[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 1345 Referred to Committee House (RTH)]
2d Session
H. RES. 1345
Impeaching George W. Bush, President of the United States, of high
crimes and misdemeanors.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
July 15, 2008
Mr. Kucinich submitted the following resolution
July 15, 2008
By motion of the House, referred to the Committee on the Judiciary
_______________________________________________________________________
RESOLUTION
Impeaching George W. Bush, President of the United States, of high
crimes and misdemeanors.
Resolved, That President George W. Bush be impeached for high
crimes and misdemeanors, and that the following Article of Impeachment
be exhibited to the United States Senate:
An Article of Impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives
of the United States of America in the name of itself and the people of
the United States of America, in maintenance and support of its
impeachment against President George W. Bush for high crimes and
misdemeanors.
Article One--Deceiving Congress With Fabricated Threats of Iraq WMDs To
Fraudulently Obtain Support for an Authorization of the Use of Military
Force Against Iraq
In his conduct while President of the United States, George W.
Bush, in violation of his constitutional oath to faithfully execute the
Office of President of the United States, and to the best of his
ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United
States, and in violation of his constitutional duty under article II,
section 3 of the Constitution ``to take care that the laws be
faithfully executed,'' deceived Congress with fabricated threats of
Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction to fraudulently obtain support for an
authorization for the use of force against Iraq and used that
fraudulently obtained authorization, then acting in his capacity under
article II, section 2 of the Constitution as Commander in Chief, to
commit U.S. troops to combat in Iraq.
To gain congressional support for the passage of the Joint
Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against
Iraq, the President made the following material representations to the
Congress in S.J. Res. 45:
1. That Iraq was ``continuing to possess and develop a
significant chemical and biological weapons capability. . . .''
2. That Iraq was ``actively seeking a nuclear weapons
capability. . . .''
3. That Iraq was ``continuing to threaten the national
security interests of the United States and international peace
and security.''
4. That Iraq has demonstrated a ``willingness to attack,
the United States. . . .''
5. That ``members of al Qaeda, an organization bearing
responsibility for attacks on the United States, its citizens
and interests, including the attacks that occurred on September
11, 2001, are known to be in Iraq. . . .''
6. The ``attacks on the United States of September 11,
2001, underscored the gravity of the threat that Iraq will
transfer weapons of mass destruction to international terrorist
organizations. . . .''
7. That Iraq ``will either employ those weapons to launch a
surprise attack against the United States or its Armed Forces
or provide them to international terrorists who would do so. .
. .''
8. That an ``extreme magnitude of harm that would result to
the United States and its citizens from such an attack. . . .''
9. That the aforementioned threats ``justify action by the
United States to defend itself. . . .''
10. The enactment clause of section 2 of S.J. Res. 45, the
Authorization of the Use of the United States Armed Forces
authorizes the President to ``defend the national security
interests of the United States against the threat posed by
Iraq. . . .''
Each consequential representation made by the President to the
Congress in S.J. Res. 45 in subsequent iterations and the final version
was unsupported by evidence which was in the control of the White
House.
To wit:
1. Iraq was not ``continuing to possess and develop a
significant chemical and biological weapons capability. . . .''
``A substantial amount of Iraq's chemical warfare
agents, precursors, munitions and production equipment
were destroyed between 1991 and 1998 as a result of
Operation Desert Storm and United Nations Special
Commission (UNSCOM) actions. There is no reliable
information on whether Iraq is producing and
stockpiling chemical weapons or whether Iraq has or
will establish its chemical warfare agent production
facilities.''
The source of this information is the Defense
Intelligence Agency, a report called, ``Iraq--Key WMD
Facilities--An Operational Support Study,'' September
2002.
``Statements by the President and Vice President
prior to the October 2002 National Intelligence
Estimate regarding Iraq's chemical weapons production
capability and activities did not reflect the
intelligence community's uncertainties as to whether
such production was ongoing.''
The source of this information is the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, a report entitled ``Report
on Whether Public Statements Regarding Iraq By U.S.
Government Officials Were Substantiated By Intelligence
Information.'' June 5, 2008.
``In April and early May 2003, military forces
found mobile trailers in Iraq. Although intelligence
experts disputed the purpose of the trailers,
administration officials repeatedly asserted that they
were mobile biological weapons laboratories. In total,
President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary
Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell, and National Security
Advisor Rice made 34 misleading statements about the
trailers in 27 separate public appearances. Shortly
after the mobile trailers were found, the Central
Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency
issued an unclassified white paper evaluating the
trailers. The white paper was released without
coordination with other members of the intelligence
community, however. It was later disclosed that
engineers from the Defense Intelligence Agency who
examined the trailers concluded that they were most
likely used to produce hydrogen for artillery weather
balloons. A former senior intelligence official
reported that `only one of 15 intelligence analysts
assembled from three agencies to discuss the issue in
June endorsed the white paper conclusion.'''
The source of this information is the House
Committee on Government Reform, minority staff, ``Iraq
on the Record: Bush Administration's Public Statements
about Chemical and Biological Weapons.'' March 16,
2004.
Former chief of CIA covert operations in Europe,
Tyler Drumheller, has said that the CIA had credible
sources discounting weapons of mass destruction claims,
including the primary source of biological weapons
claims, an informant who the Germans code-named
``Curveball'' whom the Germans had informed the Bush
administration was a likely fabricator of information
including that concerning the Niger yellowcake forgery.
Two other former CIA officers confirmed Drumheller's
account to Sidney Blumenthal who reported the story at
Salon.com on September 6, 2007, which in fact is the
media source of this information.
``In practical terms, with the destruction of the
al Hakam facility, Iraq abandoned its ambition to
obtain advanced biological weapons quickly. The Iraq
Survey Group (ISG) found no direct evidence that Iraq,
after 1996, had plans for a new biological weapons
program or was conducting biological weapons-specific
work for military purposes. Indeed, from the mid-1990s,
despite evidence of continuing interest in nuclear and
chemical weapons, there appears to be a complete
absence of discussion or even interest in biological
weapons at the Presidential level. In spite of
exhaustive investigation, the Iraq Survey Group found
no evidence that Iraq possessed, or was developing,
biological weapon agent production systems mounted on
road vehicles or railway wagons. The Iraq Survey Group
harbors severe doubts about the source's credibility in
regards to the breakout program.'' That's a direct
quote from the ``Comprehensive Report of the Special
Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence on
Iraq's WMD,'' commonly known as the Duelfer report by
Charles Duelfer.
``While a small number of old, abandoned chemical
munitions have been discovered, the Iraq Survey Group
judges that Iraq unilaterally destroyed its undeclared
chemical weapons stockpile in 1991. There are no
credible indications that Baghdad resumed production of
chemical munitions thereafter, a policy the Iraq Survey
Group attributes to Baghdad's desire to see sanctions
lifted, or rendered ineffectual, or its fear of force
against it should WMD be discovered.''
The source of this information, the ``Comprehensive
Report of the Special Advisor to the Director of
Central Intelligence on Iraq's WMD,'' Charles Duelfer.
2. Iraq was not ``actively seeking a nuclear weapons
capability.''
The key finding of the Iraq Survey Group's report
to the Director of Central Intelligence found that
``Iraq's ability to reconstitute a nuclear weapons
program progressively decayed after that date. Saddam
Husayn (sic) ended the nuclear program in 1991
following the Gulf War. Iraq Survey Group found no
evidence to suggest concerted efforts to restart the
program.''
The source of this information, the ``Comprehensive
Report of the Special Advisor to the Director of
Central Intelligence on Iraq's WMD,'' Charles Duelfer.
Claims that Iraq was purchasing uranium from Niger
were not supported by the State Department's Bureau of
Intelligence and Research in the National Intelligence
Estimate of October 2002.
The CIA had warned the British Government not to
claim Iraq was purchasing uranium from Niger prior to
the British statement that was later cited by President
Bush, this according to George Tenet of the Central
Intelligence Agency on July 11, 2003.
Mohamed ElBaradei, the Director General of the
International Atomic Energy Agency, in a ``Statement to
the United Nations Security Council on The Status of
Nuclear Inspections in Iraq: An Update'' on March 7,
2003, said as follows:
``One, there is no indication of resumed nuclear
activities in those buildings that were identified
through the use of satellite imagery as being
reconstructed or newly erected since 1998, nor any
indication of nuclear-related prohibited activities at
any inspected sites. Second, there is no indication
that Iraq has attempted to import uranium since 1990.
Three, there is no indication that Iraq has attempted
to import aluminum tubes for use in centrifuge
enrichment. Moreover, even had Iraq pursued such a
plan, it would have been--it would have encountered
practical difficulties in manufacturing centrifuges out
of the aluminum tubes in question. Fourthly, although
we are still reviewing issues related to magnets and
magnet production, there is no indication to date that
Iraq imported magnets for use in a centrifuge
enrichment program. As I stated above, the IAEA
(International Atomic Energy Agency) will naturally
continue to further scrutinize and investigate all of
the above issues.''
3. Iraq was not ``continuing to threaten the national
security interests of the United States.''
``Let me be clear: analysts differed on several
important aspects of [Iraq's biological, chemical, and
nuclear] programs and those debates were spelled out in
the Estimate. They never said there was an `imminent'
threat.''
George Tenet, who was Director of the CIA, said
this in Prepared Remarks for Delivery at Georgetown
University on February 5, 2004.
``We have been able to keep weapons from going into
Iraq. We have been able to keep the sanctions in place
to the extent that items that might support weapons of
mass destruction have had some controls on them. It's
been quite a success for 10 years.'' The source of this
statement, Colin Powell, Secretary of State, in an
interview with Face the Nation, February 11, 2001.
On July 23, 2002, a communication from the Private
Secretary to Prime Minister Tony Blair, ``Memo to
British Ambassador David Manning'' reads as follows:
``British Secret Intelligence Service Chief Sir Richard
Billing Dearlove reported on his recent talks in
Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude.
Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted
to remove Saddam through military action, justified by
the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the
intelligence and facts were being fixed around the
policy. The NSC had no patience with the U.N. route and
no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi
regime's record. There was little discussion in
Washington of the aftermath after military action. The
Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin
Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up
his mind to take military action, even if the timing
was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam
Hussein was not threatening his neighbors, and his WMD
capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or
Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to
Saddam to allow back in the U.N. weapons inspectors.
This would also help with the legal justification for
the use of force.''
4. Iraq did not have the ``willingness to attack, the
United States.''
``The fact of the matter is that both baskets, the
U.N. basket and what we and other allies have been
doing in the region, have succeeded in containing
Saddam Hussein and his ambitions. His forces are about
one-third their original size. They really don't
possess the capability to attack their neighbors the
way they did 10 years ago.'' The source of this quote,
Colin Powell, Secretary of State, in a transcript of
remarks made to German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer
in February 2001.
The October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate
concluded that ``Baghdad for now appears to be drawing
a line short of conducting terrorist attacks with
conventional or chemical or biological weapons against
the United States, fearing that exposure of Iraqi
involvement would provide Washington a stronger case
for making war.''
5. Iraq had no connection with the attacks of 9/11 or with
al Qaeda's role in 9/11.
``The report of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence documents significant instances in which
the administration went beyond what the intelligence
community knew or believed in making public claims,
most notably on the false assertion that Iraq and al
Qaeda had an operational partnership and joint
involvement in carrying out the attacks of September
11.'' This is a quote from Senator John D. Rockefeller,
IV, the chairman of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence entitled ``Additional Views of Chairman
John D. Rockefeller, IV'' on page 90.
Continuing from Senator Rockefeller:
``The President and his advisors undertook a
relentless public campaign in the aftermath of the
attacks to use the war against al Qaeda as a
justification for overthrowing Saddam Hussein.
Representing to the American people that the two had an
operational partnership and posed a single,
indistinguishable threat was fundamentally misleading
and led the Nation to war on false premises.'' Senator
Rockefeller.
Richard Clarke, a National Security Advisor, in a
memo of September 18, 2001, titled ``Survey of
Intelligence Information on Any Iraq Involvement in the
September 11 Attacks'' found no ``compelling case''
that Iraq had either planned or perpetrated the
attacks, and that there was no confirmed reporting on
Saddam cooperating with bin Laden on unconventional
weapons.
On September 17, 2003, President Bush said: ``No,
we've got no evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved
with September 11. What the Vice President said was is
that he (Saddam) has been involved with al Qaeda.''
On June 16, 2004, a staff report from the 9/11
Commission stated: ``There have been reports that
contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda also occurred after
bin Laden had returned to Afghanistan in 1996, but they
do not appear to have resulted in a collaborative
relationship. Two senior bin Laden associates have
adamantly denied that any ties existed between al Qaeda
and Iraq. We have no credible evidence that Iraq and al
Qaeda cooperated on attacks against the United
States.''
``Intelligence provided by former Undersecretary of
Defense Douglas J. Feith to buttress the White House
case for invading Iraq included `reporting of dubious
quality or reliability' that supported the political
views of senior administration officials rather than
the conclusions of the intelligence community, this
according to a report by the Pentagon Inspector
General.
``Feith's office `was predisposed to finding a
significant relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda,'
according to portions of the report released by Senator
Carl Levin. The Inspector General described Feith's
activities as `an alternative intelligence assessment
process.''' The source of this information is a report
in the Washington Post dated February 9, 2007, page A-
1, an article by Walter Pincus and Jeffrey Smith
entitled ``Official's Key Report on Iraq is Faulted,
`Dubious' Intelligence Fueled Push for War.''
6. Iraq possessed no weapons of mass destruction to
transfer to anyone.
Iraq possessed no weapons of mass destruction to
transfer. Furthermore, available intelligence
information found that the Iraq regime would probably
only transfer weapons of mass destruction to terrorist
organizations if under threat of attack by the United
States.
According to information in the October 2002
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq that was
available to the administration at the time that they
were seeking congressional support for the
authorization of use of force against Iraq, the Iraq
regime would probably only transfer weapons to a
terrorist organization if ``sufficiently desperate''
because it feared that ``an attack that threatened the
survival of the regime were imminent or unavoidable.''
``The Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) probably has
been directed to conduct clandestine attacks against
the United States and Allied interests in the Middle
East in the event the United States takes action
against Iraq. The IIS probably would be the primary
means by which Iraq would attempt to conduct any
chemical and biological weapon attacks on the U.S.
homeland, although we have no specific intelligence
information that Saddam's regime has directed attacks
against U.S. territory.''
7. Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction and therefore
had no capability of launching a surprise attack against the
United States or its Armed Forces and no capability to provide
them to international terrorists who would do so.
Iraq possessed no weapons of mass destruction to
transfer. Furthermore, available intelligence
information found that the Iraq regime would probably
only transfer weapons of mass destruction to terrorist
organizations if under severe threat of attack by the
United States.
According to information in the October 2002
National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq that was
available to the administration at the time they were
seeking congressional support for the authorization of
the use of force against Iraq, the Iraqi regime would
probably only transfer weapons to a terrorist
organization if ``sufficiently desperate'' because it
feared that ``an attack that threatened the survival of
the regime were imminent or unavoidable.'' That, again,
from the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on
Iraq.
``The Iraqi Intelligence Service probably has been
directed to conduct clandestine attacks against U.S.
and Allied interests in the Middle East in the event
the United States takes action against Iraq. The Iraq
Intelligence Service probably would be the primary
means by which Iraq would attempt to conduct any
chemical or biological weapons attacks on the U.S.
homeland, although we have no specific intelligence
information that Saddam's regime has directed attacks
against U.S. territory.''
As reported in the Washington Post on March 1,
2003, in 1995, Saddam Hussein's son-in-law, Hussein
Kamel, had informed U.S. and British intelligence
officers that ``all weapons--biological, chemical,
missile, nuclear--were destroyed.'' That from the
Washington Post, March 1, 2003, page A15, an article
entitled ``Iraqi Defector Claimed Arms Were Destroyed
By 1995,'' by Colum Lynch.
The Defense Intelligence Agency, in a report called
``Iraq--Key WMD Facilities--An Operational Report
Study'' in September 2002, said this:
``A substantial amount of Iraq's chemical warfare
agents, precursors, munitions and production equipment
were destroyed between 1991 and 1998 as a result of
Operation Desert Storm and United Nations Special
Commission (UNSCOM) actions. There is no reliable
information on whether Iraq is producing and
stockpiling chemical weapons or whether Iraq has or
will establish its chemical warfare agent production
facilities.''
8. There was not a real risk of an ``extreme magnitude of
harm that would result to the United States and its citizens
from such an attack'' because Iraq had no capability of
attacking the United States.
Here's what Colin Powell said at the time:
``Containment has been a successful policy, and I think
we should make sure that we continue it until such time
as Saddam Hussein comes into compliance with the
agreements he made at the end of the Gulf War.''
Speaking of Iraq, Secretary of State Powell said,
``Iraq is not threatening America.''
9. The aforementioned evidence did not ``justify the use of
force by the United States to defend itself'' because Iraq did
not have weapons of mass destruction, or have the intention or
capability of using nonexistent WMDs against the United States.
10. Since there was no threat posed by Iraq to the United
States, the enactment clause of the Senate Joint Resolution 45
was predicated on misstatements to Congress.
Congress relied on the information provided to it by the President
of the United States. Congress provided the President with the
authorization to use military force that he requested. As a consequence
of the fraudulent representations made to Congress, the United States
Armed Forces, under the direction of George Bush as Commander in Chief,
pursuant to section 3 of the Authorization for the Use of Force which
President Bush requested, invaded Iraq and occupies it to this day, at
the cost of 4,116 lives of servicemen and -women, injuries to over
30,000 of our troops, the deaths of over 1 million innocent Iraqi
civilians, the destruction of Iraq, and a long-term cost of over $3
trillion.
President Bush's misrepresentations to Congress to induce passage
of a use of force resolution is subversive of the constitutional system
of checks and balances, destructive of Congress's sole prerogative to
declare war under article I, section 8 of the Constitution, and is
therefore a High Crime. An even greater offense by the President of the
United States occurs in his capacity as Commander in Chief, because he
knowingly placed the men and women of the United States Armed Forces in
harm's way, jeopardizing their lives and their families' future, for
reasons that to this date have not been established in fact.
In all of these actions and decisions, President George W. Bush has
acted in a manner contrary to his trust as President and Commander in
Chief, and subversive of constitutional government, to the prejudice of
the cause of law and justice and to the manifest injury of the people
of the United States and of those members of the Armed Forces who put
their lives on the line pursuant to the falsehoods of the President.
Wherefore, President George W. Bush, by such conduct, is guilty of
an impeachable offense warranting removal from office.
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