would do so.
                    Iraq possessed no weapons of mass destruction to 
                transfer. Furthermore, available intelligence 
                information found that the Iraq regime would probably 
                only transfer weapons of mass destruction to terrorist 
                organizations if under severe threat of attack by the 
                United States.
                    According to information in the October 2002 
                National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq that was 
                available to the administration at the time they were 
                seeking congressional support for the authorization of 
                the use of force against Iraq, the Iraqi regime would 
                probably only transfer weapons to a terrorist 
                organization if ``sufficiently desperate'' because it 
                feared that ``an attack that threatened the survival of 
                the regime were imminent or unavoidable.'' That, again, 
                from the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on 
                Iraq.
                    ``The Iraqi Intelligence Service probably has been 
                directed to conduct clandestine attacks against U.S. 
                and Allied interests in the Middle East in the event 
                the United States takes action against Iraq. The Iraq 
                Intelligence Service probably would be the primary 
                means by which Iraq would attempt to conduct any 
                chemical or biological weapons attacks on the U.S. 
                homeland, although we have no specific intelligence 
                information that Saddam's regime has directed attacks 
                against U.S. territory.''
                    As reported in the Washington Post on March 1, 
                2003, in 1995, Saddam Hussein's son-in-law, Hussein 
                Kamel, had informed U.S. and British intelligence 
                officers that ``all weapons--biological, chemical, 
                missile, nuclear--were destroyed.'' That from the 
                Washington Post, March 1, 2003, page A15, an article 
                entitled ``Iraqi Defector Claimed Arms Were Destroyed 
                By 1995,'' by Colum Lynch.
                    The Defense Intelligence Agency, in a report called 
                ``Iraq--Key WMD Facilities--An Operational Report 
                Study'' in September 2002, said this:
                    ``A substantial amount of Iraq's chemical warfare 
                agents, precursors, munitions and production equipment 
                were destroyed between 1991 and 1998 as a result of 
                Operation Desert Storm and United Nations Special 
                Commission (UNSCOM) actions. There is no reliable 
                information on whether Iraq is producing and 
                stockpiling chemical weapons or whether Iraq has or 
                will establish its chemical warfare agent production 
                facilities.''
            8. There was not a real risk of an ``extreme magnitude of 
        harm that would result to the United States and its citizens 
        from such an attack'' because Iraq had no capability of 
        attacking the United States.
                    Here's what Colin Powell said at the time: 
                ``Containment has been a successful policy, and I think 
                we should make sure that we continue it until such time 
                as Saddam Hussein comes into compliance with the 
                agreements he made at the end of the Gulf War.'' 
                Speaking of Iraq, Secretary of State Powell said, 
                ``Iraq is not threatening America.''
            9. The aforementioned evidence did not ``justify the use of 
        force by the United States to defend itself'' because Iraq did 
        not have weapons of mass destruction, or have the intention or 
        capability of using nonexistent WMDs against the United States.
            10. Since there was no threat posed by Iraq to the United 
        States, the enactment clause of the Senate Joint Resolution 45 
        was predicated on misstatements to Congress.
    Congress relied on the information provided to it by the President 
of the United States. Congress provided the President with the 
authorization to use military force that he requested. As a consequence 
of the fraudulent representations made to Congress, the United States 
Armed Forces, under the direction of George Bush as Commander in Chief, 
pursuant to section 3 of the Authorization for the Use of Force which 
President Bush requested, invaded Iraq and occupies it to this day, at 
the cost of 4,116 lives of servicemen and -women, injuries to over 
30,000 of our troops, the deaths of over 1 million innocent Iraqi 
civilians, the destruction of Iraq, and a long-term cost of over $3 
trillion.
    President Bush's misrepresentations to Congress to induce passage 
of a use of force resolution is subversive of the constitutional system 
of checks and balances, destructive of Congress's sole prerogative to 
declare war under article I, section 8 of the Constitution, and is 
therefore a High Crime. An even greater offense by the President of the 
United States occurs in his capacity as Commander in Chief, because he 
knowingly placed the men and women of the United States Armed Forces in 
harm's way, jeopardizing their lives and their families' future, for 
reasons that to this date have not been established in fact.
    In all of these actions and decisions, President George W. Bush has 
acted in a manner contrary to his trust as President and Commander in 
Chief, and subversive of constitutional government, to the prejudice of 
the cause of law and justice and to the manifest injury of the people 
of the United States and of those members of the Armed Forces who put 
their lives on the line pursuant to the falsehoods of the President.
    Wherefore, President George W. Bush, by such conduct, is guilty of 
an impeachable offense warranting removal from office.
                                 <all>